Objects And Properties

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Reply Tue 6 Apr, 2010 12:18 pm
If we begin with an object X:

Then, does the object X have a color or does color depend upon an external light source?

If we were to say the exterior surface of X is materially constituted so that when an external light source (for example, white light) is directed at it, it reflects a certain shade of a certain color Y: does this then mean that it makes sense to say that object X has property Y as a color? Or does the fact that light is not an internal property of the object mean that the object is colorless?

I am confused as to whether or not objects themselves are colored.

I would just note that according to Locke's theory of ideas the colour of objects are said to be secondary as oposed to primary. Meaning that colours, according to Locke, are not properties of objects.

Any help on this would be appreciated. Thanks.

-
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 6 Apr, 2010 01:01 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;148848 wrote:
does this then mean that it makes sense to say that object X has property Y as a color? Or does the fact that light is not an internal property of the object mean that the object is colorless?



-


It means, I think, that different kinds of properties are caused in different ways. Why should that fact that the color of an object is an interactive property between the observer and the object mean that the object has no color?
 
trismegisto
 
Reply Tue 6 Apr, 2010 01:42 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;148848 wrote:
If we begin with an object X:

Then, does the object X have a color or does color depend upon an external light source?

If we were to say the exterior surface of X is materially constituted so that when an external light source (for example, white light) is directed at it, it reflects a certain shade of a certain color Y: does this then mean that it makes sense to say that object X has property Y as a color? Or does the fact that light is not an internal property of the object mean that the object is colorless?

I am confused as to whether or not objects themselves are colored.

I would just note that according to Locke's theory of ideas the colour of objects are said to be secondary as oposed to primary. Meaning that colours, according to Locke, are not properties of objects.

Any help on this would be appreciated. Thanks.

-


I think what locke was saying is that the reason the color of an object is secondary is that it requires an eyeball. It is only they way an eyeball processes light that creates what we call colors. It is not necessarily all the light that is reflected off of the object just the light the eye can process that we give titles to and agree upon as a color. I suppose its kind of like kilograms. object X has some weight but it requires us, the observers, to call that weight kilograms and determine units. kilograms don't really exist in the physical universe.
 
Pythagorean
 
Reply Tue 6 Apr, 2010 02:37 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;148861 wrote:
It means, I think, that different kinds of properties are caused in different ways. Why should that fact that the color of an object is an interactive property between the observer and the object mean that the object has no color?


Well, if we were to compare the property of color to the property of (the fact that it occupies) space or mass or spatial extension, we see that the spatial property does not require an external cause in the way that the property of color requires an external light. Color will always depend upon the relations between the object and the light source, as well as the type of light source.


And it seems this is the case also with regards to temperature of objects. If an object does not itself contain its own internal temperature, then its temperature is externally provided.

Does it not make sense to reduce objects, wherever it is possible, to their simplest or most basic sets of properties?

---------- Post added 04-06-2010 at 04:44 PM ----------

trismegisto;148872 wrote:
I think what locke was saying is that the reason the color of an object is secondary is that it requires an eyeball. It is only they way an eyeball processes light that creates what we call colors. It is not necessarily all the light that is reflected off of the object just the light the eye can process that we give titles to and agree upon as a color. I suppose its kind of like kilograms. object X has some weight but it requires us, the observers, to call that weight kilograms and determine units. kilograms don't really exist in the physical universe.


Isn't it more fair to say that color is less apart of an object? Color will always depend upon the relations between the object and the light source, as well as the type of light source, it seems.

The weight or mass of an object does not seem to depend upon external conditions as the more elusive property of color seems to do.

-

-

---------- Post added 04-06-2010 at 04:48 PM ----------

Based upon what I have noted above, I believe the property of color is not an essential part of an object. An object may posess many more potential properties than we can count. And I say that its color is only a potential property.

Does anyone disagree with the statement that color is only a potential property?

