Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.

wayne wrote:

Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.

But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?

fast wrote:

wayne wrote:

Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.

But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?

How could there be when whether an event occurs is a contingent matter?

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

wayne wrote:

Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.

But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?

How could there be when whether an event occurs is a contingent matter?

In other words, there are no logically necessary events.

fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

wayne wrote:

Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.

But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?

How could there be when whether an event occurs is a contingent matter?

In other words, there are no logically necessary events.

In two words, "That's true". What ever happens might not have happened.

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

wayne wrote:

Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.

But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?

How could there be when whether an event occurs is a contingent matter?

In other words, there are no logically necessary events.

In two words, "That's true". What ever happens might not have happened.

But surely some things that do happen must happen.

Isn't "must" ambiguous? Isn't there a sense in which what I just said is true? I agree with what you said, but isn't there a proper way to interpret the word "must" to make what I said true?

water physically must boil at 212 F. Which is to say that it would be inconsistent with physical law for it not to do so (given the appropriate initial conditions".

kennethamy wrote:

water physically must boil at 212 F. Which is to say that it would be inconsistent with physical law for it not to do so (given the appropriate initial conditions".

"The appropriate initial conditions" meaning 'conditions under which water boils at 212 degrees F'.

fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

wayne wrote:

Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.

But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?

How could there be when whether an event occurs is a contingent matter?

In other words, there are no logically necessary events.

In two words, "That's true". What ever happens might not have happened.

But surely some things that do happen must happen.

Isn't "must" ambiguous? Isn't there a sense in which what I just said is true? I agree with what you said, but isn't there a proper way to interpret the word "must" to make what I said true?

But we were talking about the "logical must". Not the "physical must". Of course, water physically must boil at 212 F. Which is to say that it would be inconsistent with physical law for it not to do so (given the appropriate initial conditions".

If we accept the Hempellian model of explanation, then that model is in the form of a modus ponens argument with the conditional premise as the applicable laws of nature

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

wayne wrote:

Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.

But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?

How could there be when whether an event occurs is a contingent matter?

In other words, there are no logically necessary events.

In two words, "That's true". What ever happens might not have happened.

But surely some things that do happen must happen.

Isn't "must" ambiguous? Isn't there a sense in which what I just said is true? I agree with what you said, but isn't there a proper way to interpret the word "must" to make what I said true?

But we were talking about the "logical must". Not the "physical must". Of course, water physically must boil at 212 F. Which is to say that it would be inconsistent with physical law for it not to do so (given the appropriate initial conditions".

Now that we're talking about the "physical must" and not the "logical must," would you agree or deny that all events that do happen must happen?

kennethamy wrote:

If we accept the Hempellian model of explanation, then that model is in the form of a modus ponens argument with the conditional premise as the applicable laws of nature

Wrong, absolutely wrong. Hempel's theory is about scientific explanations and concerns only laws of science. You are attempting a semantic slide here and when you try to bridge "cause" and "laws of nature" with the eccentric term "causal law". Ordinarily, this behaviour is called equivocation.

I thought we had all agreed that there is an impasse here.

kennethamy wrote:

I thought we had all agreed that there is an impasse here.

On the contrary, everybody, apparently including you, accepts that laws of nature are not statements constructed by scientists.

I don't think that the laws of nature are statements. That is loony. It is the statements about laws of nature that are statements.

kennethamy wrote:

I don't think that the laws of nature are statements. That is loony. It is the statements about laws of nature that are statements.

Good. Hempel's theory makes no assertions about laws of nature, the terms of his theory are limited to laws of science. Please observe this distinction in future posts.

That would be like making a distinction between the word, "elephant" and elephants.

kennethamy wrote:

That would be like making a distinction between the word, "elephant" and elephants.

No it wouldn't, you're talking about the distinction between observations and generalisations. Observations are not laws of nature.