Defense of Freewill Against Determinism

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Amperage
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 12:31 pm
@fast,
fast;151410 wrote:
LOL!!!

I edited my post. Take a look.

I will not wear a blue shirt tomorrow. Not only is that true, I know it's true, for I have made the decision to not wear a blue shirt tomorrow.
I read it....I swear you are getting at my point but we aren't coming into focus quite yet...

what if you change your mind between now and then? You are now locked into a course of action....that being....you cannot wear a blue shirt...no matter what. Or what if I offer you hundreds of dollars........do you have paypal?






unless you think that:

statement 1 at 1:30 pm -> "i will wear a blue shirt tomorrow"

is false

and statement 2 at 3:30pm -> "i will wear a blue shirt tomorrow"

is true

and there is no contradiction here....these are just 2 separate and unrelated propositions.



I suppose this would be another method of circumventing "the problem as I see it" if you do think that...
 
fast
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 12:39 pm
@Amperage,
[QUOTE=Amperage;151412]I read it....I swear you are getting at my point but we aren't coming into focus quite yet...[/QUOTE]
Amperage;151412 wrote:


what if you change your mind between now and then? You are now locked into a course of action....that being....you cannot wear a blue shirt...no matter what. Or what if I offer you hundreds of dollars........do you have paypal?

It's always possibly true that I might wear a blue shirt tomorrow, but that it's possibly true has no bearing on whether it's actually true that I will.

The distinction is between what is possibly the case and what is actually the case. Yes, possibly, I will wear one, but that has no bearing on the truth of the proposition. The truth of the proposition lies not on what is possibly the case. It lies squarely on what is the case. We don't know (unequivocally beyond error and mistake) what I will do, but what I know or don't know to be the case has no more bearing on what is the case (as far as the current proposition is concerned) than does what is possibly the case.

Fact is, I won't wear it tomorrow, so the proposition expressed here by your statement today is false. Does this mean that I must refrain from wearing it as if such a fact was set in stone? No of course not, but I'll tell you what, if I do wear one tomorrow, all that will mean is that I didn't know the proposition was in fact true. That I might be mistaken, however, is no good reason to think I will be.

Does that close the gap?
 
Amperage
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 12:43 pm
@fast,
fast;151415 wrote:
Fact is, I won't wear it tomorrow, so the proposition expressed here by your statement today is false. Does this mean that I must refrain from wearing it as if such a fact was set in stone? No of course not, but I'll tell you what, if I do wear one tomorrow, all that will mean is that I didn't know the proposition was in fact true. That I might be mistaken, however, is no good reason to think I will be.

Does that close the gap?
a little.

but why even think there is a value there before-the-fact?

you said yourself that until it is "actual" it's variable(not set in stone).

why think if you wear a blue shirt tomorrow that you were wrong about that proposition being false?

why can it not be the case that the statement lacked a value of truth or falsity before-the-fact and only became true or false upon actually happening(retrospectively)??
 
fast
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 12:58 pm
@Amperage,
[INDENT]but why even think there is a value there before-the-fact?
[/INDENT]
Law of bivalence
 
Amperage
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 01:00 pm
@fast,
fast;151424 wrote:
law of bivalence
lol
I seriously did laugh because I know you haven't been viewing the thread and it's was funny to it named again. This is the very law I am challenging and the one we've been discussing since about page 82 if I recall post #816 when it was first brought up.
 
fast
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 01:04 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;151425 wrote:
lol
I seriously did laugh. This is the very law I am challenging and the one we've been discussing since about page 82 if I recall I think somewhere around post #802 or something

You are challenging it? Why would you do such a thing?
 
Amperage
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 01:08 pm
@fast,
fast;151429 wrote:
You are challenging it? Why would you do such a thing?
because I reject the notion that a statement about a future free willed choice can be set in stone before the fact.

The future is not set....and the truth or falsity of such statements can ONLY be meaningful or ascertained or even exist after the fact

the only 2 options for me to go is reject the law of bivalence(only for propositions about future free willed choices mind you) or redefine what the law means by "proposition" or at least specify to a greater extent.
 
fast
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 01:20 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;151432 wrote:
because I reject the notion that a statement about a future free willed choice can be set in stone before the fact
I don't think you should be challenging the Law of Bivalence when what you reject has not much to do with it. What do you think it means for a statement to be set in stone?
 