-
 
trismegisto
 
Reply Tue 6 Apr, 2010 03:07 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;148888 wrote:
Isn't it more fair to say that color is less apart of an object? Color will always depend upon the relations between the object and the light source, as well as the type of light source, it seems.


I don't think the object or the light source is as active a participant as the eyeball. If our eyes were different, the color of an object would be different. the color depends on what light is absorbed into eyeballs.

Pythagorean;148888 wrote:
The weight or mass of an object does not seem to depend upon external conditions as the more elusive property of color seems to do.


I believe you missed the point. It was not about the weight of the object it was about attributing that weight to kilograms. Just as kilograms don't exist without an observer, neither does color. Read it again, it will make more sense I am sure.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 6 Apr, 2010 03:45 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;148888 wrote:
Well, if we were to compare the property of color to the property of (the fact that it occupies) space or mass or spatial extension, we see that the spatial property does not require an external cause in the way that the property of color requires an external light. Color will always depend upon the relations between the object and the light source, as well as the type of light source.


And it seems this is the case also with regards to temperature of objects. If an object does not itself contain its own internal temperature, then its temperature is externally provided.

Does it not make sense to reduce objects, wherever it is possible, to their simplest or most basic sets of properties?

---------- Post added 04-06-2010 at 04:44 PM ----------



Isn't it more fair to say that color is less apart of an object? Color will always depend upon the relations between the object and the light source, as well as the type of light source, it seems.

The weight or mass of an object does not seem to depend upon external conditions as the more elusive property of color seems to do.

-Yes, there are, as I said, different kinds of properties. But that does not make them any the less properties. What does appear to be a property of an object, but is not a property of any object, is existence. Existence is not a property of any objects. It is, however a property. It is a property of properties.

Why is color, "elusive"? The color of an object is the color it appears to have when observed by the normal observer under normal conditions.

-

---------- Post added 04-06-2010 at 04:48 PM ----------

Based upon what I have noted above, I believe the property of color is not an essential part of an object. An object may posess many more potential properties than we can count. And I say that its color is only a potential property.

Does anyone disagree with the statement that color is only a potential property?

-


-Yes, there are, as I said, different kinds of properties. But that does not make them any the less properties. What does appear to be a property of an object, but is not a property of any object, is existence. Existence is not a property of any objects. It is, however a property. It is a property of properties.

Why is color, "elusive"? The color of an object is the color it appears to have when observed by the normal observer under normal conditions.
 
Pythagorean
 
Reply Tue 6 Apr, 2010 04:10 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;148907 wrote:
-Yes, there are, as I said, different kinds of properties. But that does not make them any the less properties.


When you say there are different kinds of properties, are you saying that objects do not posess a distinct or finite amount of properties? That, because properties are 'different' then they can not be enumerated and defined?


kennethamy;148907 wrote:
Why is color, "elusive"? The color of an object is the color it appears to have when observed by the normal observer under normal conditions.


If we were to look closely the color of objects do not appear to be uniform and close analysis is required in order to ascertain the properties of physical objects.


However, there are what phenomenologists call 'sensory routes'. Sensory routes are what we would get if we constantly shined one type of light source upon an object at one type of angle and inspected the surface from one direction in which case the color upon the surface would appear constant. Perhaps what you are really saying is that it is not normal to attempt to discover the properties of objects?

-

---------- Post added 04-06-2010 at 07:14 PM ----------

trismegisto;148895 wrote:
I don't think the object or the light source is as active a participant as the eyeball. If our eyes were different, the color of an object would be different. the color depends on what light is absorbed into eyeballs.


I am assuming that human standards of measurement are valid. It is not for me a question of the subjective or relative measure that we must rely upon.

If human standards can determine the difference between some basic colours, then this is all that is required for the time being.

I am attempting to ground objects within human standards to see to what extent realism makes sense. It is for this reason that the position and the type of light source is the focus. I am assuming the realism of human vision.
 
