Numbers are certainly not physical objects, but some think they may be material objects (I don't).

Physical objects are objects that can be studied by physics.

And the number 1 cannot be studied by physics.

Berkeley held that there were physical objects (like stones). But he did not think there were any material objects.

I think that is a problem for your particular theory of how language works. Obviously, people understand the concept of imaginary things. I''m not sure you do, based on what you have written.

They tell stories about imaginary things, they give them names, they even fall in love with them.

I haven't seen you give an adequate account for the fact that people have the capacity to represent imaginary things.



Nothing that exists can be imaginary. Imaginary beings do not exist.

What should we infer from the fact that we tell stories about imaginary beings? Not that they exist, you admit. So, what should be our conclusion? I understand the concept of imaginary being. To say of something that it is an imaginary being is to say of it that it does not exist. But that does not mean that it does exist, only in some funny way).
If to assert that people have the capacity to represent imaginary beings implies that there are imaginary beings, then no one has that capacity. If it doesn't imply that capacity, then I have no idea what it means to say that people have the capacity to represent imaginary beings. Do you think that there are two things, Daffy Duck, and a representation of Daffy Duck? That is what you seem to be saying.

Yes, we use terms to refer to things, but unless we are using terms to refer to what the terms refers to, then we aren't using the terms properly. It's improper to use the term "horse" when referring to a zebra, for the term "horse" doesn't refer to zebras (or even the class of all zebras).

Speakpigeon,

You think numbers are physical?

I don't think you can fall back on notions such as "properly" and "improper" to explain meaning and reference. What I would agree with is that there has to be some kind of connection between the actual reference of the word "horse" when someone use it and some actual object that we imagine is a real horse. But it is precisely because all we can do is to visualise or to imagine a horse, that the word as we use it has to refer to the visualised or imagined horse. Whether there is any impropriety somewhere is irrelevant to this thread.
EB

The term "horse" is a referring term, and it refers to the class of all horses, and it does so even when we misuse the term..

You appear to me to be trying to fit all language use into one pattern: that of descriptions of real objects.
Language use is more complicated than that.

No one who understand the concept of imabinary beings thinks they are giving descriptons of real objects.

You appear to be trapped in the Augustinian conception of language.

The meaning of a word is given by an explanation of its meaning, it is a rule for the use of a word. Meanings of words are not objects they stand for even if a word is used to stand for an object.

And if you use a word incorrectly, you can certainly be told that you are using it incorrectly.

I think it succeeds in referring because I don't limit referents only to existing objects. Obviously, we disagree on what can be considered to be a referent.

If the referent is postulated to exist and it turns out that it doesn't exist then you can have a failure of reference. An example of that would be phlogiston.

I agree that language doesn't give only descriptions. But whenever it is descriptive, it is supposed to be descriptive of objects. And all objects are real objects. Objects do not come in two kinds, real and not real. "In the fairy story, Little Red Riding Hood was eaten by the big bad wolf" does not imply that there is a little red riding hood, nor that there is a big bad wolf. If you want to be Wittgensteinian and say that, "in the language game of fairy stories" rather than just, "in fairy stories", that's fine with me too.

Quote:

Ahab--I've asked you several times already what you think an imaginary being is. Maybe it is time you answered that question.

Well, let's see, hmmm. I guess for starters, I would say that it's a product of the imagination. Also, and because it's a product of the imagination, I say that it doesn't exist. I would never (as one might say) mistake it for furniture.

By the way, I don't think there is something inside our minds either that instantiates the existence of imaginary beings. They simply do not exist.

If I describe the pain I had last week to my doctor, I am not describing an object.
And if I give a description of a mental image I had of the Eiffel Tower last night, I am not giving a description of an object. if I go on to give a description of the Eiffel Tower itself, then I would be giving a description of an object.

Looking at myself, no, I don't appear to be trapped. No.

I don't know about you. You may think I am but then it is all your doing.

What was the Augustinian conception of language? Baptism and designation?

I agree that each of us may come to know at least part of our vocabulary through explanations of the words' meanings. For instance, I don't think that many people have pointed at an atom briefly held in their visual field and explained to thier child, "see, son, this is an atom". No. Yet, we seem to know what is an atom and I guess this comes through "explanations".

However, I'm also quite sure it is also true that very few people would have stood in a meadow with their son looking at a real horse and gone into a long and protracted explanation of what exactly is a horse (as if they knew!). Rather, they would say, "look at the horse". Wouldn't that be enough? I think it would, at least for part of our vocabulary.

Today, possibly, we may stand in the meadow looking at the video of a horse on a cellphone, but the idea remains valid: "look at the horse".

This, of course, also means that we don't need a real horse here and there to know what a horse is so it is better to insert in our model of meaning the notion of the idea of a horse.
EB

---------- Post added 03-25-2010 at 05:33 PM ----------

Which is a problem with your model.

