Defense of Freewill Against Determinism

@Emil,

Emil;151596 wrote:

However whether propositions can is another matter. IIFC U. likes the Aristotle-ian view that future contingents do not have a truth value. I don't know if he holds a proposition theory of truth carriers, but if he does, then it follows, in his view, that some propositions are neither true or false. Other people favor such a view too because of certain semantic paradoxes. They are called truth gaps. Other people again favor gluts (true and false).

yes this was a point I tried to bring up.....if one truly wishes to espouse the principle of bivalence then one needs to better specify the definition of proposition and just what is and is not considered a proposition

I think I(and others) have layed out an argument for why statements about future free willed choices should either not be considered propositions in the regular sense or be considered exceptions to the rule

@Night Ripper,

Amperage wrote:

it is if you're claiming that it has a set value before the fact.

I'm claiming it has a value, not a set value.

Quote:

you may not realize you are talking about it but it's implied with the position you are taking

Let's clarify once again what exactly you think my position is. Thanks.

ughaibu wrote:

And this position, commits you to knowledge about unknowable things, unless you deny JTB

Actually, my position has nothing to do with knowledge per se. We're talking about propositions being either true or false. My knowing which propositions are true or false is irrelevant in terms of what I'm talking about.

Quote:

I haven't noticed anyone offering any justification for espousing this peculiar notion.

I'm certain that it is not a peculiar notion that propositions are either true or false.

Emil wrote:

Sentences can be neither true or false such as the Chomsky sentence.

Sure, but that sentence says nothing about the world; it's not a proposition. I think that's irrelevant to this discussion, since we are only speaking of propositions.

Amperage wrote:

then one needs to better specify the definition of proposition and just what is and is not considered a proposition

Proposition - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

@Emil,

Emil;151596 wrote:

Sentences can be neither true or false such as the Chomsky sentence.

Colorless green ideas sleep furiously - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

So can commands such as "Go outside." but I thought it was obvious we were talking about propositions.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;151601 wrote:

Actually, my position has nothing to do with knowledge per se.

Sure it has, if knowledge is JTB. As you're claiming truth values of all future states of affairs, it follows that all future states of affairs are fully JTB knowable. In short, your position commits you to the knowability of some unknowables.

Zetherin;151601 wrote:

I'm certain that it is not a peculiar notion that propositions are either true or false.

Is this your justification??

@Amperage,

Amperage;151599 wrote:

one needs to better specify the definition of proposition

The semantic content of a declarative statement.

@Night Ripper,

ughaibu wrote:

Sure it has, if knowledge is JTB. As you're claiming truth values of all future states of affairs, it follows that all future states of affairs are fully JTB knowable. In short, your position commits you to the knowability of some unknowables.

What do you mean my position commits me to the knowability of some unknowables? Can you give me an example, or simply rephrase what you mean?

And, yes, I am following the JTB model.

ughaibu wrote:

Is this your justification??

My justification that propositions are either true or false?

Proposition - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Man, there must be countless articles. How many would you like? (And, yes, this would be appeal to authority, which is justification)

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;151601 wrote:

I'm claiming it has a value, not a set value.

the principle of bivalence is claiming it has a set value. If you think the value is indeterminate, or null, or doesn't exist, then we are not in disagreement

Zetherin;151601 wrote:

Let's clarify once again what exactly you think my position is. Thanks.

I thought it was that all propositions have a SET value of true or false at the moment of their utterance and specifically prior to the actual reality of the event taking(or not taking) place. Am I mistaken?

Zetherin;151601 wrote:

Sure, but that sentence says nothing about the world; it's not a proposition. I think that's irrelevant to this discussion, since we are only speaking of propositions.

THIS IS PARAMOUNT to the discussion. If you want to maintain your definition of proposition then I claim that sentences about future free willed choices are NOT propositions but merely sentences in the same manner as Chomsky's sentence.

btw why is it(Chomsky's sentence) not a proposition? Is it because it is a statement which is neither true nor false? Because if so, then neither are statements about future free willed choices by the same logic

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;151601 wrote:

I'm claiming it has a value, not a set value.

That is, of course, an important point. Only necessary truths (or falsities) must have a particular truth value. Contingent proposition do not. In fact, that is why they are contingent. If a sea battle will occur tomorrow, then of course, it occurs tomorrow. But that doesn't mean that the sea must occur tomorrow if it will occur tomorrow. There is no necessity that the sea battle occur at all. It is, of course true, that if it will occur tomorrow, then it will occur tomorrow. But equally, if it will not occur tomorrow, then it will not occur tomorrow.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;151607 wrote:

What do you mean my position commits me to the knowability of some unknowables?

