Objects And Properties

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HexHammer
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 07:53 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;161863 wrote:
This is a description of the scientific mental model of color. But we can't forget that color is experience as....well, color. Or "qualia." Redness just is.

Sure, we can mathematically represent red as a lower frequency electromagnetic wave than blue, but this useful representation doesn't replace Matisse. Smile
?
There has been modern studies, and all points towards a simple understanding, some may have experienced something and connected qualia's with other emotions/feelings. Some have a deep disturbed qualia thus gets smells when they should experience colors, turmors can cause such disturbed qualias or ther causes.
 
Pythagorean
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 08:46 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;162139 wrote:
I would. How could a red apple be only potentially a red apple.



By understanding that it may be viewable under different coloured lights, or by analyzing it in the absence of visible light.

-
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 11:18 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;162145 wrote:
By understanding that it may be viewable under different coloured lights, or by analyzing it in the absence of visible light.

-


Why would that show that it was only potentially red? If I viewed my nose from several different perspectives, and it looked a different length from each perspective, would that show that my nose had only a potential length? Why would you think that for an apple to be (actually) red, that it would have to look red whatever the conditions of perceptions are? Why, for an object to be blue, would it have to look blue, even under a yellow light? In fact, if an object looked blue (and not green) under a yellow light, I would believe it was not blue, since I happen to know that blue objects look green under a yellow light.
 
Pythagorean
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 01:15 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;162165 wrote:
Why would that show that it was only potentially red? If I viewed my nose from several different perspectives, and it looked a different length from each perspective, would that show that my nose had only a potential length? Why would you think that for an apple to be (actually) red, that it would have to look red whatever the conditions of perceptions are? Why, for an object to be blue, would it have to look blue, even under a yellow light? In fact, if an object looked blue (and not green) under a yellow light, I would believe it was not blue, since I happen to know that blue objects look green under a yellow light.


Yes, we are saying that we do not know of the colour. In science, the specific colour or wavelength that is used to analyze different parts of matter is important because they reveal to the scientists certain important features. So in science experiments there is a fixed wavelength but not colour. Since colour is not an item of knowledge, the numerical wavelength is used as a fixed standard. The wavelength serves as a guage for scientific purposes.


As has been alluded to previously in this thread, there is a distinction between colour, which depends upon the human eye, and wavelength, which is relative to its practical implementations.


As has also been said, light is not necessary for an object's existence. The object is said to persist unaffected without external light sources. This is why colour is an accidental property of objects.
 
VideCorSpoon
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 01:20 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;162137 wrote:
The importance of the question 'What is being?' notwithstanding, I would agree with Leibniz over Aristotle, for now at least.

I suppose it all depends on whatever philosopher you want to follow ontologically. In my mind, Aristotle provides a far more complete view of substantial primacy. Leibniz falls into the danger of second level predicates many times over. Interestingly enough, I wonder if Spinoza would be guilty of the same crime though, because anything attributed to this or that would not deny the fundamental axiom of a single substance in the universe, namely god. Maybe he axiomatically solves ontological primacy.


Pythagorean;162137 wrote:
My decision has to do with the amount of complexity modern science brings to the question about object hood. Modern science understands the nature of the world in terms of fundamental forces, thus the answer to the question 'What is being?' has been provided in a rather dramatic fashion. And whether intentionally or not science ultimately understands the universe as a whole as being without purpose.

I don't know about this though. Interestingly enough, Aristotle and modern science both share a fundamental notion of cause and effect. A cause always precedes its effect, whether that applies to Aristotle's God or scientific minutia. Purpose then seems a little relative.

Pythagorean;162137 wrote:
I keep peeling back the properties of objects as one would peel the layers of an onion, so to speak. Like Leibniz, I always end up with endless connections of properties.

I suppose that's where it has to be determined what is a predicate of what.

Pythagorean;162137 wrote:
I believe that the foremost question in all of this is, how can we locate certain knowledge? For Plato, I know, the solution lies in the metaphysical 'forms'. I guess he means something like, the mathematical structure of substances are permanent possibilities, more pure and everlasting than the examples themselves. A retreat to universals in order to stabilize our knowing. This is rationalism at its finest.

