Why would anyone think that the referent of 'Moo-moo' is a real creature?

I accept this

Thank you.

See I can shorten a post up to where either it no longer means anything or it means the opposite.

Second chance.

Quote:

Ahab--The name Wile E. Coyote refers to what the creator conceives, imagines, thinks Wiley E. Coyote is.

I don't think so. If that was the was the case, we should be saying that Wile E. Coyote exists.

Last chance, any reason?

The reason is in my initial post.

[/COLOR]Wile E. Coyote exists as an imaginary being.


EB

My concept (much like an idea) is a mental phenomena. It's a product of the mind. In fact, it's a direct product of the mind, and because minds are brain dependent, it's an indirect product of the brain.

All that means is that Wiley does not exist, but Wile was imagined. (Wiley is asserted to be a coyote in a cartoon film). Wiley is not a being, imagined or otherwise.

[/COLOR]

Concepts and ideas are not mental phenomena. They are not mental paticulars that literally exist inside a mind.
You and I can share the same concept.

Did you read the article I linked to?

I don't suppose that anyone does.

And why would anyone suppose that Moo-Moo exists, either, and how can a "being" (whatever that is) not exist? An imaginary being need no more exist than an intellectual dwarf need be an intellectual or a dwarf. (Or, the Holy Roman Empire be Holy, Roman, or even, an Empire).

"Philosophy is a constant battle against the bewitchment of the intellect by language" Wittgenstein.

Quote:

There are now even more possibilities on the table:
A) the term refers to the idea/concept of Wile E. Coyote
B) the term refers to the imaginary creature Wile E. Coyote
C) the term refers to the character in fiction
D) the term refers to the actual living coyote that we will never see running
I vote D. I thought you voted C. Apparently you're voting B.

This is a good question; I am inclined to go with (B) or (C).

If you need to know why that didn't constitute a reason, read the thread.

Did I say Moo-moo exists? You are fighting a straw-man here.




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Quote:

PappasNick--I agree that there can be fuzziness (subjectivity) to the idea 'rock', but a typical rock is nonetheless, in my opinion, an objective phenomenon while the idea 'one' is at most only as objective as the object (rock) in question.

A rock is a material object. Material objects have objective, measurable scientific properties.
One is not a material object but a conceptual ideal. Conceptual ideals are independent of material objects.

When little Johnny runs around the front yard with arms spread wide imagining that he's flying an airplane, then yes, one might say to the neighbor that he's flying in his imaginary airplane (not that he actually is, of course), but little Johnny is not imagining that he's flying an imaginary airplane (what fun would that be?); he's imagining (pretending) that he's flying a real airplane.

If we assume that a rock is a physical object, or if we define the notion of "physical" as being the status of this rock, then number 1 is also a physical object. [/COLOR]

Obviously, there is the concept of number 1 as well as number 1 as the physical being. The two are not at all the same thing. The best we can do seems to say that number 1 as the physical being is the counterpart of the concept of number 1 (and vice versa).

Still, the point is that numbers do exist in the physical sense.

Now, I'm trying to figure out what might be the measure of number 1.
EB

Quote:

Speakpigeon Nothing refers to anything on its own. If I say "Wile E. Coyote", it may refer to my idea of Wile E. Coyote or to my idea of the cartoonist's idea of Wile E. Coyote. Still, we have to assume the word refers at the moment it is used to some idea of the speaker, even when this idea may refer to another of the speaker's idea that may itself refers to somebody else's idea, etc.

The term "horse" is a referring term, and it refers to the class of all horses, and it does so even when we misuse the term. For example, when the child at the zoo looks at and points to a zebra and says, "Look at the horse mommy," we know that the child is referring to a zebra, but we also know that the child has mistaken the zebra for a horse. The terms "horse" and "zebra" continue to refer to what they refer to independent of our individual intentions. I too can look at a zebra and intentionally say, "Look at the horse," but at no time is it true that the term, "the horse" therefore refers to the zebra. This notion that terms refer to what we say they do is misguided.

What kind of being does not exist? It is the term, "being" that is the problem in the phrase, "X is an imaginary being".

Nothing can be both imaginary and a being.

It seems you want to say that the reference of term "horse" is somehow fixed (by a dictionary? conventions?) but this is not entirely the case. If I want to use the word in the sense of the dictionary, I will, but I can use it differently, as you pointed out. So clearly, in this case, I would be disagreeing for instance with the dictionary, which is fine.

I agree that it is very nearly what you say it is. We do seem to baptise words by "designation" of the real objects when we are looking at them and keeping up the flamme through repeats and dictionaries. At the level of the "person", we can be content with such an approximation. But if you want to discuss imaginary beings, I think the concept of person is found to be wanting. In fact, the whole thread seems a good example of the shortcomings of this view.
EB