1) you hold that there is a truth about any future state of affairs
2) as there is a truth, a justified belief can be true
3) therefore any future state of affairs can be known
4) some future states of affairs are not knowable
5) therefore some unknowable states of affairs are knowable.

Zetherin;151607 wrote:

there must be countless articles. How many would you like?

None. I want you to write one or two sentences explaining your justification for holding this position.

@Night Ripper,

ughaibu wrote:

therefore any future state of affairs can be known

I don't know if this is true. I think there are probably things we cannot know.

Quote:

None. I want you to write one or two sentences explaining your justification for holding this position.

I believe that the definition of "proposition" I linked to is correct.

Does that sentence suffice? If not, let me know what exactly you're looking for.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;151616 wrote:

I don't know if this is true.

How could it not be true?
1) knowledge is JTB
2) all future states of affairs have presently decided truth values
3) any true proposition can be believed
4) any belief can be justified
5) therefore, for any future state of affairs there is a true proposition about which a justified belief can be held
6) therefore, any future state of affairs can be known.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 11:54 AM ----------

Zetherin;151616 wrote:

I believe that the definition of "proposition" I linked to is correct.

Okay. What makes statements for which there is no corresponding fact, propositions?

@Night Ripper,

ughaibu wrote:

therefore, for any future state of affairs there is a true proposition about which a justified belief can be held

I'm not sure if every belief about a proposition can be justifiably believed. But what I meant is that every proposition cannot be known. That seems unrealistic. I'm not saying it's logically impossible, but it doesn't seem to be physically possible. We're not omniscient.

Quote:

4) any belief can be justified

Are you sure that is true?

Let's suppose everything you just said is true, though. Now what? What is the unknowable that I would now know? If I can know it, it wouldn't be unknowable, now would it?

---------- Post added 04-13-2010 at 11:07 PM ----------

ughaibu wrote:

Okay. What makes statements for which there is no corresponding fact, propositions?

"Amperage will wear a red shirt tomorrow" is a proposition since it says something about the world; it is a describable state of affairs. It seems to me a truthbearer, an entity which is either true or false.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;151626 wrote:

what I meant is that every proposition cannot be known.

According to you, "a proposition is a sentence expressing something true or false", this means that any such sentence is a proposition. Further than this, you claim that the propositional content is timelessly true, this means that the proposition was true before it was an uttered sentence, so your position carries commitments beyond utterances.

Zetherin;151626 wrote:

If I can know it, it wouldn't be unknowable, now would it?

Unknowability has been proved, see Fitch's theorem 5.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 12:18 PM ----------

Zetherin;151626 wrote:

"Amperage will wear a red shirt tomorrow" is a proposition since it says something about the world; it is a describable state of affairs. It seems to me a truthbearer, an entity which is either true or false.

Then you are committed to either determinism or fatalism, because if all states of the world, at all times, are describable states of affairs now, then there are no realisable alternatives in the future, and that means that there is no free will.

@Night Ripper,

ughaibu wrote:

this means that the proposition was true before it was an uttered sentence, so your position carries commitments beyond utterances.

The proposition would be either true or false. Don't you agree that "The sun will rise tomorrow" is either true or false? If not, can you explain why you don't?

Quote:

Unknowability has been proved, see Fitch's theorem 5.

I didn't say that there weren't things that we cannot know (in fact, if you read what I said, you would know that I was even leaning on believing that it is true we cannot know some things). What I did say is that if I knew that thing, it would be something we can know. But I will read Fitch's theorem, thanks for the suggestion.

I'm not sure how this is relevant, though.

Quote:

Then you are committed to either determinism or fatalism, because if all states of the world, at all times, are describable states of affairs now, then there are no realisable alternatives in the future, and that means that there is no free will.

No, this is the misconception I'm trying to point out. Just because future propositions must either be true or false, does not mean we don't have free will. I don't believe in fatalism, and I'm not advocating anything close. I'm saying we have choice, but also that propositions are truthbearers and must be true or false since they describe a state of affairs.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;151634 wrote:

No, this is the misconception I'm trying to point out. Just because future propositions must either be true or false, does not mean we don't have free will.

