Truth, Opinion, Time

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davidm
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 01:37 pm
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;167384 wrote:
Owen's original assertion was "future tense propositions cannot be true now". It's true that fifteen minutes from now, I will either be at home or not at home, but I see no reason to believe that either disjunct is true now, because if either can be proved to be true, I can bring about the other.


Actually, no, on the correspondence theory of truth, which this seems to be about, I don't think you could bring the other about.

This is because if it's true now that 15 minutes from now you will be home, then the reason this proposition is true now is because you yourself, 15 minutes later, supplied the truth conditions for the antecedent proposition.

To try to do other than the true proposition describes would essentially mean you would try to both be home and not home in 15 minutes, a logical impossibility.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 01:39 pm
@davidm,
davidm;167380 wrote:
Wait, I think we're in agreement. But that's not what I'm getting at.

I do agree that it's false to say that either p is necessary, or that not-p is necessary. Neither is necessary.

What looks to be necessary, though, and what I was trying to say, is that one or the other disjuncts is true, if the disjunctive statement is true, regardless of whether we can verify which one is true.

All I'm saying is that the statement "Aliens either exist or do not exist in Admromeda," means that one of the disjuncts of the disjunctive statement is contingently true, but true nonetheless; which again implies that verifiability is not a criterion believing in the reality of truth values.


As I argued previously, if verifiability were a necessary condition of truth, then that the Moon existed before people existed could not be true. But, that the Moon existed before people existed is true. Therefore, verifiability is not a necessary condition of truth. QED. The notion that verifiability is a necessary condition of truth is just another version of Idealism which holds that truth and knowledge of truth are equivalent. And that, of course, is clearly false.
 
Owen phil
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 01:42 pm
@davidm,
davidm;167380 wrote:
Wait, I think we're in agreement. But that's not what I'm getting at.

I do agree that it's false to say that either p is necessary, or that not-p is necessary. Neither is necessary.

What looks to be necessary, though, and what I was trying to say, is that one or the other disjuncts is true, if the disjunctive statement is true, regardless of whether we can verify which one is true.

All I'm saying is that the statement "Aliens either exist or do not exist in Admromeda," means that one of the disjuncts of the disjunctive statement is contingently true, but true nonetheless; which again implies that verifiability is not a criterion believing in the reality of truth values.


The truth value of (p v ~p) is shown to be the case (verified) in virtue of the truth table method of decision.
For all of the truth values of p, (p v ~p) is true.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 01:45 pm
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;167384 wrote:
Owen's original assertion was "future tense propositions cannot be true now". It's true that fifteen minutes from now, I will either be at home or not at home, but I see no reason to believe that either disjunct is true now, because if either can be proved to be true, I can bring about the other.


Aren't you miswriting. Don't you want to say "if either can be proved true, I cannot bring about the other"? Looks to me like a Freudian slip. Of course, it is quite irrelevant whether either can be proved true, anyway. The issue is whether either is true, not whether either can be proved true.
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 01:48 pm
@davidm,
davidm;167385 wrote:
Actually, no, on the correspondence theory of truth, which this seems to be about, I don't think you could bring the other about.

This is because if it's true now that 15 minutes. . . .
1) correspondence theory requires a state of affairs to which the truth can correspond, demonstrate to me the existence of future states of affairs
2) there is no reason to suppose that there is a truth, now, about where I'll be in fifteen minutes time, so I reject your objection.

---------- Post added 05-23-2010 at 04:50 AM ----------

kennethamy;167388 wrote:
Don't you want to say "if either can be proved true, I cannot bring about the other"?
No, I meant what I wrote. Proofs are a matter of logic and logic is independent of reality.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 01:52 pm
@Owen phil,
Owen;167387 wrote:
The truth value of (p v ~p) is shown to be the case (verified) in virtue of the truth table method of decision.
For all of the truth values of p, (p v ~p) is true.


"Shown to be the case" in this case, does not mean, empirically verified, as I hope you realize. The truth table is a decision method for analytic truths. In any case. p v ~p is true whether or not anyone can show it is true. The LEM was not indeterminate until someone managed to invent truth tables. Aristotle knew LEM was true.
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 01:55 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;167391 wrote:
Aristotle knew LEM was true.
Constructivists reject LEM, so, it appears to be voluntary, not true (whatever that means).
 
