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... I don't think we're talking about mutually exclusive categories here - but rather categorical networks ...
Yes. Informed and supported faith, which, in English, is usually called, "belief" because faith is unsupported and uninformed belief. All faith is belief, but not all belief is faith. See the difference?
Now, of course, when I apply that to actual objects in "the world," I am immediately thrust back to trust in my senses: "I see one apple. Now I see another apple. Therefore, I now see two apples."
... not to mention mereological choices ... yes, one milliliter of water plus one milliliter of water equals two centiliters of water ... but what does one drop of water plus one drop of water equal?... here, it seems to require a non-intuitive choice of "object" ("milliliter" instead of "drop") in order to make simple arithmetic "true" of experience.
As far as things you can "just know" - how about the knowledge that sticking your hand into a fire and grasping a red-hot coal will cause you great pain? ... this would seem to circumvent your problem with having to trust in your senses because it is a truth of the senses.
Okay, so do we need to specify what "realm" of knowledge we are swimming around in before we can make any sense of what we call knowledge? Does "knowledge" mean different things in different contexts? I was trying to delimit one meaning of knowledge by specifying "my knowledge." For example, "Whenever I say, I know something, I always mean that I trust something or somebody."
Okay, so do we need to specify what "realm" of knowledge we are swimming around in before we can make any sense of what we call knowledge?
... maybe ... but maybe not ... let's start at a "ground zero" of sorts and see where it leads ... "I trust that I experience." ... can you doubt this? ... I can't ... so this is "self-evident" knowledge ... let's keep going ... "I trust that I experience both voluntarily and involuntarily. Voluntary experience I can control and so I call 'imagination'; involuntary experience I can interact with and I just call 'experience'." ... can you doubt this? ... again, I can't ... your turn
But people may experience palm trees and cool water, and it may just be a mirage in the desert. They may not be able to doubt that they are experiencing an oasis, but it still turns out to be a mirage. So the fact that you cannot doubt something shows nothing except that you are unable to doubt what you should doubt.
... hey! - you skipped a bunch of steps! ... no fair!!!... anyhoo, we would have eventually gotten there ... there's only so much "ground truth" before you begin postulating things such as "other" and "reality" ... as you point out, these things can easily be doubted ... and doubt is the point at which "ground truth" ends and "belief" begins, yes? ...
I don't understand what you are getting at. We can certainly doubt our experiences, as the example I just gave you proves.
... we need a postulate of an objective order of mind-independent reality for at least six important reasons:
1. To preserve the distinction between true and false with respect to factual matters and to operate the idea of truth as agreement with reality
2. To preserve the distinction between appearance and reality, between our picture of reality and reality itself
3. To serve as a basis for intersubjective communication
4. To furnish the basis for a shared project of communal inquiry
5. To provide for the fallibalistic view of human knowledge
6. To sustain the causal mode of learning and inquiry and to serve as a basis for the objectivity of experience
You do? But you can trust someone and be wrong because he is mistaken, or he is lying to you. But can you know something and be wrong? I don't think so. So, "I know" cannot mean that you trust someone. You may claim to know because you trust someone. But that can be a very weak reason for claiming to know because you are trusting the wrong person. And if people know that when you claim to know, all you mean is that you trust someone, it will not be long before they cease to trust you as a reliable source of knowledge.
... we cannot doubt that we experience ... on the other hand, we can doubt that our experience corresponds to something ... thus, the knowledge that we experience is not based in belief, whereas the knowledge of what our experience corresponds to is based in belief ... as Nicholas Rescher points out:
(from Process Philosophy: A Survey of Basic Issues)
In other words, just to communicate with others, we must first believe in an external reality ... and thus in order to do science, we must first believe in an external reality (science is not science if we do not communicate our experimental results to others for independent corroboration!) ... science can give us powerful reasons for believing one thing about this external reality as opposed to believing something else - but at the end of the day just about everything we call "knowledge" sits atop a foundation of belief.
I have sometimes thought that I experienced something when, it turns out that I never had that experience.
Yes, you keep insisting that is true even while I point out that our beliefs are often confirmed by sense-knowledge and logic, so that they are not just faith, which apparently is what you think they are. You really should distinguish between "faith" and "belief", since you systematically confuse them.
... when we started from "ground zero" we were limiting our scope to the immediate present,
The same thing can happen in the immediate present.
... actually, I have no problem with such a distinction ... belief in an external reality that is often predictable yet occasionally surprising; belief that my memory is a reasonably accurate representation of my past experiences; and so on ... these are all beliefs that are firmly grounded in induction ... I see a teacup and decide to take a sip - and for the most part this works (with a remote chance that I am careless and spill, or my wife beats me to it and I go wanting) ... likewise, I see a face that I remember and call the remembered name I associate with that face and (again, for the most part) receive a smile in return ... the consistency of these things (as well as the occasional inconsistency!) is what leads me to certain beliefs about them ... science is the formalization and socialization of this instinctive procedure ... on the other hand, religious faith is a whole 'nother story entirely!
I don't think I understand what you are getting at in your final paragraph. My point (to repeat) is that although all faith is belief, not all belief is faith. And what you call "religious faith" is not something all those who have it maintain without supporting reasons (although some do). But I did not think that this discussion was confined to religious faith anyway. I thought the view being expressed was that all knowledge "rests" on faith. And that seems to me clearly false.
... maybe ... but maybe not ... let's start at a "ground zero" of sorts and see where it leads ... "I trust that I experience." ... can you doubt this? ... I can't ... so this is "self-evident" knowledge ... let's keep going ... "I trust that I experience both voluntarily and involuntarily. Voluntary experience I can control and so I call 'imagination'; involuntary experience I can interact with and I just call 'experience'." ... can you doubt this? ... again, I can't ... your turn
Is this the same as saying:
"I assume I exist, and I assume the world exists, and I assume that I am experiencing the phenomena of the world via my senses."
... nope - that's making assumptive leaps that that can only be derived from the initial statement "I trust that I experience" plus the content of that experience ... for example:
I trust that I experience and certain elements of that experience surprise me - so either I have a subconscious that can invent things that surprise me, or else there is an external reality through which I move and discover surprising things ... now, if I had a subconscious that could invent things that surprise me, here's what it would have to be capable of inventing:
...
This incredible subconscious is all seeing all knowing all powerful - a creator God ... so applying Occam's Razor, I choose to believe that there is an external reality through which I move and discover surprising things.
"I trust that I experience" is a reasonable place to start, though, I suppose one might argue that I have to have developed a concept of myself as a sentient being before I can make that statement. There is another problem. It's quite possible that the "I" is already full of pre-suppositions of what it means to be an "I" by the time he or she addresses the thought, "I trust that I experience." Then there is the problem of the definition of "trust" and "experience." Tedious, perhaps, but if we are going to agree on a starting point, it may be necessary.
I don't trust that I experience, I just am. I exist as far as I can tell, according to my senses and logic. Why would I trust my experience? Am I worried that I am insane and my perceptions may not be right? I think you are making this more complicated than it is.