I'm definitely interested. I'll check it out. But on the face of it, it sounds like a naturalized approach to propositional attitudes and beliefs, especially if you are contenancing that animals and new-borns can have beliefs--which I am confident is false.

Here is is where I am coming from:

Structured Propositions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Propositions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

In the latter entry, you can check out the parts titled "the substitution problem," "objectivization effect," "the ambiguity response," and the "syntax response." Moltmann (2003) and Jeffrey King (2002) think something on the lines that you are equivocating on the objects feared and the contents believed. There is an extensive bibliography at the end of each entry too.

Because Joes fears the very same thing I believe: namely that he is going to be fired tomorow.

That such and such is the case. Someone can believe it is going to rain tomorrow without formulating the proposition that it is going to rain tomorrow.

If John believes that the Butler stole the silverware and Susie believes that the Butler stole the silverware, then they believe the same thing.

Why do you want to interpose another object (an abstract object) into this scenario?

Don't you think animals and young children believe things about the world? Surely they don't believe in propositions. The young child has not yet developed his capacity to use language and the animal doesn't possess such a capacity.

Bede Rundle, P.M.S. Hacker and H. J. Glock are analytical philosophers whose postions are closely related to or outgrowths from the later philosophy of Wittgenstien. I have been heavily influenced by all of them.

Here is Glock's homepage with some of his articles:
UZH - Philosophisches Seminar - Hans-Johann Glock
Thanks for the link. I will check it out. Have to run now.

Kennethamy said that the proposition that the fountain of youth exists, is an abstract object. This implies that abstract objects can be false. Not only does this knock the sense out of indispensability arguments, it also makes the stance that fictional objects aren't abstract objects, even more mysterious.

Objects cannot be true or false. It is false that there is a Fountain of Youth. But that does not mean that the Fountain of Youth is false, since that make no sense. But you are mistaken. I never said that the Fountain of Youth is an abstract object. In fact, I denied it was an object at all. You ought to reread my post.

I take it from this that you support the claim that all abstract objects exist, and that this includes all propositions and all mathematical objects. For example, you believe that the proposition 2+3=6 exists, that the number aleph eight exists, etc, will you kindly tell me why you also hold the view that the fictional object, Rudolph, does not exist?

why would you suppose that if I believe numbers exist, then I should believe Rudolph exists?

Thanks. That's all I wanted to know.

Therefore, others should not be asking you why you think Hamlet does not really exist, or why you think "Hamlet" fails to have reference, but why you think fictional linguistic frameworks provides different meanings of the word "to exist."

For the reasons given, very many times. Numbers are abstract objects, they cant be examined and their properties enumerated, their existence depends entirely on the claim that they have properties. Fictional objects have properties, therefore fictional objects are abstract objects under your paradigm. Similarly, you claim that only those things which exist can be referred to, fictional objects can be referred to, therefore, again under your paradigm, fictional objects exist.

But fictional objects can't have properties if they don't exist.

But you are not in the position to say that they dont exist without a failure by circularity!!

Why? Can't I say that Martians don't exist without circularity? Remember, I am not saying that objects like cartoon characters don't exist. But cartoon characters are not objects of any kind. I am starting to think that our disagreement is only a verbal disagreement. When you assert that fictional objects exist are you saying anything more than that there are such things as cartoon characters, and characters in stories like unicorns?

But you're getting into Meinongian suggestions if you do about different types of existence.

But why do you think I am suggesting that there are different kinds of existence? I have denied that over and over again. Hamlet does not exist. The play does. And Hamlet is a character in the play. (As some might like to say, "exists (only) as a character in the play". Which just means that the character Hamlet exists, but that Hamlet does not.

You just did countenance a different type of existence, namely, Hamlet "existing (only) in...."--using your special linguistic framework that presumably allows you to "intelligibly" say this.

Why? I said not that Hamlet exists in the play. That's nonsense. I said that the character, Hamlet exists in the play. And that's true. And there the term, "exist(s)" has the plain old meaning.

This is just assumed true.

Suppose my dog and myself both fear the postman charging at us with a knife because the postman suddenly "got postal" on us. Then what I believe,

that the postman is charging us with a knife

is not the same thing as what my dog and I directly fear namely,

the postman's-charging-us-with-a-knife,

simply for the fact that the dog doesn't, nor can it, have beliefs which he can express, talk about, or tell us whether he thinks are true or false. You can ask the dog what it is the dog believes, but I don't think he could tell you, because he doesn't know what he believes, he just simply fears <the postman's charging at him with a knife>. But he doesn't know or believe the proposition that <the postman is charging at him with a knife>.

The postman's-charging-him-with-a-knife

is not identical to

that the postman is charging him with a knife.




"Formulating a proposition" is not the same kind of activity as "believing a proposition"--so it doesn't really matter if someone went through the conscious process of constructing, or articulating the content of his belief. It is still a fact that, what a person believes is, in fact, the proposition that it is going to rain tomorrow. If you ask him what he believes, he will say, that it is going to rain tomorrow, whether he consciously articulated this before you asked him or not.