Owen phil
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 02:00 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;167386 wrote:
As I argued previously, if verifiability were a necessary condition of truth, then that the Moon existed before people existed could not be true. But, that the Moon existed before people existed is true. Therefore, verifiability is not a necessary condition of truth. QED. The notion that verifiability is a necessary condition of truth is just another version of Idealism which holds that truth and knowledge of truth are equivalent. And that, of course, is clearly false.


"that the Moon existed before people existed is true."

How do you demonstrate that you know it to be true?

I think that it is very probable, ie. it is a strong belief.
Perhaps a justified belief, but it is not a known truth.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 02:00 pm
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;167389 wrote:
1) correspondence theory requires a state of affairs to which the truth can correspond, demonstrate to me the existence of future states of affairs
2) there is no reason to suppose that there is a truth, now, about where I'll be in fifteen minutes time, so I reject your objection.

---------- Post added 05-23-2010 at 04:50 AM ----------




No, I meant what I wrote. Proofs are a matter of logic and logic is independent of reality.


Well, of course, there is a reason to suppose there is a truth about where you will be in 15 minutes. Just wait and I'll show it to you. That's just like saying that there is no reason to think that there is a truth about where you were 15 minutes ago. Do you think that all truths are present truths? If you think that you cannot prove future truths now, then why do you think you can prove past truths now. Of course, you needn't prove truths at all for them to be truths.

Well, you certainly did not write that. Whatever that means.
 
Owen phil
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 02:15 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;167391 wrote:
"Shown to be the case" in this case, does not mean, empirically verified, as I hope you realize. The truth table is a decision method for analytic truths. In any case. p v ~p is true whether or not anyone can show it is true. The LEM was not indeterminate until someone managed to invent truth tables. Aristotle knew LEM was true.


The truth table method deals with all propositions, not just analytic ones.

(It's raining or It's not raining) is just as tautologous as is,
(2+2=4) or ~(2+2=4).
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 02:17 pm
@Owen phil,
Owen;167403 wrote:
The truth table method deals with all propositions, not just analytic ones.

(It's raining or It's not raining) is just as tautologous as is,
(2+2=4) or ~(2+2=4).


Yes, and neither one are synthetic propositions. You think that, either it is raining or it is not raining is a synthetic proposition? Or contingent? Or empirical?
 
Owen phil
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 02:25 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;167405 wrote:
Yes, and neither one are synthetic propositions. You think that, either it is raining or it is not raining is a synthetic proposition? Or contingent? Or empirical?


(p v ~p) is analytic and true, ie. it is logically true for all propositions p.

(It's raining or It's not raining) is just as tautologous as is,
(2+2=4) or ~(2+2=4).
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 02:28 pm
@Humchuckninny,
Humchuckninny;167188 wrote:

Again, my intent is not to steer towards a discussion of knowledge, but rather to clarify the thread's context. Are we claiming to have knowledge of these truths (internalism) or simply that these truths can possibly exist (externalism)?


In a nutshell, my friend, we are looking at this:

Is all truth temporary, true just for awhile? That would make truth relative, or at least non-eternal truth relative.

Are there some truths that remain true? For instance, the truths of mathematics and formal logic? Most would say yes here. What about Kant's categories? Or that sort of thing....

A dynamic theory of truth insists that truth changes, that yesterday's truth is today's lie.

Moderates might say that most truths have an expiration date, but a few don't.

---------- Post added 05-22-2010 at 03:36 PM ----------

kennethamy;167191 wrote:
I don't understand what you are asking. A lot of jumping around, but no clear question.

I claim that Obama is the 44th president of the United States. Now, what is the question about that claim? Whether it is true? How we know it is true? Is it eternally true (whatever that means)?


No, I wasn't asking a particular question. Yes, it's vague. This thread is inspired by a chapter of Kojeve called Eternity, Time, and the Concept. He traces the relationship of these three things from Parmenides to Hegel, including without going much into more skeptical and pragmatic positions. He didn't go into these because they don't make claims, for the most part, on atemporal truth.

