To talk about X does not necessitate that X exists. The idea of X is not X, as you pointed out earlier. So why can't we talk about the idea of X?



You know how to talk about what does not exist. You just did. And you can truly say something does not exist if the idea has no manifestation with properties (as you also pointed out earlier). Where's the confusion?



What do you mean?

I don't understand what you and Plato are having a hard time with. Perhaps it's just me being dense. Maybe you could elaborate further?

Plato is asking whether, and how we can talk about what does not exist. Since he supposes that if we talk about X, then X must exist.

Else we are talking about nothing.

You say that we are, in that case, really talking about the idea of X, and not X. But then, the question is, how, when we say that X does not exist, are we talking about the idea of X? We are not, after all, saying that the idea of X does not exist. (The idea of mermaid and the idea of unicorn does exist).

Plato is correct, but we are not talking about X when we talk about the idea of X, when X does not exist. We are not talking about unicorns when we describe the concept of the unicorn. We obviously cannot talk about something which does not exist.



We are talking about an idea. If ideas are nothing, then we are talking about nothing. If ideas are something, we are talking about something. Me thinks ideas are something, and therefore we're still talking about something.



We are saying that the physical manifestation, of what we think is related to the idea, does not exist. We are theorizing that if there were an X capable of existence (based upon our idea of X), it would not exist. When we say X doesn't exist, we are not saying anything about X, actually. We are saying something about our conception of X (as that is all we have to go on if something doesn't exist). So, we are saying that our conception has no physical manifestation with properties, and so does not exist.

Am I still missing something?

1. If we were talking about our idea (or conception) of a unicorn, wouldn't we be saying things like, "my idea of a unicorn is in my mind", or, "my idea of a unicorn may not be the same as your idea of a unicorn". But we are not saying that kind of thing at all.

2. If when we talk about unicorns, we are really talking about the idea of a unicorn (as you say we are) then when we say that unicorns do not exist, would we not be saying that the ideas of unicorns do not exist? But we are clearly not saying that at all.

So, for reasons 1. and 2., I don't think you are right when you say that when we talk about unicorns, we are really talking about the idea of unicorn.

What do you suppose people are saying when unicorns don't exist, then? Perhaps "unicorns don't exist" is meaningless. It's very possible it is.




Here's two questions:

• What does it mean to talk about something?
  
• Are we always just talking about the idea of that something, even if that something exists?
  

We never talk about unicorns, as they do not exist. If it's possible that we can even talk about something

Hey, no fair. That was my question.
How could it both be true and meaningless that unicorns do not exist?

When I say that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, I am not saying that the idea of the Eiffel Tower is not Paris.

But children, and mythologists, do talk about unicorns. And, even if God does not exist, still, lots of people talk about God.

Our statement must not be true. Since it's meaningless, it cannot be true or false. And we know it can't be true, because we aren't even talking about unicorns (we cannot, as they do not exist). It's just meaningless, I think.



But maybe you believe you were talking about the Eiffel Tower, but you were just talking about the idea all along. And so even if the physical manifestation vanished, you still had no less than you started with.

So confusing...



If they are talking about unicorns, unicorns must exist. Otherwise, they are not talking about unicorns at all. Likewise for God.

You really think that it is not true that unicorns exist? How about Extra-terrestrials? Now, we don't know whether or not there are Extraterrestrials. According to you principle that if we talk about what does not exist, the sentence is meaningless, we don't know whether talk about extra-terrestrials is meaningless or isn't. Isn't that right? That ought to confuse astronomers.

So all you have to do to prove there is a God is to talk about God?

Just as an aside, this is all very much like trying to have a conversation about nothing, or nothingness.

By that I mean that at this moment, sitting at my computer, I am trying to discuss nothing, or nothingness, as in what might await our individual senses, when consciousness ceases permanently, as in death.

I am trying to discuss nothingness as a void, where there is no way to even categorize what I mean, or what I think I mean, by the term nothing.

Unfortunately, the instant I define 'nothing', I have made it 'something', that is, it is no longer nothing.

Could the adjective 'exist' be defined then as not nothing? The English Lit. major in me recoils in horror at the double negative.....

If scientists created a breed of horse which had a single horn, would we call it a unicorn, or would we say that it was a horse which looked like or had some properties of a unicorn? Isn't it possible that no matter what, we will never confess that something is a unicorn?

If we find life on another planet, do extraterrestrials exist, or is it just our definition of extraterrestrial that is proven true? What if we find there are multiple universes, and planets that could inhabit life in other universes. Is it possible that we would change the definition of "extraterrestrial" to be creatures from other universes, instead of creatures just not on Earth, until we found creatures in the other universes? Would we still say that every other creature not on earth is an extraterrestrial? I don't know. What if we made ways to traverse planets on the fly, and distance was never an issue; wouldn't this change our notion of "extraterrestrial" in some way? Perhaps we'd divorce the real from the unreal, once again - once we discover something, it is no longer the thing we once thought existed, but then something else will be the new thing we think exists.

