@Fairbanks,
Cause is not a simple idea and refers to the flow of time. If time flows one direction cause is mechanical and if the other it is intelligent. These define the two kinds of cause. They are both temporal and therefore of the same nature and ultimately are each other. The possible third kind of cause, stochastic, would not be referred to the direction of flow of time and might be a feature of Derrida's general text. -Fairbanks
First, I would say that
cause has no meaning, exept as it refers to the passage of time. In that sense, I can't see any more simple idea, as time/change stands alone and cannot be defined any further, nor is there anything whih does not presupose this idea. My objetion to causality is not founded on an attempt to refute that time passes; that would be absurd. I object to the notion that a subsequent phenomenon is the product of the preceeding phenomenon; the relation between the former and the latter phenomena in any series of phenomena is imaginary; i.e., there could be a relation, but there is no reason to beleive so. That A is followed by B is indeed a fact; that A
causes B is an assumption; what even is a cause? There is no reason to assume that A has motive power. The critic of this view of mine would say that the force of A effects B, whcih process is called causation. I would say to that critic that force is imaginary, albeit very useful for describing the funtioning of some phenomena; no one has ever sensed a force, a force cannot be described except by its results; i.e., by the actual phenomena A and B. Therefore, I use sequentiality instead of causality (in philosophial coversations only of course, I have no desire to change the language); the result is the same, but there is no unfounded assumption of motive force or positing of homoniculi within phenomena. This problem of inserting motive fore in nature is related to the arbitrary division of the world into subject and object; the world is not allowed to stand on its own; it is divided into that which observes and that which is observed, or that which acts and that which is acted upon.
As I said in the first sentence above, causality (or sequentiality) has no meaning except as a symbol for the passage of time. Speaking of intelligence as another kind of causality, non-mechanical causality, has the same problem; there is no reason to assume that one thought causes another thought, only that one
follows another. The notion that our ideas, our intentions and other mental activities are immune from the law of causality that we assume for the external world is nothing but a vain attempt to maintain our erroneous assumption that there is such a thing as free will, and that we posses it.
However, we do have a feeling of free will, which is simply a lak of understanding, a lack of ability to foresee a future which will be one way and will not be any other. Fortunately, for those who do not want to know the future, myself included, that lack of understanding is necessarily insurmountable, because our understanding itself is a part of the world, whih affects the world. Therefore, if we were to somehow make the infinite calculations neccessary to determine the course of the future, it would immiedtly be altered by that very knowledge. Of course, such calculations are not only pratically, enormously unlikely, but actually impossible, because of the infinity of organization of the world from both ends of the spectrum of complexity, macro and microscopic.
I am just beginning to read Henri Bergson who deals with free will extensively I am told. I already disagree with his assumption of duality in the world, but his thoughts on what you call mechanical and non-mechanical causality are interesting. He holds that quantity is temporal, extistant is memory, while quality is non-temporal, existing in the present. Mechanism ivolves objets, which are generalized, quantitative; beause non-mechanical, present events are unique and cannot be quantified, they appear to have no mechanism, they are except from causality. This was already my view essentially, except that I would place the mechanistic world entirely within the conciousness of the individual. while Bergson gives it some reality of his own. Note: Henri, and any of his better versed disciples here, will have to forgive me if I have misinterpreted him; I just began Matter and Memory and my understanding is probably pretty superficial. Nonetheless, the above ideas are relevant, whether or not they contain elements of my owm that i've accidentally injected into Bergsonism.