numbers vs. words

@fast,

fast;157106 wrote:

You can't literally take your finger and point to Rudolph, so although you can point out, you can't point to. Referring terms don't point out. They point to. Well, they 'try'.

We can refer to things that we can point to with a finger. That does not entail that we cannot refer to things that we cannot point to with a finger.

The definition for 'to refer' is not: to point to some thing with your finger.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;157057 wrote:

"Talking about X" does not imply that X exists

If I am talking about Santa, then Santa is what I am talking about. Therefore, Santa has the property of "being that which I am talking about". So, if to have a property is to exist, Santa exists.

@Ahab,

[QUOTE=Ahab;157125]If there were no point in differentiating between Santa and Rudolph then why give them separate names? Why attribute different properties to them?[/QUOTE]We don't differentiate between Santa and Rudolph. You say we do, but we don't. What we differentiate between are characters. We only attribute properties to things that exist; at least, we shouldn't attribute properties to things unless those things exist.

Attributing properties to X is akin to saying that X has properties. What we say is important, but it's better when what we say is true. When you attribute properties to Santa, you're saying that Santa has properties, but that you say it's so doesn't make it so.

I feel like we're going in a big circle. Underlying this mess isn't a single confusion. Interesting trip though.

---------- Post added 04-27-2010 at 12:55 PM ----------

Ahab;157129 wrote:

We can refer to things that we can point to with a finger. That does not entail that we cannot refer to things that we cannot point to with a finger.

The definition for 'to refer' is not: to point to some thing with your finger.

Yes, I know that. For example, the numeral three is a referring term, and it refers to the number three. We can't point to the number three with our finger, but then again, it's abstract, so we wouldn't expect to be able to.

We're dealing with what would be a concrete object if Santa existed ... just like a person that doesn't exist could be pointed to with a finger if that person that doesn't exist did exist.

@Ahab,

Ahab;157129 wrote:

We can refer to things that we can point to with a finger. That does not entail that we cannot refer to things that we cannot point to with a finger.

The definition for 'to refer' is not: to point to some thing with your finger.

Of course it does not entail it. It would be to commit a formal fallacy (denying the antecedent) to believe so. But even if it does not entail it, that does not mean it is not true. To think so would be to commit a different fallacy.

No one said that the definition of "refer" was, to point to something with your finger. "To point" here, is a metaphor. We are talking about indication. And it is impossible to indicate what does not exist.

@ACB,

edited out

............

@ACB,

ACB;157139 wrote:

If I am talking about Santa, then Santa is what I am talking about. Therefore, Santa has the property of "being that which I am talking about". So, if to have a property is to exist, Santa exists.

Yes. We have to be careful about the notion of property. Suppose that I believe that Santa exists. Can we infer from that, that Santa exists? (That would be a quick way of proving that God exists, wouldn't it?) Being talked about, like, being believed are intensional properties (notice the 's' in "intension") and they are very peculiar properties, if they are at all. But that is a good point, and needs discussing, not dismissing.

@fast,

fast;157144 wrote:

We don't differentiate between Santa and Rudolph. You say we do, but we don't. What we differentiate between are characters. We only attribute properties to things that exist; at least, we shouldn't attribute properties to things unless those things exist.

You haven't accounted for why the fictional characters are depicted differently.

The character is a representation of an imaginary being. If we are differentiating between the characters, we are, in effect, differentiating between the imaginary beings that are depicted in a work of fiction.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;157158 wrote:

Yes. We have to be careful about the notion of property. Suppose that I believe that Santa exists. Can we infer from that, that Santa exists? (That would be a quick way of proving that God exists, wouldn't it?) Being talked about, like, being believed are intensional properties (notice the 's' in "intension") and they are very peculiar properties, if they are at all. But that is a good point, and needs discussing, not dismissing.

I agree, but this can be a sticky situation because natural languages often imply some things exist which we want to exist, while also implying that some things exist which we don't want to exist. For instance, all of the following are logially valid.

Obama is president.
That Obama is president is true
So there is somethng, a proposition, namely, that Obama is president, and that proposition is true.

Fido is a dog.
There exists something that is a dog.

Santa wears boots.
There exists something that wears boots.

Fido is a dog.
Fido has the property of being a dog.
So there exists a property Fido has, namely, doghood.

Santa is fat.
So Santa has the property of being fat.
So there exists a property Santa has, namely, fathood.

