numbers vs. words

@cws910,

cws910;116362 wrote:

Today we tend to describe the world using numbers. Because of that we can bring beauty down to a set of numbers, life down to a four line equasion, etc. But is this the best way to describe the traits and patterns of the world? Inthe case of beauty, we can define bit with numbers, but we can't CREATE it. But with words, we can truly create beauty; we can describe the elements of life and we also can explore that which numbers cannot. Death, reality, and love. So what do you guys think?

Numbers and a rudimentary understanding precede language. In other words I am saying that people do not think in their heads in a language. They think and then assign a meaning to what they are thinking with a word. So I think numbers are a more accurate way to describe beauty.

@cws910,

what do numbers mean without words attached to the numbers ?

nothing really

@north,

north;145063 wrote:

what do numbers mean without words attached to the numbers ?

nothing really

Well language does not define thought. Thought defines language

@OntheWindowStand,

Quote:
Originally Posted by north

http://www.philosophyforum.com/images/PHBlue/buttons/viewpost.gif

what do numbers mean without words attached to the numbers ?

nothing really

OntheWindowStand;145069 wrote:

Well language does not define thought. Thought defines language

thought yes , does define language

but numbers don't define the language

the language comes first

numbers without language are meaningless

@Extrain,

Extrain;144946 wrote:

Sorry to pick on you like everyone else....but please answer if you can.

I agree "refer" is a success term. But what is bothering me about your account is how you account for the truth-values of statements made about fictional objects which seem clearly to be true or false. The question is: what makes them true? IF no object exists, however linguistically or fictionally abstract, any statements made about fictional entities will be vacuous or false (depending on how they are formulated)--first-order logic requires the existence of some entity in order for statements to be true. So FOL depends on the logical notion of satisfaction.

My general answer to that is that a sentence like, "Hamlet murdered Polonius" should be understood along the lines of, "In Shakespeare's play, Hamlet murdered Polonius". with, "In Shakespeare's play" understood as a kind of operator ranging over the next sentence.This is about what Russell says about fictional sentences, and, of course, this lets them have a truth value. I really see no objection to this approach.

---------- Post added 03-28-2010 at 10:46 AM ----------

ughaibu;144593 wrote:

Why on Earth do you keep repeating this? You have consistently failed to defend this claim.

I don't see why this claim needs defending. Everyone knows there is no such thing as Mickey Mouse.

---------- Post added 03-28-2010 at 11:02 AM ----------

Extrain;144344 wrote:

Which verbs you are deciding to include and exclude in your intensional/extensional verb distinction seems a bit tailored to suit your ontology rather than your ontology being tailored to your use of verbs. I am not sure which way is more plausible, anyway....

What do you think exists?

Here are what might be some counterexamples:

I can certainly know the fictional character Sherlock Holmes is a more famous detective than the fictional character Doctor Thirteen. So how would you account for the truth of this statement if neither Sherlock nor Doctor Thirteen exist? Is it truth-valueless? Can I say something false with respect to fictional entities? On what grounds could I correct other's mistakes when they made them?

Likewise, I can certainly believe that Fido is a dog. And suppose Sandy believes everything that I believe. So Sandy believes that Fido is a dog. So there is something that we both believe, namely the proposition that Fido is dog. So there are propositions, and more than one person can believe the same proposition. So belief is transitive verb desigating a relation between the person believing and that which is believed. So belief implies the existence of what is believed, namely abstract entities such as propositions.

You think that when Ponce de Leon believed that there was a Fountain of Youth, that the Fountain of Youth existed, because the proposition that The Fountain of Youth existed was believed by Ponce de Leon? The proposition that the Fountain of Youth exists. is an abstract object. There is no abstract object, The Fountain of Youth. And, if The Fountain of Youth did exist, it would certainly not be an abstract object.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;145142 wrote:

My general answer to that is that a sentence like, "Hamlet murdered Polonius" should be understood along the lines of, "In Shakespeare's play, Hamlet murdered Polonius". with, "In Shakespeare's play" understood as a kind of operator ranging over the next sentence.This is about what Russell says about fictional sentences, and, of course, this lets them have a truth value. I really see no objection to this approach.

