The Real is Rational

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;154948 wrote:

It might be a little indulgent of me to poke at those whose post I don't even see, but there's your "eye for an eye." I would rather the haters excuse themselves from threads they claim are nonsensical. What does it say about a person that they would waste their time on that which they claim is nonsense? Can they not start their own threads? But perhaps that would require too much honesty. Thread title: "I don't like philosophy, and I don't want you to like it." " Let's back to WORK. Philosophy is WORK. It's a man's job."
"Let's grind away at our trivialities, gentlemen...the future will surely be grateful for our sacrifice. And a curse on those for whom there is meaning in German philosophy....."

It is not a waste of time to point out nonsense. Others might think it was not nonsense, and that might be detrimental. Some German philosophy is very important and good. Kant, certainly. Then there is Carnap, and Hempel, and Reichenbach, and Schlick, and, of course, Wittgenstein. I suppose you mean German 19th century Idealists.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;154955 wrote:

It is not a waste of time to point out nonsense. Others might think it was not nonsense, and that might be detrimental. Some German philosophy is very important and good. Kant, certainly. Then there is Carnap, and Hempel, and Reichenbach, and Schlick, and, of course, Wittgenstein. I suppose you mean German 19th century Idealists.

Yes, philosophy has much irrational nonsense it is guilty of. This nonsense needs to be corrected in order to filter out the good from the bad.

Too often the wannabe philosopher mistakenly upholds the philosopher as the proper authority precisely where he shouldn't be doing that. The real practicing and disciplined philosopher upholds reason as the proper authority precisely where he should be doing that.

@Extrain,

Extrain;154957 wrote:

Yes, philosophy has much irrational nonsense it is guilty of. This nonsense needs to be corrected in order to filter out the good from the bad.

Yes. That is why Locke compared philosophers with underlaborers. And why Wittgenstein complained of all the slumlords who are philosophers, and said that it was his mission to raze the slums. Of course, Descartes advanced much the same image. We must first destroy in order to built anew. As Voltaire wrote, "ecrasez l'infame".

@Fido,

Fido;154396 wrote:

And you can try to be civil...I get that you think I am stupid, and you may get that I think you are stupid... Show me wrong so I can accept it and I will not bother you, and may even respect you in reality and not just out of pity...And by pity, I mean pity for all those members here who are antagonized by animosity, even at a distance... Just tell me what you think you know...

I don't actually think you're stupid. I just think you're incredibly lazy, and so fail to think critically about the philosophical topics at hand.

I've told you that you are not even discussing philosophy at all. At most, you are having an argument with the English Dictionary. Consequently, many of your posts are just expressions of meaningless nonsense.

Fido;154396 wrote:

You deny that words are concepts, and in a sense you are correct since each word's definiition is the concept, but no concept would be worth much without its name...

Proof you are not using the English language correctly: Definitions are not concepts. Words are used to define concepts. So a definition is a set of words (or statements) that define the intension or meaning of a concept and the intension or meaning of another word. So each word's definition is a set of symbols with closely synonymous meanings that define the meaning of that word. And one might even say that the meaning of a word just is its concept--that would be ok.

You might even say something like "the definition of that concept is incomplete because the person left out this and that.....etc." But just saying "definitions are concepts" is nonsense without saying something more about that.

Here is the definition of the word "Concept":

n.
1. an idea, esp an abstract idea the concepts of biology
2. (Philosophy) Philosophy a general idea or notion that corresponds to some class of entities and that consists of the characteristic or essential features of the class
3. (Philosophy) Philosophy a. the conjunction of all the characteristic features of something
b. a theoretical construct within some theory
c. a directly intuited object of thought
d. the meaning of a predicate

Here is the definition of the word "Word":

word n. 1. A sound or a combination of sounds, or its representation in writing or printing, that symbolizes and communicates a meaning and may consist of a single morpheme or of a combination of morphemes.
2. Something said; an utterance, remark, or comment: May I say a word about that?

Here is the definition of the word "definition":

n. 1. a. A statement conveying fundamental character.
b. A statement of the meaning of a word, phrase, or term, as in a dictionary entry.

