What is Free Will?

@prothero,

prothero;115454 wrote:

The inability to accurately flawlessly predict human behavior using the laws of physics and chemistry: rejection of determinism in human behavior (hard or soft). The future is open and contains many possiblities. There are many possible futures, unknown and unknowable. Some things can be predicted and are determined others are not. On the whole the small unpredictable things add up to a future which is open. Chaos develops from system of sufficent complexity even if the underlying principles are held to be deterministic. New properties arise and "free will" arises from minds of sufficent complexity.

As I understand it, unpredictability arises from indeterminacy at the quantum level, which gives rise to large-scale chaos over a period of time. But quantum events (whether in the brain or the outside world) are random, so how could they be the basis for free will?

@ACB,

ACB;115540 wrote:

As I understand it, unpredictability arises from indeterminacy at the quantum level, which gives rise to large-scale chaos over a period of time. But quantum events (whether in the brain or the outside world) are random, so how could they be the basis for free will?

Anyway, not the kind of free will anyone would want to have. That is the problem, of course. If determinism implies there is no free will (hard determinism) then if the only alternative is indeterminism of some kind. And it that indeterminism implies a free will that is random, then either we have no free will, or else we have a kind of free will that no one would want to have. So, if incompatibilism is true, then either there is no free will, or there is a pointless kind of free will that would be rejected by any rational person.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;115486 wrote:

But, of course, when people say, "she had no choice" what they really mean is that she had no better choice, not that she literally had no choice. She chose between two evils (as they say) and she chose the lesser evil. So she did have a choice, and she chose it. Isn't that true?

Well, they seem to say that she actually was overwhelmingly forced; could do no other. I think that is incorrect.

Nevertheless, we do like to use extreme or unusual examples in order to investigate:
"Is this showing such a case as mentioned is possible - where psychological force is overwhelming, and no choice is left available ?"

@memester,

memester;115547 wrote:

Well, they seem to say that she actually was overwhelmingly forced; could do no other. I think that is incorrect.

Nevertheless, we do like to use extreme or unusual examples in order to investigate:
"Is this showing such a case as mentioned is possible - where psychological force is overwhelming, and no choice is left available ?"

But it is not true she had no choice. What she did not have was a better choice.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;115552 wrote:

But it is not true she had no choice. What she did not have was a better choice.

I think so too. She had choices, but preferred one of them.

Now we would have to determine if preference was forced.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;115541 wrote:

Anyway, not the kind of free will anyone would want to have. That is the problem, of course. If determinism implies there is no free will (hard determinism) then if the only alternative is indeterminism of some kind. And it that indeterminism implies a free will that is random, then either we have no free will, or else we have a kind of free will that no one would want to have. So, if incompatibilism is true, then either there is no free will, or there is a pointless kind of free will that would be rejected by any rational person.

What's so terrible about not having free will? You like roller coasters don't you?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;115541 wrote:

Anyway, not the kind of free will anyone would want to have. That is the problem, of course. If determinism implies there is no free will (hard determinism) then if the only alternative is indeterminism of some kind. And it that indeterminism implies a free will that is random, then either we have no free will, or else we have a kind of free will that no one would want to have. So, if incompatibilism is true, then either there is no free will, or there is a pointless kind of free will that would be rejected by any rational person.

I don't think that is a helpful way to look at it.
I find this is better. choose from these vis a vis what is most sensible and pragmatically useful as premise for the logical suitability of doing anything.
1/ we think we are robots, and we are robots
2/ we think we are robots, but we are not robots.

3/ we think we are not robots, and we are not robots.
4/ we think we are not robots, but we are robots.

you could arrange them like this, too;

1/ we are robots. and we think we are robots.
2/ we are robots, but we think we are not robots.

3/ we are not robots. and we think we are not robots.
4/ we are not robots, but we think we are robots.

@fast,

Free will is the capability to choose between good and evil and experience the results.

@ACB,

ACB;115540 wrote:

As I understand it, unpredictability arises from indeterminacy at the quantum level, which gives rise to large-scale chaos over a period of time. But quantum events (whether in the brain or the outside world) are random, so how could they be the basis for free will?

Quantum events are not mathematically random they are stochastic probablities (ordered possiblities). Precisely the kind of free will you do have; choice among a limited number of ordered (actual) possiblities. One must attribute some causal efficiency to mind. Will is not free it is choice among a relatively limited number of actual possibilites for any given situation. The ability to do otherwise, not the ability to do anything or everything.

@fast,

consider this argument against free will. A photon created at the BB will not experience the passage of time therefore it will experience all moments overlapped(assuming it is never destroyed prior).
Therefore it would seem to me that from a photons perspective, it's already seen the future which I don't see as possible unless everything has already happened, we just haven't gotten there yet.

@memester,

memester;115583 wrote:

I don't think that is a helpful way to look at it.
.

Why not? .....................

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;119868 wrote:

Why not? .....................

because it is useless.

@memester,

memester;119895 wrote:

because it is useless.

