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As I said, I'm most interested in why people desire to believe in the spiritual. If you don't mind sharing, why do you desire this? Why do you find it important to believe in something you can't even articulate?
What fascinates me the most is why people want to believe so badly!
madman would question the sacred truth of Science...)
This is more debatable. (You are trying to synthesize here and I apologize to you if I look like exploiting the inevitable approximations - actually I am going to make some rough approximations too).
Indeed, philosophically speaking, there was a change. The principa prima, that were unquestionable in pre-scientific age philosophy, relied on religious-metaphysical elements. The rational mechanics eventually managed to give a proved account of the universe without those principia.
The success of Science led to the assumption that everything that we sense (in some way) is real and can be scientifically explained. Hence the claim that Science is the only true knowledge of the being, or that the scientific method is the only way to proceed to achieve knowledge, extended its hegemony over large parts of the West - and notably over the Anglosphere.
This claim is no longer Science, it is something else. (And, philosophically, it is questionable; Hume and Kant gave some reasons for questioning it - and both were not exactly metaphysical thinkers).
"Going analytic" means not to question this claim.
But one philosophy can be equally concerned with Science moving from different beliefs. And indeed the first problem arise with the question: what is Science, what is the scientific method? Do we really know what Science is?
We are clearly impressed by the power of Science, by the power to control and subdue forces and elements. Is this awe in front of the power of Science still scientific? Or is it something else?
Having said the above, that's not yet the reason why I dislike - or bemoan, if you prefer - analytic philosophy.
But this is a matter of taste and as I believe that my taste is not of general interest, I'll refrain from getting into it.
There are two questions there.
Continental Philosophy has tossed out the baby with the bathwater. Exposition of text is not philosophizing, and continental philosophy has tried to replace philosophy with exposition of text. Doing that is what has been called, "failure of nerve". We cannot compete with science in its home territory (true) therefore, let us abandon philosophy and turn to literary criticism of philosophers. Absurd.
What a peculiar, and in Kant's case especially, even a perverse thing to say!
(Sorry if I hurted your feelings on Moore, I did not mean that - but, as Martin Luther said, that's my opinion and I can't help it).
I guess that you mean an approach to philosophy that is focusing only on the literary quality of the philosopher's work.
(I can't explain why, but I have the feeling that you do not refer to all continental philosophers, but only targeting a very specific person).
I would even agree with you for some authors, notably in the post-Heidegger area, but not in general. I can hardly see Hegel or Marx as literary reviewers.
Of course you do not have to believe me, but it's still quite possible not to view Kant as a realist. And this opinion is not confined to myself - Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer (and others) shared this idea. Maybe they got everything wrong, but I hope you will allow some people like me to have a different opinion from yours, without belittling their intelligence.
But are you saying that it is I who am diverting the argument, and failing to pay proper attention to what you mean, and only seizing on some minor or irrelevant part of it?
I did ask, "do you mean whatever you can learn by empirical observation and detached logical reasoning?", and as far as I can see, you didn't confirm, until now, that that was (more or less) what you meant.
actually I articulate it pretty well, I think.
But that is an ambiguous question. And, in one sense (at least) it begs the question.
If we are considering 'truths about our concepts' or the reality of our subjective experience, then we are already in a difficult position. We are already considering questions of a different order to questions about the nature of objects. Why? Because in order to validate a concept, we presumably ascertain whether it corresponds to an objective reality. But consider the following:
In order to make the comparison between the conceptual and the objective, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison?
I don't know if I am making some silly mistake (if I am, no doubt someone will tell me right away), but it seems to me that the answer to this question is very simple. I alluded to it the day before yesterday, in post #7 of another thread:
http://www.philosophyforum.com/philosophy-forums/branches-philosophy/metaphysics/5088-universal-game-hypothesis-kevin-thomson.html
There are a great many ways to talk about this. Whether Heidegger writes about it successfully, I don't know, but at least in simple, commonsense English, we are in the world, not outside it, and our being in the world is a way of knowing it. Presumably Schopenhauer also wrote about this. But you don't have to know anything about philosophy (I certainly don't know much!) to know it - and to be right about it, in a way of which even G. E. Moore might have approved. This "knowledge" is not always in competition with scientific "knowledge" (scare quotes because of ambiguity), but it sometimes is. When the two forms of knowledge compete, the issue is not always decided in advance, either way. And we simply can't dispense with either. We need both, we can't avoid either of them, and we have to endure the occasional tension between them.
