Defense of Freewill Against Determinism

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fast
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 07:04 am
@wayne,
wayne wrote:
Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.
But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 07:49 am
@fast,
fast wrote:

wayne wrote:
Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.
But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?


How could there be when whether an event occurs is a contingent matter?
 
fast
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 08:10 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

wayne wrote:
Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.
But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?


How could there be when whether an event occurs is a contingent matter?
In other words, there are no logically necessary events.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 08:22 am
@fast,
fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

wayne wrote:
Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.
But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?


How could there be when whether an event occurs is a contingent matter?
In other words, there are no logically necessary events.


In two words, "That's true". What ever happens might not have happened.
 
fast
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 09:07 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

wayne wrote:
Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.
But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?


How could there be when whether an event occurs is a contingent matter?
In other words, there are no logically necessary events.


In two words, "That's true". What ever happens might not have happened.
But surely some things that do happen must happen.

Isn't "must" ambiguous? Isn't there a sense in which what I just said is true? I agree with what you said, but isn't there a proper way to interpret the word "must" to make what I said true?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 09:14 am
@fast,
fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

wayne wrote:
Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.
But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?


How could there be when whether an event occurs is a contingent matter?
In other words, there are no logically necessary events.


In two words, "That's true". What ever happens might not have happened.
But surely some things that do happen must happen.

Isn't "must" ambiguous? Isn't there a sense in which what I just said is true? I agree with what you said, but isn't there a proper way to interpret the word "must" to make what I said true?



But we were talking about the "logical must". Not the "physical must". Of course, water physically must boil at 212 F. Which is to say that it would be inconsistent with physical law for it not to do so (given the appropriate initial conditions".
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 09:16 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
water physically must boil at 212 F. Which is to say that it would be inconsistent with physical law for it not to do so (given the appropriate initial conditions".
"The appropriate initial conditions" meaning 'conditions under which water boils at 212 degrees F'.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 09:45 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
water physically must boil at 212 F. Which is to say that it would be inconsistent with physical law for it not to do so (given the appropriate initial conditions".
"The appropriate initial conditions" meaning 'conditions under which water boils at 212 degrees F'.


Meaning, I hope, the normal conditions under which we have discovered water boils. These, of course, turn out to be the initial conditions. If we accept the Hempellian model of explanation, then that model is in the form of a modus ponens argument with the conditional premise as the applicable laws of nature, and the minor premise as a statement of the initial conditions. The minor premise is the assertion of the antecedent of the previous conditional premise. Without that, we cannot have a valid modus ponens argument.
 
fast
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 09:57 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

wayne wrote:
Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.
But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?


How could there be when whether an event occurs is a contingent matter?
In other words, there are no logically necessary events.


In two words, "That's true". What ever happens might not have happened.
But surely some things that do happen must happen.

Isn't "must" ambiguous? Isn't there a sense in which what I just said is true? I agree with what you said, but isn't there a proper way to interpret the word "must" to make what I said true?



But we were talking about the "logical must". Not the "physical must". Of course, water physically must boil at 212 F. Which is to say that it would be inconsistent with physical law for it not to do so (given the appropriate initial conditions".
Now that we're talking about the "physical must" and not the "logical must," would you agree or deny that all events that do happen must happen?
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 10:02 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
If we accept the Hempellian model of explanation, then that model is in the form of a modus ponens argument with the conditional premise as the applicable laws of nature
Wrong, absolutely wrong. Hempel's theory is about scientific explanations and concerns only laws of science. You are attempting a semantic slide here and when you try to bridge "cause" and "laws of nature" with the eccentric term "causal law". Ordinarily, this behaviour is called equivocation.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 10:12 am
@fast,
fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

fast wrote:

wayne wrote:
Of course A could have exploded but there was still a point where that option would fail.
But armed with logic, we can maintain that it was still logically possible for the planes not to crash no matter how much of real impossibility it was to avoid it. For example, it was a logical possibility that aliens could have beamed the plane up, and that remains so even if aliens don't actually exist.

