numbers vs. words

@Speakpigeon,

Speakpigeon;143652 wrote:

I was not saying that it is what you were saying. There is no need to be so literal all the time. I meant that it was a consequence of assuming that the referent had to be an actual object.

Who assumed that the referent has to be an actual object? I've already stated that an imginary being can be a referent.
I would suggest that you take into consideration the context in which I say something. I don't care if you don't agree with me. But at least try to make it a disagreement with something I actually claimed.

Quote:

The problem is that we never really know that there is any actual object to which our word could refer. So, in effect, assuming an actual object as referent leads to the possibility of having a failure of referent and this not acceptable in my view. A word has to have a referent and the only thing that always exists and can therefore provide a proper referent is the idea the speaker has in mind when using the particular word. Whereas real objects, so called, may not always exist, which would lead to a "failure" of reference, which is in fact rather a failure of the model you use for meaning and reference.

Nothing you've said gives me a reason for adopting your 'model'.

Quote:

Good, so now I would like to know what you meant by "the Eiffel Tower itself" if not "the Eiffel Tower in itself"... Can you tell?

I was simply saying I could describe the Eiffel Tower (which is an object) in addition to being able to describe my mental image of the Eiffel Tower. I added 'itslelf' in order make clear I was doing the former rather than the latter.

Quote:

Thanks.
EB

You are welcome.

---------- Post added 03-25-2010 at 12:06 PM ----------

fast;143661 wrote:

This conversation is all over the map.

I believe that I am looking at a horse even when I'm viewing a horse indirectly through a mirror. Also, I believe I am looking at a horse even though there is no direct connection from my brain to the horse.

There are some people that believe (unfortunately) that we cannot directly observe objects, but that is because they allow their understanding of a process to skew their understanding of what it means to observe something.

For example, I can visually observe a horse by looking at a horse, but some deny that I can even do that because they confuse the process of seeing an object with actually understanding what it means to see an object.

Anyhow, I think I'm going to back out of this for a wee bit.

You've made a wise decision. I had to put Speakpigeon on my ignore list on the other discussion board. Looks like I'll have to do the same here.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;143026 wrote:

But this claim is quite completely vapid because the so called property depends on exactly the same kind of object. You're boot-strapping.Of course Rudolph is abstract because fictional objects are a subset of abstract objects.But this is exactly what is under contention and exactly what you have continuously failed to support. You claim that numbers exist because they have properties but Rudolph doesn't have properties because it doesn't exist, this reasoning is fallacious, it's obviously fallacious and it's been brought to your attention several times that it's fallacious.

But that is not fast's argument; his argument is that x exists if and only if it has properties, so numbers exist because they have properties, and Rudolph does not have properties because it does not exist. And that is not fallacious. It is valid, and, so far as I can see, sound. And why do you think that fictions are a subset of abstract objects when they are not objects?

@kennethamy,

[QUOTE=kennethamy;143682]And why do you think that fictions are a subset of abstract objects when they are not objects?[/QUOTE]That's what I wanted to know. We're so busy trying to classify objects as one kind or another that some forget (and need reminding) that some things under discussion aren't even objects at all.

Maybe the very fact the word, "object" is in the term, "fictional object" is what drives the propensity to think that a so called fictional object is a kind of object.

A fictional object is no more a kind of object than a toy car is a kind of car.

@fast,

fast;143692 wrote:

That's what I wanted to know. We're so busy trying to classify objects as one kind or another that some forget (and need reminding) that some things under discussion aren't even objects at all.

Maybe the very fact the word, "object" is in the term, "fictional object" is what drives the propensity to think that a so called fictional object is a kind of object.

A fictional object is no more a kind of object than a toy car is a kind of car.

Nor is an abstract object a kind of object.
By the way some philosophers do take the position that fictional objects exist. I don't agree with them. But I don't think I would claim that these fictional objects don't have properties in order to refute their position.

If you posit something that is atemporal, aspatial and acausal why would you think that the mere claim that it has properties entail that it really exists?

@Ahab,

[QUOTE=Ahab;143705]Nor is an abstract object a kind of object. [/QUOTE]I've played around with that idea, and I'm still up in the air on it, but I still hold that abstract objects exist since they have properties.