So this thread is especially, in my mind, about the possibility and/or status of atemporal truth. This is why I expect Euclidean geometry, formal logic, and mathematics to come up. Also one might expect Kantian-type structures of perception to be mentioned. Smile
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 04:08 pm
@Owen phil,
Owen;167408 wrote:
(p v ~p) is analytic and true, ie. it is logically true for all propositions p.

(It's raining or It's not raining) is just as tautologous as is,
(2+2=4) or ~(2+2=4).


Yes, certainly. What makes you think I think differently?
 
Owen phil
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 04:10 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;167425 wrote:
Yes, certainly. What makes you think I think differently?


Originally Posted by kennethamy http://www.philosophyforum.com/images/PHBlue/buttons/viewpost.gif
Yes, and neither one are synthetic propositions. You think that, either it is raining or it is not raining is a synthetic proposition? Or contingent? Or empirical?

You asked, I answered.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 04:13 pm
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;167410 wrote:
In a nutshell, my friend, we are looking at this:

Is all truth temporay, or true just for awhile? That would make truth relative, or at least non-eternal truth relative.

Are there some truths that remain true? For instance, the truths of mathematics and formal logic? Most would say yes here. What about Kant's categories? Or that sort of thing....

A dynamic theory of truth insists that truth changes, that yesterday's truth is today's lie.

Moderates might say that most truths have an expiration date, but a few don't.

---------- Post added 05-22-2010 at 03:36 PM ----------



Yes, it's vague. This thread is inspired by a chapter of Kojeve called Eternity, Time, and the Concept.Smile


Oh, had you told me that before, I would not have bothered. Even a vague question can be made precise enough to give some kind of intelligent answer. But not a question inspired by the likes of Kojeve. You and he seem to want your readers to do the work you should be doing. That is just lazy. You are, if effect, saying. "I have no idea what the hell I mean by that. Answer it anyway!".
 
prothero
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 04:34 pm
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;167410 wrote:
Is all truth temporay, or true just for awhile? That would make truth relative, or at least non-eternal truth relative.

So this thread is especially, in my mind, about the possibility and/or status of atemporal truth. This is why I expect Euclidean geometry, formal logic, and mathematics to come up. Also one might expect Kantian-type structures of perception to be mentioned. Smile
I am not sure why numbers would be regarded as abstract and the world of temporal flux, change and sense perception be regarded as concrete. I know that sounds very Platonic or Pythagorean and it is.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 05:35 pm
@prothero,
prothero;167430 wrote:
I am not sure why numbers would be regarded as abstract and the world of temporal flux, change and sense perception be regarded as concrete. .



Well, you know, that is just how some people are. (In philosophical lingo, "abstract" means, does not have spatio-temporal predicates. "Concrete" means does).
 
prothero
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 06:49 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;167437 wrote:
Well, you know, that is just how some people are. (In philosophical lingo, "abstract" means, does not have spatio-temporal predicates. "Concrete" means does).
That just shows the Western prejudice for the material over the mental. It also shows confusion about what changes and what is eternal, what is "real" and what is temporal.:perplexed::bigsmile:
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Sat 22 May, 2010 07:55 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;167427 wrote:
Oh, had you told me that before, I would not have bothered. Even a vague question can be made precise enough to give some kind of intelligent answer. But not a question inspired by the likes of Kojeve. You and he seem to want your readers to do the work you should be doing. That is just lazy. You are, if effect, saying. "I have no idea what the hell I mean by that. Answer it anyway!".


Oh, I have my opinions, but I share them enough already. It's fun to start a thread on a theme, and see where others take it.

---------- Post added 05-22-2010 at 08:57 PM ----------

prothero;167430 wrote:
I am not sure why numbers would be regarded as abstract and the world of temporal flux, change and sense perception be regarded as concrete. I know that sounds very Platonic or Pythagorean and it is.


Well, I have much respect for you and your perspective on this. I certainly see mathematical relationships in nature, but aren't many of them continuous rather than discrete? Of course we have to record them with our discrete abstractions.

I am aware that at the tiniest level, nature seems truly quantified, or at least it strongly corresponds with our numbers. I also think it quite possible that the digital physicists are right. Of course I don't pretend to be a physicist, but I do think I have an open mind as far as nature goes. Smile
 
 

 
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