Owen's original assertion was "future tense propositions cannot be true now". It's true that fifteen minutes from now, I will either be at home or not at home, but I see no reason to believe that either disjunct is true now, because if either can be proved to be true, I can bring about the other.

Wait, I think we're in agreement. But that's not what I'm getting at.

I do agree that it's false to say that either p is necessary, or that not-p is necessary. Neither is necessary.

What looks to be necessary, though, and what I was trying to say, is that one or the other disjuncts is true, if the disjunctive statement is true, regardless of whether we can verify which one is true.

All I'm saying is that the statement "Aliens either exist or do not exist in Admromeda," means that one of the disjuncts of the disjunctive statement is contingently true, but true nonetheless; which again implies that verifiability is not a criterion believing in the reality of truth values.

Wait, I think we're in agreement. But that's not what I'm getting at.

I do agree that it's false to say that either p is necessary, or that not-p is necessary. Neither is necessary.

What looks to be necessary, though, and what I was trying to say, is that one or the other disjuncts is true, if the disjunctive statement is true, regardless of whether we can verify which one is true.

All I'm saying is that the statement "Aliens either exist or do not exist in Admromeda," means that one of the disjuncts of the disjunctive statement is contingently true, but true nonetheless; which again implies that verifiability is not a criterion believing in the reality of truth values.

Owen's original assertion was "future tense propositions cannot be true now". It's true that fifteen minutes from now, I will either be at home or not at home, but I see no reason to believe that either disjunct is true now, because if either can be proved to be true, I can bring about the other.

Actually, no, on the correspondence theory of truth, which this seems to be about, I don't think you could bring the other about.

This is because if it's true now that 15 minutes. . . .

Don't you want to say "if either can be proved true, I cannot bring about the other"?

The truth value of (p v ~p) is shown to be the case (verified) in virtue of the truth table method of decision.
For all of the truth values of p, (p v ~p) is true.

Aristotle knew LEM was true.

As I argued previously, if verifiability were a necessary condition of truth, then that the Moon existed before people existed could not be true. But, that the Moon existed before people existed is true. Therefore, verifiability is not a necessary condition of truth. QED. The notion that verifiability is a necessary condition of truth is just another version of Idealism which holds that truth and knowledge of truth are equivalent. And that, of course, is clearly false.

1) correspondence theory requires a state of affairs to which the truth can correspond, demonstrate to me the existence of future states of affairs
2) there is no reason to suppose that there is a truth, now, about where I'll be in fifteen minutes time, so I reject your objection.

---------- Post added 05-23-2010 at 04:50 AM ----------




No, I meant what I wrote. Proofs are a matter of logic and logic is independent of reality.

"Shown to be the case" in this case, does not mean, empirically verified, as I hope you realize. The truth table is a decision method for analytic truths. In any case. p v ~p is true whether or not anyone can show it is true. The LEM was not indeterminate until someone managed to invent truth tables. Aristotle knew LEM was true.

The truth table method deals with all propositions, not just analytic ones.

(It's raining or It's not raining) is just as tautologous as is,
(2+2=4) or ~(2+2=4).

Yes, and neither one are synthetic propositions. You think that, either it is raining or it is not raining is a synthetic proposition? Or contingent? Or empirical?

Again, my intent is not to steer towards a discussion of knowledge, but rather to clarify the thread's context. Are we claiming to have knowledge of these truths (internalism) or simply that these truths can possibly exist (externalism)?

I don't understand what you are asking. A lot of jumping around, but no clear question.

I claim that Obama is the 44th president of the United States. Now, what is the question about that claim? Whether it is true? How we know it is true? Is it eternally true (whatever that means)?

(p v ~p) is analytic and true, ie. it is logically true for all propositions p.

(It's raining or It's not raining) is just as tautologous as is,
(2+2=4) or ~(2+2=4).

Yes, certainly. What makes you think I think differently?

In a nutshell, my friend, we are looking at this:

Is all truth temporay, or true just for awhile? That would make truth relative, or at least non-eternal truth relative.

Are there some truths that remain true? For instance, the truths of mathematics and formal logic? Most would say yes here. What about Kant's categories? Or that sort of thing....

A dynamic theory of truth insists that truth changes, that yesterday's truth is today's lie.

Moderates might say that most truths have an expiration date, but a few don't.

---------- Post added 05-22-2010 at 03:36 PM ----------



Yes, it's vague. This thread is inspired by a chapter of Kojeve called Eternity, Time, and the Concept.

Is all truth temporay, or true just for awhile? That would make truth relative, or at least non-eternal truth relative.

So this thread is especially, in my mind, about the possibility and/or status of atemporal truth. This is why I expect Euclidean geometry, formal logic, and mathematics to come up. Also one might expect Kantian-type structures of perception to be mentioned.

I am not sure why numbers would be regarded as abstract and the world of temporal flux, change and sense perception be regarded as concrete. .

Well, you know, that is just how some people are. (In philosophical lingo, "abstract" means, does not have spatio-temporal predicates. "Concrete" means does).

Oh, had you told me that before, I would not have bothered. Even a vague question can be made precise enough to give some kind of intelligent answer. But not a question inspired by the likes of Kojeve. You and he seem to want your readers to do the work you should be doing. That is just lazy. You are, if effect, saying. "I have no idea what the hell I mean by that. Answer it anyway!".

I am not sure why numbers would be regarded as abstract and the world of temporal flux, change and sense perception be regarded as concrete. I know that sounds very Platonic or Pythagorean and it is.