Forget, for a minute, whether we have free will. Isn't having free will the ability to do otherwise than you did do? So, when someone says, "I did that of my own free will" , isn't he, at least, saying, I could have done something else; I was not forced to do what I did"?

It depends. Some people may mean that they were not forced by something external to them, but that they did what they did because of their desire, and that was not something that they chose. So, someone might say, an action done by "free will" means that one is not externally compelled, not that one was not compelled internally to act in the manner that one acted.

It depends. Some people may mean that they were not forced by something external to them, but that they did what they did because of their desire, and that was not something that they chose. So, someone might say, an action done by "free will" means that one is not externally compelled, not that one was not compelled internally to act in the manner that one acted.

What I have found in discussions of "free will" is that, generally, people do not precisely define what they mean, and then get into arguments with others who likewise do not precisely define what they mean by the expression "free will". They then typically see each other as idiots, who cannot see what is obvious about the expression that they are using, neglecting the fact that they may simply be using different definitions of the terms. In my opinion, this is precisely the problem that occurs with compatibilists versus incompatibilists (with determinism), where each is simply using a different idea of what is meant by "free will".

In other words, I think you are right to start with, "Forget, for a minute, whether we have free will." The first thing to do is to state what, precisely, "free will" is. It is only after one knows what one is talking about that one will be in a proper position to say whether or not people have such a thing.

But even the above is rather optimistic and flattering to people. By not defining a term precisely, it allows for much equivocation, which leads to all sorts of problems. I think, for some people, the problem is not simply that they are using a different definition from others, but that they do not have a precise definition that they adhere to, and so they flounder about, saying all sorts of nonsense.

Going with the "quitting smoking" scenario:

Let's say it was a New Year's Resolution.
We can see that various pressures exist internally on whether to make resolutions, whether to announce them, whether "quit smoking" is one we want to make right now, whether we are optimistic about outcome, etc. etc.

The pressures are diffferent from moment to moment; some or all of the pressures at the moment of announcement differ from pressure three days into the ordeal.

See this as to how pressures change moment to moment: as resolution
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUkj9pjx3H0

Hitchens does better



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4LPubUCJv58

at 4:40 he says that you can't think of anything else.

I don't think there has ever been a case of someone doing "other than they did". You'd think if it was possible someone would have done it by now.



the possibility of differing choosing/decision exists for us before events, but afterward, there is no other possibility, none. Whatever forced it, forced it.
Unless we bring in "retro-causality" or something like that. Maybe Robert Lanza.

I agree with your post, except that we should not attempt to carve the definition in stone. That is, we should not make it precise. For it may very well be that when we take the next step, and consider how the definition should be applied in cases (either actual or theoretical) we may find as a consequence that we will have to modify the original definition in various ways. We may find gaps that the original definition cannot fill. And, in fact, we may find ourselves going back and forth between definition and cases (and our intuitions about those cases) until we come to a rational agreement. In fact, this is a process which is sometimes called, "the process of reflective equlibrium". Everything is revisable, Even definitions. And we may find that when we have gone through our thinking, that the definition we started with has been greatly altered. Of course, it is a good thing to start with something fairly clear, and then consider applications. But, on the other hand, not be dogmatic about the definition. I think that is the rational way to go. "Precision", in other words, should not mean, "dogmatism".

I agree that definitions should not be carved in stone. It is often that case that one definition will turn out to be more useful than another, and it would be bad to lock in a less useful definition for a term. But if people start off with different ideas, and they fail to communicate that fact, it almost always results in a lot of wasted effort. And that, in my opinion, is what is wrong with all, or nearly all, threads that I have seen online regarding the topic of "free will". It is also what I have noticed about conversations about "free will", so it is not unique to the internet.

I think this is a perennial problem in philosophy more because of this failure to communicate than due to any inherent intractability of the issues at hand. When I was a student, I had a great deal of trouble understanding why there were both compatibilists and incompatibilists with free will and determinism. As it turns out, whether they are compatible or not depends upon the particular definitions used. If I had been told by one of my teachers, that different people are using different definitions for the terms, it would have been much easier, but I had to figure that out for myself. Once one realizes that different people mean quite different things by the terms, it becomes obvious why different people would make different claims about them, and their failure to realize that others are using different definitions makes it obvious why they would be perplexed by the apparent obstinacy of their opponents in their arguments.

Not all behavior is addictive behavior. So, it is fallacious to project from addictive behavior.

I think rather that the problem lies in how to understand the notion of, "could have done otherwise". I think that we can agree that to say that a person acted of his own free will is to imply (at least) that he could have done otherwise. But the disagreement starts when we try to understand what that phrase comes to. I think that is the core idea of "free will".

In other words, you are saying that the words used to define "free will" are not sufficiently clear, so that there is an ambiguity present even when people agree that those words somehow define "free will".

Why is it fallacious to project from any particular behaviour ? IOW, is your problem with that, because of using "addictive behaviours" as examples, or is using any example a problem, as it cannot be said to be "all behaviour" ?

Addictive behavior is not normal behavior (I suppose, "by definition"). So it would not constitute what statisticians would call "a fair sample".

What would be more likely fallacious, is to go selecting for " normal" behaviours only, as examples, when it is the "not normal" ones - or anomalies - that would show weaknesses in the reasoning.

We should, of course, take a fair sample, depending on what we want to know about. And that might include all kinds of behaviors. (A weakness in what reasoning do you mean?)

any reasoning.
I would naturally test any reasoning by the most extreme of examples to see where boundaries lie.

Yes, I edited in some examples of extreme examples to use. Great psychological force, mild physical force, and so on.

Everything then points to force being present to some degree in every event.
But to say that the slight breeze was the cause of a death where I stabbed someone, that is easily seen as nonsense.

I still don't understand what you mean. What reasoning is it you are testing, and by what examples?

Well, the reasoning that the lady got in the car, but not of her free will. It is said that she was forced. And so that was used as an example of an overpowering psychological force, as it's an obvious threat to life.

Extreme or unusual examples are great for exploring ( as opposed to looking for only for normal behaviours, normal forcing)

I still don't get what you mean. Wasn't the lady forced to get into the car? And isn't it true that because she was forced to get into the car, she did not get into the car of her own free will? I don't know what you want to say about this reasoning. And how you want to test it.

The test - in this exammple, it's being argued that psychological force makes no other choice available - is done by using an example of extreme paychological force. Not normal. Extreme. so therefore people can say "Oh, that is obviously overpowering; she had no choice"