ABYA
 
Reply Sun 2 May, 2010 08:06 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorian wrote
Quote:

I would just note that according to Locke's theory of ideas the colour of objects are said to be secondary as oposed to primary. Meaning that colours, according to Locke, are not properties of objects.

Any help on this would be appreciated. Thanks.


Objects absorb certain colours and reflect other colours.
When we see a red apple, red is the colour it can't absorb.
The only true thing we could say about the colour of a red apple is that its any colour but red.:perplexed:
 
trismegisto
 
Reply Tue 4 May, 2010 01:35 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;148921 wrote:


I am assuming that human standards of measurement are valid. It is not for me a question of the subjective or relative measure that we must rely upon.

If human standards can determine the difference between some basic colours, then this is all that is required for the time being.

I am attempting to ground objects within human standards to see to what extent realism makes sense. It is for this reason that the position and the type of light source is the focus. I am assuming the realism of human vision.


Again, it is the eyeball you should be focusing on, but it is your topic so I will leave you to it.
 
north
 
Reply Tue 4 May, 2010 08:48 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;148848 wrote:
If we begin with an object X:

Then, does the object X have a color or does color depend upon an external light source?

If we were to say the exterior surface of X is materially constituted so that when an external light source (for example, white light) is directed at it, it reflects a certain shade of a certain color Y: does this then mean that it makes sense to say that object X has property Y as a color? Or does the fact that light is not an internal property of the object mean that the object is colorless?

I am confused as to whether or not objects themselves are colored.

I would just note that according to Locke's theory of ideas the colour of objects are said to be secondary as oposed to primary. Meaning that colours, according to Locke, are not properties of objects.

Any help on this would be appreciated. Thanks.

-


Locke is right

the colour(s) we see are the electromagnetic wavelengths of light reflected or rejected , so to speak , by the object

but Locke is also wrong

in that the properties of the object , that rejected a certain wavelength of light , and is therefore not a property of the object

yet it is the property of the object , which rejects a certain wavelength of light

how else could it be ?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 4 May, 2010 11:23 pm
@north,
north;160193 wrote:
Locke is right

the colour(s) we see are the electromagnetic wavelengths of light reflected or rejected , so to speak , by the object

but Locke is also wrong

in that the properties of the object , that rejected a certain wavelength of light , and is therefore not a property of the object

yet it is the property of the object , which rejects a certain wavelength of light

how else could it be ?


Yes. There are different kinds of properties. Color is an interactive property because it the the result of the interaction between the object and the perceiver. But that does not mean it is not a property. And, of course, existence is a property, but it is not a property of any object, since it is a property that properties have. The property of being had by some object. (Being exemplified). Calling something a property is a start, of course, but we cannot leave it at that, since we would then be concealing important differences among things we call "properties". Just as on one level we can call both reptiles and apes, animals. But, if we are doing biology, or zoology, we can't stop there. There is too much difference between reptiles and apes to stop there.
 
north
 
Reply Wed 5 May, 2010 12:53 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;160221 wrote:
Yes. There are different kinds of properties. Color is an interactive property because it the the result of the interaction between the object and the perceiver. But that does not mean it is not a property.


Quote:
And, of course, existence is a property, but it is not a property of any object, since it is a property that properties have.


disagree

any property , of any object , is based on the object(s) constituents

and the constituents are based on objects......
 
HexHammer
 
Reply Wed 5 May, 2010 05:50 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;148848 wrote:
If we begin with an object X:

Then, does the object X have a color or does color depend upon an external light source?

If we were to say the exterior surface of X is materially constituted so that when an external light source (for example, white light) is directed at it, it reflects a certain shade of a certain color Y: does this then mean that it makes sense to say that object X has property Y as a color? Or does the fact that light is not an internal property of the object mean that the object is colorless?

I am confused as to whether or not objects themselves are colored.

I would just note that according to Locke's theory of ideas the colour of objects are said to be secondary as oposed to primary. Meaning that colours, according to Locke, are not properties of objects.

Any help on this would be appreciated. Thanks.