2. The act or process of stating a precise meaning or significance; formulation of a meaning.

Fido;154396 wrote:

What is your concept of a cat compared to your definition of a cat; because I don't think you can have one without the other, and are they not both identities, and both conserved???

Is a large cat a cat as much as a small cat... You could hardly fill a dictionary with definitions if they were not conserved, and like concepts are meaning to a certain being... Words are a certain meaning in relation to a being...

Some of this is right. A meaning of a word might just be a concept. But a definition is not a concept. Definitions are sets of words (or statements)that express the semantic content of concepts.

Moreover, words are not meanings. Words have meanings. And these meanings help us communicate with each other about states of affairs in the world (or what you call "being"). But the world doesn't have linguistic meanings. At most, the world does or does not have intrinsic or relational significance. This is why the meaning of the word "mountain" is not the mountain itself.

Here is the definition of the word "meaning."

meaning [ˈmiːnɪŋ]
n 1. the sense or significance of a word, sentence, symbol, etc.; import; semantic or lexical content
2. the purpose underlying or intended by speech, action, etc.
3. the inner, symbolic, or true interpretation, value, or message the meaning of a dream
4. valid content; efficacy a law with little or no meaning
5. (Philosophy) Philosophy a. the sense of an expression; its connotation
b. the reference of an expression; its denotation. In recent philosophical writings meaning can be used in both the above senses See also sense [13]

Fido;154396 wrote:

A Conjunction is like the concept: Number, in relation all numbers...Conjunction is the concept, and Although is an exampe of it

Concepts are not conjunctions, because conjunctions are functions which map one thing to another. Concepts don't always do this. Concepts are better conceived as sets of different word meanings. However, Frege certainly thought concepts behave as functions, such as in the concept "the capital of x." The value "Y" of this concept is "Berlin" when the argument is "Germany." But some people might disagree.

So it must be kept in mind that conjunctions are functions. "And" and "+" are conjunctions. {0,1} is not a conjunction; instead, it is an ordered pair.

And numbers stand in relation to other numbers, sure...but numbers are not conjunctions. "2+2=4" is an expression of a mathematical equality between 4 and the sum of 2 and 2. So "+" is a kind of conjunction, or function--namely, the function of addition. And we say "4 is the sum of 2 and 2." But 4 is not the ordered pair {2,2}. 4 is the value, or sum, of 2 and 2. So 2+2=x is a function, which maps numbers to the true and the false. If you plug in 3 for "x", you get "false." There is one and only one number that satisfies this function, namely, 4.

Fido;154396 wrote:

... Do you understand that a house cat is still a Cat, and that every individual Cat is still a Cat??? The concept is the general, the name of a class...

Concepts are set of predicates denoting features of entities within a certain class, sure. But concepts are not names. We have names of concepts such as "cat"; and "cat" denotes the concept of cat.

Here is the definition of the word "name":

name (n

m)
n. 1. A word or words by which an entity is designated and distinguished from others.
2. A word or group of words used to describe or evaluate, often disparagingly.

Fido;154396 wrote:

So language is a concept

No. Language is not a concept. Language is a set of signs, symbols, and gestures, with a set of rules that are used to articulate concepts. However, you might say something like, "the concept of language is not understood entirely by linguists in their field because language also consists of this and that....etc."--that would be ok to say. But just saying "language is a concept" doesn't make sense without saying something more about it.

Here is the definition of the word "language":

n.

1. a. Communication of thoughts and feelings through a system of arbitrary signals, such as voice sounds, gestures, or written symbols.
b. Such a system including its rules for combining its components, such as words.
c. Such a system as used by a nation, people, or other distinct community; often contrasted with dialect.

2. a. A system of signs, symbols, gestures, or rules used in communicating: the language of algebra.
b. Computer Science A system of symbols and rules used for communication with or between computers.

3. Body language; kinesics.
4. The special vocabulary and usages of a scientific, professional, or other group: "his total mastery of screen language[IMG]
5. A characteristic style of speech or writing: Shakespearean language.
6. A particular manner of expression: profane language; persuasive language.
7. The manner or means of communication between living creatures other than humans: the language of dolphins.
8. Verbal communication as a subject of study.

