@Night Ripper,
Back to the question of a general theory of physical possibility. So far, all that has been offered is this:
kennethamy;137109 wrote:The general theory of physical impossibility is an implication of the DN model. It is physically impossible for an event to occur unless it can be deduced on the lines of the DN model.
As far as I can see, the deductive-nomological theory of explanation fails as a general theory of physical possibility, as follows.
The deductive-nomological theory of explanation, is specifically a theory of what scientific explanations consist of, so, if Kennethamy's claim is to be accepted, the only physically possible events are events that are amenable to a scientific explanation. Further, the type of explanation required has the form of a prediction, either deterministic or probabilistic, thus, Kennethamy's claim entails that all physically possible events are members of sets of outcomes described by predictive algorithms. But, in a world as described by the best physical theories real numbers represent real quantities, so, while the number of predictive algorithms is, at most, countably infinite, the number of events is uncountable infinite. This means either that the best physical theories are wrong or that the set of possible events has zero measure. If the deductive-nomological theory carries the corollary that the best physical theories are wrong, I think it fails as a theory of scientific explanation, but if the set of physically possible events has zero measure, then the probability of any event, in a world described by the best physical theories, occurring, is zero. Both possibilities appear to be false, so I reject Kennethamy's general theory of physical possibility.