There is no misconception. An agent has free will on occasions when that agent makes and acts of conscious choices from amongst realisable alternatives. This requires that there is a set of more than one incompatible options, and which one of these options will be selected is open until the choice is made and acted on. If all states of the world, at all times, are exactly described by statements which take truth values now, then there is no set of options, there is a fact now about the agent's future behaviour, and that entails that there is no free will. If you hold that the truth of all propositions, about future states of affairs, does not follow from determinism, then fatalism is the only remaining possibility.

@Night Ripper,

ughaibu wrote:

If all states of the world, at all times, are exactly described by statements which take truth values now, then there is no set of options, there is a fact now about the agent's future behaviour, and that entails that there is no free will.

I still don't understand why you come to this conclusion, but I'll reread all of this tomorrow when I wake up.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;151634 wrote:

The proposition would be either true or false. Don't you agree that "The sun will rise tomorrow" is either true or false? If not, can you explain why you don't?

I didn't say that there weren't things that we cannot know (in fact, if you read what I said, you would know that I was even leaning on believing that it is true we cannot know some things). What I did say is that if I knew that thing, it would be something we can know. But I will read Fitch's theorem, thanks for the suggestion.

I'm not sure how this is relevant, though.

No, this is the misconception I'm trying to point out. Just because future propositions must either be true or false, does not mean we don't have free will. I don't believe in fatalism, and I'm not advocating anything close. I'm saying we have choice, but also that propositions are truthbearers and must be true or false since they describe a state of affairs.

@Emil,

Emil;151670 wrote:

I don't see how anyone could confuse "we cannot know some things" with (1) unless English isn't your first language.

@Emil,

The bottom line on this thread aims straight to Being against non Being.

1 - Whatever I will do tomorrow it will certainly have a cause.
2 - the chain of causes amounts to the present today and to the past before it.
3 - All ensemble of causes lead to one event describable in an ensemble of consequences...
4 - knowing what I will do is a different matter, as I am part of the problem, once I cannot know the ensemble of all, causes in myself, in others, or in the world in general...(part of Being)

If we take the word "Physicallity" to describe what Being is (not to describe the nature of matter) and assume at this light that no future event will be without physical cause, same is to say that it cannot emerge from nothingness, then this future event is already "potentiated" even if I/we cannot know its value...

In such case "Indeterminism" on a micro scale requires parallel Universes to be true, or some other quite similar explanation in an ensemble of possibilities that will amount to one multi-event. Same is to say ONE SET of opposite events that will be/are True !!!

NOTHING CAN EMERGE FROM NOTHING !!! = Necessary True value for what there is and will be.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 09:02 AM ----------

So if it is True that tomorrow I can either use a yellow or blue shirt, physically it is true that I must use both in a parallel ensemble of reality's...such amounts to non classical Determinism.

On the contrary, if only one of this choices is referred by I can, as true value, then classical determinism is True.

Conclusion:

Modal fallacy is a fallacy !
(What it can happen remains in Being and not out of it !!!)

@Emil,

Emil;151670 wrote:

Some X is not Y, and,
No X is Y.

By contrast, not all X is Y, is not ambiguous. It just means, some X is not Y.

I too think he meant, some X is not Y.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 10:26 AM ----------

Zetherin;151641 wrote:

I still don't understand why you come to this conclusion, but I'll reread all of this tomorrow when I wake up.

Posted by Ughaibu:

If all states of the world, at all times, are exactly described by statements which take truth values now, then there is no set of options, there is a fact now about the agent's future behaviour, and that entails that there is no free will.

I think he just confuses "all states of the world are described by statement that are either true or false" with, "all states of the world are inevitably described by statements that are true or false". The statements are either true or false, but they are not inevitably true or false.

It is unclear what "true or false now" means. But it might mean "inevitably true or false". "Truth" is not a temporal predicate. It makes no more (or less) sense to say that it is true now that P, then it makes to say that 2+2 =4 now. I guess it does = 4 now. But since it is impossible for it not to = 4 earlier, or later, there is no contrast. "=" is not a temporal predicate, and neither is "true". When, in ordinary language, we say things like, "It is true now that it is snowing, but it was not true earlier" we are merely omitting time parameters. If we put them in, we would just have different statements like, "it was not snowing at 3 p.m."(Earlier) but it is snowing at 4 pm (Now)" Two different statements. "Now" and "earlier" are indexicals.

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