@Ahab,

[QUOTE=Ahab;157165]You haven't accounted for why the fictional characters are depicted differently.[/QUOTE]First, let's drop the "fictional character" talk. It leads to yet another problem we can avoid, so if you don't mind, I'll change what you said to, "You haven't accounted for why [characters in fiction] are depicted differently."

I hold that X is either A) non-existent or B) existent, and if X is B, then X is either B1) concrete or B2) abstract, so X is either A, B1, or B2.

When I talk about Santa, I am talking about something that is A (non existent). When I talk about the corresponding character in fiction, I am talking about something that is B1 (a concrete existent). We can't literally touch a character in fiction, but because they were created by their creators, they do exist in time, and because they exist in time, they are not abstract, and like I said, if X is B, then it's either B1 or B2, and since it's not B2, it's B1.

Recap:
1) Santa (A): does not exist (no properties)
2) character in fiction (B1): does exist (does have properties)

Now to your question (statement?). You asked, "You haven't accounted for why [characters in fiction] are depicted differently." They are depicted different because they are different. They have different properties. If they didn't have different properties, people wouldn't notice the differences, but what's really important here is to understand what exactly it is that is being observed, which is not (A) but rather (B1).

(A) cannot be observed. Does that mean (A) doesn't exist? No. It just means
we aren't able to observe Santa, and we won't be observing Santa anytime soon, and I think you know why: it doesn't exist. That is because it does not exist.

Notice, I didn't say imaginary. I don't want you to think that Santa is an existing kind of thing that is imaginary because Santa is not a kind of thing at all. Recall: (A), or nonexistent. This may help: If X isn't imaginary, then X is real, but if X doesn't exist, then X is neither real nor imaginary. That should help. That should help a lot.

Remember: Things that do not exist do not have properties, and the mere fact that I'm talking about X isn't to say there is an X. The nature of our language gives off the impression that we are presupposing its existence, but that unfortunate fact has been reconciled, as I think most philosophers educated in the field accept (and rightfully so) that saying X does not exist doesn't imply that X exists. I'm certainly not presupposing the existence of Santa - real or otherwise.

---------- Post added 04-27-2010 at 02:07 PM ----------

Extrain;157172 wrote:

Santa is fat.
So Santa has the property of being fat.
So there exists a property Santa has, namely, fathood.

Santa is not fat, nor does Santa have the property of being fat.

@fast,

fast;157175 wrote:

First, let's drop the "fictional character" talk. It leads to yet another problem we can avoid, so if you don't mind, I'll change what you said to, "You haven't accounted for why [characters in fiction] are depicted differently."

I hold that X is either A) non-existent or B) existent, and if X is B, then X is either B1) concrete or B2) abstract, so X is either A, B1, or B2.

When I talk about Santa, I am talking about something that is A (non existent). When I talk about the corresponding character in fiction, I am talking about something that is B1 (a concrete existent). We can't literally touch a character in fiction, but because they were created by their creators, they do exist in time, and because they exist in time, they are not abstract, and like I said, if X is B, then it's either B1 or B2, and since it's not B2, it's B1.

Recap:
1) Santa (A): does not exist (no properties)
2) character in fiction (B1): does exist (does have properties)

Now to your question (statement?). You asked, "You haven't accounted for why [characters in fiction] are depicted differently." They are depicted different because they are different. They have different properties. If they didn't have different properties, people wouldn't notice the differences, but what's really important here is to understand what exactly it is that is being observed, which is not (A) but rather (B1).

(A) cannot be observed. Does that mean (A) doesn't exist? No. It just means
we aren't able to observe Santa, and we won't be observing Santa anytime soon, and I think you know why: it doesn't exist. That is because it does not exist.

Notice, I didn't say imaginary. I don't want you to think that Santa is an existing kind of thing that is imaginary because Santa is not a kind of thing at all. Recall: (A), or nonexistent. This may help: If X isn't imaginary, then X is real, but if X doesn't exist, then X is neither real nor imaginary. That should help. That should help a lot.

Remember: Things that do not exist do not have properties, and the mere fact that I'm talking about X isn't to say there is an X. The nature of our language gives off the impression that we are presupposing its existence, but that unfortunate fact has been reconciled, as I think most philosophers educated in the field accept (and rightfully so) that saying X does not exist doesn't imply that X exists. I'm certainly not presupposing the existence of Santa - real or otherwise.

---------- Post added 04-27-2010 at 02:07 PM ----------

Santa is not fat, nor does Santa have the property of being fat.