A word has a referent or it does not. You can't say the word has a referent but please wait till we realise that it does not. No, it is not polite.
When used to mean something, a word always has a referent and this referent is the something meant, i.e. which can only be an idea, which may also vary to such an extent that it becomes "improper" but improper reference is reference nonetheless, unless the notion of reference does not refer to anything at all.
I believe my concept of 'referent' more closely matches standard usage of referring terms than yours does and that is why I prefer it over your concept.
Excellent.
EB

So you somehow know the object in itself? I would rather suggest that you would be giving a description of something you would assume to be a view of the Eiffel Tower. So, in effect, and somewhat contrary to what Kennethamy believes, we never describe objects. We can only describe things that are directly accessible, that is to say things which exists inside our minds: ideas, imagined gods, percepts of sounds, pain, desires, what else?
EB

There is, clearly, a difference between A) a horse and B) a video of a horse. We are not literally looking at A) a horse when looking at B) a video of a horse, but it's okay to talk in shorthand and say, "look at the horse" while showing the video of a horse to another, as context disambiguates and alleviates the need for being overly explicit.

Still, the term, "horse" and the term, "video of a horse" do not refer to the same thing. What's important is what is meant, and what is meant is B even though what is said is A, and it's okay to say A so long as A isn't confused with B. Sad it would be if one actually looked at a video of a horse and actually thought he or she was viewing an actual horse. Common sense should tell us that a horse can't literally fit into a cell phone; cell phones are just too small.

Why would you think that an ostensive explanation is not an explanation of the meaning of a word?

It was once believed that there really was something that scientists called "phlogiston". That something was the referent of the word "plhogistion". Later scientists came to learn that phlogistion does not exist. The word 'phlogistion' currently has no referent. Of course we could think of a new use for the word 'phlogiston'.

I don't deny that some words can be used to refer and others not be used to refer. I don't understand your objection here.

Where did I say I was describing 'the object in iteslf'?

If I describe the pain I had last week to my doctor, I am not describing an object.
And if I give a description of a mental image I had of the Eiffel Tower last night, I am not giving a description of an object. if I go on to give a description of the Eiffel Tower itself, then I would be giving a description of an object.

They can't be mental particulars that exist in in an individual's mind for you and I can share the exact same concept.
I would highly recommend taking a look at this article that I previously cited in another thread:
Concepts: Where Subjectivism Goes Wrong

you'll have noticed that your mentor doesn't dispute that there is a property of being imaginary

I hope you'll agree that it is possible to imagine some thing, and if that thing that you're imagining doesn't exist anywhere in time or space, like your number three, then that thing will be irreducibly imaginary. That property of being irreducibly imaginary distinguishes such an object, purely of the imagination, from other objects which have spatio-temporal locations, and those distinguishing features of objects are properties. It is therefore the case that all irreducibly imaginary things have, at least, the property of being imaginary.

We speak as if ideas are in our mind, and I'm okay with speaking like that, but that we speak as if ideas are in our mind is no grand reason for thinking that ideas have an actual location like a piano in a room could be located as being somewhere in particular. Sure, the idea is in the mind, but where might I ask is your mind?

A neurosurgeon would have about as much luck finding your mind as would a podiatrist (a foot doctor).

The mind has no location, and oh yes, you heard that right, so where might it be? That's the whole point. The question assumes something that is false. It has no location, so it is nowhere.

The phlogiston story shows why there is a problem with your model. A word has a referent or it does not. You can't say the word has a referent but please wait till we realise that it does not. I though it was clear enough. And I realise that it is indeed clear enough. Please, try a little harder.

You said:
Seems clear enough to me or do you want to try a rewording?
EB

So you see, I can debunk a very long paper in just 37 seconds.

These guys are actually paid real money? I should change jobs.
EB

I'm not so sure we're still talking about the same thing. When I look at a wall, I'm directly looking at a wall, and when I turn my back to the wall and look at a mirror, I will see a reflection of the wall, but although I am not directly looking at the wall, I am indirectly looking at the wall, so in both cases, I see the wall, even though in one case what I see is a reflection of the wall.

When I close my eyes, I can still visualize a mental picture of the wall, and that is called (I think) a percept, and what it would be a percept of is the wall. Is this what you're talking about when you say, "some representation inside our mind"?

Quote:

Speakpigeon--A word has a referent or it does not. You can't say the word has a referent but please wait till we realise that it does not.

But I never said "please wait till we realise it" . Again, you are putting words in my mouth. Please address what I actually wrote.

There is no need for me to reword it. I said "the Eiffel Tower itself" I didn't say the "Eiffel Tower in itself." Those two expression do not mean the same thing.

Yes, you should.