[quote]If you posit something that is atemporal, aspatial and acausal why would you think that the mere claim that it has properties entail that it really exists?[/QUOTE]It's not the claim but rather the fact they have properties. When I claim that the number three has properties, I'm not mistaken am I?[/SIZE]

By the way, I've enjoyed this conversation with you. It's been rather pleasant, but as I turn to Ughaibu's objection, I hope to keep it pleasant even if it entails him wishing to throw a chair at me.

At any rate, let me start by throwing out a couple arguments:

1. That which has properties exists.
2. The number three has properties
Therefore 3, the number three exists.

4. That which doesn't have properties doesn't exist.
5. Rudolph does not have properties.
Therefore 6, Rudolph doesn't exist.

Gee, I hope I worded that right.

Ughaibu apparently believes that number five above is false, and when asked to list the properties he thinks Rudolph has, he tries (as do others) to pawn off fictional properties as if they're real, and when called on it, he reverts back and attacks my claim regarding number 2. This may be a strawman (sorry Ughaibu), but I'm trying to get a grip on what the problem is.

It's almost as if he is mistakenly regarding fictions as abstract objects, and from a previous post of his, I'm gathering that has a lot to do with it.

ETA: a fiction isn't abstract, and that is true whether fictions exist or not. If it doesn't exist, then it's neither concrete nor abstract, and if it does exist, then it's concrete. Remember, a fiction (if it exists at all) is temporal, and nothing that is temporal is abstract.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;143682 wrote:

his argument is that x exists if and only if it has properties, so numbers exist because they have properties, and Rudolph does not have properties because it does not exist. And that is not fallacious. It is valid, and, so far as I can see, sound.

This is how it goes:
Fast: numbers have properties, therefore numbers exist
Me: fictional objects have properties, therefore fictional objects exist
Fast: fictional objects dont have properties because fictional objects dont exist
Me: numbers dont have properties because numbers dont exist.

There is nothing claimed by Fast, or you, that justifies claiming that numbers exist but fictional objects dont.

@ughaibu,

When I say that X has properties, I don't need to be explicit and say that X has real properties, for properties that are not real are not properties at all. If you say that fictional objects have properties, then that should be taken to mean that fictional objects have real properties, but you don't actually believe that fictional objects have real properties do you?

@fast,

fast;143949 wrote:

When I say that X has properties, I don't need to be explicit and say that X has real properties, for properties that are not real are not properties at all. If you say that fictional objects have properties, then that should be taken to mean that fictional objects have real properties, but you don't actually believe that fictional objects have real properties do you?

Presumably you're asking me. As I've pointed out, your properties are only real if your object is real, so you are boot-strapping, and this is circular reasoning. The same with your denial of fictional objects, you can not decide that fictional objects dont exist unless you can show that they dont have properties, so, claiming that they dont have properties because they dont exist, is circular reasoning. Fictional objects have at least one "real" property, and that is the property of being fictional.

@ughaibu,

[QUOTE=ughaibu;143956]Presumably you're asking me. As I've pointed out, your properties are only real if your object is real, so you are boot-strapping, and this is circular reasoning. The same with your denial of fictional objects, you can not decide that fictional objects dont exist unless you can show that they dont have properties, so, claiming that they dont have properties because they dont exist, is circular reasoning. Fictional objects have at least one "real" property, and that is the property of being fictional.[/QUOTE]When I say, "to say of something that it has properties is to say of something that it exists" it is not an argument, nor is it a how-to guide on determining whether or not something exists. It is an explanation that helps us better understand what the word "exist" means. I can make a couple arguments though:

1. That which has properties exists.
2. The number three has properties
Therefore 3, the number three exists.

4. That which doesn't have properties doesn't exist.
5. Rudolph does not have properties.
Therefore 6, Rudolph doesn't exist.

The arguments as far as I can tell are not only valid but sound as well. Do you have a problem with both premises in both arguments?

@fast,

fast;143958 wrote:

1. That which has properties exists.
2. The number three has properties
Therefore 3, the number three exists.

4. That which doesn't have properties doesn't exist.
5. Rudolph does not have properties.
Therefore 6, Rudolph doesn't exist.

The arguments as far as I can tell are not only valid but sound as well. Do you have a problem with both premises in both arguments?

Yes, I have the same objections that I've always had.

@ughaibu,

[QUOTE=ughaibu;143956]Fictional objects have at least one "real" property, and that is the property of being fictional.[/QUOTE]To say of the character in fiction that the character is fictional is not to say (or at least I hope it isn't to say) that the character in fiction does not exist. Of course there are characters in works of fiction. So, if you're saying that the character in fiction has the property of being fictional, then I suppose I could agree, but when I say that Rudolph doesn't exist, I'm not saying there is no character in fiction. I'm saying there is no real reindeer with the property of being able to fly.