-
Locke just formulates himself in a very overly unessesary complex way, trying to sound smart when a more simple explenatin is in order.

This overcomplexity is often the heel of philosophy as philosopher can't simplify matters and therefore end up in an irrational mental maze.

Color is either pigments or colored by prismatic properties, when dividing light into different colorspectres, different prism shapes will display diffren colors ..ie opals, a high quality diamond will shine white, but a poorly cut diamond will display colors.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 5 May, 2010 05:57 am
@north,
north;160239 wrote:
disagree

any property , of any object , is based on the object(s) constituents

and the constituents are based on objects......


Of which objects is existence a property? And of which isn't it a property?

---------- Post added 05-05-2010 at 08:00 AM ----------

HexHammer;160293 wrote:
Locke just formulates himself in a very overly unessesary complex way, trying to sound smart when a more simple explenatin is in order.

This overcomplexity is often the heel of philosophy as philosopher can't simplify matters and therefore end up in an irrational mental maze.

Color is either pigments or colored by prismatic properties, when dividing light into different colorspectres, different prism shapes will display diffren colors ..ie opals, a high quality diamond will shine white, but a poorly cut diamond will display colors.


Yes, that Locke. Obviously a man of low self-esteem. Always trying to look smarter than he was. You have to feel sorry for him. He probably had a very demanding mother.
 
fast
 
Reply Wed 5 May, 2010 08:12 am
@Pythagorean,
[QUOTE=Pythagorean;148848]If we begin with an object X:

Then, does the object X have a color or does color depend upon an external light source?[/QUOTE]Both.

The key to understanding whether or not an object has color lies in understanding what it even means to say of an object that it has color.

Your question is worded such that you already think that if the color of an object is dependent on an external light source, then no object has color when light is absent, but that's not the case.

For example, if we take what we would ordinarily call a blue ball and place it in a cave underground where no light source can get to it, the ball (I'm here to tell you) is still blue, and I know this because I know what it means to say of an object that it has color, and I'll tell ya, it doesn't have much to do with what color the ball appears to have in abnormal circumstances.

For example (example 1), if you are color blind, then you may not perceive what is ordinarily referred to as a blue ball as blue, but does this mean that it is both blue and not blue? No. Does it mean that it's not blue? No.

Furthermore (example 2), if you change the lighting under which you observe what is ordinarily referred to as a blue ball, and if the ball appears to have a color other than blue, then does this mean that the ball is not blue? No.

As I said, the key to understanding whether or not an object has color lies in understanding what it means to say of an object that it has color.

Often, when objects appear to have color, they do have color; the trick is determining what the color is, and the key to unraveling that mystery is careful observation, but remember, the observation ought not take place under abnormal conditions; hence, consider my two before-mentioned examples before making the observations. Don't let those that are color blind make the observations, and don't make the observations under abnormal lighting. Do not do anything that can be construed to making observations under abnormal conditions. Keeping that in mind will keep you on track when people start talking about what color balls appear to be when observed by rare and exotic (or even not so rare and exotic) animals.

How does it appear to the normal observer with normal vision under normal lighting? If it appears blue, then the object is blue.
 
VideCorSpoon
 
Reply Wed 5 May, 2010 09:27 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;148848 wrote:
If we begin with an object X:

Then, does the object X have a color or does color depend upon an external light source?

If we were to say the exterior surface of X is materially constituted so that when an external light source (for example, white light) is directed at it, it reflects a certain shade of a certain color Y: does this then mean that it makes sense to say that object X has property Y as a color? Or does the fact that light is not an internal property of the object mean that the object is colorless?

I am confused as to whether or not objects themselves are colored.

I would just note that according to Locke's theory of ideas the colour of objects are said to be secondary as oposed to primary. Meaning that colours, according to Locke, are not properties of objects.

Any help on this would be appreciated. Thanks.