Are there any historical examples of actual events that are also logically necessary events?


How could there be when whether an event occurs is a contingent matter?
In other words, there are no logically necessary events.


In two words, "That's true". What ever happens might not have happened.
But surely some things that do happen must happen.

Isn't "must" ambiguous? Isn't there a sense in which what I just said is true? I agree with what you said, but isn't there a proper way to interpret the word "must" to make what I said true?



But we were talking about the "logical must". Not the "physical must". Of course, water physically must boil at 212 F. Which is to say that it would be inconsistent with physical law for it not to do so (given the appropriate initial conditions".
Now that we're talking about the "physical must" and not the "logical must," would you agree or deny that all events that do happen must happen?


I suppose so if some form of determinism is true. (But that would, I am informed, leave out micro-events).
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 10:13 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
If we accept the Hempellian model of explanation, then that model is in the form of a modus ponens argument with the conditional premise as the applicable laws of nature
Wrong, absolutely wrong. Hempel's theory is about scientific explanations and concerns only laws of science. You are attempting a semantic slide here and when you try to bridge "cause" and "laws of nature" with the eccentric term "causal law". Ordinarily, this behaviour is called equivocation.


Oh, are we back to that again? I thought we had all agreed that there is an impasse here.
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 10:17 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
I thought we had all agreed that there is an impasse here.
On the contrary, everybody, apparently including you, accepts that laws of nature are not statements constructed by scientists.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 10:28 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
I thought we had all agreed that there is an impasse here.
On the contrary, everybody, apparently including you, accepts that laws of nature are not statements constructed by scientists.


I don't think that the laws of nature are statements. That is loony. It is the statements about laws of nature that are statements.
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 10:31 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
I don't think that the laws of nature are statements. That is loony. It is the statements about laws of nature that are statements.
Good. Hempel's theory makes no assertions about laws of nature, the terms of his theory are limited to laws of science. Please observe this distinction in future posts.
 
fast
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 10:32 am
P1. Some truths are contingent truths.
P2. Some truths are necessary truths.

P3. All events are logically contingent
P4. No event is logically necessary.

P5. Either no or some events are physically contingent.
P6. At least some (and possibly all) events are physically necessary.

I think that’s a good summary so far.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 10:39 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
I don't think that the laws of nature are statements. That is loony. It is the statements about laws of nature that are statements.
Good. Hempel's theory makes no assertions about laws of nature, the terms of his theory are limited to laws of science. Please observe this distinction in future posts.


Well, if I understood the distinction you are making, I would certainly try to do so. Is the distinction between laws of nature themselves and the statement that describe them? That would be like making a distinction between the word, "elephant" and elephants. Who would not draw that distinction? Am I to suppose that trivial distinction is the one you are insisting on?
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 10:46 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
That would be like making a distinction between the word, "elephant" and elephants.
No it wouldn't, you're talking about the distinction between observations and generalisations. Observations are not laws of nature.
I just cant see why you dont get bored with this, wouldn't it be easier and more productive to educate yourself? Then you would be able to make constructive contributions, instead of repeating the same simplistic mistakes, year after year on board after board.
 
fast
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 11:00 am
@ughaibu,
If we label statements about laws of nature as 'A', lable laws of nature as 'B', and lable laws of science as 'C', would you by chance be saying A=C?

Don't yell.
 
fast
 
Reply Wed 21 Jul, 2010 11:10 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
That would be like making a distinction between the word, "elephant" and elephants.
No it wouldn't, you're talking about the distinction between observations and generalisations. Observations are not laws of nature.
The distinction between a statement and what a statement is about is similar in form to the distinction between a word and a word's referent. Statement on the left hand. What a statement is about on the right. Word on the left hand. Referent of the word on the right. Our observations (written down) on the left. Our observations (what we see or calculate to be if we can't see) on the right.
 
 

 
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