I agree the premise is false. But it doesn't matter. The argument is still logically valid. So the burden is on us to explain why "Fido is a dog, therefore there exists a dog" is valid, but "Santa is fat, therefore there exists a fat man" would be invalid. Saying it's because "Santa is not fat" is just arguing in a circle because it presupposes Santa exists! "Santa is not fat" cannot be true, either, if Santa does not exist.

And do you agree with the following sematic principle:?

For any given language where "Fa" is true, "Fa" is true in that langauge only if "a" refers to something existent.

So "Santa wears boots" is false not only in physical talk, but in fictional talk, too.

But somehow "Fido is a dog" is true in all languages, including fictional talk. The linguistic framework within which the proposition is mentioned doesn't affect the truth-value of that proposition. It makes no difference where you find that proposition expressed.

And why does "existence," "truth," and "property" take on different meanings in different forms of discourse? They clearly have the same meaning. If you say in fiction, "Santa really exists" you are still saying something false.

@fast,

---------- Post added 04-27-2010 at 01:27 PM ----------

If Santa is not real hardly I am real, once I cannot assert my own true nature to the bottom of what may be my essential characteristics and its ontic origins...

My sense of self ? ...is a construction in the brain, an epiphenomena...
Feeling my actual self ? ...We can do that in a computer also...
Being able to be recognised by others similar to me ? ...we can also create such a virtual artificial community of some sort of beings, probably very soon...there are already social games played by robots for instance...

So what is what ?

@fast,

fast;157175 wrote:

Recap:
1) Santa (A): does not exist (no properties)
2) character in fiction (B1): does exist (does have properties)

Now to your question (statement?). You asked, "You haven't accounted for why [characters in fiction] are depicted differently." They are depicted different because they are different. They have different properties. If they didn't have different properties, people wouldn't notice the differences, but what's really important here is to understand what exactly it is that is being observed, which is not (A) but rather (B1).

And you have failed to address my question.
The character in fiction is a representation of an imaginary person. Why do we represent Santa as having a white beard and Rudolph as having a red nose?

@Ahab,

Ahab;157187 wrote:

And you have failed to address my question.
The character in fiction is a representation of an imaginary person. Why do we represent Santa as having a white beard and Rudolph as having a red nose?

...because Santa really has a white beard and Rudolph really has a red nose...lol

The question is no more ours than yours.

@Extrain,

[QUOTE=Extrain;157178]If you say in fiction, "Santa really exists" you are still saying something false.[/QUOTE]If someone says that Santa exists in works of fiction, I wouldn't interpret that to mean that a real live Santa literally exists within a work of fiction. I would interpret that to mean that there exists a character in a work of fiction depicted as having the name Santa.

It's important that we not lose sight of the difference between 1) Santa (which is not in a work of fiction--since Santa does not exist) and 2) the character in works of fiction (which incidentally is only depicted as having the name Santa--if we want to take being literal to the extreme).

At any rate, I wouldn't say it's false simply because the literal interpretation is false, for context ought not be ignored. No more should we ignore it here as we should when the boy in the museum points to a picture of George Washington and says, "hey mom, it's George Washington."

---------- Post added 04-27-2010 at 04:22 PM ----------

[QUOTE=Ahab;157187]And you have failed to address my question.
The character in fiction is a representation of an imaginary person. Why do we represent Santa as having a white beard and Rudolph as having a red nose?[/QUOTE]
There you go with that word "representation" again. There is nothing (no thing and no person) for the representing, and an imaginary person isn't anything (not a thing and not a person) that exists for the representing. X does not represent Y in cases where there is no Y.

There is certainly a difference between 1) a unicorn and 2) a statue of a unicorn, but can we really have a statue of a unicorn if there are in fact no unicorns? Language! It would seem that literally the answer is no since there can be no statue of something when there is no something at all, but surely we all agree that there are statues of unicorns, so it behooves us to consider that something to do with the nature of our language is making things difficult. This is a case where there actually is something when language 'tricks' us to think otherwise, and you present to me a case where there is nothing when language 'tricks' us to think there is!:

When you say, "The character in fiction is a representation of an imaginary person," the very nature of the language we speak gives us the impression that there is something that there is a representation of, but it's a 'trick' of language that we shouldn't fall victim to. I say, let's report language to the Mods!

@Ahab,

Ahab;157187 wrote:

And you have failed to address my question.
The character in fiction is a representation of an imaginary person. Why do we represent Santa as having a white beard and Rudolph as having a red nose?