Fido;154396 wrote:

One alone has being...One is the concept upon which all numbers are founded, and one might say that is the concept, and all other numbers are only signs in relation to One...In fact, all are treated as concepts as multiples of a concept, and justifyably so...

This is incredibly convoluted. But in any case, we know that numbers cannot be concepts in the head because this view carries too many problems. If the number 4 was just a concept in Bob's head, then the number 4 would cease to exist when Bob died. But clearly, the number 4 does not. Therefore, the number 4 is not a concept in Bob's head.

Whatever numbers are, I know the prevaling view is that numbers are sets. Although I am not sure I agree with this yet, here are some commonly accepted definitions nevertheless. From Stanford Set Theory > Basic Set Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)n − 1}. In this way, n is a particular set of n elements.
[/INDENT]

@Extrain,

You forgot to include:

mountain, n.

I. Literal uses.

1. a. A large natural elevation of the earth's surface, esp. one high and steep in form (larger and higher than a hill) and with a summit of relatively small area. With regard to the modern limitation of use see also HILL n. Down to the 18th cent. often applied to elevations of moderate altitude (cf. e.g. quots. 1765 , 1773). the mountains: formerly often used poet. with connotations of a region remote from civilization. to make a mountain (out) of a molehill: see MOLEHILL n. 2a.

1. b. An artificial hill or tumulus. Also in extended use. Obs.
1. c. A landform on the moon or other planet analogous to a mountain on earth.
1. d. Heraldry. = MOUNT n.1 1d. Obs. rare.
1. e. Irish English and Eng. regional (north.). As a mass noun: rough unenclosed pastureland, often on the slope of a hill. Cf. mountain-land n. (a) at Compounds 2a.

II. Extended uses.

2. a. A huge heap or pile; a great mass. Usu. with of. mountain of ice n. an iceberg. Cf. icy mountains or hills at ICY adj. 2.
2. b. fig. A mass, quantity, or amount impressive by its vast proportions.
2. c. A stockpile, a surplus, esp. of a designated type of food. Cf. LAKE n.4 1b.

3. mountain of piety n. [After French n. and Italian n.] Now chiefly hist. Latterly also humorous = MOUNT OF PIETY n. With allusion to n. and n.

4. A variety of Malaga wine, made from grapes grown on the mountains. Cf. earlier mountain wine n. at Compounds 2a. Now hist.

5. French Hist. [After French la Montagne (1792), so called from the fact that the party occupied the most elevated position in the chamber of assembly.] With the and capital initial. An extreme party in the National Convention during the French Revolution, led by Robespierre and Danton. Also (in extended use): any of several later political groups or parties of extreme views. Cf. PLAIN n.1 6. The term was applied in England to an extreme party in parliament at the close of the 18th and beginning of the 19th cent., and was revived in France c1848 to describe the extreme republican party of that time. In Britain also applied to a group of Conservatives at the beginning of the 20th cent.

6. [After Norwegian berg mountain.] A huge shoal (of fish). Obs.

7. Usu. with capital initial. A type of heavy steam locomotive with a 4-8-2 wheel arrangement, used in mountainous terrain.

OED

[CENTER]EH
LEHI
OLEHIL
MOLEHILL[/CENTER]

:flowers:

@longknowledge,

longknowledge;155011 wrote:

You forgot to include:

mountain, n.

I. Literal uses.

1. a. A large natural elevation of the earth's surface, esp. one high and steep in form (larger and higher than a hill) and with a summit of relatively small area. With regard to the modern limitation of use see also HILL n. Down to the 18th cent. often applied to elevations of moderate altitude (cf. e.g. quots. 1765 , 1773). the mountains: formerly often used poet. with connotations of a region remote from civilization. to make a mountain (out) of a molehill: see MOLEHILL n. 2a.

1. b. An artificial hill or tumulus. Also in extended use. Obs.
1. c. A landform on the moon or other planet analogous to a mountain on earth.
1. d. Heraldry. = MOUNT n.1 1d. Obs. rare.
1. e. Irish English and Eng. regional (north.). As a mass noun: rough unenclosed pastureland, often on the slope of a hill. Cf. mountain-land n. (a) at Compounds 2a.

