does this then mean that it makes sense to say that object X has property Y as a color? Or does the fact that light is not an internal property of the object mean that the object is colorless?



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If we begin with an object X:

Then, does the object X have a color or does color depend upon an external light source?

If we were to say the exterior surface of X is materially constituted so that when an external light source (for example, white light) is directed at it, it reflects a certain shade of a certain color Y: does this then mean that it makes sense to say that object X has property Y as a color? Or does the fact that light is not an internal property of the object mean that the object is colorless?

I am confused as to whether or not objects themselves are colored.

I would just note that according to Locke's theory of ideas the colour of objects are said to be secondary as oposed to primary. Meaning that colours, according to Locke, are not properties of objects.

Any help on this would be appreciated. Thanks.

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It means, I think, that different kinds of properties are caused in different ways. Why should that fact that the color of an object is an interactive property between the observer and the object mean that the object has no color?

I think what locke was saying is that the reason the color of an object is secondary is that it requires an eyeball. It is only they way an eyeball processes light that creates what we call colors. It is not necessarily all the light that is reflected off of the object just the light the eye can process that we give titles to and agree upon as a color. I suppose its kind of like kilograms. object X has some weight but it requires us, the observers, to call that weight kilograms and determine units. kilograms don't really exist in the physical universe.

Isn't it more fair to say that color is less apart of an object? Color will always depend upon the relations between the object and the light source, as well as the type of light source, it seems.

The weight or mass of an object does not seem to depend upon external conditions as the more elusive property of color seems to do.

Well, if we were to compare the property of color to the property of (the fact that it occupies) space or mass or spatial extension, we see that the spatial property does not require an external cause in the way that the property of color requires an external light. Color will always depend upon the relations between the object and the light source, as well as the type of light source.


And it seems this is the case also with regards to temperature of objects. If an object does not itself contain its own internal temperature, then its temperature is externally provided.

Does it not make sense to reduce objects, wherever it is possible, to their simplest or most basic sets of properties?

---------- Post added 04-06-2010 at 04:44 PM ----------



Isn't it more fair to say that color is less apart of an object? Color will always depend upon the relations between the object and the light source, as well as the type of light source, it seems.

The weight or mass of an object does not seem to depend upon external conditions as the more elusive property of color seems to do.

-Yes, there are, as I said, different kinds of properties. But that does not make them any the less properties. What does appear to be a property of an object, but is not a property of any object, is existence. Existence is not a property of any objects. It is, however a property. It is a property of properties.

Why is color, "elusive"? The color of an object is the color it appears to have when observed by the normal observer under normal conditions.

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---------- Post added 04-06-2010 at 04:48 PM ----------

Based upon what I have noted above, I believe the property of color is not an essential part of an object. An object may posess many more potential properties than we can count. And I say that its color is only a potential property.

Does anyone disagree with the statement that color is only a potential property?

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-Yes, there are, as I said, different kinds of properties. But that does not make them any the less properties.

Why is color, "elusive"? The color of an object is the color it appears to have when observed by the normal observer under normal conditions.

I don't think the object or the light source is as active a participant as the eyeball. If our eyes were different, the color of an object would be different. the color depends on what light is absorbed into eyeballs.

I would just note that according to Locke's theory of ideas the colour of objects are said to be secondary as oposed to primary. Meaning that colours, according to Locke, are not properties of objects.

Any help on this would be appreciated. Thanks.

I am assuming that human standards of measurement are valid. It is not for me a question of the subjective or relative measure that we must rely upon.

If human standards can determine the difference between some basic colours, then this is all that is required for the time being.

I am attempting to ground objects within human standards to see to what extent realism makes sense. It is for this reason that the position and the type of light source is the focus. I am assuming the realism of human vision.

If we begin with an object X:

Then, does the object X have a color or does color depend upon an external light source?

If we were to say the exterior surface of X is materially constituted so that when an external light source (for example, white light) is directed at it, it reflects a certain shade of a certain color Y: does this then mean that it makes sense to say that object X has property Y as a color? Or does the fact that light is not an internal property of the object mean that the object is colorless?

I am confused as to whether or not objects themselves are colored.

I would just note that according to Locke's theory of ideas the colour of objects are said to be secondary as oposed to primary. Meaning that colours, according to Locke, are not properties of objects.

Any help on this would be appreciated. Thanks.

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Locke is right

the colour(s) we see are the electromagnetic wavelengths of light reflected or rejected , so to speak , by the object

but Locke is also wrong

in that the properties of the object , that rejected a certain wavelength of light , and is therefore not a property of the object

yet it is the property of the object , which rejects a certain wavelength of light

how else could it be ?

