@ughaibu,
ughaibu;157484 wrote:However, these three maintain that numbers exist, regardless of the fact that they meet the criteria for non-existence met by fictional objects. Which position is "justified" by an obviously circular argument, illucid nonsense exhibit two.
Yes. Consider the following dialogue:
A: Why do you say that numbers exist but fictional characters do not?
B: Because numbers have properties (like being greater or lesser than other numbers), whereas fictional characters have no properties.
A: But why do you say that fictional characters have no properties? Doesn't Sherlock Holmes have the property of being a detective?
B: No, Sherlock Holmes has no properties, because he does not exist. Numbers do exist. That's the difference.
A: But why do you say that numbers exist but fictional characters do not?
Clearly, B's argument is circular. He is arguing that fictional characters are non-existent
because they have no properties, and that they have no properties
because they are non-existent. Similarly for numbers, but in the affirmative. His explanation of the difference between numbers and fictional characters begs the question.
If you assume from the outset that numbers exist, you can "prove" that they have properties. And if you assume from the outset that they have properties, you can "prove" that they exist. But you can make exactly the same assumptions and "proofs" for fictional characters. So why would you be wrong to do so? (No question-begging, please.)
One further question. Are ideas, and their contents, objects? If so, why cannot a fictional character be
the content of an idea of a particular set of properties, and therefore exist? Such an idea could be shared between different people, and represented in literature, art and drama. It would then make sense to say that it is represented correctly or incorrectly, according to whether the representation corresponds properly with the established idea.
---------- Post added 04-28-2010 at 02:26 PM ----------
kennethamy;157489 wrote:What I think is that unless what would be a concrete object if it existed, exists concretely, it would not exist.
And I see no reason to think this.