knowledge is merely one of faith's children

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

Not sure I follow the God part ...

... poetic license Wink

... given the choice between believing that a) there is no external reality and instead I have this inconceivably smart and manipulative subconscious ("God") that invents everything and then spoon feeds it to my relatively moronic conscious, throwing in a surprise now and then to keep my conscious guessing, and b) that there is an external reality full of surprises to be discovered, I choose "b" ... but that's getting ahead of ourselves ...

Dichanthelium wrote:

... though, I suppose one might argue that I have to have developed a concept of myself as a sentient being before I can make that statement. There is another problem. It's quite possible that the "I" is already full of pre-suppositions of what it means to be an "I" by the time he or she addresses the thought, "I trust that I experience."

... could we whittle things down even further?: "Something experiences"? ...

@Theaetetus,

Theaetetus wrote:

I don't trust that I experience, I just am. I exist as far as I can tell, according to my senses and logic. Why would I trust my experience? Am I worried that I am insane and my perceptions may not be right? I think you are making this more complicated than it is.

... trusting that your experience is in some sense "right" is one thing - trusting that you experience at all is quite another ... how about if we rephrase this as "I just experience" - does that work for you? ...

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

So, how about this: "I know" means nothing else except, "I am familiar with something or I believe something to be true."

... works for me ... in which case, knowledge falls into one of two categories: familiarity or belief ...

Familiarity: I know I am seeing an alien on TV.
Belief: I know that the alien I am seeing on TV is a computer-generated image.

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... could we whittle things down even further?: "Something experiences"? ...

That's better! But does that mean...

"I don't know what I am, but I hear, see, feel, etc. Things are are happing to me and around me. I have both pleasant and unpleasant sensations."

Basically, I am imagining the state of mind of an infant.

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

That's better! But does that mean...

"I don't know what I am, but I hear, see, feel, etc. Things are are happing to me and around me. I have both pleasant and unpleasant sensations."

Basically, I am imagining the state of mind of an infant.

... not quite what I was shooting for (I was trying to get rid of the "I"s), but it's good enough for me if it's good enough for you Smile

... anyhoo, to cut to the chase, it's looking to me like the border between self-evident knowledge (familiarity) and knowledge that requires some degree of belief is going to be the border between experience and the assertion that experience in any way corresponds to something ... that is, to say that "I am seeing an alien on TV" is self-evident knowledge so long as we confine ourselves to interpreting these words as a mere description of experience ... but the moment we start asserting that "TV" corresponds to the subconscious phenomenally presenting the conscious with the "idea" of "TV", or asserting that "TV" corresponds to a phenomenal projection of an objective reality, then we've entered into the realm of belief ...

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... not quite what I was shooting for (I was trying to get rid of the "I"s), but it's good enough for me if it's good enough for you ... anyhoo, to cut to the chase, it's looking to me like the border between self-evident knowledge (familiarity) and knowledge that requires some degree of belief is going to be the border between experience and the assertion that experience in any way corresponds to something ... that is, to say that "I am seeing an alien on TV" is self-evident knowledge so long as we confine ourselves to interpreting these words as a mere description of experience ... but the moment we start asserting that "TV" corresponds to the subconscious phenomenally presenting the conscious with the "idea" of "TV", or asserting that "TV" corresponds to a phenomenal projection of an objective reality, then we've entered into the realm of belief ...

Actually, we are on two different tracks. I was thinking that any possibility of self-evident knowing would have to be restricted to primitive self awareness--awareness of self purely as a center of concsciousness. I know that "I am" because stuff is happening to me and around me. Any more sophisticated knowing, such as the development of mental constructs and knowing that I get via a teaching process, requires that I trust my senses and my reasoning and my teachers.

The other distinction I was trying to draw had to do with two different kinds of knowing. (1) I am familiar with, maybe even intimate with, somebody or something. (2) I believe in the veracity of some factual claim, like the moon is made of cheese.

Both of these require that I trust my sensory perceptions and reasoning powers.

@Dichanthelium,

In any case, we were trying not to lose your line of thought.

"I trust that I experience." Let's assume that we agree this is a self-evident truth. I cannot doubt it. It cannot possibly be false. Yes?

The next step was voluntary experience, no? Is that the same as saying "I experience willful action?" "I experience my own will?"

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

I know that "I am" because stuff is happening to me and around me.

... but where does the notion of "around" first come from - isn't that an assertion that certain elements of experience correspond to something external? (and you might get an argument on that point from some of the folks on this forum! Wink

) ...

Dichanthelium wrote:

Any more sophisticated knowing, such as the development of mental constructs ... requires that I trust my senses and my reasoning

... but does a daydream require trust in senses and in reasoning? ... do I need to trust in my senses and my reasoning in order to invent a work of fiction? ...

Dichanthelium wrote:

The other distinction I was trying to draw had to do with two different kinds of knowing. (1) I am familiar with, maybe even intimate with, somebody or something. (2) I believe in the veracity of some factual claim, like the moon is made of cheese.

... can I ask what the import of such a distinction is? ...

