If you mean that the numerically same (identical) phenomenon cannot reoccur, then, of course, for what is different cannot be exactly the same. But, that is just true by definition. Nothing to write home about. "The same" does not mean "identical". But why would anyone think that it does?

Maybe I'm a pedant, but it seems lto me like its pretty important, at least with respect to linear causality, or the lack thereof. The concept that X causes Y, in general, is simply wrong if there never is a repetition of X or Y. In itself, that's not very significant I suppose, but if we use causal relations like this broadly, the result might be a very skewed vision of reality. We might come hold a vision of reality which is much more regular and rational that is warranted, as we do. I use the argument I made earlier to express doubts about the 'rational universe' and to criticize the idea that science or mathematics reveal truth; they are rather only tools, which express a utility for us.

But that, for instance, cutting off someone's head, and the person decapitated dying, has been repeated many times through the years, and even on the internet. And, in any case, we have excellent reason to believe that cutting off someone's head will cause him to die even if we had never seen it. Wouldn't you agree?

If we can't know, wouldn't it be best to apply Occham's razor and disregard the idea? The question is whether the causal line of thinking is necessary or if we can just speak of patterns of correlation.

Theory and practice ought not to conflict.

I would agree, but from what ive observed with this thread, and information elsewhere. Its just a strong correlation/practical cause and not an absolute cause.

There are many things that are not in my experience, where i feel 100% confident i could predict the outcome. The beheading example is one. I've never tried to breathe under water, but i know doing so would cause water to enter my lungs and i would drown. Ive never jumped out of an airplane without a parachute, but i know in doing so, the impact with the ground would kill me.

The above seem to be absolute causes, but are really strong correlationgs/practical causes. The beheading example also seems a stronger correlation than last example.

If you cant prove, or give an example of absolute cause, whatever it may be, then the question of "what is the difference between causation and correlation" is pointless. We cant even define a cause, let alone distinguish it from something else.

I'm not so sure either that saying an unknown variable at a quantum level could in no way, influence, or be connected to the fact that molecules render the properties of a rock or any other thing. Although the argument againt it seemed reasonable, and if it is so easy to eliminate the quantum half of the puzzle, than what is so elusive on the larger scale, that prevents this from establishing a true cause.

The purpose of Occam's razor is to eliminate superfluous entities. But the idea of causation is not a superfluous entity, for it alone offers a possible explanation of strong correlations (unless you can think of any other). If you concede that causation may exist, how can you disregard the possibility that it may be an essential element in explaining (a) the prevalence of regularities in the world, and (b) the usefulness of induction?

When you refer to 'patterns of correlation', do you accept the difference in kind between strong and weak correlations? Or do you wish to treat all correlations as mere coincidence? The latter view seems to me extremely implausible.

Moreover, I do not see how anyone could sincerely hold it, given that they must use induction in real life. Theory and practice ought not to conflict.

I don't know what an "absolute cause" is supposed to be.

If two events have high probability of simultaneous occurrence and one precedes the other without any other known factors, we can conclude in a practical sense, everything we might conclude with a causal relationship without assuming such an unverifiable metaphysical property.

So there is a difference between practice, where we assume causation (or something tantamount to it), and theory, where we do not. Is that right? If so, I think it would be reasonable to try to resolve the difference and thus give a single answer to the question "Is there really causation?" Either there is or there isn't. Seems like a legitimate philosophical question to me.

If statistically significant patterns of correlation are not to be put down to pure coincidence, surely they must rest on some real factor and therefore have some basis in metaphysics.

I think that the main two questions here are: "Can you verify causation?" and "Does causation matter if you cannot verify it empirically?" I would answer the first with a 'no'.

If we are relying on sense experience to verify a causal relationship, and we can conclude that it is logically possible that there is no cause, then we have no basis for a claim of definite causality. That it 'seems likely' or 'seems to fit' is not really important if we are talking about a problem of certainty.

When we stroll back into the realm of the practical, we might take a look at what Kennethamy means when he asks if we cannot say that beheading causes death. Does he mean that it is logically necessary that dead follow beheading? No, of course not. He means that it is empirically verifiable and has been verified to hold in a statistically significant number of cases so is accepted as fact. This is not what we mean when we are talking about causality, we are talking about absolute certainty and logical necessity. Neither of these is present in his example.

