A mind is a product of a brain (and CNS). A mind isn't a brain, and a mind isn't in (or within) a brain, and a mind isn't in the neurons of a brain. But, it is so that a brain gives rise to a mind. A mind is brain-dependent. Only because we have a brain can we have a mind, and only with a mind can we have ideas, concepts, thoughts, fantasies, and memories. So, although a concept is not physical, what gives rise to it is. There is a physical basis for the fact we have concepts and ideas, but our actual concepts and ideas, however, are anything but physical.

Advances in brain imagining and related technologies may allow us to reverse engineer the mind. And if you can reverse engineer something...

There's something about the way you word that that just doesn't come across quite right.

A) the term refers to the idea/concept of Wile E. Coyote
B) the term refers to the imaginary creature Wile E. Coyote
C) the term refers to the character in fiction
D) the term refers to the actual living coyote that we will never see running

When a parent tells a child that Santa does not exist, what message do you think is being communicated?

If I were to tell you that Superman does exist (and supposing I actually meant it), what message do you think I would be communicating?

I think the implications of the answers should be illuminating.

If I were to say that Superman exists (and meant it), then the message understood would be that I believe there is an actual red cape wearing man that can fly and deflect bullets.

If I were to say that Superman doesn't exist, then the message understood would be that I believe there is no actual red cape wearing man that can fly and deflect bullets[

To be honest I don't really know what it would mean for there to be an actual, living Superman.

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I did say, "the term refers to the actual living coyote that we will never see running," but I should have been careful to say what I've said several times before that. Here is a clarification of my view:

My view is that a term is either a referring term or a non-referring term. If the term is a referring term, then the term either succeeds or fails to refer. I'm saying that the term, "Wile E. Coyote" is a referring term, and I'm saying that the term, "Wile E. Coyote" is a referring term that fails to refer.

So, although I did say, "the term refers to the actual living coyote that we will never see running," I should have been more careful, especially since I do not believe that the referring term, "Wile E. Coyote" successfully refers.

Ok so you agree that the bearer of the name "Wiley E. Coyote" is the imaginary creature depicted in cartoons?

Oh come on! Watch a Superman movie and imagine him in our world. Take your shoes off and relax. He's depicted as a man with superhuman powers living in our world among us. You don't have to try to make sense of how it could be; just use your imagination and pretend

I'm sure many a woman in their younger years would have dreamed of having Superman swoop up and take them for a romantic ride! Had I been Superman, I think I would have told Lois my secret. :flowers:

You're worried about the laws of physics?

We have no problem saying that Superman doesn't exist, for we know that no such being exists in our world, and we know that, for we know the history behind how the concept of the character came to be

No. I'm reserving that term for my own personal shouting pleasure. If by some miracle we find a real live version of what's depicted in said cartoon, I'm going to shout "Wile E. Coyote does in fact exist!"

Enjoy your weekend.

Then it makes no sense to claim that 'Wile E. Coyote' is a term that fails to refer.

.

Oh come on! Watch a Superman movie and imagine him in our world.

"to refer" is an extensional verb. It does imply the existence of its object. I cannot refer to what does not exists anymore than I can eat what does not exist.

Why doesn't it? It is a referring term, but it fails to refer. Why would that make no sense?

I agree that people can fall in love with imaginary creatures. That is one reason why I don't find it problematical that we can succeed in referring to an imaginary creature.

If by "an imaginary creature" you mean a creature that does not exist, then why not? We can look for imaginary creature, and we can think about imaginary creatures, we can hunt for imaginary creature. But we cannot kick imaginary creatures, nor eat them. The fact that we cannot kick or eat them is, it seems to me a good reason for thinking we cannot succeed in referring to them. For the same reason, we can believe that an imaginary creature exists, but we cannot know that an imaginary creature exists. Don't you agree? "Hunt" and "believe" are intensional verbs (spelled that way) because they do not imply the existence of the object of the verb. But, "eat" and "know" are extensional verbs, since they do imply the existence of their objects. " To imagine" is, of course, an intensional verb. And (finally) "to refer" is an extensional verb. It does imply the existence of its object. I cannot refer to what does not exists anymore than I can eat what does not exist.

Why doesn't it? It is a referring term, but it fails to refer. Why would that make no sense?

I agree that people can fall in love with imaginary creatures. That is one reason why I don't find it problematical that we can succeed in referring to an imaginary creature.

If by "an imaginary creature" you mean a creature that does not exist, then why not? We can look for imaginary creature, and we can think about imaginary creatures, we can hunt for imaginary creature. But we cannot kick imaginary creatures, nor eat them. The fact that we cannot kick or eat them is, it seems to me a good reason for thinking we cannot succeed in referring to them. For the same reason, we can believe that an imaginary creature exists, but we cannot know that an imaginary creature exists. Don't you agree? "Hunt" and "believe" are intensional verbs (spelled that way) because they do not imply the existence of the object of the verb. But, "eat" and "know" are extensional verbs, since they do imply the existence of their objects. " To imagine" is, of course, an intensional verb. And (finally) "to refer" is an extensional verb. It does imply the existence of its object. I cannot refer to what does not exists anymore than I can eat what does not exist.

Because it is not the name of a real coyote. It is the name of an imaginary coyote.
Isn't the basis for the claim of reference failure that "Wile E. Coyote" is the name of a real coyote but there is no such coyote?

No. To say of a proper noun or a noun phrase that it fails to refer is to say of it that it is a referring term, but that what it allegedly refers to does not exist. So there need not be a referent. "Abraham Lincoln" is a referring term that succeeds in referring. But "Wile" is a referring term that fails to refer. "The first man on Mars" is a referring term, but we do not know whether or not it succeeds in referring or not.

So you agree that the name "Wile E. Coyote" is the name of an imaginary being, not the name of a real coyote which does not exist?

Several fictional objects have been mentioned on this thread and nobody has expressed any puzzlement about any of them, all participants understand what's talked about when Rudolph is mentioned. Quite clearly there are terms which refer to fictional objects. Therefore, if it is the case that terms can only refer to things which exist, then fictional objects exist.

It is the name of a cartoon figure in a cartoon of that same name. Isn't that satisfactory? If not, then why not?

there are no fictional objects

Today we tend to describe the world using numbers. Because of that we can bring beauty down to a set of numbers, life down to a four line equasion, etc. But is this the best way to describe the traits and patterns of the world? Inthe case of beauty, we can define bit with numbers, but we can't CREATE it. But with words, we can truly create beauty; we can describe the elements of life and we also can explore that which numbers cannot. Death, reality, and love. So what do you guys think?

First of all, only some terms are referring terms. Those that succeed in referring refer to what exists. What else? But there are no fictional objects. So, referring terms cannot succeed in referring to them. One of your premises is false namdly, there are terms which refer to fictional objects. "Refer" is a success term. Like the term, "win (the race)". It is not a process term like, "run (the race)". Unless there is a finish line, no participant can win a race. And, unless there is an object, no term can succeed in referring".

*On a side note. Both Frege and Russll thought names of fictional entities fail to have reference. Frege thought fictional names fail to refer because the entity purportedly designated by that name doesn't exist. Russel agreed, but it was because Russell thought all names, about both fictional and really existent entities alike, do not refer at all because they are disguised definite descriptions. So Frege and Russell had slightly different accounts of the logical structures of propositions.

Frege thought "Hamlet is the King of Denmark" lacked a truth-value because no such entity is designated by the name "Hamlet" even though there is a concept designated by the word "Hamlet." Russell, on the other hand, thought the same statement was outright false because there was entity at all, nor any concept designated by the word "Hamlet."