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

The next step was voluntary experience, no? Is that the same as saying "I experience willful action?" "I experience my own will?"

... both voluntary and involuntary ... voluntary experience (say, a daydream) points at nothing - it simply is as I imagine it to be ... involuntary experience (say, a nightmare or the fleeting glimpse of a mountain lion) is surprising and denies my own invention ... it implies something "other" ("Where the heck did that come from?!"), but not necessarily - I can also imagine a subconscious as a cause for involuntary experience ... how do I decide which is the cause? ... that can get pretty complex ... (my wife always surprises me, so I believe her to be "other" Wink

; when we catch a glimpse of the mountain lion, my wife screams "run"! and so I believe the mountain lion to be "other"; but when my wife wakes me up and tells me I've been having a bad dream I believe the nightmare to be my own subconscious creation) ... bottom line though, it seems that the border between voluntary experience and involuntary experience may be another manifestation of the border between self-evident knowledge and knowledge that requires some degree of belief ...

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... but where does the notion of "around" first come from - isn't that an assertion that certain elements of experience correspond to something external? ...

Yes, good point. But it occurs to me that it might be possible for humans to have some innate knowledge that would account for that. Something akin to instinct. How do we deal with this?

paulhanke wrote:

... but does a daydream require trust in senses and in reasoning? ... do I need to trust in my senses and my reasoning in order to invent a work of fiction? ...

Well, if by "daydream" you mean an exercise of the imagination, does that put it in the same category as inventing a work of fiction? Or are you calling attention to two different things? If I "use my imagination" or "do something creative," I might be able to account for such activities as a very complex form of reasoning involving free association. Certainly, if I write a work of fiction, I have to string together a lot of concepts and facts that I share in common with the people who speak my language, so it would be hard for me to say that I am not ultimately trusting sense perception and reasoning powers for each individual concept and fact that I employ as part of the story.

paulhanke wrote:

... can I ask what the import of such a distinction is? ...

The distinction I am proposing between knowing as in "being familiar with" and knowing as in "giving mental assent to a proposition" is hard to define, because "being familiar with" may, arguably, consist of an accumulation of individual "assents to propositions." However, "being familiar with" strikes me as having a significantly different quality. Maybe it goes beyond an accumulation of assent to lots of individual propositions.

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... voluntary experience (say, a daydream) points at nothing - it simply is as I imagine it to be ... involuntary experience (say, a nightmare or the fleeting glimpse of a mountain lion) is surprising and denies my own invention ... it implies something "other" ...

... it seems that the border between voluntary experience and involuntary experience may be another manifestation of the border between self-evident knowledge and knowledge that requires some degree of belief ...

I'll wait to see how you define "voluntary experience." It seems to me that you are using it in the sense of "creative thinking," possibly not distinct from "imagination." Such activities would seem to be a function of the mind that involves both knowing and willing. I have to know something before I can exercise my will to create an imaginary situation involving that thing, don't I? That doesn't strike me as having anthing to do with "self-evident" truth or knowing.

@Dichanthelium,

If I'm reading the Bhagavad-Gita correctly, what Krishna seems to be saying is that faith is the act of sacrificing to a god (in the end, all gods wind up being him), and that, in Krishna's eyes, knowledge is the best way to effect this sacrifice. In fact, in Sanskrit, "knowledge" (jnana) and "sacrifice" (yajna) come from the same root (jna, "to know"). That is, according to the Gita, the best way to effect homage to Krishna (and by extension, your local god) is to improve your knowledge and rationality: a very different conclusion than what winds up being the answers in the Bible!

@hammersklavier,

hammersklavier wrote:

If I'm reading the Bhagavad-Gita correctly, what Krishna seems to be saying is that faith is the act of sacrificing to a god (in the end, all gods wind up being him), and that, in Krishna's eyes, knowledge is the best way to effect this sacrifice. In fact, in Sanskrit, "knowledge" (jnana) and "sacrifice" (yajna) come from the same root (jna, "to know"). That is, according to the Gita, the best way to effect homage to Krishna (and by extension, your local god) is to improve your knowledge and rationality: a very different conclusion than what winds up being the answers in the Bible!

That's a new twist! I'm convinced (trusting my reasoning powers) that there is a necessary relationship between knowing and faith (in the generic sense of "trust" or "believing"). And I'm still inclined to think that, perhaps with the exception of the most primitive forms of knowledge (thank you paulhanke!), whatever I know is a product of my faith/ trust/ belief in something or somebody.

But the concept of sacrifice is a whole new angle to me. I normally think of sacrifice as giving up (usually reluctantly) something valuable in order to receive something else that is presumed to be more valuable. I can see where faith might lead one to sacrifice something, but I don't understand how "faith is the act of sacrificing to a god." Can you elaborate or give an example?

Then, also, I'm curious as to why you think there is a major dichotomy between whatever the Bhagavad-Gita is saying and "what winds up being the answers in the Bible."

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

Yes, good point. But it occurs to me that it might be possible for humans to have some innate knowledge that would account for that. Something akin to instinct. How do we deal with this?