Amperage
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 01:28 pm
@fast,
fast;151434 wrote:
I don't think you should be challenging the Law of Bivalence when what you reject has not much to do with it. What do you think it means for a statement to be set in stone?
It means that it is either always true.....or always false....even before the fact, and at no time can it change.

It is the "even before the fact" part that troubles me. How can something be set in stone before I've decided what I will choose??? This makes free will seem illusory(though I've addressed this). And I would like to believe in the notion myself..

With specific regards to my objection(note: there have been many many who have objected to the law of bivalence), I take it to mean that the truth or falsity of the statement dictates what my actions will be vs. my actions dictating the truth or falsity of the statement.

And I don't mean that the statement is what is "causing" my actions, but that my actions are caused by other factors which are beyond my control. And no amount of free will can be contrary to the statement even with foreknowledge.

hypothetically I could be shown before-the-fact that, "tomorrow, at noon, I will be raped by an angry eskimo because I choose to take the subway instead of a taxi", and yet I would be powerless to change it.

---------- Post added 04-13-2010 at 02:34 PM ----------

if ya'll see fit to "go there", then I am more than willing to begin questioning the definition of "proposition" because I certainty think(especially for people who want to maintain the law of bivalence) that such statements(future free willed choices) must obviously not fall in the category of being a proposition

especially if by proposition you mean a sentence expressing something true or false.
for the very objection I've raised: that such "before the fact" statements are neither true nor false.

perhaps they should be called future contingent propositions or time dependent propositions or something to distinguish them...

but this is obviously not where I'm trying to make my argument

---------- Post added 04-13-2010 at 02:58 PM ----------

here's one flaw I see with my argument for me. What about God? If God exists I believe in the notion of His foreknowledge so I ought not mind if propositions are set in stone before-the-fact...even propositions about future free willed choices.

But for someone who doesn't believe in God or who doesn't think God knows the future, my argument would still hold.

So, I guess, for me, of the 3 options:

1. Either such statements(propositions concerning future free willed choices) have no value(null, neither true nor false, indeterminate, blank) before the fact.
2. Determinism is true.
3. One will ALWAYS freely choose in accordance with the pre-ordained truth value of the statement even if one knew this fact before actually making the choice. And no bribe or coaxing or anything could lead one to not freely choose in accordance with the pre-ordained truth value of the statement.

I really ought to be a proponent of (3), course (3) also implies fatalism I'd say as does (2)
 
Night Ripper
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 02:01 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;151438 wrote:
It means that it is either always true.....or always false....even before the fact, and at no time can it change.

It is the "even before the fact" part that troubles me. How can something be set in stone before I've decided what I will choose???


Because the truth is timeless.
 
Amperage
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 02:03 pm
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;151456 wrote:
Because the truth is timeless.
how can a statement be given a value of true or false before the fact when that distinction is mine for the choosing? And I haven't chose yet!

The truth or falsity of the statements changes upon the whim of my choosing....it is in flux until the event happens. Not set in stone
 
fast
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 02:34 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;151438 wrote:
It is the "even before the fact" part that troubles me. How can something be set in stone before I've decided what I will choose??? This makes free will seem illusory. At I would like to believe in the notion myself..
What I will wear is not set in stone; hence, it's not the case that I must wear what I say I will.

If I must do X, then I will do X, but that I will do X isn't to say I must do X. I am saying that I will wear red tomorrow. I'm not saying that I must wear red tomorrow. To say that I know I will wear red tomorrow isn't to say that I must wear red tomorrow. It's to say that my justified belief that I will wear red tomorrow is (is, I say) true--not must be true.
 
Amperage
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 02:41 pm
@fast,
fast;151467 wrote:
What I will wear is not set in stone; hence, it's not the case that I must wear what I say I will.

