numbers vs. words

@fast,

fast;143015 wrote:

No, of course not! There is a difference between a real being that you have pictured in your mind and an imaginary being. To say of a being that it is imaginary is to deny that there is a real being. Imagining your friend George doesn't make him an imaginary being.

I'm not denying that there is a real coyote named Wile E. Coyote. There never was a question of there being a real coyote.

You seem to be modelling the concept of imaginary beings on the idea that they are first posited as real beings that have been shown not to exist. That is a distortion of the concept, I believe.

@ughaibu,

[QUOTE=ughaibu;143026]Of course Rudolph is abstract because fictional objects are a subset of abstract objects.[/QUOTE]I now suppose you're talking about the character in fiction that was created in a particular year, but then, you also say the character is abstract despite that?

Rudolph doesn't exist, and things that don't exist aren't abstract.

@fast,

fast;143042 wrote:

There was no creator of Wile E. Coyote. What was created was the character Wile E. Coyote. If there was a creator of Wile E. Coyote, we wouldn't be denying the existence of Wile E. Coyote.

The character Wile E. Coyote wouldn't exist unless someone first imagined this imaginary being Wile E. Coyote.

Cartoon characters are representations of imaginary beings.

@fast,

fast;143048 wrote:

Rudolph doesn't exist, and things that don't exist aren't abstract.

I'm really bored of this vacuous repetition, can you support your claim that numbers exist but fictional objects do not exist?

@fast,

fast;143048 wrote:

I now suppose you're talking about the character in fiction that was created in a particular year, but then, you also say the character is abstract despite that?

Rudolph doesn't exist, and things that don't exist aren't abstract.

I'm not taking the position that numbers don't exist.

But there was a time when someone first came up with the concept of the number zero. So Saying Rudolph was conceived in a particular year doesn't negate the point ughaibu is making.

Don't you have other reasons for thinking numbers exist besides your claim that a number has properties?

@Ahab,

[QUOTE=Ahab;143049]The character Wile E. Coyote wouldn't exist unless someone first imagined this imaginary being Wile E. Coyote. [/QUOTE]True, but I'm hesitant to regard the character in fiction as being a direct product of the imagination. Something else needs to also occur for there to be a character in fiction. The very idea of a character needs to be incorporated into a work of fiction before we assert that there is a character in fiction.

By the way, there's something else we haven't touched on. The idea of Wile E. Coyote versus the idea of the character in fiction Wile E. Coyote.

When I talk of the former, you think of the latter.

---------- Post added 03-24-2010 at 12:32 PM ----------

[QUOTE=ughaibu;143060]I'm really bored of this vacuous repetition, can you support your claim that numbers exist but fictional objects do not exist?[/QUOTE]I'm not exactly sure what misunderstandings you bring to the table regarding fictional objects. I do agree that characters in fiction exist (in so much as there are in fact characters in works of fiction), if that helps, but I seem destined to continue believing that Pinocchio doesn't exist despite my belief that such characters in fiction (in fiction, I say) do exist.

@fast,

fast;143069 wrote:

True, but I'm hesitant to regard the character in fiction as being a direct product of the imagination. Something else needs to also occur for there to be a character in fiction. The very idea of a character needs to be incorporated into a work of fiction before we assert that there is a character in fiction.

By the way, there's something else we haven't touched on. The idea of Wile E. Coyote versus the idea of the character in fiction Wile E. Coyote.

When I talk of the former, you think of the latter.

I don't know the actual sequence of events that happened to bring about the creation of the cartoon character Wile E. Coyote. I imagine more than one person was involved in the process.

For Wiley to became a cartoon character, someone needed to draw him. And the other characters in the cartoon needed to be drawn and a plot had to be created.

Not sure what you mean by the idea of Wile E. Coyote versus the idea of the character. Sounds like the distinction I've been making between the imaginary being and the depiction of that imaginary being in a cartoon.

@Ahab,

Ahab;143063 wrote:

But there was a time when someone first came up with the concept of the number zero.

You said, "concept." You said "the concept of the number zero." So, you're not talking about the number zero but instead, you're talking about the concept of the number zero. So, I'm not going to talk about the number zero (which is abstract); instead, I'm going to talk about the concept of the number zero (which is concrete).

The concept of the number zero (not to be confused, we hope, with the number zero) is NOT non-spatiotemporal. If we were not talking about the concept of the number zero but instead talking about the number zero, then I would mention the fact that the number zero IS non-spatiotemporal.

Quote:

So Saying Rudolph was conceived in a particular year doesn't negate the point ughaibu is making.

You and I are clearly not using the term, "Rudolph" the same way. I operate under the notion that "Rudolph" refers to Rudolph (well, it would if it succeeded in referring).

You, on the other hand, operate as if the term, "Rudoph" refers to something else, apparently a product of the imagination, if I'm keeping all this straight.

Quote:

Don't you have other reasons for thinking numbers exist besides your claim that a number has properties?

We use them.

