fast wrote:

One view is that even though all events are caused, not all events are necessary events. Another view (albeit a wild and wacky view) is that because all events are caused, all events are necessary events.

As logics are independent of reality, nothing about your post makes sense.

Does the following make sense to you? Some events are necessary events? If not, does the following make sense to you? The proposition that some events are necessary events is true. Does any of this make sense to you?

But I don't understand how I can believe I made a choice but did not. Suppose I am in an ice-cream shop, and I point to the vanilla bin and say to the server, "I'll have a scoop of vanilla, please". How could it be that I merely believe I made a choice but I didn't. Isn't doing what I did just called, "making a choice"?

Some events are necessary events? If not, does the following make sense to you? The proposition that some events are necessary events is true. Does any of this make sense to you?

fast wrote:

Some events are necessary events? If not, does the following make sense to you? The proposition that some events are necessary events is true. Does any of this make sense to you?

These are sensible propositions within a defined logic, they are meaningless as statements about the actual world.

Everyone else understands it.

Is the following a correct summary of the difference between causality and determinism?
Causality. . . . (Causality in this sense is false, since the sequence A-then-B is obviously dependent on the non-occurrence of countless possible interfering events.)
Determinism. . . .

Causality - For some or all events, event A is a sufficient cause of event B. That is to say, event B can be fully explained by event A without the need to consider any other events or states of the universe. The immediate cause is entirely local. Whenever a white snooker ball located at position X on the table is struck in a particular way, it will definitely hit a red ball located at position Y. We can simply say "A causes B"; we do not need to add anything else such as "unless someone grabs the ball first" or "unless the table collapses" or "unless a nuclear bomb is detonated 10 miles away". (Causality in this sense is false, since the sequence A-then-B is obviously dependent on the non-occurrence of countless possible interfering events.)

A particular white ball will definitely hit a particular red ball only if one particular state of the universe's entire history obtains. If even the smallest detail of the universe's history (past or future) is changed, it is no longer (physically) necessary that the white ball (if it still exists in the new scenario) will hit the red ball (if it still exists). (Determinism may be true or false.)

These are sensible propositions within a defined logic, they are meaningless as statements about the actual world.

That seems a fair summary, for me at this time of night. There are various theories of causation but they all suffer from some kind of problem, such as that which you point out.

(Causality in this sense is false, since the sequence A-then-B is obviously dependent on the non-occurrence of countless possible interfering events.)

I wonder who would think that viruses do not cause colds because if someone invented a vaccine against the cold, people who took the vaccine would not catch cold?

The cause of the cold was still the virus.

kennethamy wrote:

But I don't understand how I can believe I made a choice but did not. Suppose I am in an ice-cream shop, and I point to the vanilla bin and say to the server, "I'll have a scoop of vanilla, please". How could it be that I merely believe I made a choice but I didn't. Isn't doing what I did just called, "making a choice"?

When you said what you said, you believed that you made a choice. Of course you believed you made a choice. That's what's so sadistic about the view. Everything you think you did by choice was not a choice at all but rather a function of the laws of nature playing out in the only one way it could by you doing what you had to do (which includes you thinking you made a choice).

ughaibu wrote:

These are sensible propositions within a defined logic, they are meaningless as statements about the actual world.

Propositions are statements about the actual world.

He pointed out that things could have happened differently. How is that a problem for causation?

fast wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

But I don't understand how I can believe I made a choice but did not. Suppose I am in an ice-cream shop, and I point to the vanilla bin and say to the server, "I'll have a scoop of vanilla, please". How could it be that I merely believe I made a choice but I didn't. Isn't doing what I did just called, "making a choice"?

When you said what you said, you believed that you made a choice. Of course you believed you made a choice. That's what's so sadistic about the view. Everything you think you did by choice was not a choice at all but rather a function of the laws of nature playing out in the only one way it could by you doing what you had to do (which includes you thinking you made a choice).

But why I made the choice is one thing. Whether I made the choice is a very different thing. The fact that I was caused to make the choice in no way shows I did not make the choice. Indeed to say both that I was caused to make a choice, and to say I made no choice, is self-contradictory, for how could I possibly have been caused to make a choice I never made?

Zetherin wrote:

The cause of the cold was still the virus.

The main cause of the cold was the virus. But there were other causes also - some positive (the person had a certain level of susceptibility to the virus, he/she was exposed to it for a certain length of time, the ambient conditions were conducive to infection, etc) and some negative (he/she did not take the vaccine, did not die from another illness, etc).