And, why is that? I would have thought that the question of whether a particular understanding of free will is "worth having" is (in part) to ask whether it is useful.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;119897 wrote:

And, why is that? I would have thought that the question of whether a particular understanding of free will is "worth having" is (in part) to ask whether it is useful.

and I answered; that that understanding is not that useful.

@memester,

memester;119909 wrote:

and I answered; that understanding is not that useful.

But you did not say why. Just saying that it is not useful does not make it true that it is not useful.

@prothero,

prothero;119826 wrote:

Quantum events are not mathematically random they are stochastic probablities (ordered possiblities). Precisely the kind of free will you do have; choice among a limited number of ordered (actual) possiblities. One must attribute some causal efficiency to mind. Will is not free it is choice among a relatively limited number of actual possibilites for any given situation. The ability to do otherwise, not the ability to do anything or everything.

Your position seems to be exactly the opposite of kennethamy's. He is (I think) arguing that any worthwhile free will requires determinism, while you are arguing that it requires (limited) indeterminism. Have I got that right? The complicating factor here is that we have three different concepts: (1) law-like regularities; (2) stochastic probabilities: and (3) random events.

Incidentally, does the idea that "one must attribute some causal efficiency to mind" imply mind-body dualism? If not, the action of "mind" is reducible to the motions of impersonal particles and waves in accordance with universal physical laws.

---------- Post added 01-14-2010 at 10:17 PM ----------

Amperage;119828 wrote:

A photon created at the BB will not experience the passage of time therefore it will experience all moments overlapped(assuming it is never destroyed prior).

Sorry, I don't understand this. Can you elaborate, please?

@ACB,

[QUOTE=ACB;120010] Your position seems to be exactly the opposite of kennethamy's. He is (I think) arguing that any worthwhile free will requires determinism, while you are arguing that it requires (limited) indeterminism. Have I got that right? The complicating factor here is that we have three different concepts: (1) law-like regularities; (2) stochastic probabilities: and (3) random events. [/QUOTE] The first two are found in nature, and correspond to our experience. Meaningful free will requires some degree of causality and predictability on this I think we agree. What is meant by free will exactly and what is meant by causality and by determinism, I do not think are notions we share. Laplace type determinism (only one possible future and only one possible past) is not compatible with "free will" as I "see" it. Any other type of view of possibilities for the future and the past allows for some degree of "free will" as I understand the term. "Free" is a bit of a misnomer because the use of your will is always severely but not totally constrained.

[QUOTE=ACB;120010] Incidentally, does the idea that "one must attribute some causal efficiency to mind" imply mind-body dualism? If not, the action of "mind" is reducible to the motions of impersonal particles and waves in accordance with universal physical laws.[/QUOTE] One of the problems with discussing "free will" is that it gets defined in terms of other metaphysical concepts like "causality, determinism, and mind". So that no universally accepted concept of free will exists. I am a neutral monist (ultimate reality has both mental and physical attributes which are not separate but only different manifestations of more fundamental nature).
What is mind anyway? My concept of primitive properties of mind: experience, perception, memory, interiority and some degree of freedom in response extends to the very core of nature. Mind in my view is not some rare, emergent, property of matter but a fundamental feature of nature in which the human mind and human consciousness is just a matter of degree of expression or arrangement of these attributes. Mind does not arise miraculously from nature which is fundamentally inert and insensate. I doubt many people share this view.

@prothero,

prothero;120093 wrote:

The first two are found in nature, and correspond to our experience. Meaningful free will requires some degree of causality and predictability on this I think we agree. What is meant by free will exactly and what is meant by causality and by determinism, I do not think are notions we share. Laplace type determinism (only one possible future and only one possible past) is not compatible with "free will" as I "see" it. Any other type of view of possibilities for the future and the past allows for some degree of "free will" as I understand the term. "Free" is a bit of a misnomer because the use of your will is always severely but not totally constrained.

.

Why would it matter that there is only one possible future for me, as long as it is up to me what that future will be? If, in other words, that future is the consequence of what I decide to do. For instance, suppose my future is to eat some vanilla ice-cream. But that is because I decided to eat vanilla ice-cream. So, I ate vanilla ice-cream of my own free will.

@ACB,

ACB;120010 wrote:

Sorry, I don't understand this. Can you elaborate, please?

Well a photon travels at the speed of light. At the speed of light, it would seem to me, that would mean that it would not experience the passage of time as we know it.
At the speed of light I would think that all moments would just be superimposed on top of each other. Kind of like pictures in a flip book. We experience time because we are not traveling at the speed of light and so we are simply going from page to page. At the speed of light though, the pages would be flipped so fast, in fact so fast that the book would become just one thing. To me this would mean that the future has already happened we just haven't gotten there yet. And if the future has already happened that means there's no way for it to happen any other way.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;119910 wrote:

But you did not say why. Just saying that it is not useful does not make it true that it is not useful.

It's not useful because whatever you decide about will, there is only one useful way to proceed...and that is as if we have will.

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