Aristotle examined this in great detail in Metaphysics Zeta as well as Categories. An interesting point Aristotle arose as to Platonic wherein the form of say, a bronzen sphere (his example), you still have a fundamental notion with second level predicates. If anything, if attributes are the topic of the day, the subject has to be logically consistent.

Pythagorean;162137 wrote:
The proof for Plato is that there can be no knowledge of a thing if that thing is one of a kind. There is no knowledge to be gained in the examination of existential objects without recourse to categories of knowledge. The categories logically precede the existential occurances. But the moderns stood all of this purposeful reasoning on its head.

This is a very interesting interpretation, especially as far as existential quantifiers are concerned.

Pythagorean;162137 wrote:
Starting with a universe which contains absolutely nothing except for one object I ask myself: what are the properties of this object?
Pythagorean;162137 wrote:
If the object does not contain its own internal source of light, then it has no color. If the object contains no internal source of heat, then what is its temperature? Whether or not the object possesses the capacity for locomotion, in what direction can it be said to be moving? what is its mass? If it has shape, from where does shape originate? What is the ontological derivation of shape? What is the origin of the nuclear particles?

I would not go so far as self emanating attributes. But I have been too brainwashed by Aristotle on this subject though. It almost sounds that instead of looking at predicates outside in, you want to look at predicates inside out. To tell the truth, this does seem Leibnizian. God puts everything in a single monad at creation, thus everything reflects in the self contained monad, and what we see is that which reflects the universe most accurately. But even in this though, you still have a divine predicate.
Pythagorean;162137 wrote:
That's my procedure. Imagining the self alone in the universe and existence, substance and being are then relative to mind, I believe. The end of all science is the unification of mind with body contemplating its own motion as it moves within relative space.

This sounds like Aristotle conclusions as to the nature of God, an unmoved mover. One of the more interesting occupations Aristotle attributed to God was that it was contemplating itself since it is in itself the all perfect being.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 02:22 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;162185 wrote:
Yes, we are saying that we do not know of the colour. In science, the specific colour or wavelength that is used to analyze different parts of matter is important because they reveal to the scientists certain important features. So in science experiments there is a fixed wavelength but not colour. Since colour is not an item of knowledge, the numerical wavelength is used as a fixed standard. The wavelength serves as a guage for scientific purposes.


As has been alluded to previously in this thread, there is a distinction between colour, which depends upon the human eye, and wavelength, which is relative to its practical implementations.


As has also been said, light is not necessary for an object's existence. The object is said to persist unaffected without external light sources. This is why colour is an accidental property of objects.


But can we stick to your argument, please? Your argument was that the apple is not red, but only potentially red because it does not appear red under all conditions of perception.

But why do you think that argument is valid? Why must an apple appear red under all conditions of perception (for example, if it is perceived under a strong light of a different color) for it to be not only potentially red, but actually red?

Why is that argument a valid argument?
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 02:56 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;162145 wrote:
By understanding that it may be viewable under different coloured lights, or by analyzing it in the absence of visible light.


One can view objects from many different angles and conditions, but that doesn't mean that what is, isn't, simply because the object can be perceived differently.

Suppose I put a penny on a table and then view it at eye level. All I will see is a thin, copper-colored line. Does this mean that the penny isn't round, or that it does not have the face of a past U.S. president on it anymore? Of course not.

So why would you think that because a red ball can be viewed in different conditions, that it is in fact not red?
 
trismegisto
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 02:57 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;162192 wrote:
But can we stick to your argument, please? Your argument was that the apple is not red, but only potentially red because it does not appear red under all conditions of perception.

But why do you think that argument is valid? Why must an apple appear red under all conditions of perception (for example, if it is perceived under a strong light of a different color) for it to be not only potentially red, but actually red?

Why is that argument a valid argument?


I am going to that it is because it is the conditions under which the eyeball perceives the apple which determine the color, not the apple itself or the eyeball for that matter.

The color of the apple is entirely dependent on the light source and the perceiving organ. If the sun's light was shifted to a predominantly blue spectrum and the apple remained exactly the same it would still appear different. If the eyeball shifted up into utraviolet and lost red in its spectrum and the apple remained exactly the same it would still appear different.

In fact, it could be that we all see colors differently. It could be that we just agree on the names for which we call the spectrums we see individually as being the same universally.By the design of the eyeball, probably not, but there is still no way to see through another's eyes so the possibility remains open.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 03:08 pm
@Pythagorean,
trismegisto wrote:
The color of the apple is entirely dependent on the light source and the perceiving organ.