So if someone says, 'Unicorns have horns.', it is ok for me to reply, 'yes, that is true.'?

@Ahab,

Ahab;145150 wrote:

So if someone says, 'Unicorns have horns.', it is ok for me to reply, 'yes, that is true.'?

Of course not. But if someone says, "In legends, unicorns have a horn", you can reply, that's true.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;145142 wrote:

You think that when Ponce de Leon believed that there was a Fountain of Youth, that the Fountain of Youth existed, because the proposition that The Fountain of Youth existed was believed by Ponce de Leon? The proposition that the Fountain of Youth exists. is an abstract object. There is no abstract object, The Fountain of Youth. And, if The Fountain of Youth did exist, it would certainly not be an abstract object.

I think you raised an important point. Believing that p is not the same as believing the proposition that p.

---------- Post added 03-28-2010 at 08:16 AM ----------

kennethamy;145151 wrote:

Of course not. But if someone says, "In legends, unicorns have a horn", you can reply, that's true.

I don't understand. What need is there to refer to the fact that unicorns appear in legends to justify the claim that unicorns have horns?

@Ahab,

Ahab;145155 wrote:

I think you raised an important point. Believing that p is not the same as believing the proposition that p.

Well, certainly not the same as believing that there is a proposition that p.

@Ahab,

Ahab;145155 wrote:

I think you raised an important point. Believing that p is not the same as believing the proposition that p.

I dont know about that. The quoted proposition is false, if all false mathematical propositions exist, the indispensability arguments look very odd.

@Ahab,

Ahab;145155 wrote:

I think you raised an important point. Believing that p is not the same as believing the proposition that p.

---------- Post added 03-28-2010 at 08:16 AM ----------

I don't understand. What need is there to refer to the fact that unicorns appear in legends to justify the claim that unicorns have horns?

I am not trying to justify anything, as far as I can tell. But, the proposition that unicorns have horns is false, and the proposition that in some legends, unicorns have horns is true. (It may be, of course, that when someone says, that unicorns have horns, what he really means is that in some legends that unicorns have horns is true). It is as if I went to a portrait museum as asked one of the guards whether George Washington was in this room in the museum or the next. He would understand me (I hope) as asking whether the portrait of George Washington was in this room or the next. I don't think he would understand me as asking whether George Washington was in this room or the next. We often talk in short-hand. "Unicorns have horns" is just short-hand for, "In some legends, unicorns have horns". There is no need to invent fictional objects so that the term "unicorns" can have a referent.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;145160 wrote:

Well, certainly not the same as believing that there is a proposition that p.

Apparently I misunderstood your original point.
I thought you were referring to the fact that believing that there is a proposition that p is not the same as believing the propostion that there is a proposition that p.

@Ahab,

Ahab;145166 wrote:

Apparently I misunderstood your original point.
I thought you were referring to the fact that believing that there is a proposition that p is not the same as believing the propostion that there is a proposition that p.

No, I did not mean that. I think those are the same.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;145163 wrote:

I dont know about that. The quoted proposition is false, if all false mathematical propositions exist, the indispensability arguments look very odd.

Not sure I understand the point you are making.

If I believe that Joe is going to be fired tomorrow and Joe fears the very same thing, Joe doesn't fear the proposition that Joe is going to be fired tomorrow.

That is why I pointed out that believing that p is not the same as believing the propositon that p.

@Ahab,

Ahab;145170 wrote:

Not sure I understand the point you are making.

Kennethamy said that the proposition that the fountain of youth exists, is an abstract object. This implies that abstract objects can be false. Not only does this knock the sense out of indispensability arguments, it also makes the stance that fictional objects aren't abstract objects, even more mysterious.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;145165 wrote:

I am not trying to justify anything, as far as I can tell. But, the proposition that unicorns have horns is false, and the proposition that in some legends, unicorns have horns is true. (It may be, of course, that when someone says, that unicorns have horns, what he really means is that in some legends that unicorns have horns is true). It is as if I went to a portrait museum as asked one of the guards whether George Washington was in this room in the museum or the next. He would understand me (I hope) as asking whether the portrait of George Washington was in this room or the next. I don't think he would understand me as asking whether George Washington was in this room or the next. We often talk in short-hand. "Unicorns have horns" is just short-hand for, "In some legends, unicorns have horns". There is no need to invent fictional objects so that the term "unicorns" can have a referent.

