I imagine the requirements for an Eternal Truth would be stringent.

What is the relation between truth, opinion, and time?

If we make a claim to "Truth" that does not stop being the truth, are we not forced to make a claim on the future? Some might say that this kind of truth is impossible. If so, does this not leave us with nothing but opinions?

Someone like Kant tries to give us the unchanging structure of our otherwise changing experience. Or so is my understanding. The more religious philosophers might talk of a God who created and exists outside of time. Hegel suggest that truth must slowly evolve from opinion, within time. Aristotle (correct me if I am wrong) justifies his Truth with the notion that time repeats itself. Schopenhauer seems to be in the same boat. For instance, the individual animal dies but the species remains. Or different kinds of government come and go, but humans remain the same.

Natural science assumes without being able to prove (?) that the laws of nature do not change. (Is this correct?)

I'm not making a case in any direction but opening a dialogue, or shall we say trialogue.

I think he's asking something like this: If I say that Obama is the 44th President of the United States, would I also have to claim that I know in the future, say, 1000 years, that Obama is the 44th President of the United States? That question is difficult because it seems too obvious XD.

Perhaps this is better: All our experiences of an external world occur in Space and Time. Will this claim ever cease to be true?

The claim is that it is true in 2010 that Obama is the 44th president. But that claim will clearly be true 1,000 years from now. Just as it was true, 1,000 years ago.

I don't think your second version is better, perhaps because I don't know what it means.

It cannot be true 1,000 years from now if we cannot be certain there will be people at that time...true to whom, if there is no whom?
Surely (I know you don't like to be called Shirley but ..) truth has no meaning without mind.

It cannot be true 1,000 years ago, because there is no possible way of showing future tense true ..at any time.
Future tense propositions cannot be true now.

It cannot be true 1,000 years from now if we cannot be certain there will be people at that time...true to whom, if there is no whom?
Surely (I know you don't like to be called Shirley but ..) truth has no meaning without mind.

It cannot be true 1,000 years ago, because there is no possible way of showing future tense true ..at any time.
Future tense propositions cannot be true now.

Why can't future-tense propositions be true now?

If I say, "It is true in the year 1,008 that Obama will be elected president in 2008," that seems like a true statement. Why wouldn't it be?

A proposition is true, iff, it can be shown to be the case.
What is shown via proof is truth.

In the year 1,008 there was no method of confiming physical facts of 2008. Future happenings cannot be shown to be the case (true) until and unless they become present.

Why is it necessary for there to be people in order for a proposition to be true? It was true before there were people that the Moon existed. At least so scientists believe. There have to be people in order for a proposition to be known to be true, but not for it to be true. Do not confuse knowledge of the truth with truth.

Does this mean that, in the year 3008, if records are destroyed because of war or some other catastrophe, and it becomes impossible to verify that Obama was elected a thousand years earlier, in 2008, then will the statement in 3008, that Obama was elected president in 2008, be false, or will it lack a truth value?

Truth and falsity are abstract, ie. they exist only within mind.
If there are no people, then there are no abstract things at all.

There cannot be a 'proposition' "The moon exists." before there were people.
We all believe 'The moon existed before there were people', but we cannot know its truth. It cannot be shown to be the case.

---------- Post added 05-22-2010 at 02:55 PM ----------



imo, It would lack a truth value.
Verifyability is required to know its truth.

Suppose we were to say, "There are intelligent aliens in the Andromeda galaxy."

Now, we cannot verify this claim, so you're saying it lacks a truth value? That seems peculiar to me. I'm not saying you're wrong about this, but the logic seems suspect.

Of course, your position looks to be the same as Aristotle's position about future contingent propositions.

But suppose we were to say, "It's true that aliens either exist, or do not exist, in Andromeda."

Now it seems the above disjunctive statement must necessarily be true. For it cannot be the case that they both exist and don't exist, and existence and non-existence are the only options.

So if the disjunctive statement necessarily is true, it seems (to me) that it follows that one or the other disjuncts must also necessarily be true, from which it follows that verifiability is not a criterion for assigning a truth value.

It is not the case that: If (p or ~p) is necessary, then p is necessary or (~p) is necessary, for synthetic propositions.

Aliens exist in Andromeda, or Aliens do not exist in Andromeda, implies,
Necessarily(Aliens exist in Andromeda) or Necessarily(Aliens do not exist in Andromeda) ...is false

In time the truth will out.
Opinion is temporal, truth is eternal.

Or something like that.:bigsmile:

A proposition is true, iff, it can be shown to be the case.

What looks to be necessary, though, and what I was trying to say, is that one or the other disjuncts is true, if the disjunctive statement is true, regardless of whether we can verify which one is true.