The source of the conflict with Ken's point of view is this:

1cause Pronunciation: \ˈkȯz\ Function:noun Etymology:Middle English, from Anglo-French, from Latin causaDate:13th century 1 a: a reason for an action or condition : motive b: something that brings about an effect or a result c: a person or thing that is the occasion of an action or state ; especially : an agent that brings something about d: sufficient reason <discharged for causenoun Etymology:Medieval Latin correlation-, correlatio, from Latin com- + relation-, relatio relationDate:1561 1: the state or relation of being correlated ; specifically : a relation existing between phenomena or things or between mathematical or statistical variables which tend to vary, be associated, or occur together in a way not expected on the basis of chance alone <the obviously high positive correlation between scholastic aptitude and college entrance - J. B. Conant>2: the act of correlating

Which one of these better fits what you and Ken seem to be talking about?

So the question remains: "Is this sort of causation necessary or even imoprtant?" This is a more difficult question, but I would also respnd to it with a 'no'. The causation that we are talking about(definite, logically necessary causation) is nothing but specualtion, informed speculation, but speculation nontheless.




Not totally sure what you mean by what is in bold.

It seems enough to me to say that we are fairly certain that death follows beheading as a rule, so we shouldn't go around cutting off other peoples heads. Just my 2 cents.

Whether X is caused to happen or X simply happens by chance, either way X still happens. Therefore no one can determine the difference between cause or chance merely by observing X.

Substitute for X with beheadings, coin tosses, heated metal or whatever else you like.

Zetetic11235 - Thanks for your recent post. I have two questions:

1. You quote the dictionary definition of 'cause' as "something that brings about an effect or a result". That is indeed what I mean. But then you refer to "definite, logically necessary causation". Definite, yes. But why logically necessary? Why not simply "necessary by the laws of nature"?

2. You reject the idea of causation in the beheading/death example because we do not have absolute proof of it. But you are content with the idea of a correlation between them. However, we do not have absolute proof of anything outside the field of logic and mathematics. We do not know beyond all doubt that beheading and death even exist! So they, and any correlation between them, seem just as 'doubtful' as causation. Why, then, must causation meet a higher standard of proof to be metaphysically acceptable?

Since speculation is just guessing without evidence, I don't think there can be such a thing as "informed speculation". And it certainly is not speculation that when someone is beheaded he will die, and that the beheading is the cause of his death. If anything is not speculation, that is not speculation. It is the very opposite of speculation, or even of guessing.

Zetetic11235 - Thanks for your recent post. I have two questions:

1. You quote the dictionary definition of 'cause' as "something that brings about an effect or a result". That is indeed what I mean. But then you refer to "definite, logically necessary causation". Definite, yes. But why logically necessary? Why not simply "necessary by the laws of nature"?

2. You reject the idea of causation in the beheading/death example because we do not have absolute proof of it. But you are content with the idea of a correlation between them. However, we do not have absolute proof of anything outside the field of logic and mathematics. We do not know beyond all doubt that beheading and death even exist! So they, and any correlation between them, seem just as 'doubtful' as causation. Why, then, must causation meet a higher standard of proof to be metaphysically acceptable?

Hume says:

For ANY cause, MULTIPLE effects are conceivable. Really?

I'm sorry, but i disagree with that.

Oh wait. I overlooked the possibility that the person might pick their head up and put it back on, or that maybe we dont need our heads, and that person may just walk away with no head.

To me there is only one conceivable outcome of this scenario. One ping, and one ping only!

Of couse this is different than smacking some billiard balls around on a table. Seems to be more sentiment involved, a more intimate connection to the events, as opposed to inanimate objects.

I can conceive of a person being beheaded, and not dying. I mean the supposition is not self-contradictory. But, of course, I know that people who are beheaded will die. Bu that does not mean that it is logically impossible that they won't die, nor that it is absolutely certain, without the possibility of error, that they won't die.

Fair enough, I could also conceive it, but why would I? It makes no sense.

Heating metal on the other hand...if I had experience with heat, but none with metal. I may entertain the idea that it may: expand, melt, catch fire, or even explode. Since i dont have any connection to it, i have no way of knowing what effect the heat will have on it, but have conceived some sensible ideas based on my experience with heat.

I am connected to my body, I have experience with it, I have power over it, I have intimacy with it..heh, and if nobody had ever been beheaded before, because of my connection with my body. I would only conceive one effect. I could not exist without it. I would die(physically anyways).