@JeffD2,
ABC wrote:5. We should apply the same criteria to our claims that we know that X as we do to our claims that X. It is reasonable to say now, without qualification, (a) that Paris is still the capital of France, and (b) that we know Paris is still the capital of France. But if we later find that they'd already changed it, we can obviously no longer claim that (a) was true when we said it. So why should we still want to claim that (b) was true when we said it?
(B) is all we ever have, ABC.
After doing some more research, I've found a view that echoes what I've been attempting to articulate here. The philosopher is David Hume, and he states (paraphrased from wiki):
"Hume asserts that the fallibility of human beings means that they cannot obtain absolute certainty except in trivial cases where a statement is true by definition (as in, "all bachelors are unmarried" or "all triangles have three angles"). All rational statements that assert a factual claim about the universe that begin "I believe that ...." are simply shorthand for, "Based on my knowledge, understanding, and interpretation of the prevailing evidence, I tentatively believe that...." For instance, when one says, "I believe that Lee Harvey Oswald shot John F. Kennedy," one is not asserting an absolute truth but a tentative belief based on interpretation of the assembled evidence. Even though one may set an alarm clock prior to the following day, believing that waking up will be possible, that belief is tentative, tempered by a small but finite degree of doubt (the earth might be destroyed, or one might die before the alarm goes off)."
This is exactly what I'm referring to with my vase example. All one can do is claim knowledge, a tentative belief based on interpretation of the evidence (high certainty, ample justification). If I say I
know the vase is on the table upon leaving for work, I am claiming knowledge based on a tentative belief, not an "absolute truth". There is no way I can ever claim the (A) you're referring to. Unless, of course, we use a definition that in itself is true (example in quotes), or we use a fixed system (such as a formal logic truth table).
This epistemological stance, I believe, would be closely related to agnosticism.
So, in answer to your question:
Quote:Zetherin - I agree that "know" should be used without regard to remote possibilities of falsity. But that does not entitle us to use it retrospectively where something was actually false. Do you see the difference?
Because humans do not have the capability to know of the remote possibilities of falsity, humans should be entitled to either use "know" retrospectively where something was actually false, or not use it at all. We
must use it while admitting some shred of doubt, and we should be able to claim we know even if we find out later it was false. Again, the knowledge would be revised, as knowledge is relative. So, if humans discovered mars was made out of playdo instead of rock 500 years down the road, I would say we had knowledge of Mars being made of rock, yet we were wrong. Because, as I mentioned, if we do not say we held knowledge, then how are we ever to claim
any knowledge? 1,000 years from now someone
could prove false most things we think we now know. Without the new knowledge from 1,000 years in the future, you would most certainly claim you
knew!