Didymos Thomas,

Please by all means put it in your own terms, as long as it expresses the fact that the first interest served is that of the will of the subject which preforms the action,

I respectfully disagree. I think it is an instinctual thing. But that is a story in itself. thanks for the reply though.

Please by all means put it in your own terms, as long as it expresses the fact that the first interest served is that of the will of the subject which preforms the action, and that this is all encompassing of all actions.

But does this statement have any real content? Isn't it just a tautology? 'If I decide to do something, then it is I who decide to do it.' Or: 'All my voluntary actions are actions that I myself want to do.' This is just saying that x = x.

Excellent, so, the question then arises, if of necessity, every action that I preform is the fulfilment of my will, can it be said that there is any such thing as pure altruism. Actually as hard as it might be to believe looking at the length of this thread, the moral question was never the issue. Every action is self motivated, the fulfilment of ones will, it then could be judged selfless or selfish after the fact, but the issue is,"All my voluntary actions are actions that I myself want to do." very nicely capped.

ACB,

"All my voluntary actions are actions that I myself want to do." very nicely capped.

I understand your point, but how then would you define 'altruism'? Surely the word should refer to something, even if that thing does not actually exist. (Compare 'unicorn', which refers to a horse-like creature with one horn.) But according to your argument, 'altruism' does not refer to anything at all, since it implies a logical impossibility. Thus it has no meaning; and consequently any sentence in which it appears (e.g. 'No action involves altruism') has no meaning either.

Clearly, if altruism cannot (by definition) exist, then it does not exist. And if all actions must (by definition) be selfish, then they are all selfish. But such self-proving definitions seem pointless. Surely the length of this thread is due to the fact that 'altruism' and 'selfishness' are normally defined in a less all-embracing way. And standard definitions are a matter of social consensus - they cannot be 'wrong'.

ACB,

I suppose you are right, but I was not the one to introduce moral judgement in the mix, the function which allows for the formation of intent, the will to do/act is itself without moral judement, moral judgement can only come after the event/action, as value judgement. The point always was that any action is self-fulfilling, the will is fulfilled through action, all actions have this characteristic, and are personal. However I raise the white flag, all action are self-fulfilling first, and they can be both selfish and selfless, as a value judgement after the fact.

Firstly, I don't think "selfish" was the best word to use in distinguishing the actions that are being discussed here. Selfish implies concern of oneself, a conscious disregard of others. This is not what was intended. I believe Selfish should have been clarified from the beginning, and the thread appropriately named "The Self-Intent Of All Actions", or something less abrasive.

I'm not sure if you've read a lot of what boagie has written, but I believe he's tried to clarify: Self-Intent ≠ Selfishness. Even if we deduce that every single action involves Self-Intent on some cognitive level, it doesn't mean that every action is Selfish. The reason being that Selfish and Selfless are part of a dichotomy. If, ultimately, every action is Selfish, then it really isn't Selfish after all. Why? Because the dichotomy then doesn't exist anymore. The actions would just be, without moral judgment.

I tried to clarify boagie earlier, on page 55:



Is this a tautology? Well, I'm not quite so sure. Neither am I sure that every action is led by self-intent. What if one is forced/compelled to do something, where one really has no other choice? Or, if a choice is not even presented? There's no self-intent in having the back of your knees taken out and gravity slamming your face into the pavement by someone else. Those things forced upon us could still be considered actions, in addition to those things where a choice just isn't presented. A choice may be purely instinctual, without any reason, and I don't see this having anything to do with intent. If we are to say every conscious rationalization is self-inclined, then sure, I'd buy that. But certainly not every action.

Actually, the attack against you would be the action. What happens to you afterward, is the consequence of the action.

An action with no self-intent would be tripping on the sidewalk while walking. Unless someone purposely trips, the agent had no intention to do so.

I think your sidewalk one is a bit better, but we could still say the action was to walk and you tripping was the consequence of that action.

So, if the agent had no conscious intention, I don't see how every action can be of one with self-intent. Can you?

I tried to clarify boagie earlier, on page 55:



"Is this a tautology? Well, I'm not quite so sure. Neither am I sure that every action is led by self-intent. What if one is forced/compelled to do something, where one really has no other choice? Or, if a choice is not even presented? There's no self-intent in having the back of your knees taken out and gravity slamming your face into the pavement by someone else. Those things forced upon us could still be considered actions, in addition to those things where a choice just isn't presented. A choice may be purely instinctual, without any reason, and I don't see this having anything to do with intent. If we are to say every conscious rationalization is self-inclined, then sure, I'd buy that. But certainly not every action.

Zetherin;

That it was an unfortunate choice of words is an understatement, but, one would think in a philosophy site that that unfortunate confusion dealing with semantics could be clarified, but apparently not. That it may be a tautology is probably true, though one apparently not obvious to most as true. As far as being threatend with say a gun or some other form of intimidation, that is just factored into the mix, your will then becomes to do as your told in order not to get hurt, still your will in action, and a moral judgement can certainly be applied after the fact. As to being struck to the ground that is not a volentary action, so, not applicable. Even with instinctual action, there is a desire to preform said action, the reasoning may be faulty or it may not be faulty or non-existent, but where there is desire to act, there is a will in action, or perhaps there are instinctual involentary action, not real sure on the count, but if so, it would be involentary thus not applicable.

Even with instinctual action, there is a desire to preform said action, the reasoning may be faulty or it may not be faulty or non-existent, but where there is desire to act, there is a will in action, or perhaps there are instinctual involentary action, not real sure on the count, but if so, it would be involentary thus not applicable.

You would have to account for cases such as tripping on the sidewalk while walking. While walking demonstrates self-intent, tripping while doing so does not, unless the individual wanted to trip. Many actions that are consequences of other actions are not selfish or done with self-intent as motivation.

Theaetetus,

An error is not a volentary action. The intent is to walk not tripp.

I don't believe every voluntary action breathes desire. Again, with the example I noted, the buckling of the kneecaps may be involuntary, however, for that moment whilst falling, a choice is made -- in which direction to fall (at least in the example I'm giving; I can understand if maybe someone was slammed or something). I don't think this choice has anything to do with desire, as it was not reasoned, nor was there any emotional attachment. How can we say we desired falling in that certain direction when we didn't even have enough time to rationalize?

Using the definition of desire:

To wish or long for; want.

But all actions imply all actions, not just voluntary actions.

But where you place your other foot as to not fall down can be argued to be voluntary. And, I don't feel this action, while voluntary, has anything to do with desire.

Zetherin;

How can one have a volentary action without intent, intent infers a desire to do. After you have lost your balance, if you can decide in which direction you are going to fall, that would infer an intent, and again, intent infers a desire to do. If you cannot decide for yourself the direction of your fall, then it is not intentional.