As asked earlier, if a red ball was placed in a cave with absolutely no light source, would it now not be a red ball anymore? And if you think it wouldn't, why?

Quote:
If the sun's light was shifted to a predominantly blue spectrum and the apple remained exactly the same it would still appear different. If the eyeball shifted up into utraviolet and lost red in its spectrum and the apple remained exactly the same it would still appear different.


Hm, I don't see how this is relevant. All you've demonstrated is that you can conjure up a thought experiment. What if the earth was gravity-less, like most of space (that is, the laws of physics were different)? Does the fact that things could have been different, mean that when I jump out this window I won't fall twelve stories? Not that I can see. What is, still is, no matter how much I imagine things to be different.

Quote:
In fact, it could be that we all see colors differently. It could be that we just agree on the names for which we call the spectrums we see individually as being the same universally.By the design of the eyeball, probably not, but there is still no way to see through another's eyes so the possibility remains open.


Just because something could be, doesn't mean we have to consider the possibility plausible. It's more than likely that we see colors similarly. I actually made a thread on this a while back. Maybe I'll link to it later if I feel like digging the old thread up.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 03:15 pm
@trismegisto,
trismegisto;162198 wrote:
I am going to that it is because it is the conditions under which the eyeball perceives the apple which determine the color, not the apple itself or the eyeball for that matter.

The color of the apple is entirely dependent on the light source and the perceiving organ. If the sun's light was shifted to a predominantly blue spectrum and the apple remained exactly the same it would still appear different. If the eyeball shifted up into utraviolet and lost red in its spectrum and the apple remained exactly the same it would still appear different.

In fact, it could be that we all see colors differently. It could be that we just agree on the names for which we call the spectrums we see individually as being the same universally.By the design of the eyeball, probably not, but there is still no way to see through another's eyes so the possibility remains open.


But the fact is that how we decide what color the object is, is determined by what color it appears to have under its normal condition of perception by the normal observer. Even if each of us were to have his own private sensation of color which was different from those of others, that would not be what that color term meant. The color a particular object has is exactly the color named by normal observers under normal conditions.

And do look at an ongoing and recent thread very much related to this discussion:

http://www.philosophyforum.com/philosophy-forums/philosophers/twentieth-century-philosophers/ludwig-wittgenstein/8823-wittgensteins-beetle.html#post162195
 
Pythagorean
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 04:16 pm
@VideCorSpoon,
VideCorSpoon;162186 wrote:



I suppose that's where it has to be determined what is a predicate of what.


It seems that modern science has gone ahead and provided ontological primacy for us all. It has organized the universe according to utility or use for mankind, in my opinion. Knowledge is effectively organized around human minds and societies. The human mind is at the center of all this, and so, I would say, it is the effective substratum. I consider myself an idealist.






VideCorSpoon;162186 wrote:
I would not go so far as self emanating attributes. But I have been too brainwashed by Aristotle on this subject though. It almost sounds that instead of looking at predicates outside in, you want to look at predicates inside out. To tell the truth, this does seem Leibnizian. God puts everything in a single monad at creation, thus everything reflects in the self contained monad, and what we see is that which reflects the universe most accurately. But even in this though, you still have a divine predicate.


To tell the truth, I can only believe that shape belongs to shape etc. in some universal. To make the actual connection between the universal and the predicates seems necessary. It seems logical to me that the attributes of objects must be universals. But if we were to have absolute knowledge (and I believe this is inevitable) I still don't see how such universal causation can be knowable. So I believe in universals as causes but I don't believe they could ever be objects of knowledge.


VideCorSpoon;162186 wrote:
This sounds like Aristotle conclusions as to the nature of God, an unmoved mover. One of the more interesting occupations Aristotle attributed to God was that it was contemplating itself since it is in itself the all perfect being.



To put it as simply as I can: I think the universe is attributable to mind and the contemplation of motion in the unity of thinking and being - in the unity of mind and body- ..this contemplation is divine participation, which is the human upward limit. Contemplation of motion while moving is thinking in an otherwise empty universe. In any event, I do see the evolution of societies based upon pure knowledge or as close to pure knowledge as is possible for humans to be.