-


Definitely one of the best examples to use is Aristotle's substrative substance. All of this comes from chapters 3-4 of Book Zeta in Aristotle's Metaphysics. To put in all in context, Aristotle reaches the point we are interested (objects and predication) by examining "what is being." Long story short, Aristotle reasons that it is substance. For example, when Aristotle says a things is walking, it is not the walking that exists but the walking that is attributed to it. It is a walking thing, a sitting thing, a healthy thing. These are all attributes of the thing itself. Aristotle acknowledges that substance can be thought of in many ways, but what is most certain is that substance is a primary thing that other things are predicated of. Indeed, by chapter three Aristotle concludes that substance is most accurately know to us as the "that which underlies." Long short, Aristotle determines four possible things in which substance could be, namely a universal, a genus, a predicates predicate, and what underlies. He knocks out the first three and moves onto the fourth for the fourth chapter.

Aristotle asserts that, "Wherever, then, the formula expressing a thing does not include that thing itself, this is the formula of what being is for a thing." (1029 b20) Whatness to Aristotle at least belongs to a sole ontological category. It is not spoken of in its own right, but referred to by its predicates. After this, there is a great progression on predication and Socrates' snub nose nose (two noses) and formal definitions, but the major point is the substrative nature of substance and the predication of qualities, etc. So to tie into your question, the objects themselves (whatever those objects may be) are not colored in themselves, but have been predicated upon in one way or another. And when you rightly bring up Locke and the theory of ideas, Locke is saying something very much in line with Aristotle I think, that it is really a predicate of another on a more substantial element.

http://i41.tinypic.com/2me4bhh.jpg

But I suppose the whole thing is a matter of interpretation I suppose. Leibniz, who in my opinion should have known better, stated that substances were just an endless collection of properties. Superficially in the light of Aristotle it does not make sense because like Aristotle had said, roundness is a predicate of a predicate, etc. Aristotle is more exact in his goals because he is attempting at least to find something ontologically primary.
 
Termite phil
 
Reply Thu 6 May, 2010 06:09 am
@Pythagorean,
While an object having color that we can see does indeed depend upon there being an external light-source, the light from that same light-source, cast on two different objects, will reveal different colors unless they are identical, because of the differences in the way they interact with the light. These differences that change the way the objects interact with light are most certainly properties of the objects themselves, independent of the external-light source.

Although I am not very familiar with the science behind color, I must assume that, even if it is not yet possible, we can or will be able to determine an object`s color without actually looking at it by looking at the compounds it is made of, etc.

So yes, color is a property. Perhaps calling it color is a bit misleading though, since an object`s apparent color may change under tinted lighting, for instance. What matters is that what causes us to see color in an object, that is, the way it reflects and absorbs light, most certainly is a property of the object itself.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Sat 8 May, 2010 04:39 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;148888 wrote:


Based upon what I have noted above, I believe the property of color is not an essential part of an object. An object may posess many more potential properties than we can count. And I say that its color is only a potential property.

Does anyone disagree with the statement that color is only a potential property?

-


I agree.

As to the original theme, aren't these objects just conceptual bundles? I feel that an object is above all things a unification.

It's like set theory. A set or bundle of properties. The object is the name of the set. And I feel that "essence and accident" already imply this. A ball can be red or green and still be a ball, because color is not part of the socially understood essence of "ball."

What do you make of "round square"?

---------- Post added 05-08-2010 at 05:41 PM ----------

HexHammer;160293 wrote:
Locke just formulates himself in a very overly unessesary complex way, trying to sound smart when a more simple explenatin is in order.

This overcomplexity is often the heel of philosophy as philosopher can't simplify matters and therefore end up in an irrational mental maze.

Color is either pigments or colored by prismatic properties, when dividing light into different colorspectres, different prism shapes will display diffren colors ..ie opals, a high quality diamond will shine white, but a poorly cut diamond will display colors.


This is a description of the scientific mental model of color. But we can't forget that color is experience as....well, color. Or "qualia." Redness just is.