II. Extended uses.

2. a. A huge heap or pile; a great mass. Usu. with of. mountain of ice n. an iceberg. Cf. icy mountains or hills at ICY adj. 2.
2. b. fig. A mass, quantity, or amount impressive by its vast proportions.
2. c. A stockpile, a surplus, esp. of a designated type of food. Cf. LAKE n.4 1b.

3. mountain of piety n. [After French n. and Italian n.] Now chiefly hist. Latterly also humorous = MOUNT OF PIETY n. With allusion to n. and n.

4. A variety of Malaga wine, made from grapes grown on the mountains. Cf. earlier mountain wine n. at Compounds 2a. Now hist.

5. French Hist. [After French la Montagne (1792), so called from the fact that the party occupied the most elevated position in the chamber of assembly.] With the and capital initial. An extreme party in the National Convention during the French Revolution, led by Robespierre and Danton. Also (in extended use): any of several later political groups or parties of extreme views. Cf. PLAIN n.1 6. The term was applied in England to an extreme party in parliament at the close of the 18th and beginning of the 19th cent., and was revived in France c1848 to describe the extreme republican party of that time. In Britain also applied to a group of Conservatives at the beginning of the 20th cent.

6. [After Norwegian berg mountain.] A huge shoal (of fish). Obs.

7. Usu. with capital initial. A type of heavy steam locomotive with a 4-8-2 wheel arrangement, used in mountainous terrain.

OED

[CENTER]EH
LEHI
OLEHIL
MOLEHILL[/CENTER]

:flowers:

But Fido says it means, home. The dictionary must be wrong. Or, at least, anti-spiritual.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;155014 wrote:

But Fido says it means, home. The dictionary must be wrong. Or, at least, anti-spiritual.

Of course if you're a fish, you can't tell home from shoal!

@longknowledge,

longknowledge;155018 wrote:

Of course if you're a fish, you can't tell home from shoal!

?

But the word "mountain" is a noun. Mountains themselves are not nouns. And the definitions you gave express the various meanings of that word "mountain."

@Extrain,

Extrain;155020 wrote:

?

See meaning #6 above.

:flowers:

---------- Post added 04-21-2010 at 08:46 PM ----------

Reconstructo;142396 wrote:

I struggled with this line at first. How is the real rational, when we are always still figuring out what reality is?

It now makes perfect sense to me, so I'm sharing my view on it, and encouraging a friendly discussion on the matter. Here's my view on it.

The world as we know it is structured by human concept. Even if there is a structure beneath or above our human concept, this itself is still just a human concept. Human concept is all the structure we have and are ever going to have, it seems to me.
We cook up gods and theories and philosophies, and this is the intelligable structure of the world. And we cannot speak or think outside of structure, also known as ratio, also known as rationality.

But to get back to the OP, according to the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset, "radical" reality is "my life", your life, the life of each one of us, in the sense that all other realities appear or are "rooted" within it. "My life" consists of "I" and "my circumstance". My circumstance includes all the phenomena that appear to me, including sensations, thoughts, dreams, etc.

Now in order to orient myself with regard to "my circumstance" I employ my imagination to create a "world," i.e., an idea that I believe is a model or an explanation of the phenomena that occur to me. The "world" that I create may be "rational" in the sense that its structure is logically consistent, but it could still be incorrect if it does not give an adequate explanation of the phenomena I experience.

To paraphrase Korzybsky, "My world is not my circumstance!"

:flowers:

@longknowledge,

longknowledge;155030 wrote:

But to get back to the OP, according to the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset, "radical" reality is "my life", your life, the life of each one of us, in the sense that all other realities appear or are "rooted" within it. "My life" consists of "I" and "my circumstance". My circumstance includes all the phenomena that appear to me, including sensations, thoughts, dreams, etc.

Now in order to orient myself with regard to "my circumstance" I employ my imagination to create a "world," i.e., an idea that I believe is a model or an explanation of the phenomena that occur to me. The "world" that I create may be "rational" in the sense that its structure is logically consistent, but it could still be incorrect if it does not give an adequate explanation of the phenomena I experience.

To paraphrase Korzybsky, "My world is not my circumstance!"