He doesn't believe it is going to rain tomorrow, he believes that it is going to rain tomorrow. He my perhaps expect, or anticipate the future-fact <it is going to rain tomorrow>--that would be ok. But he doesn't believe the actual physical event <it is going to rain tomorrow>, because (1) his belief is not actually standing in direct reference to a present event actually occurring at the time of his belief, and (2) <it is going to rain tomorrow> is not actually a present event at all, it is a future fact, namely, the future fact <going to rain tomorrow>. So, he can only believe the proposition that it is going to rain tomorrow.

Moreover, if the object of one's belief were either a fact or an event, then it would be just plain silly to say that the object of one's belief can be true or false, because events and facts can't be true or false; rather, they either exist or don't, they are either occuring presently, pastly, or futurely, or not occurring, or existing, at all. Only propositions can be true or false. So again, he can only believe the proposition that it is going to rain tomorrow.

Therefore, propositions really exist.

Q.E.D.



correct.



Because there is no referent for their belief after Butler stole the silverware if the referent just is the physical happening of the Butler's stealing the silverware. That event is passed and gone. So they can only believe an abstract object.



Children (before language) and dogs don't have beliefs.

---------- Post added 03-28-2010 at 05:28 PM ----------



Cool. Thanks for the references. I will try to take the time to check some of it out to familiarize myself with where you are coming from.

Yes, I am familliar, too, with what Wittgenstein had to say about it, along with Russell, Frege, Strawson, Davidson, and others.

But rather than make appeals to authority as arguments, I would rather think through this by using our own resources--our brains--

Of course, nothing prevents our referencing others, and we should do it when the time is right too. So all of it goes on the table. I am just deeply fascinated by the philosophy of language and am looking for anyone willing to explore some of it...

But if this is not the place to do it, or you are not up to it, just feel free to tell me. Maybe we could start another thread on reference and propositional attitudes? This one deals with the ontology of abstract entites, not exactly language; though language is directly relevant.

Cheers.

Why?

First I'd like to clarify that I am not denying the existence of propositions or that we do indeed believe propositions.

You said you think that I am assuming it is true that I believe and Joe fears the same thing. Maybe it would help if I flesh out the example a little more.

Joe tells me, "I fear that I am going to be fired. Whenever I think about it I break out in a sweat."
I wish to comfort Joe so he doesn't have to be so fearful. So I attempt to gather some information that I could give him so he doesn't worry about this matter. To my dismay I learn information that leads me to believe that Joe is going to be fired.
So I know that Joe fears that he is going to be fired. And I believe that he is going to be fired.

But Joe doesn't fear the proposition that he is going to be fired.

It appears clear to me that he is fearing and I am believing exactly the same thing: that he is going to be fired.

In your example of fearing the postman. Isn't that like believing the postman?

It seems that your example is equivocating on different uses of the word "believe".

Also, you changed the wording. At first you said fear 'the postman charging at us with a knife' and changed it to fear 'the postman's-charging-us-with-a-knife'. They don't mean the same thing. There was no such change in my example.

In any case, since we don't both agree that dogs and young children can have a belief, maybe our examples should deal only with adults who are competent users of our language.

Anyways, I'd be delighted to discuss this issue with you more. Just bear in mind that I am a pure amateur at this.

What little I've leanred has just been picked up in my spare time. That was one reason I provided the links I did. Not to make a case based on authority, but to provide you a with chance to obtain a clearer presentation of this unpopular conception of propositions.

Again thanks for the links, Did take a brief glance at them. Can see that it will take me some time to understand all that is being discussed at those sites. It is very likely that I may well be unable to grasp you position completely because of my lack of technical training in your area of expertise.

Then what is your domain "fictional character" ranging over? All entities only in plays, or only in literature, or does it range over all things that exist?

Ahab wrote:

Joe tells me, "I fear that I am going to be fired. Whenever I think about it I break out in a sweat."
I wish to comfort Joe so he doesn't have to be so fearful. So I attempt to gather some information that I could give him so he doesn't worry about this matter. To my dismay I learn information that leads me to believe that Joe is going to be fired.
So I know that Joe fears that he is going to be fired. And I believe that he is going to be fired.

All this seems correct (except for the slight blunder above). I am aware people, including ourselves, will say stuff like Joe said, but if we are performing this kind of linguistic analysis we need to be charitable about linguistic implications and meaning, and not take literally what Joe says at face value. so...

Joe doesn't fear that he is going to be fired. Otherwise he would be fearing a proposition--which is false. Instead, Joe is fearing he is going to be fired. In other words, Joe is fearing the potential possibility of being fired. In other words, Joe is fearing the potential fact of his being (or getting) fired.

So it is not a proposition that Joe is actually fearing.

You are making my case for me. The whole point of the example is to show that it is absurd to think Joe is fearing a proposition. And that is why you can't simply assume that 'I believe that p' is the same as saying 'I believe the proposition that p'.
For after all Joe and I do fear or believe the same thing: 'he will be fired'..


As to propositions. basically, I think it is something that can be expressed by the use of a sentence.