Defense of Freewill Against Determinism

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

That I visited the restaurant without being compelled to do so would seem to me adequate proof that I visited the restaurant of my own free will.

Again, acting is not having free will. Nobody denies that we act, otherwise we would be zombies. Free will means that your choices are not a causally determined sequence of reactions. I don't see how saying "I make conscious choices" does address that.

@EmperorNero,

EmperorNero wrote:

I don't see how saying "I make conscious choices" does address that.

Having realisable alternatives addresses it.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

EmperorNero wrote:
I don't see how saying "I make conscious choices" does address that.
Having realisable alternatives addresses it.

The hangup is the 'realisable' part. Just by saying your options are realisable you do not demonstrate that they actually are realisable.

@EmperorNero,

EmperorNero wrote:

The hangup is the 'realisable' part. Just by saying your options are realisable you do not demonstrate that they actually are realisable.

As has recently been demonstrated, the burden is on you to show that they are not realisable, if that's what you contend. Or is your belief that they're not realisable a matter of faith?

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

EmperorNero wrote:
The hangup is the 'realisable' part. Just by saying your options are realisable you do not demonstrate that they actually are realisable.

As has recently been demonstrated, the burden is on you to show that they are not realisable, if that's what you contend. Or is your belief that they're not realisable a matter of faith?

No it's not. It's a silly claim to say that the skeptics have to prove a negative. "You have the burden of proof if you think Atlantis doesn't exist." "You have the burden of proof if you think Jesus won't return." "You have to prove that Santa Clause is not real."

@EmperorNero,

EmperorNero wrote:

ughaibu wrote:
the burden is on you to show that they are not realisable
No it's not. It's a silly claim to say that the skeptics have to prove a negative.

I'm not asking you to prove a negative. Here it is again; I can type 10, it is thereby established that, for me, typing 10 is possible, likewise with 01. I have now established the existence of two numbers that I can type, 10 and 01. Yet you claim, that my ability, a demonstrated ability, to type both numbers doesn't translate to an ability to type either, when I make my choice. Let's imagine that your claim can be backed up by some kind of proof, and you tell me that I'll choose, for example, 10, what then is stopping me from choosing 01? If there is nothing stopping me, then your claim is false, because regardless of what you "prove" that I'll do, I can do the opposite. Therefore you are committed to the existence of something which blocks one of my options, and that is a positive, not a negative. So, do you have an argument or not?

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

Therefore you are committed to the existence of something which blocks one of my options, and that is a positive, not a negative.

Oh, that way. When you say "I have two realisable alternatives", you mean potentially, not actually. You have both options, just theoretically, and you can pick either unless something stops you. That is actually true.
I do think something stops you, but that indeed is a positive statement. Which would have to be proven. I think we're getting there though, what do you think about this: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121450609076407973.html

@EmperorNero,

EmperorNero wrote:

what do you think about this:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121450609076407973.html

At a glance, it seems to be about Haynes, Libet and the like. Not only do their findings not conflict with free will but Haggard has recently shown that the so called action potential is observed in cases when the subjects do not choose. So, I'm unimpressed.

@ughaibu,

All this would mean that free will can exist within determinism though.

@EmperorNero,

EmperorNero wrote:

All this would mean that free will can exist within determinism though.

But determinism is almost certainly false.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

EmperorNero wrote:
All this would mean that free will can exist within determinism though.
But determinism is almost certainly false.

It wouldn't matter to the question of free will. Everything can be causally determined and you still have two options in your head and pick one.

@EmperorNero,

EmperorNero wrote:

ughaibu wrote:
EmperorNero wrote:
All this would mean that free will can exist within determinism though.
But determinism is almost certainly false.
It wouldn't matter to the question of free will. Everything can be causally determined and you still have two options in your head and pick one.

Sure it would matter, because if determinism were the case, then there would be a truth about all future states of the world. For example, if I'm considering whether to drink tea or to drink coffee, in an hours time, then there would be a true statement, now, about which I drink, and the alternative wouldn't be realisable. But as determinism is almost certainly false, I see no reason to suppose that there is a truth now about which, if either, I'll drink. Until I decide and enact that decision, what would any such statement be true of, in a non-determined world?