A unicorn does not have to exist for it to be a referent. It simpy has be identified as to what it is in order for it to be a referent.

We have different conceptions of 'reference'.

---------- Post added 03-28-2010 at 08:56 AM ----------

kennethamy;145167 wrote:

No, I did not mean that. I think those are the same.

I don't think they are. Apparently, we also have different conceptions of 'propositions'.

---------- Post added 03-28-2010 at 09:18 AM ----------

kennethamy;145165 wrote:

I am not trying to justify anything, as far as I can tell. But, the proposition that unicorns have horns is false, and the proposition that in some legends, unicorns have horns is true. (It may be, of course, that when someone says, that unicorns have horns, what he really means is that in some legends that unicorns have horns is true).

The proposition is what is given by the use of the expression 'unicorns have horns.' In the context of explaining what the word 'unicorn' means, it would be a true proposition.

Also, in that context, 'unicorns have horns' is an example of a grammatical proposition. It is informing someone of the correct use of the word 'unicorn'.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;145142 wrote:

My general answer to that is that a sentence like, "Hamlet murdered Polonius" should be understood along the lines of, "In Shakespeare's play, Hamlet murdered Polonius". with, "In Shakespeare's play" understood as a kind of operator ranging over the next sentence.This is about what Russell says about fictional sentences, and, of course, this lets them have a truth value. I really see no objection to this approach.

Thanks. That's all I wanted to know.

Therefore, others should not be asking you why you think Hamlet does not really exist, or why you think "Hamlet" fails to have reference, but why you think fictional linguistic frameworks provides different meanings of the word "to exist." I don't know how much respect you have for Quine's univocalizing the existential quantifier (Ex), but notice that you are assigning different meanings to it by adopting fictional operators like "In Shakespeare's play it is true that __". So you think things exist in different ways? In Shakespeare's play, Hamlet is the King of Denmark. Again, what makes

"In Shakespeare's play, (EX) Dx"

true?
.
Do you just deny that First-Order Logic works with a univocal meaning of "satisfaction" and "to exist"?

Quote:

You think that when Ponce de Leon believed that there was a Fountain of Youth, that the Fountain of Youth existed, because the proposition that The Fountain of Youth existed was believed by Ponce de Leon?

Absolutely not. What Ponce de Leon believed was a proposition that the Fountain of Youth existed or was in such and such a location, he didn't believe the Fountain of Youth. That doesn't even make sense because it is a category error. How can you believe a non-existent entity, or believe an existent entity for that matter? People don't believe entities, they believe propositions. PDL stood in the belief relation to a proposition, not to a non-existent entity (regarless of whether FOY does or does not exist). This is why people can believe propositions whose singular terms failure to refer, and statement about what it is that you believe can be true or false--the statement is about what you believe, not about what exists or doesn't.

Quote:

The proposition that the Fountain of Youth exists. is an abstract object.

I agree.

Quote:

There is no abstract object, The Fountain of Youth. And, if The Fountain of Youth did exist, it would certainly not be an abstract object.

Perhaps. But the question above needs to be answered first, before the answer to what exists can be answered.

I am concerned about your construal of fictional operators in linguistic frameworks, and what you think the quantifier (Ex) is doing when we talk this way such as "In Shakespeare's play, Hamlet is the King of Denmark."

@Ahab,

Ahab;145170 wrote:

Not sure I understand the point you are making.

If I believe that Joe is going to be fired tomorrow and Joe fears the very same thing, Joe doesn't fear the proposition that Joe is going to be fired tomorrow.

That is why I pointed out that believing that p is not the same as believing the propositon that p.

I tend to sympathize with your ontology.

But I wonder why you don't think that

X believes that Y.

is not the same as

X believes the proposition that Y.

Are they not both true salve veritate?

You apparently think that the case for believing propositions is going to be analogous to the failure of substitution in cases of someone fearing something. But why should we force this failure of substitution for fearing the proposition onto cases where two persons believe the same proposition?