(I understand this paragraph is very muddy; I'm going to need a lot of charity on this one)

It doesn't seem as though "unicorn" or "extraterrestrial" are referential terms. Are they? Will we let them be ever?



Are you saying that you can talk about things which don't exist? So you disagree with Plato?

But the most interesting thing, I think, is that while you're attempting to articulate a thought which, by definition, cannot exist, I'm here on the other end interpreting your meaning. Somehow, some way, what you mean is being understood by me. For some reason I find this mind-blowing.

(a bit off-topic, I know)

I might have put this question into the language section, but since possibly the most central question in metaphysics is that of existence, I decided to put it there.

Still confused also,

Zeth

Maybe not so much off as one might think, when placed against kennethamy's original comment, which was:



The fact that I am sitting here typing, and the fact that you are there interpreting, seems to me to be pretty good evidence, that is, evidence I can feel good about believing, that both of us exist.




Glad I'm not alone.

This is an interesting thread.

I am glad you think so. Here we are philosophizing about existence. What could be more philosophical? That we exist is not in question. What is at issue is what is meant by saying that X exists (or does not exist).

and suggest that saying that X exists (or does not exist) doesn't mean anything other than that it is a statement which intends to convey a proposition that X either does, or does not, exist.



TTM

"Unicorn" and "extraterrestrial" are referential terms. But as for the first, it fails to refer, and as for the second, it fails to refer as far as we know.

We apparently do talk about what does not exist. The question is, how do we do so in view of Plato's objections?

Bertrand Russell posed this question, is the statement, "the present King of France is bald": true or false? Russell held that it was false because in implied that there is a present King or France, and there is none. And you?

Why does "unicorn" fail to refer and "extraterrestrial" fail to refer as far as we know? Couldn't a "unicorn" be an "extraterrestrial"? Keep in mind unicorns do not necessarily have anything to do with magic. Many writers have envisioned them simply as white horses with long manes and a single horn on their heads.

But I don't understand how they're referential terms. What do they refer to? Our thoughts? Can referential terms refer to things which have the potential for existence? What does the 'potential for existence' even mean? I thought referential terms referred to things which existed only. Perhaps I am incorrect. So, which common nouns, even the ones we make up, aren't referential terms? Is hampherfishboo, a noun I just conjured, a referential term?



How do we know we're talking about what does not exist, if it does not exist, or if, for whatever reason, we don't know it exists? This seems to be a grave epistemic problem. The only thing it appears we're sure of if we say we are speaking about something which does not exist, is that we're talking about the idea of something which, to the best of our knowledge, doesn't exist.



If there was a King of France and he wasn't bald, I would say that statement is false. Since there is not even a King of France, I would most likely say that that statement is a statement of nonsense. I wouldn't honor it with any semantic analysis. My current stance (which may very well change) is that the statement does not describe any feature of the world, and so is not capable of being objectively true or false.

What I would do is clarify that there is no King of France, and make sure the person understood this so they didn't continue making the same stupid, uneducated statement to others.

But what is the analysis of the proposition it conveys? For instance, when I say that X is my brother, I, of course, mean to convey that X is my brother. But the analysis of the proposition I convey is that, X is my male sibling. Can we do something like that with, X exists?

I said "unicorn" fails to refer as far as we know.

"Unicorn" and "extraterrestrial" are referential terms. But as for the first, it fails to refer, and as for the second, it fails to refer as far as we know.

That doesn't mean that it does not refer. Of course, the likelihood is nil-1. Tha standard view is that unicorns are magical. If there aren't, the likelihood of their existence is nil-1/2.

I mean by "referential term" that it purports to refer. It is a noun or a noun-phrase. As contrasted with a term like, "the", or "although". The mark you just invented is not a noun in English. So it is not a referential term.

You seem to advocate "truth-gaps". Russell does not. If "The present king of France is bald" is neither true or false then how does it happen that the following argument is valid?

1. All people who are bald have cold heads.
2. The present king of France is bald.
Therefore, 3. The present king of France has a cold head.

Your view is very like Peter Strawson's. See,

Peter Frederick Strawson (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

See the section on "reference". #2

I think so, but my background in much of what is being discussed here is so limited as to be non-existent that I can't be sure . . . but I'll give it a shot anyway.

The analysis of the proposition conveyed by my stating that X exists is that I am confident enough that something which I am calling X can be described either objectively or subjectively that I am willing to make the argument that it exists.

Or does this border on a tautological proof?

I'm still confused, but I think I right on the edge of understanding what you're getting at . . . At least I hope so, as my dunce cap is starting to chafe.

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Tock