@jeeprs,
jeeprs wrote:
I don't understand how the common-sense view of the matter can be rejected. The common-sense view is that there are tendencies for certain outcomes, but there are always unpredictabilities as well. So within certain bounds, outcomes are never completely determined. The whole idea of mechanistic determinism was articulated by LaPlace
Quote:We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.
However due to the statistical nature of chaos theory and quantum mechanics, this view has been discredited, and I think it was never anything other than a scientific fantasy in the first place.
But unpredictability is no more free will than predictability is the absence of free will. You are buying into the same view that makes others believe that there is no free will. It is a common phenomenon in philosophy that both proponents of a view and opponents of the same view make the same mistake. The mistake in this case is to think that predictability has anything to do with what we all understand as free will. It is compulsion which we have to worry about, not predictability. Why should it matter that I can predict (accurately) that you will be going to a particular restaurant tomorrow on the ground that you, as a creature of habit, always go to that restaurant on that day of the week as long as you are not being compelled to go to that restaurant. Why should your predictability in this matter imply that you are not going to the restaurant of your own free will? And, in that case, why should the fact, if it is a fact, that you are not such a creature of habit after all, and that although you have the tendency to go to that restaurant, it is perfectly possible that you will decide to do otherwise be a reason for thinking that you do have free will. If perfect predictability is not a reason against free will, then unpredictability is, by the same token, not a reason for free will. Neither has anything to do with free will. The belief that it has is largely the source of the problem in the first place.
' "What is your aim in philosophy?" "To show the fly the way out of the fly bottle" ' Wittgenstein
By the way, if you are a fan of the Buddha, you should appreciate this koan of Wittgenstein's.