:flowers:

I agree. The question moves to what constitutes adequate. In a "real" way, the map is the territory. And let us play with this a little further: if Korzybski, who I like, says that "the map is not the territory," he still seems to be drawing on the map rather than the territory, assuming there is a difference. (Of course in a practical sense there is clearly a difference, but one could include all this on the "map-territory-fusion" if one was inclined.) Humans must work and suffer at times in either case. Smile

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;155055 wrote:

I agree. The question moves to what constitutes adequate. In a "real" way, the map is the territory. And let us play with this a little further: if Korzybski, who I like, says that "the map is not the territory," he still seems to be drawing on the map rather than the territory, assuming there is a difference. (Of course in a practical sense there is clearly a difference, but one could include all this on the "map-territory-fusion" if one was inclined.) Humans must work and suffer at times in either case.

Whoever knows what this means, please raise his hand. We have to assume there is a difference between the map of Colorado and Colorado?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;155056 wrote:

Whoever knows what this means, please raise his hand. We have to assume there is a difference between the map of Colorado and Colorado?

Just as there's a difference between drawing a line on a map and building a wall. "Map-territory-con-fusion" is more like it.

:flowers:

PS: My hand is thrust outward, not raised!

@Reconstructo,

Signs have significance, and words are also signs, though not directly visual, as red is for danger... What have you read on the subject, fellows; because they may be a little dusty, but I have kept much of what I have read, and I may be able to dust find them and dust them off...

I would, on the one hand, argue that only people have meaning, and all they find meaning in is in relation to their lives; and yet, on the other hand, it is meaning which we communicate, through concepts, words, numbers, signs and actions, and if we did not find a certain meaning in things like Mountains, we could not communicate that meaning, nor have anything of meaning to say...And I will agree that Plato was wrong, on many levels, primarily in his metaphysics, and theory of forms..

---------- Post added 04-21-2010 at 09:56 PM ----------

longknowledge;155064 wrote:

Just as there's a difference between drawing a line on a map and building a wall. "Map-territory-con-fusion" is more like it.

:flowers:

PS: My hand is thrust outward, not raised!

A map is like a metaphore...

@longknowledge,

longknowledge;155064 wrote:

Just as there's a difference between drawing a line on a map and building a wall. "Map-territory-con-fusion" is more like it.

:flowers:

PS: My hand is thrust outward, not raised!

Sorry, I don't understand. Can you please just say what is your conclusion?
And what are your reasons? Of course there is a difference between a line on a map, and a wall on the land. So what?

@Reconstructo,

Here's the thing, gents. We can say that it's silly to call the map the territory. But this is to miss the point entirely. The map is a metaphor for our image of reality. Korzybski warned us that "the map was not the territory." I always loved this line. It's same damn thing as Kant, who I also always loved.

But at some point a person realizes that this nice little contrast between the map and the territory, or between their image of reality and reality, is still just part of the "map."

Did someone mention Colorado? Can they see it from where they are typing? And what exactly constitutes Colorado? Everything within its borders? How deep must one dig in the Colorado soil to escape its boundaries? The mantle of the Earth? Can we see all of Colorado at the same time? Maybe from space, you say. But how much detail are we seeing then? How much detail can a mind process in the first place?

Does Colorado include the thoughts inside the heads of those "within" "Colorado?"

If the map is the territory, then the distinction breaks down between them. To say that the map is not the territory is actually, in my view, idealism. Whereas to equate the map and the territory is to transcend that same idealism. Kant --> Hegel

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;155074 wrote:

Here's the thing, gents. We can say that it's silly to call the map the territory. But this is to miss the point entirely. The map is a metaphor for our image of reality. Korzybski warned us that "the map was not the territory." I always loved this line. It's same damn thing as Kant, who I also always loved.

But at some point a person realizes that this nice little contrast between the map and the territory, or between their image of reality and reality, is still just part of the "map."

Did someone mention Colorado? Can they see it from where they are typing? And what exactly constitutes Colorado? Everything within its borders? How deep must one dig in the Colorado soil to escape its boundaries? The mantle of the Earth? Can we see all of Colorado at the same time? Maybe from space, you say. But how much detail are we seeing then? How much detail can a mind process in the first place?

Does Colorado include the thoughts inside the heads of those "within" "Colorado?"