... also a good point ... so is there such a thing as "species knowledge"? ... that is, can a species "learn"? ...

Dichanthelium wrote:

Well, if by "daydream" you mean an exercise of the imagination, does that put it in the same category as inventing a work of fiction? Or are you calling attention to two different things?

... yes ... I'm wondering if to say that "I trust my senses and my reasoning" is too inclusive and should just be "I trust in my senses" ... that is, aren't the experiential products of reason "self-evident"? ... the "trust" problem only arises once you try to assert that the experience of reason in any way corresponds to something (as is the case with any experience) ...

Dichanthelium wrote:

Certainly, if I write a work of fiction, I have to string together a lot of concepts and facts that I share in common with the people who speak my language, so it would be hard for me to say that I am not ultimately trusting sense perception and reasoning powers for each individual concept and fact that I employ as part of the story.

... but if we're dealing strictly with the logic of this situation, then the experience of drawing something from memory and applying it to a work of fiction does not logically require trust in any sense perception nor even in memory itself - we're just inventing something new from a pile of raw materials we found laying around ...

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

I have to know something before I can exercise my will to create an imaginary situation involving that thing, don't I? That doesn't strike me as having anthing to do with "self-evident" truth or knowing.

... delegating to the previous post the discussion of whether or not you have to "know" anything before you can invent (see blathering about "we're just inventing something new from a pile of raw materials we found laying around"), once you have invented something new, is not the thing imagined "self-evident"?

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... so is there such a thing as "species knowledge"? ... that is, can a species "learn"?...

Evidently there are some innate behaviors, that would seem to require knowledge, all of which might more properly be termed, in accordance with our current prevailing understanding of biology, "adaptations."

Also, I think we know (= we have faith in the prevailing opinions of experts in their respective fields, because we have faith in their expertise and their demonstrations that ostensibly confirm their opinions) that we are "hard wired" for certain mental activities, such as language. Such "hard wiring" may just be another kind of adapation, I guess.

Whatever we may want to do with those categories, I would be content to say that, if there is anything that we might be inclined to call "innate knowledge," it would appear to be very primitive.

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... I'm wondering if to say that "I trust my senses and my reasoning" is too inclusive and should just be "I trust in my senses" ... that is, aren't the experiential products of reason "self-evident"? ... the "trust" problem only arises once you try to assert that the experience of reason in any way corresponds to something (as is the case with any experience)...

I'm a little lost... How can the experience of reason not correspond to something?

I think of the expression, "self evident" as applying to some proposition of truth. In other words, one might argue (as I recall Theaetetus may have offered) that the claim, "I exist" or "I am" is a self evident truth. On that view, it requires no confirmation, no proof.

I don't understand how we could say that the products of reason are self evident. For example, if I look out the window and observe ice on the ground, I reflect for a moment (reason) and declare, "It is cold outside." If someone asks, "How do you know?" I can offer as confirmation both my sensory experience (I saw ice) and my reasoning (ice does not form unless temperatures fall below freezing). My reasoning (not to mention my sensory experience) could very easily be faulty. Maybe it was cold yesterday, but it's warm today, and yesterday's ice hasn't thawed yet.

So I am still stuck on the idea that my claim to know something depends on my trust in my reasoning process (which may or may not be reliable). I'm assuming this is true whether or not I am fully in charge of that process. I can make myself sit down and work out a math problem ("the answer is 43.12"), or I might be half asleep, and a thought might occur to me "out of the blue" ("Hey, I should run for city council").

The former requires that I exercise my will. The latter is apparently a subconscious function of the brain. In either case, though, if I run with the conclusion (assume that I know something) that knowing depends on my trust in the reasoning process that yielded the conclusion.

@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... but if we're dealing strictly with the logic of this situation, then the experience of drawing something from memory and applying it to a work of fiction does not logically require trust in any sense perception nor even in memory itself - we're just inventing something new from a pile of raw materials we found laying around ...

I get the "new" part, but what exactly is that pile of raw materials?

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

I'm a little lost... How can the experience of reason not correspond to something?

... what is experience and reason to a hard-core solipsist? ... for a hard-core solipsist, all experience is self-evident because experience does not correspond to an external reality - it's just in the mind ... and thus reason grounded in experience is also self-evident (there is nothing to which it corresponds, either) ... admittedly, this is an extreme case, but extreme cases are often where we find interesting things about ourselves Smile

...

Dichanthelium wrote:

So I am still stuck on the idea that my claim to know something depends on my trust in my reasoning process (which may or may not be reliable).

... in which case perhaps a dive into the extremes of the human psyche is unnecessary ... that is, if we're only investigating the consequences of some form of realism here, delving into idealism is probably superfluous ... and in that sense, when you say "know something" is that shorthand for "know something about the external world"? ...

@Dichanthelium,

Dichanthelium wrote:

I get the "new" part, but what exactly is that pile of raw materials?

... it's just a solipsist interpretation of experience ... new ideas can be reasoned from existing ideas, but at the end of the day they are all just ideas ...

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