But in this very conversation what were are talking about is our experiences of the world (internal and external) and our concepts about what knowledge and science are. Psychology is a science. Some things aren't explicitly studied by science (at this time) because there is not an easy way to do so. But that doesn't make them a "different kind of thinking".
Many of your questions I did not understand, and that is why I did not respond to them directly. First, like I mentioned before, I am unsure what you mean by "personal knowledge". Maybe you mean knowledge about something personal? Like that I only put on deodorant every other day? I don't know what else you would mean, since I thought all my knowledge was personal in the sense that it was in fact my knowledge.
Also, I was not only referring to a posteriori knowledge (empirical observation), and I don't know why you would think that.
Lastly, if you could please clarify "detached logical reasoning", that would help.
Sorry, it seems as though we're not on the same wavelength here.
The next step was that of analytic philosophy (or at least some analytic philosophy since there were important exceptions). The step was to distinguish between science as a first-order discipline, and philosophy as a second-order discipline. Science was about the world, and it tried to discover empirical truths about the world. Philosophy, on the other hand, was not about the world (or not, at leas, directly). Rather is concerned the concepts we used to think and talk about the world, including, of course, the concepts science uses to talk and think about the world. For example, the concept of causation. So here was a division of labor, and the reduction, if not the complete elimination, of the original competition between science and philosophy. Science is talk about the world, and philosophy is, as Gilbert Ryle (one of the most prominent of the analytic philosophers) talk about talk. Philosophy was not an empirical discipline about the the world, but it was a conceptual discipline about our concepts about the world.
That may not be quite right. Important philosophers like Bertrand Russell, and W.V. Quine refused (for different reasons) to distinguish so sharply between science and philosophy. But even it it is not quite right, it seems clearly on the right track. Or so it seems to me, anyway.
I did not say that exposition du texte concerns only the literary quality of the text (although it may do that too). But the idea does not primarily concern literally quality. It concerns what it says it concerns: the meaning of the text regardless of its literary quality. In any case, it involves philosophizing only very peripherally. No, I am not targeting anyone in particular. If I am targeting anything it is continental philosophy (as it is known).
I didn't say that Kant was a Realist. In fact, he is often thought of as a (transcendental) Idealism. But Realism is a metaphysics, isn't it? As is transcendental idealism. So why would not Kant be a metaphysician? You don't think that only Idealists are metaphysicians, do you? Why would you think that?
Can you enlarge on what "this" is? By "what you see is what you get", you obviously don't mean literally just "see", but do you mean whatever you can learn by empirical observation and detached logical reasoning?
What is your position on the status of scientific knowledge in relation to knowledge in general?
If it excludes what might be called "personal" knowledge, then it's easy enough to understand why it would consequently exclude knowledge of any god or gods; however, it might be that you are quite willing to grant some sort of respectable status to informal, unscientific, unverifiable, unfalsifiable personal knowledge, yet still be an atheist.
(That has been my own position for most of my life, although in recent years I have been shifting towards a baffled, reluctant, and tormented theism - feeling pretty much like Job, and not at all comfortable!)
Twirlip;160264 wrote:Can you enlarge on what "this" is? By "what you see is what you get", you obviously don't mean literally just "see", but do you mean whatever you can learn by empirical observation and detached logical reasoning?
I don't know what is being asked here.
Twirlip;160264 wrote:If it excludes what might be called "personal" knowledge, then it's easy enough to understand why it would consequently exclude knowledge of any god or gods; however, it might be that you are quite willing to grant some sort of respectable status to informal, unscientific, unverifiable, unfalsifiable personal knowledge, yet still be an atheist.
It seems to me you wished to make a dichotomy here - A.) Scientific knowledge B.) Personal knowledge - but I think this might be a false dichotomy. Knowledge of something scientific, is of course the same "sort" of knowledge of knowledge as knowledge of any of those things you noted. If a god exists, then it makes sense that one could in fact have knowledge of such a thing.
