ughaibu wrote:

no satisfactory notion of cause in philosophy. . . . . fundamental physics

But there is a satisfactory notion of cause used in philosophy. And in fact, it is a very commonly used word in science, too.

Let us start with why you find the notion of "cause", used in various fields, unsatisfactory.

What kind of satisfactory proof for cause would fit then ?

I don't why you bothered to point out that you wrote "fundamental physics" and not "science". As far as I know, science encompasses fundamental physics, so I was saying that the term is used in fundamental physics too, as far as I know. And I do not know why you find it to be unsatisfactory.

Why would I have to post a notion of cause? You can look it up for yourself. Here's a link to get your started: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality

That there is a notion of cause used in science doesn't imply that there is a notion of cause in fundamental physics.

Of course I can look it up, or I can guess, or I can fabricate something that you obviously dont mean, the fact is that if you have in mind some specific notion of cause, I need to know, from you, what that is.

If this means no more than "follows in a temporal sequence", then it suffers from the triviality mentioned earlier and is incompatible with determinism.

There is a notion of cause in fundamental physics. I just linked it.

Zetherin wrote:

There is a notion of cause in fundamental physics. I just linked it.

And have you read that section? There is no notion of cause in fundamental physics because the statements of fundamental physics are time symmetric, and the reason that they are unavoidably time symmetric is that they are deterministic mathematical statements. Temporal symmetry is a feature of determinism, temporal asymmetry is a feature of cause, causes precede effects. On top of which, cause is an irreducibly local notion, whereas determinism is an irreducibly global notion. This means that cause and determinism are, at least, independent, and any notion of cause which allows for the construction of trivial causal chains, allows for the construction of non-determined causal chains. But as you've read all this before, I guess I'm writing for the benefit of new readers.

Causality describes the relationship between causes and effects, is fundamental to all natural science, especially physics, and has an analog in logic.

If there is no notion of cause in fundamental physics, what on earth do you think they were discussing in that article?

There is most certainly a notion of cause in physics. If there wasn't, why would there be an entire article dedicated to "Causality (physics)"?

Zetherin wrote:

There is most certainly a notion of cause in physics. If there wasn't, why would there be an entire article dedicated to "Causality (physics)"?

I'll take it that you cant understand my explanation. So, I guess you'll be stuck with a misunderstanding of determinism, which puts you outside the conversation.

Fair enough.

Zetherin wrote:

Fair enough.

Sorry, I was very short of time earlier. There are two points about our recent exchanges; first, that determinism is not the claim that all events have a cause, and second, the question of whether or not causal completeness can be defended.
On the first point, the confusion of causal completeness with determinism seems to be one reason why free will denial persists, and why people who are probably not determinists, claim to be. As such, clearing this matter up is important for understanding one's stance.
On the second point, any defence of causal completeness requires a notion of cause which is consistent and applicable in all fields. I dont know of any such notion. And, if the notion of cause has a scientific basis, then causal completeness is false. So, defenders of causal completeness need to address this. But, in any case, causal completeness is not determinism and, in itself, doesn't conflict with free will. Whether any conflict is implied will depend, primarily, on the definition of cause employed.