But that is just the trouble. The regularity does not explain anything at all. Regularities require explanation, they do not provide explanation.

The problem with the antinomy Regularity or Necessity only shows up in a open-ended infinite Reality.

Of course QM particule behaviour may be pointed as good reason for paralell Universes. .

Says which? Are you suggesting LEM should be discarded for this question?
Okay, rigorise your position, under which circumstances does the LEM apply?
Otherwise, if you're espousing a discrete ontology, whereby you disregard almost all modern science, what is your argument for determinism?.

Bollocks. Science is limited by the need to offer predictions, predictions are, by their nature, deterministic, so the models proposed by scientists are of no consequence, for this question.

But that is just the trouble. The regularity does not explain anything at all. Regularities require explanation, they do not provide explanation.

I suppose you are right. It is not the regularity itself that explains anything. I suppose I was thinking of the explanation accompanying a regularity and then using that to draw a conclusion. For instance, if I never wore yellow shirts, I could induce that I won't wear a yellow shirt tomorrow.

No, that's deduction. Since you're going from general to specific and it's deduction that goes from general to specific.

Determinism isn't incompatible with free will, but it sure does sober the idea up.

Inductive reasoning, also known as induction or inductive logic, is a type of reasoning that involves moving from a set of specific facts to a general conclusion.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning

He was using deduction not induction. If he would have been moving from a few specific instances of my not wearing yellow to a general conclusion that I never wear yellow then he would have been inducing something.

You are willing to argue about anything, it seems, but if you don't know basic terminology then you won't get very far in an argument. Saying you're inducing something when you're deducing something shows a deep misunderstanding of what induction is. It's important that we correct that now.

Have you considered my counterexamples to the view that deduction always is an inference that goes from the general to the specific?

it's deduction that goes from general to specific

Here's what I wrote:



I didn't claim deduction always goes from general to specific. However, it is true that deduction goes from general to specific and not induction, unlike what Zetherin incorrectly said.

Z. did not say that at all. He just presented an argument. You are just backpedaling very rapidly. I don't know physics very well, and if I make a mistake, I admit it. You know almost no philosophy or logic.

For instance, if I never wore yellow shirts, I could induce that I won't wear a yellow shirt tomorrow.

That you're clearly becoming more and more insulting just shows how incapable you are of admitting you're wrong. You continually misrepresent the positions of others and when you are shown wrong you lash out irrationally.

It's time to face reality.



That's not induction. If you think it is then you're wrong. Now is the time to admit it instead of trying to derail the discussion with strawman arguments about the nature of deduction.

For instance, if I never wore yellow shirts, I could induce that I won't wear a yellow shirt tomorrow.

For instance, if I never wear yellow shirts, I could induce that I won't wear a yellow shirt tomorrow.

Here's what he wrote:

Here's what I've been reading:

So, as you can see. I am wrong. I misread. My mistake.

No, that's deduction. Since you're going from general to specific and it's deduction that goes from general to specific.

1. All men are mortals
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Socrates is mortal.

Induction would be to infer from a few specific examples of me not wearing yellow that I never wear yellow.

I thought an example of an inference would be a conclusion drawn from past instances, about what will happen. It's nothing more than a prediction, albeit one with good reasoning.