Yes. There are different kinds of properties. Color is an interactive property because it the the result of the interaction between the object and the perceiver. But that does not mean it is not a property.

And, of course, existence is a property, but it is not a property of any object, since it is a property that properties have.

If we begin with an object X:

Then, does the object X have a color or does color depend upon an external light source?

If we were to say the exterior surface of X is materially constituted so that when an external light source (for example, white light) is directed at it, it reflects a certain shade of a certain color Y: does this then mean that it makes sense to say that object X has property Y as a color? Or does the fact that light is not an internal property of the object mean that the object is colorless?

I am confused as to whether or not objects themselves are colored.

I would just note that according to Locke's theory of ideas the colour of objects are said to be secondary as oposed to primary. Meaning that colours, according to Locke, are not properties of objects.

Any help on this would be appreciated. Thanks.

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disagree

any property , of any object , is based on the object(s) constituents

and the constituents are based on objects......

Locke just formulates himself in a very overly unessesary complex way, trying to sound smart when a more simple explenatin is in order.

This overcomplexity is often the heel of philosophy as philosopher can't simplify matters and therefore end up in an irrational mental maze.

Color is either pigments or colored by prismatic properties, when dividing light into different colorspectres, different prism shapes will display diffren colors ..ie opals, a high quality diamond will shine white, but a poorly cut diamond will display colors.

If we begin with an object X:

Then, does the object X have a color or does color depend upon an external light source?

If we were to say the exterior surface of X is materially constituted so that when an external light source (for example, white light) is directed at it, it reflects a certain shade of a certain color Y: does this then mean that it makes sense to say that object X has property Y as a color? Or does the fact that light is not an internal property of the object mean that the object is colorless?

I am confused as to whether or not objects themselves are colored.

I would just note that according to Locke's theory of ideas the colour of objects are said to be secondary as oposed to primary. Meaning that colours, according to Locke, are not properties of objects.

Any help on this would be appreciated. Thanks.

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Based upon what I have noted above, I believe the property of color is not an essential part of an object. An object may posess many more potential properties than we can count. And I say that its color is only a potential property.

Does anyone disagree with the statement that color is only a potential property?

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Locke just formulates himself in a very overly unessesary complex way, trying to sound smart when a more simple explenatin is in order.

This overcomplexity is often the heel of philosophy as philosopher can't simplify matters and therefore end up in an irrational mental maze.

Color is either pigments or colored by prismatic properties, when dividing light into different colorspectres, different prism shapes will display diffren colors ..ie opals, a high quality diamond will shine white, but a poorly cut diamond will display colors.

Definitely one of the best examples to use is Aristotle's substrative substance. All of this comes from chapters 3-4 of Book Zeta in Aristotle's Metaphysics. To put in all in context, Aristotle reaches the point we are interested (objects and predication) by examining "what is being." Long story short, Aristotle reasons that it is substance. For example, when Aristotle says a things is walking, it is not the walking that exists but the walking that is attributed to it. It is a walking thing, a sitting thing, a healthy thing. These are all attributes of the thing itself. Aristotle acknowledges that substance can be thought of in many ways, but what is most certain is that substance is a primary thing that other things are predicated of. Indeed, by chapter three Aristotle concludes that substance is most accurately know to us as the "that which underlies." Long short, Aristotle determines four possible things in which substance could be, namely a universal, a genus, a predicates predicate, and what underlies. He knocks out the first three and moves onto the fourth for the fourth chapter.

Aristotle asserts that, "Wherever, then, the formula expressing a thing does not include that thing itself, this is the formula of what being is for a thing." (1029 b20) Whatness to Aristotle at least belongs to a sole ontological category. It is not spoken of in its own right, but referred to by its predicates. After this, there is a great progression on predication and Socrates' snub nose nose (two noses) and formal definitions, but the major point is the substrative nature of substance and the predication of qualities, etc. So to tie into your question, the objects themselves (whatever those objects may be) are not colored in themselves, but have been predicated upon in one way or another. And when you rightly bring up Locke and the theory of ideas, Locke is saying something very much in line with Aristotle I think, that it is really a predicate of another on a more substantial element.



But I suppose the whole thing is a matter of interpretation I suppose. Leibniz, who in my opinion should have known better, stated that substances were just an endless collection of properties. Superficially in the light of Aristotle it does not make sense because like Aristotle had said, roundness is a predicate of a predicate, etc. Aristotle is more exact in his goals because he is attempting at least to find something ontologically primary.

Does anyone disagree with the statement that color is only a potential property?

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