---------- Post added 05-09-2010 at 06:29 PM ----------

kennethamy;162192 wrote:
But can we stick to your argument, please? Your argument was that the apple is not red, but only potentially red because it does not appear red under all conditions of perception.

But why do you think that argument is valid? Why must an apple appear red under all conditions of perception (for example, if it is perceived under a strong light of a different color) for it to be not only potentially red, but actually red?

Why is that argument a valid argument?



An apple does not have to appear red under all conditions of perception for it to be actually red. The question is whether the colour is a potential one or an actual one. Either we are examining properties of objects or we are asserting norms. Why is red the actual colour of the object when it is potentially blue or green?

-
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 04:48 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean wrote:
Either we are examining properties of objects or we are asserting norms. Why is red the actual colour of the object when it is potentially blue or green?


What do you mean by "potentially" here?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 05:30 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;162226 wrote:

An apple does not have to appear red under all conditions of perception for it to be actually red. The question is whether the colour is a potential one or an actual one. Either we are examining properties of objects or we are asserting norms. Why is red the actual colour of the object when it is potentially blue or green?

-


It does not seem to me that a red apple is potentially blue or green. What would make you think that? But the issue is (again) how does it follow that because a blue car looks green when it is under a yellow light, that it is not a blue car?
 
trismegisto
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 06:20 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;162202 wrote:
As asked earlier, if a red ball was placed on a cave with absolutely no light source, would it now not be a red ball anymore? And if you think it wouldn't, why?


As stated before, of course it would not be a red ball. Nobody would ever say it was a red ball. Color only exists with light. Without light it is a black ball.



Zetherin;162202 wrote:
Hm, I don't see how this is relevant. All you've demonstrated is that you can conjure up a thought experiment. What if the earth was gravity-less, like most of space (that is, the laws of physics changed)? Does the fact that things could have been different, mean that when I jump out this window I won't fall twelve stories? Not that I can see. What is, still is, no matter how much I imagine it to be different.


The reason you don't see the relevance is exactly why you are having so much trouble with the question. You are assuming that the light we recieve from the sun is somehow the only light possible "light." In this you are quite mistaken. When we figure out how to manipulate gravity in the ways he can manipulate types of light, then yes, you will not fall 12 stories, just as when we subject apples to different light YOU see the apple as different colors.


Zetherin;162202 wrote:
Just because something could be, doesn't mean we have to consider the possibility plausible. It's more than likely that we see colors similarly. I already made a thread on this a while back. Maybe I'll link to it later if I feel like digging the old thread up.


Just shine different colored lights on an apple and see if the apple appears differently. It is a simple test that you can do to clear up your confusion. You will easily discover that the color of the apple depends on the color of the light you shine on it.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 07:02 pm
@Pythagorean,
trismegisto wrote:
Just shine different colored lights on an apple and see if the apple appears differently. It is a simple test that you can do to clear up your confusion. You will easily discover that the color of the apple depends on the color of the light you shine on it.


Interesting. So I assume that you think depending on how I view a penny, the shape of it changes. I never knew that. In fact, I thought a penny had a particular shape, no matter how I viewed it.

It seems that you do not believe that things have particular colors. Spinach is not green, raspberries are not red, carrots are not orange. If I flashed a green light on a carrot, the carrot is now, according to you, green. But I don't know why you would think that. I'm pretty sure most people would agree that the carrot was still orange, but that it had a green light shining on it which made it look green.

Quote:
As stated before, of course it would not be a red ball. Nobody would ever say it was a red ball. Color only exists with light. Without light it is a black ball.


If my son loses a ball under my shed, and tells me, "Daddy, I lost my favorite red ball under my shed", I would go look for it. Say, just for the sake of argument, I find three balls under the shed, but because I cannot see the color of the balls, I bring all three out. I know, however, that only one is the ball my son was referring to. I come out, and after the light hits the balls, I quickly realize that two of the balls are yellow and the third is red. I'm relieved I found the ball, and my son, without hesitance, runs up to me and snatches the red ball out of my hand, exclaiming, "Daddy, thank you!".