Because that is what stories and songs that have them as characters say. Like, "Rudolph the red-nosed reindeer, had a very shiny nose". And those stories and songs are not true. Isn't that answer to your question obvious?

@fast,

fast;157220 wrote:

If someone says that Santa exists in works of fiction, I wouldn't interpret that to mean that a real live Santa literally exists within a work of fiction. I would interpret that to mean that there exists a character in a work of fiction depicted as having the name Santa.

It's important that we not lose sight of the difference between 1) Santa (which is not in a work of fiction--since Santa does not exist) and 2) the character in works of fiction (which incidentally is only depicted as having the name Santa--if we want to take being literal to the extreme).

At any rate, I wouldn't say it's false simply because the literal interpretation is false, for context ought not be ignored. No more should we ignore it here as we should when the boy in the museum points to a picture of George Washington and says, "hey mom, it's George Washington."

But context doesn't always change the meanings of words. So when I say the "character exists in fiction depicted as having the name Santa," does the meaning of "existence" change? That doesn't seem obvious to me. Of course, I don't mean a physical object exists in fiction, nor do I mean an abstract object exists in fiction. I just mean a character exists in fiction. So how come Santa exists in one context, but does not exist in another? If this is truly possible, then "existence" changes its meaning across different linguistic frameworks, and I don't see that as obviously true....because now you have different "ways" of existing...and I only think there is one "way," namely, to exist.

"Santa Claus wears boots" is false both inside and outside of fictional linguistic frameworks because something existent must bear this name "santa" in order for that statement to be true at all.

@Ahab,

Ahab;157187 wrote:

The character in fiction is a representation of an imaginary person.

Ask any nine year old if it's possible to play Superman, Batman or any other fictional object, without faithfully enacting an extant story. If nine year olds realise that fictional objects are independent of any existing work of fiction, why do some members of this thread find the matter so difficult?

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;157277 wrote:

Ask any nine year old if it's possible to play Superman, Batman or any other fictional object, without faithfully enacting an extant story. If nine year olds realise that fictional objects are independent of any existing work of fiction, why do some members of this thread find the matter so difficult?

So now there are characters in fiction and imaginary persons? Now there are re-enactments of characters in fiction which are representations of actual imaginary beings? Can a child fail to faithfully re-enact the imaginary person? Is there a right and wrong way of depicting imaginary beings, then? In what sense can a child fail to represent an imaginary being if it is not the same being as the character in the story? Sounds like your notion of non-existence is becoming more robustly like something existent by the moment.

@Extrain,

Extrain;157285 wrote:

Sounds like your notion of non-existence is becoming more robustly like something existent by the moment.

Yes, that happens once you start to slide down that Meinongian slippery slope. The only thing to do is keep off that slope in the first place.

@fast,

fast;157220 wrote:

There you go with that word "representation" again. There is nothing (no thing and no person) for the representing, and an imaginary person isn't anything (not a thing and not a person) that exists for the representing. X does not represent Y in cases where there is no Y.

What you are claiming is that people cannot represent what they imagine to be the case. That is clearly false.

Quote:

There is certainly a difference between 1) a unicorn and 2) a statue of a unicorn, but can we really have a statue of a unicorn if there are in fact no unicorns?

Unicorns are imaginary animals. The statue is a representation of what we imagine unicorns to be.

Quote:

Language! It would seem that literally the answer is no since there can be no statue of something when there is no something at all, but surely we all agree that there are statues of unicorns, so it behooves us to consider that something to do with the nature of our language is making things difficult. This is a case where there actually is something when language 'tricks' us to think otherwise, and you present to me a case where there is nothing when language 'tricks' us to think there is!:

I'm not following you here. I see no 'trick'. When I read about about how delightful a conversationalist a fictional character is at a party I am not 'tricked' into thinking I can put her on the guest list for my next party.

Quote:

When you say, "The character in fiction is a representation of an imaginary person," the very nature of the language we speak gives us the impression that there is something that there is a representation of, but it's a 'trick' of language that we shouldn't fall victim to. I say, let's report language to the Mods!

So you would like to forbid people to refer to the things they have imagined?

You have a theory of references that presupposes that people can only refer to what exists. Unfortunately for your theory, no such presupposition is required in our language to use proper names to refer to imaginary persons.

Philosophy Forum

numbers vs. words

Quick Links

My Account

able2know