---------- Post added 03-24-2010 at 12:51 PM ----------

I have to run for now.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;142995 wrote:

So, today you cant imagine a real dog show??Is there any reason that I should accept both this claim and the claim that the existence of numbers is known by the fact that they have properties?
Yet again, Rudolph is purely imaginary and Rudolph has a red nose, if having a red nose is not a property, what on Earth is it?

Oh, having a red nose is a property all right. But it is false that Rudolph, the reindeer has a red nose. What is true, of course, is that in a well-known song, it is asserted that there is a reindeer named "Rudolph" etc. etc.

@fast,

[QUOTE=fast;143079]You said, "concept." You said "the concept of the number zero." So, you're not talking about the number zero but instead, you're talking about the concept of the number zero. So, I'm not going to talk about the number zero (which is abstract); instead, I'm going to talk about the concept of the number zero (which is concrete).[/QUOTE] There was a time when someone first conceived of the number zero and there was a time when someone first conceived of the imaginary being Rudolph.
Because of that we are able to talk about Rudolph and zero.
I still don't see how this negates the point ughaibu was making.

Edited comment:
Actually, I think it does undermine Ughaibu's point (unless I'm misunderstanding his point):
For Rudolph was conceived as being imaginary while the number zero was not conceived as being imaginary.

Quote:

The concept of the number zero (not to be confused, we hope, with the number zero) is NOT non-spatiotemporal. If we were not talking about the concept of the number zero but instead talking about the number zero, then I would mention the fact that the number zero IS non-spatiotemporal.

I don't agree. Our concepts can be concepts of things that are spatio-temporal and of things that are non-spatio-temporal. Concepts themselves are non-spatial-temporal. They can't be mental particulars that exist in in an individual's mind for you and I can share the exact same concept.
I would highly recommend taking a look at this article that I previously cited in another thread:
Concepts: Where Subjectivism Goes Wrong

Quote:

We use them.

We agree on that.

@Ahab,

Ahab;143087 wrote:

Edited comment:
Actually, I think it does undermine Ughaibu's point (unless I'm misunderstanding his point):
For Rudolph was conceived as being imaginary while the number zero was not conceived as being imaginary.

I dont see why this would make any difference. There is a set of causally inert objects without location in space or time, as far as I can see, whether or not the members of this set are said to exist depends on which objects "existence" is defined to include. Up to here Fast and Kennethamy seem to hold a similar view. However, their view that some of the objects in this set exist but others dont hasn't been justified, under their definition of existence, and as we've had similar threads at the other place and this one has been going for nearly 500 posts, I dont expect there will be any justification.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;143102 wrote:

I dont see why this would make any difference. There is a set of causally inert objects without location in space or time, as far as I can see, whether or not the members of this set are said to exist depends on which objects "existence" is defined to include. Up to here Fast and Kennethamy seem to hold a similar view. However, their view that some of the objects in this set exist but others dont hasn't been justified, under their definition of existence, and as we've had similar threads at the other place and this one has been going for nearly 500 posts, I dont expect there will be any justification.

Ok. I agree with you that if someone is going to posit an entity X that is aspatial, atemporal and causally inert, it is not enough simply to say 'X has properties and so X exists'. You need to have a way to verify that X has the poperties you claim it has. And how does one do that with a posited entity that is causally inert, atemporal and aspatial?

@ughaibu,

First people needed to grasp the concept of No-thing. Then they gave it a Name Nihil or something. Finally they used the o as a symbol of 0.
So Order is as follows: Concept > Words > Numbers;
Pepijn Sweep's
Kind :nonooo:
Regards
Santa

@fast,

fast;143079 wrote:

You and I are clearly not using the term, "Rudolph" the same way. I operate under the notion that "Rudolph" refers to Rudolph (well, it would if it succeeded in referring).

Who was given the name "Rudolph"?
It wasn't given to a real reindeer. If it had been, then the name would succeed in referring to that reindeer.
You apparently refuse to acknowledge the possibility that it could be given to an imaginary being.

So who was given the name 'Rudolph'?

Quote:

You, on the other hand, operate as if the term, "Rudoph" refers to something else, apparently a product of the imagination, if I'm keeping all this straight.

Rudolph is an imaginary being. I think 'Rudolph' refers to that imaginary being.

I think it succeeds in referring because I don't limit referents only to existing objects. Obviously, we disagree on what can be considered to be a referent.

If the referent is postulated to exist and it turns out that it doesn't exist then you can have a failure of reference. An example of that would be phlogiston.

I believe my concept of 'referent' more closely matches standard usage of referring terms than yours does and that is why I prefer it over your concept.

@Ahab,

Ahab;143179 wrote:

Who was given the name "Rudolph"?
It wasn't given to a real reindeer. If it had been, then the name would succeed in referring to that reindeer.
You apparently refuse to acknowledge the possibility that it could be given to an imaginary being.

So who was given the name 'Rudolph'?

Rudolph is an imaginary being. I think 'Rudolph' refers to that imaginary being.

I think it succeeds in referring because I don't limit referents only to existing objects. Obviously, we disagree on what can be considered to be a referent.

If the referent is postulated to exist and it turns out that it doesn't exist then you can have a failure of reference. An example of that would be phlogiston.