ETA: and THAT reindeer does NOT have the property of being fictional. It has no properties AT ALL.

@fast,

fast;143973 wrote:

when I say that Rudolph doesn't exist, I'm not saying there is no character in fiction. I'm saying there is no real reindeer with the property of being able to fly.

If there was a real reindeer then that reindeer wouldn't be fictional, would it? Nobody is saying. . . . etc, etc, etc, for the umpteenth time.

@ughaibu,

[QUOTE=ughaibu;143980]If there was a real reindeer then that reindeer wouldn't be fictional, would it? Nobody is saying. . . . etc, etc, etc, for the umpteenth time.[/QUOTE]When a child asks, "Do flying reindeers really exist," the reason why we answer no is because there are no real flying reindeers, and when a child asks, "does Rudolph really exist," the reason why we say no is for the same reason as before: because there are no real flying reindeers.

@fast,

fast;143983 wrote:

When a child asks, "Do flying reindeers really exist," the reason why we answer no is because there are no real flying reindeers, and when a child asks, "does Rudolph really exist," the reason why we say no is for the same reason as before: because there are no real flying reindeers.

So what? Children aren't enquiring about abstract objects, are they?

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;143784 wrote:

This is how it goes:
Fast: numbers have properties, therefore numbers exist
Me: fictional objects have properties, therefore fictional objects exist
Fast: fictional objects dont have properties because fictional objects dont exist
Me: numbers dont have properties because numbers dont exist.

There is nothing claimed by Fast, or you, that justifies claiming that numbers exist but fictional objects dont.

But that was not the criticism I replied to. You claimed fast's argument was invalid, it was not invalid.

Now, here is the argument (or reason):

1. The argument is that all and only what exists has properties.
2. Numbers do have properties, but fictional objects do not.
Therefore, 3. Numbers exist, but fictional objects do not.

This argument is valid. I expect you disagree with both premises. So, what is your disagreement?

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;143987 wrote:

So what? Children aren't enquiring about abstract objects, are they?

Rudolph isn't an abstract object.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;143990 wrote:

But that was not the criticism I replied to. You claimed fast's argument was invalid, it was not invalid.

Now, here is the argument (or reason):

1. The argument is that all and only what exists has properties.
2. Numbers do have properties, but fictional objects do not.
Therefore, 3. Numbers exist, but fictional objects do not.

This argument is valid. I expect you disagree with both premises. So, what is your disagreement?

I said his reasoning is fallacious, and as has been stated about twenty times, this is because he has claimed that "like it or not", if a thing has properties, then he has to agree that it exists. His reason for realism about numbers as abstract objects is that numbers have properties, and it's already been pointed out that the existence of abstract objects can be established in no other way. This means that the argument has this form:
1) the set of things with properties has the same members as the set of things which exist
2) (hidden premise) fictional objects do not have properties, therefore;
3) fictional objects do not exist
4) therefore fictional objects do not have properties.

---------- Post added 03-26-2010 at 11:55 PM ----------

fast;143992 wrote:

Rudolph isn't an abstract object.

It's causally inert and doesn't have any location in space or time, of course it's an abstract object!

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;143998 wrote:

It's causally inert and doesn't have any location in space or time, of course it's an abstract object!

Not unless there are fictional objects

1. There are abstract objects.
2. There are no fictional objects.

Therefore, 3. Fictional objects are not abstract objects.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;144005 wrote:

1. There are abstract objects.
2. There are no fictional objects.

Which is exactly what you still have given me no reason to accept.

@ughaibu,

[QUOTE=ughaibu;143998]It's causally inert and doesn't have any location in space or time, of course it's an abstract object![/quote]
Let's do this in a two-step process. Determine whether or not something exists before trying to determine whether or not it's concrete or abstract.

Rudolph does not exist, and because Rudolph does not exist, it's neither concrete nor abstract. See my point!?

Now let's suppose Rudolph does exist. Gee, looky there, a flying reindeer! Notice it and see it in both time and space. You should conclude that Rudolph is concrete--supposing Rudolph exists, of course.

You seem to hold this rather odd view that things that do not exist are abstract. To say of something that it's abstract isn't to say that something doesn't exist. It's to say it does exist!

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numbers vs. words

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