Sure, we can mathematically represent red as a lower frequency electromagnetic wave than blue, but this useful representation doesn't replace Matisse. Smile
 
Pythagorean
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 07:39 am
@VideCorSpoon,
VideCorSpoon;160396 wrote:
Definitely one of the best examples to use is Aristotle's substrative substance. All of this comes from chapters 3-4 of Book Zeta in Aristotle's Metaphysics. To put in all in context, Aristotle reaches the point we are interested (objects and predication) by examining "what is being." Long story short, Aristotle reasons that it is substance. For example, when Aristotle says a things is walking, it is not the walking that exists but the walking that is attributed to it. It is a walking thing, a sitting thing, a healthy thing. These are all attributes of the thing itself. Aristotle acknowledges that substance can be thought of in many ways, but what is most certain is that substance is a primary thing that other things are predicated of. Indeed, by chapter three Aristotle concludes that substance is most accurately know to us as the "that which underlies." Long short, Aristotle determines four possible things in which substance could be, namely a universal, a genus, a predicates predicate, and what underlies. He knocks out the first three and moves onto the fourth for the fourth chapter.

Aristotle asserts that, "Wherever, then, the formula expressing a thing does not include that thing itself, this is the formula of what being is for a thing." (1029 b20) Whatness to Aristotle at least belongs to a sole ontological category. It is not spoken of in its own right, but referred to by its predicates. After this, there is a great progression on predication and Socrates' snub nose nose (two noses) and formal definitions, but the major point is the substrative nature of substance and the predication of qualities, etc. So to tie into your question, the objects themselves (whatever those objects may be) are not colored in themselves, but have been predicated upon in one way or another. And when you rightly bring up Locke and the theory of ideas, Locke is saying something very much in line with Aristotle I think, that it is really a predicate of another on a more substantial element.

http://i41.tinypic.com/2me4bhh.jpg

But I suppose the whole thing is a matter of interpretation I suppose. Leibniz, who in my opinion should have known better, stated that substances were just an endless collection of properties. Superficially in the light of Aristotle it does not make sense because like Aristotle had said, roundness is a predicate of a predicate, etc. Aristotle is more exact in his goals because he is attempting at least to find something ontologically primary.



The importance of the question 'What is being?' notwithstanding, I would agree with Leibniz over Aristotle, for now at least.

My decision has to do with the amount of complexity modern science brings to the question about object hood. Modern science understands the nature of the world in terms of fundamental forces, thus the answer to the question 'What is being?' has been provided in a rather dramatic fashion. And whether intentionally or not science ultimately understands the universe as a whole as being without purpose.

I keep peeling back the properties of objects as one would peel the layers of an onion, so to speak. Like Leibniz, I always end up with endless connections of properties.

I believe that the foremost question in all of this is, how can we locate certain knowledge? For Plato, I know, the solution lies in the metaphysical 'forms'. I guess he means something like, the mathematical structure of substances are permanent possibilities, more pure and everlasting than the examples themselves. A retreat to universals in order to stabilize our knowing. This is rationalism at its finest.

The proof for Plato is that there can be no knowledge of a thing if that thing is one of a kind. There is no knowledge to be gained in the examination of existential objects without recourse to categories of knowledge. The categories logically precede the existential occurances. But the moderns stood all of this purposeful reasoning on its head.

Starting with a universe which contains absolutely nothing except for one object I ask myself: what are the properties of this object?

If the object does not contain its own internal source of light, then it has no color. If the object contains no internal source of heat, then what is its temperature? Whether or not the object possesses the capacity for locomotion, in what direction can it be said to be moving? what is its mass? If it has shape, from where does shape originate? What is the ontological derivation of shape? What is the origin of the nuclear particles?

That's my procedure. Imagining the self alone in the universe and existence, substance and being are then relative to mind, I believe. The end of all science is the unification of mind with body contemplating its own motion as it moves within relative space.

--
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 07:44 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean;148888 wrote:

Does anyone disagree with the statement that color is only a potential property?

-


I would. How could a red apple be only potentially a red apple.
 
 

 
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