I believe my concept of 'referent' more closely matches standard usage of referring terms than yours does and that is why I prefer it over your concept.

Nothing was given the name of "Rudolph", but in the song, it was asserted that Rudolph was a reindeer. The proper name, "Rudolph the red-nosed reindeer" has no referent, and thus, fails to refer. (By the way, the writers of the song never imagined that there was such a reindeer, so why would you say that Rudolph was an imaginary being?)

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;142858 wrote:

I'm well aware of it.
1) being imaginary is a property

No.
No in the sense that the being that is deemed imaginary does not have the property of being imaginary. Certainly not in any sense of "property" which I take it here to imply that (a) existence is not a property and (b) to have a property something has to exist.
EB

@Speakpigeon,

Speakpigeon;143492 wrote:

No.

Any reason I should accept this?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;143483 wrote:

Nothing was given the name of "Rudolph", but in the song, it was asserted that Rudolph was a reindeer. The proper name, "Rudolph the red-nosed reindeer" has no referent, and thus, fails to refer. (By the way, the writers of the song never imagined that there was such a reindeer, so why would you say that Rudolph was an imaginary being?)

I'm imagining a little round furry ball that has one leg and one eye and a large mouth full of very sharp teeth. The color of her fur is a dark red. I've decided to call her Moo-moo. Someday I hope to write a story about Moo-moo.

I think Moo-moo is an imaginary being, don't you?

Why would anyone think that the referent of 'Moo-moo' is a real creature?

@Ahab,

[QUOTE=Ahab;143087]I don't agree. Our concepts can be concepts of things that are spatio-temporal and of things that are non-spatio-temporal. Concepts themselves are non-spatial-temporal. They can't be mental particulars that exist in in an individual's mind for you and I can share the exact same concept.[/QUOTE]

I'm making a distinction between A) my concept and B) its referent (for lack of a better term).

Let's talk about B, the referent, or (not the concept) but what the concept is a concept of. For example, I may have a concept of my cat, and clearly, my cat is a concrete object. Also, I may have a concept of the class of all dinosaurs, and a class is generally regarded as being an abstract object. So yes, I agree with you in that I cannot only have concepts of concrete objects, but I can also have concepts of abstract objects. I have no issue with that.

But, let's not talk about B but instead A. My concept (my actual mental concept) is quite unique, as it appears to neither be fully concrete nor fully abstract but somewhere in-between. Appears, I say, but instead of calling the concept (not to be confused with its referent) concrete is the route I take, and I'll tell you why.

First, I believe "concrete" is defined in terms of "abstract." To say of something that it's abstract is to say that it's neither in time nor space. In other words, there are two necessary conditions that need to be satisfied for it to be true that something is abstract.

Second, I believe that concrete and abstract are dichotomous in that if an object exists, then it's either one or the other and never both. In other words, they are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories.

Third, if we find something that meets one but not both conditions, then although it appears as though its quasi-concrete/abstract, things are not as they appear. My position is that if both conditions aren't met, then by definition, the object is concrete.

Forth, recall that I am not talking about the referent of our concepts. Hence, I'm not talking about things like my cat or things like a class of dinosaurs. Instead, I'm talking about A) my concept--which (and again) ought not be confused with what my concept is a concept of. My concept (much like an idea) is a mental phenomena. It's a product of the mind. In fact, it's a direct product of the mind, and because minds are brain dependent, it's an indirect product of the brain.

Fifth, what's important is whether or not those two conditions have been met, as we seek to know whether or not my concepts (not what my concepts are concepts of) are abstract or concrete. My concepts are in time, but they are not eternal. Because they are in time, they are also not non-temporal. To put it another way, I had no concepts prior to my birth. A few scientist might disagree, so I'll say I had no concepts prior to my conception--at least not prior to the zygote that eventually came to be me.

Sixth, because my concepts are temporal, my concepts are not abstract, and because my concepts are not abstract, my concepts are concrete. Thus, A) my concepts are concrete, and B) the referent of my concepts are either concrete or abstract.

Seventh, because I was talking about A and because your objection pertained to B, your objection doesn't stand against what I had to say.

Now, let's examine this again, but with a twist:
1) A) My concept (concrete)
2) B1) my cat (concrete)
3) B2) class of dinosaurs (abstract)

When we talk of abstract objects, we are talking about things like number 3 above, but let's examine the term, "abstract concept" as it gets thrown around a lot. This is where we have to be careful about language. Saying that something is an abstract concept is different than saying a concept is abstract. To say that X is an abstract concept is to say that what the concept is a concept of is abstract (hence, akin to number 3). To say a concept is abstract is to talk about number 1 and say A) my concept is abstract.

@fast,

fast;142717 wrote:

An imagined friend is imaginary, but it's imagined to be real. Who imagines things to be imaginary?

This is no problem. If we assume that something imaginary exists then we can imagine something either to be a real something or to be an imaginary something. As a child I can imagine Santa Claus to be real and as a grown-up I can imagine Santa Claus but this time as an imaginary one.
EB

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