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

if I'm considering whether to drink tea or to drink coffee, in an hours time, then there would be a true statement, now, about which I drink, and the alternative wouldn't be realisable

It would be realisable for you, in your head. For you there is not a true statement. That is what your demonstration means by "I have two realisable alternatives". If you change the meaning of those words to mean physically realizable, i.e. there not being a true statement, you change the meaning of your demonstration, and it no longer works.The words are the same, but it doesn't mean the same. You can't just alternate the meanings of words.
But as we said, that's even better for you, because your demonstration not only works but even under determinism.

@EmperorNero,

EmperorNero wrote:

If you change the meaning of those words to mean physically realizable, i.e. there not being a true statement, you change the meaning of your demonstration, and it no longer works.

Which is exactly the contention that you have still to give me any reason to accept.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

EmperorNero wrote:
If you change the meaning of those words to mean physically realizable, i.e. there not being a true statement, you change the meaning of your demonstration, and it no longer works.
Which is exactly the contention that you have still to give me any reason to accept.

"I have two realisable alternatives" can mean that you have two realisable alternatives, in your head. That way your demonstration works. Or that there are two realisable alternatives, i.e. there is not a true statement about the future. Demonstrating the former does not make the other one true as well, that's just a verbal trick.

@EmperorNero,

EmperorNero wrote:

Demonstrating the former to be the case does not make the other one true as well, that's just a verbal trick.

Pretending that I mean the former, which is your own concoction, when I mean that latter, doesn't constitute an objection to the latter. Seriously, do you have an objection? What is it that stops me from performing actions which I have a demonstrated ability to perform?
Notice that my demonstration relies only on observables, and is repeatable by anyone who's capable of choosing two numbers. As far as I can see, this puts the scientific respectability on my side.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

EmperorNero wrote:
"I have two realisable alternatives" can mean that you have two realisable alternatives, in your head. That way your demonstration works. Or that there are two realisable alternatives, i.e. there is not a true statement about the future. Demonstrating the former does not make the other one true as well, that's just a verbal trick.
Pretending that I mean the former, (...) when I mean that latter, doesn't constitute an objection to the latter.

Actually it does. Because the latter was never demonstrated. The former was demonstrated and then you alternate the meaning of the words to make it seem as if the latter is demonstrated. That's just a verbal trick.
If you mean the former, your demonstration not only works but also works within determinism. But if you mean the latter, then your whole demonstration is merely a circular argument.
So why would you object to meaning the former?

@EmperorNero,

EmperorNero wrote:

the latter was never demonstrated.

I guess you're not going to offer any objection.

EmperorNero wrote:

If you mean the former, your demonstration not only works but also works within determinism.
So why would you object to meaning the former?

This is interesting, you seem to be puzzled as to why I would object to pretending that determinism is the case and pretending that free will is an illusion, because in return for this self deception I can claim to have a consistent solution to an explanatory gap. This is particularly odd as I thought you were an atheist, yet here you are, apparently proposing the kind of bullshit that no atheist would dream of accepting in support of theism. In short, the reason I object, is that I'm not interested in pretending that things which are false, are true, to fill explanatory gaps.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

EmperorNero wrote:
the latter was never demonstrated.
I guess you're not going to offer any objection.

In the latter meaning you have the burden of proof.

ughaibu wrote:

EmperorNero wrote:
If you mean the former, your demonstration not only works but also works within determinism.
So why would you object to meaning the former?
why I would object to pretending that determinism is the case a

You wouldn't have to comment on determinism at all, because it wouldn't matter to your theory.

@EmperorNero,

EmperorNero wrote:

You wouldn't have to comment on determinism at all, because it wouldn't matter to your theory.

I think it's clear enough why you're actually denying free will. As it's a matter of self deception, I see no point in continuing our discussion. Thanks for the insight.

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