"If I believe that Joe is going to be fired tomorrow and Joe fears the very same thing, Joe doesn't fear the proposition that Joe is going to be fired tomorrow."

Correct, but so what? Joe doesn't fear the very same thing Bob believes.

Joe believes that Joe is going to be fired tomorrow and Bob believes that he is going to be fired tomorrow. Therefore, there is something that they both believe, namely the proposition that Joe is going to be fired to tommorrow--this is true, salve veritate. But why should we even think that what Joe fears and what Bob fears being the same thing, is therefore a proposition that they both fear? They don't both fear that Joe is going to fired tomorrrow. Rather, they both fear Joe is going to fired tomorrow. Why would they both be fearing a proposition anyway? That's absurd. So there is nothing intuitively incorrect about saying what Joe fears and what Bob believes are not going to be the same thing anyway. In the first case, Joes fears he is going to be fired tomorrow. In second case, Bob believes the proposition that Joe is going to be fired tomorrow.

So why should it be problematic for both Joe and Bob believing the same proposition that Joe is going to be fired tomorrow? After all, Joe is certainly free to think that his believing the proposition that he is going to be fired tomorrow is one thing, but his fearing his going to be fired tomorrow is a completely different thing altogether. So what he believes is not what he fears. What's wrong with that?

Do you deny that John and Bob stand in a belief relation to a proposition when they believe that p? So "that p" doesn't function as a noun-phrase designating anything?

What is it that they are believing?

@Extrain,

Extrain;145283 wrote:

I tend to sympathize with your ontology.

But I wonder why you don't think that

X believes that Y.

is not the same as

X believes the proposition that Y.

Are they not both true salve veritate?

You apparently think that the case for believing propositions is going to be analogous to the failure of substitution in cases of someone fearing something.

"If I believe that Joe is going to be fired tomorrow and Joe fears the very same thing, Joe doesn't fear the proposition that Joe is going to be fired tomorrow."

This is correct. But why is it the same for believing the proposition that Y?

Because Joes fears the very same thing I believe: namely that he is going to be fired tomorow.

Quote:

Do you deny that John stands in a belief relation to a proposition when he believes that p? So "that p" doesn't function as a noun-phrase designating anything?

If a person believes that p, then they are of course going to believe the proposition that p.

Quote:

What is it that he is believing?

That such and such is the case. Someone can believe it is going to rain tomorrow without formulating the proposition that it is going to rain tomorrow.

Quote:

If John believes that P and Susie believes that P, do they not both believe the same thing? And how could that same thing NOT be an abstract object, namely, a proposition that they both believe?

If John believes that the Butler stole the silverware and Susie believes that the Butler stole the silverware, then they believe the same thing. Why do you want to interpose another object (an abstract object) into this scenario?

Don't you think animals and young children believe things about the world? Surely they don't believe in propositions. The young child has not yet developed his capacity to use language and the animal doesn't possess such a capacity.

If you wish to understand better where I am coming from on this issue you could check out the following:
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/Ontology%20of%20belief.pdf

I'd also link you to Bede Rundle's article Objects and Attitudes that appeared in the journal Language & Communication but it is not availabe for free online.

Bede Rundle also wrote a book, Grammar in Philosophy, in which he discusses this issue.

@Ahab,

Quote:

If you wish to understand better where I am coming from on this issue you could check out the following:
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/Ontology%20of%20belief.pdf

I'd also link you to Bede Rundle's article Objects and Attitudes that appeared in the journal Language & Communication but it is not availabe for free online.

Bede Rundle also wrote a book, Grammar in Philosophy, in which he discusses this issue.

I'm definitely interested. I'll check it out. But on the face of it, it sounds like a naturalized approach to propositional attitudes and beliefs, especially if you are contenancing that animals and new-borns can have beliefs--which I am confident is false. Here is is where I am coming from:

Structured Propositions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Propositions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

In the latter entry, you can check out the parts titled "the substitution problem," "objectivization effect," "the ambiguity response," and the "syntax response." Moltmann (2003) and Jeffrey King (2002) think something on the lines that you are equivocating on the objects feared and the contents believed. There is an extensive bibliography at the end of each entry too.

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