However, let's clear something up - all knowledge is true, by definition. It is justified, true belief. And with that said, I don't really even know how falsifiability applies, like you use here "unfalsifiable personal knowledge, yet still be an atheist". How would knowledge be unfalsifiable or falsifiable? If said belief is not true, it cannot be knowledge by definition.
Twirlip;160264 wrote:(That has been my own position for most of my life, although in recent years I have been shifting towards a baffled, reluctant, and tormented theism - feeling pretty much like Job, and not at all comfortable!)
What has your position been for most of your life? Did you mean that your position has been that you don't question or approach people about their meandering evangelism simply because the subject matter about which they speak is unverifiable? You just grant them that "respectable status", and allow them to go their merry spiritual way? Well, that's definitely better than my position, I'll tell you that. I actually question these people, and it usually turns into one mighty shitstorm, let me tell you. But yes, I can't lie, I think these spiritualists are grasping for straws, and I think many of them willfully choose to be mystified, much like one can choose to become immersed in a hollywood fantasy movie.
I have tried several times now, in different words, to ask you whether your ground for rejecting religious or spiritual beliefs is a rejection of a larger category of beliefs, which I have described - loosely, but surely adequately for present purposes - as beliefs about persons (including oneself).
I have tried several times now, in different words, to ask you whether your ground for rejecting religious or spiritual beliefs is a rejection of a larger category of beliefs, which I have described - loosely, but surely adequately for present purposes - as beliefs about persons (including oneself)
It's not yet clear to me. Do you mean that continentals gave away all inquiry about reality because that was taken over by science?
I can see why you say that... but I disagree.
I believe it's very difficult to summarize all continental modern to contemporary philosophy in this way. Your view could scientific method scientific method (at least sub specie of judgments synthetic a priori) is the only way to know the world, to extend knowledge.
But as we know, Idealism (and Schopenhauer and Nietzsche) took his doctrine well beyond his original design, and I have meant to refer to this use of Kant's philosophy.
One more consideration. Even acknowledging that both Idealism and Realism are metaphysics, I have to admit, , that Realism seems more complying with Occam's razor, and that's probably why physics generally looks more underpinned by Realism than by Idealism - but this is debatable.
For example, it is said that meditators come to the realization that the ego is something of an illusion. How is that a different order of thinking? Aren't they philosophically examining our concepts the self?.
Twirilip,
It seems to me you wished to make a dichotomy here - A.) Scientific knowledge B.) Personal knowledge - but I think this might be a false dichotomy. Knowledge of something scientific, is of course the same "sort" of knowledge of knowledge as knowledge of any of those things you noted.
Humans are not separate from the universe, they participate personally in it, with human skills and passions playing a key role in guiding discovery and validation. Polanyi observes that the mark of a great scientist is the ability to identify those questions which are likely to lead to a successful resolution. This ability derives not only from the scientist's ability to perceive patterns and connections, but also from their commitments. These commitments lead scientists to risk their reputation by committing to a hypothesis. He gives the example of Copernicus, who declared that the Earth revolved around the sun. Polanyi claimed that Copernicus arrived at the truth of the Earth's true relation to the sun not by following a method, but via "the greater intellectual satisfaction he derived from the celestial panorama as seen from the sun instead of the earth.
If you are not familiar with Michael Polanyi, who is a philosopher of science, it is worth reading some abstracts. His best known book is probably 'Personal Knowledge' which addresses this very topic.
It seems to me that philosophy works on axioms and the logical clarification of concepts, while science works on empirical scrutiny. However, I believe that both philosophy and science are expressions of the will to truth. With that said, does this mean that philosophers believe that logical clarification, which is non-empirical, amounts to truth in the same way that the empirical method does?
Could you say, scientific investigation proceeds from axioms, while philosophical investigation asks: why do we have the axioms we do?
Which, again, is seeking a different level of explanation.
I don't know what it means that "philosophy proceeds from axioms". When I (or anyone) argues that fatalism is false because it is clearly false that whatever will be will inevitably be, how is that supposed to be "arguing from axioms"? It doesn't seem so to me. But, maybe I don't know what "arguing from axioms" means. In fact, I am pretty sure I don't know what it means.
Are you sure? It is not unreasonable to suppose the axioms in this case are the laws of nature. If nature is deterministic, then our actions can be complete determined by those laws in conjunction with the initial conditions.