If I must do X, then I will do X, but that I will do X isn't to say I must do X. I am saying that I will wear red tomorrow. I'm not saying that I must wear red tomorrow. To say that I know I will wear red tomorrow isn't to say that I must wear red tomorrow. It's to say that my justified belief that I will wear red tomorrow is (is, I say) true--not must be true.
well here's the issue:


If the statement "I will do X tomorrow" is true, then it follows that you cannot not do X tomorrow.

If the statement "I will do X tomorrow" is false, then it follows that you cannot do X tomorrow.

by the law of bivalence said statment falls into one of those 2 categories the moment you uttered it and prior to your final resolution of actually doing X or not.

thus we see that if a truth value exists before-the-fact....you are locked into a course of action with no way of choosing the contrary. Even in the event that, between now and tomorrow, someone shows you which category you fall into and offers you money to switch, you won't be able to switch. Totally violating your free will.

At least that's how the argument goes

---------- Post added 04-13-2010 at 03:45 PM ----------

the problem you have to contend with is this:

since a truth value exists before-the-fact and absolutely(bivalence).....if someone showed you the value and offered you money, women, clothes, fame, power, respect, love, happiness, whatever..... could you choose to act contrary? If not, then your free will is an illusion and if so, you have shown why bivalence for future contingent propositions is false.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 02:54 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;151472 wrote:
well here's the issue:


If the statement "I will do X tomorrow" is true, then it follows that you cannot not do X tomorrow.



What is the argument for that? It seems to me that on the contrary, only if you do X tomorrow is your statement, "I will do X tomorrow" true. And it is up to you whether you do X tomorrow, and therefore, it is up to you whether you will do X tomorrow.
 
fast
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 02:56 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;151472 wrote:
well here's the issue:


If the statement "I will do X tomorrow" is true, then it follows that you cannot not do X tomorrow.


I know the difference between "cannot" and "can not", but I have no idea what "cannot not" is.

I have pizza on the table. I can eat a slice, or if I choose, I can not eat a slice, but it's not true that I cannot eat a slice.

I suppose you meant, "cannot," but that's not true. If the statement, "I will do X tomorrow" is true, then what follows is that I will not do X tomorrow--not that I cannot.

Quote:
If the statement "I will do X tomorrow" is false, then it follows that you cannot do X tomorrow.
No. What follows is that I will not do X tomorrow. That's something different.
 
Amperage
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 03:01 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;151479 wrote:
What is the argument for that? It seems to me that on the contrary, only if you do X tomorrow is your statement, "I will do X tomorrow" true. And it is up to you whether you do X tomorrow, and therefore, it is up to you whether you will do X tomorrow.
yes, but the value is pre-ordained.

by saying I will do X tomorrow a truth value gets assigned right then and there....before you actually make your choice.

So if we presuppose the value was true then it follows that you cannot not do X.
 
fast
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 03:03 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;151482 wrote:
yes, but the value is pre-ordained.

by saying I will do X tomorrow a truth value gets assigned right then and there....before you actually make your choice.

So if we presuppose the value was true then it follows that you cannot not do X.
You did it again. I need that Amperage-to-English thingy you got once more. Very Happy
 
Amperage
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 03:05 pm
@fast,
fast;151484 wrote:
You did it again. I need that Amperage-to-English thingy you got once more. Very Happy
Really? I've heard many a philosopher use this phrase....it basically means "must do" "necessarily do" I suppose. So to re-write the sentence I could say the following:

If the statement "I will do X tomorrow" is true, then it follows that you will do X tomorrow necessarily"

It's just a different way of placing emphasis.
 
fast
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 03:08 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;151485 wrote:
Really? I've heard many a philosopher use this phrase....it basically means "must do" "necessarily do" I suppose. So to re-write the sentence I could say the following:

If the statement "I will do X tomorrow" is true, then it follows that you will do X tomorrow necessarily"

See post 955 and apply that to what I quoted you saying.
 
Amperage
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 03:11 pm
@fast,
fast;151486 wrote:
See post 955 and apply that to what I quoted you saying.
I'm not sure what your asking....could you please elaborate or explain?

also, with regards to post 955, your statement, "If the statement, "I will do X tomorrow" is true, then what follows is that I will not do X tomorrow", is completely wrong but I think it may have just been an oversight on your part.
 
 

 
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