According to you, anything with any amount of justification, as long as it's above absolutely none at all, is "justified".

That's like saying that anything that isn't perfectly round is "flattened".

There are (at least) three necessary conditions of knowledge, and one of them is adequate justification.

Consider the difference between adequate justification and inadequate justification. There are (at least) three necessary conditions of knowledge, and one of them is adequate justification. Generally, we speak in shorthand, and if I say that I have a justified belief, that is shorthand for I have an adequately justified belief.

Consider the difference between adequate justification and inadequate justification. There are (at least) three necessary conditions of knowledge, and one of them is adequate justification. Generally, we speak in shorthand, and if I say that I have a justified belief, that is shorthand for I have an adequately justified belief.

Unfortunately, you cant know that your justification is adequate, or that your belief is true, without suffering a regress.

According to you, anything with any amount of justification, as long as it's above absolutely none at all, is "justified".

That's like saying that anything that isn't perfectly round is "flattened".

But, again, you are assuming that because we cannot be certain, that we cannot know. So, you assume that knowledge implies certainty. Isn't that so?

I might agree with you that there is nothing we can be certain about, but that doesn't mean that I have to agree with you that there is nothing that we can know. Not if knowledge does not imply certainty. So, that is really what you have to show; that knowledge implies certainty.

But that does not mean we can't know. Often people do not even know that they know something.

Sure, it depends on the definition of "knowledge" that you're using.

For me, to declare that you know something, you have to be certain of it.

That's right, I believe that certainty is a requisite of knowledge.



I think that here the problem lies with the definition of knowledge. For me, to declare that you know something, you have to be certain of it. Otherwise you are surely diluting the term knowledge, and might as well always declare "I probably know something" because, by definition, you are not certain of it.

Which definition are you using? I was referring to the JTB model.

I didn't make that claim.

The amount of justification required for a belief to be justified varies.

In order to know P, one must believe P. So, no, he wouldn't have known until he believed.

That sounds really ad hoc. Varies based on what?

That sounds really ad hoc. Varies based on what?

I think it depends on the belief. Some beliefs may require more justification than others.



Oh, he believed but he wasn't certain? Was he justified? Then, yes, he knew. He just wasn't certain that he knew. Happens all the time.

Can someone with 99.999% of belief (relative conception of belief) be certain that he is certain ?