If the map is the territory, then the distinction breaks down between them. To say that the map is not the territory is actually, in my view, idealism. Whereas to equate the map and the territory is to transcend that same idealism. Kant --> Hegel

How would the fact (if it is one) that I cannot see Colorado from where I am have anything to do with whether the map of Colorado is identical with Colorado? Colorado is a large area in the United States. A map of Colorado is not a large area in the United States. Therefore, a map of Colorado is not Colorado. QED. As usual, you confuse our knowledge (of Colorado) with what our know is of (Colorado). The Idealist fallacy. The very same fallacy over, and over, and over, again. Our knowledge of X is not X. Can't you understand that? You really have to come to grips with this central issue.

@Extrain,

Extrain;155020 wrote:

?

But the word "mountain" is a noun. Mountains themselves are not nouns. And the definitions you gave express the various meanings of that word "mountain."

No one can possibly express all the meaning of even a single mountain...How many answers would you get asking of the meaning of life...It is different every moment, and different for every person.... We can say the mountain has meaniing because in relation to life, each and every life, it has a value, and value is a sort of meaning, for that with the most meaning we also value highly....But what of those things we fear??? Do they not have a negative value???

If you think the word has meaning but the object the word points to has no meaning, you are nuts... The word communicate part of the meaning, and even the concept as the word and its definition only communicates are part of the meaning of the object, and all still stands only in relation to life, because when the person for whom as object has meaning dies, the meaning they find in all around them dies with them... All that exists may yet exist without humanity, and who can say -for even existence is a sort of meaning; but without me to recognize something as meaningful it would be meaningless...

@Fido,

Fido;155079 wrote:

If you think the word has meaning but the object the word points to has no meaning, you are nuts...

Words have meaning. The object (in case there happens to be one-unicorn has meaning, but there are no unicorns) may have significance to this or that person. The term, "bit of thread on the carpet" has meaning. But the object, bit of thread on the carpet, has no significance to me or anyone I know. Therefore, the word has meaning, but the object it points to does not have any significance. QED.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;155077 wrote:

How would the fact (if it is one) that I cannot see Colorado from where I am have anything to do with whether the map of Colorado is identical with Colorado? Colorado is a large area in the United States. A map of Colorado is not a large area in the United States. Therefore, a map of Colorado is not Colorado. QED. As usual, you confuse our knowledge (of Colorado) with what our know is of (Colorado). The Idealist fallacy. The very same fallacy over, and over, and over, again. Our knowledge of X is not X. Can't you understand that? You really have to come to grips with this central issue.

The map of Colorado is like a metaphore for Colorado...Maps are never identical with areas...Identity is a principal of reason, and Colorado is Colorado, and maps are maps...

Our knowledge of X is our concept of X...

---------- Post added 04-21-2010 at 10:34 PM ----------

kennethamy;155083 wrote:

Words have meaning. The object (in case there happens to be one-unicorn has meaning, but there are no unicorns) may have significance to this or that person. The term, "bit of thread on the carpet" has meaning. But the object, bit of thread on the carpet, has no significance to me or anyone I know. Therefore, the word has meaning, but the object it points to does not have any significance. QED.

Words have definitions, and convey meaning... By themselves, pointing at nothing, standing for nothing, words have no meaning... About like your words.

And you are right, that a thing with little significance will have little meaning; but in relation to life, no one can say with certainty that anything will not have some meaning... I would say: I see a bit of thread on the carpet, therefore I am... If you can make the distinction between a thing of value, and its meaning; and those who find value in it, and their meaning then you are a wonder...All I am certain of is that without life there is no meaning...Is the meaning in the person finding meaning, or is it in the object found to have meaning... The question is moot...

@Fido,

Fido;155084 wrote:

Our knowledge of X is our concept of X...

That just about sums that up. Well said. Where are the snows of yesteryear? Where in spatial reality are our hopes and dreams? Do they not exist? Where does love hide? In pictures of the brain?

How do we form real relationships with other humans if not through memory? If not through shared ideals?

How do we drive down the street unless we classify our sense-impressions into objects and "empty" space? The human real is clearly "rational" if by "rational" one means infused with an intelligible dynamic structure.

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