It's a wonder how my son knew that that ball was the red one, or why I knew I had found the red ball, despite it not being a red ball since it had been out of light's reach for quite some time. According to you, it was a black ball my son was referring to, but, for some reason, he picked the particular ball he did. You believe it was simply a wild guess my son took? Should I have told my son, "Young fella, once a ball is in darkness, it loses its color and becomes a black ball. I'm sorry, son, but we will never know which one is the red ball ever again"?
 
trismegisto
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 07:30 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;162250 wrote:
Interesting. So I assume that you think depending on how I view a penny, the shape of it changes. I never knew that. In fact, I thought a penny had a particular shape, no matter how I viewed it.


Wow!!! That is about the most illogical thing I have ever seen you write. How do you make the leap from color to shape? You cannot be that stupid, perhaps you lost your mind for a second so I will nt hold this one against you. Although I would feel better if you admitted that this analogy is insane.

Zetherin;162250 wrote:
It seems that you do not believe that things have particular colors. Spinach is not green, raspberries are not red, carrots are not orange. If I flashed a green light on a carrot, the carrot is now, according to you, green. But I don't know why you would think that. I'm pretty sure most people would agree that the carrot was still orange, but that it had a green light shining on it which made it look green.


I am afraid you are wrong, almost nobody would agree with you.


Zetherin;162250 wrote:
If my son loses a ball under my shed, and tells me, "Daddy, I lost my favorite red ball under my shed", I would go look for it. Say, just for the sake of argument, I find three balls under the shed, but because I cannot see the color of the balls, I bring all three out. I know, however, that only one is the ball my son was referring to. I come out, and after the light hits the balls, I quickly realize that two of the balls are yellow and the third is red. I'm relieved I found the ball, and my son, without hesitance, runs up to me and snatches the red ball out of my hand, exclaiming, "Daddy, thank you!".

It's a wonder how my son knew that that ball was the red one, or why I knew I had found the red ball, despite it not being a red ball since it had been out of light's reach for quite some time. According to you, it was a black ball my son was referring to, but, for some reason, he picked the particular ball he did. You believe it was simply a wild guess my son took? Should I have told my son, "Young fella, once a ball is in darkness, it loses its color and becomes a black ball. I'm sorry, son, but we will never know which one is the red ball ever again"?


Just think about what you wrote here. Maybe your confusion will come to light.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 08:12 pm
@Pythagorean,
I suggest that an object's "true color" is a useful abstraction. I also suggest that we usually see circles as ovals, and that we automatically translate these ovals into circles, just as we process our visual field into arrangements of objects into 3 dimensional space.

I suspect that as far transcendental faculties go, the unification of sensations and their relations to other sensations are nothing but these same "objects," a world that derives from "thrown before." Projections, if you will. Yes, there is a world out there, but I also think we, language using humans, "chop" this world into particular objects. And we use color, texture, shape, etc., in order to do this. We don't divided the world in some random way, but in ways that have helped us survive.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 10:53 pm
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;162259 wrote:
I suggest that an object's "true color" is a useful abstraction.


So if Mary walks into a beauty salon (if that is what those places are called nowadays) and gets her hair dyed so that although she was originally a brunette, but walks out a blonde, it is only a useful abstraction to say that the true color of Mary's hair is brunette, but that now it is blonde? Or if I am thinking of buying a coat, and the coat appears to have one shade under the store's florescent light, so I want to take it into daylight to see what the coat's true color is, that is merely a useful abstraction?
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 10:59 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;162302 wrote:
So if Mary walks into a beauty salon (if that is what those places are called nowadays) and gets her hair dyed so that although she was originally a brunette, but walks out a blonde, it is only a useful abstraction to say that the true color of Mary's hair is brunette, but that now it is blonde? Or if I am thinking of buying a coat, and the coat appears to have one shade under the store's florescent light, so I want to take it into daylight to see what the coat's true color is, that is merely a useful abstraction?


I wonder what sort of look recon. and tris. give people when they stop at red lights. Do they curse at the other drivers, arguing that the color is subjective? I suppose that's a good argument to present to a police officer who's about to give you a ticket for driving through a traffic light.

Edited*
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 11:08 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;162303 wrote:
I wonder what kind of look recon. and tris. give people when they stop at red lights. Do they curse at the other drivers, arguing that the color is subjective?

Edited*


What some call a useful abstraction, and what others think is actually false, is exactly how we actually understand the term, "real color" when we speak English. But then, philosophers always know better about the meanings of terms than people who actually use them. Philosophers, after all, have theories as to how the terms ought to be used. Theories which have little to do with how the terms are actually used.
 
 

 
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