I think it's close to being a category error to say that a proposition is certain. The only thing I can imagine that to mean is that the proposition is necessarily true.

Yes. Descartes held that he was certain that he existed. But Descartes certainly did not think that the proposition that he existed was a necessary truth. He thought that the only existential proposition that was a necessary truth was that God exists. (Descartes did not think that he was God). It seem to me that to say that p is certain is just a loose way of saying that I am certain that p. A different question is whether I am certain of all necessary truths. It seems to me that the answer to that must be, no.

This post is just to note another difference between being infallibly certain and confidently certain.

1. Certain (infallible): I am certain means I am infallible.
2. Certain (confident): I am certain means I am confident.
3. Certain (particular): another discussion

Observation 1: In regards to number 1 above, Amy is either certain or she isn't. In other words, she's either infallible or she isn't. There's no in between--no degrees of certainty; hence, no degrees of fallibility.

Observation 2: In regards to number 2 above, Bob is confident, but not as confident as Amy, yet more confident than Charles. In other words, there are varying degrees of confidence; hence, there are varying degrees of certainty.

Conclusion:
1. Certain (infallible): no varying degrees of certainty or fallibility.
2. Certain (confidence): varying degrees of certainty and confidence.

That phrase is a case of misusing language.

Well. I did tell you to learn logic first, and then discuss things. You're doing it backwards.

Ya gotta fight fire with fire sometimes, man!



That's right, I am doing it backwards. I'm planning on contemplating tough logic problems for another decade. Then, ten years down the line, I'm going to start formally learning logic. Ya know, actually open a logic textbook or something. In this way, I will stay thoroughly confused for as much time as possible (heck, I should really increase this to about 20-30 years) before understanding what all the formalizations mean. If all goes as planned, right before I die I'll have just understood things I was contemplating for the better part of my life.

This is the philosopher's way.

Sorry, I'll stop posting here - you guys write, I'll read!

Here's some more thoughts on the matter:

I can be confident that p, but not only that, I can be confident. Of course, if I'm confident that p, then I'm confident (for being confident that p implies being confident), but that I'm confident doesn't imply that I'm confident that p. For example, I can be a somewhat confident person in general without being confident that p, so there is a distinction. In fact, I am a confident person, but not so confident that p-depending on what p is, of course.

The point of that was simply to illustrate a difference between being confident and being confident that p. Notice how the distinguishing point holds true for being certain; hence, when using "certain" to mean confident, I can either be certain or certain that p; thus, I can either be confident or confident that p. There are more combinations.

But, this doesn't strike me as correct when talking about fallibility. It just doesn't ring true to the ear. Yes, we are fallible, so yes, we are not certain, but because "fallible that p" doesn't make sense to me, neither does "certain that p" make sense when using "certain" to mean infallible. What in the Quito does "John is fallible that p" mean?

So (or to recap), in regards to being certain (confident), I can be certain and thus confident, and on top of that, I can be certain that p and thus be confident that p; however, in regards to being certain (infallible), I can be certain (at least in a world where God allows it) and thus I can be infallible, but to go that extra mile and say that I can be certain that p (or infallible that p) seems to be stretching things a bit too far.

Yet, I can't escape that Kennthamy has done just that when he said: "For John to be certain that p, is for it to be impossible that John is mistaken that p." The only explanation I have is that it need not ring true to the ear for it to be so.

I'm okay with saying "certain that p" when "certain" means confidence, but I'm not so fine with saying "certain that p" when "certain" means infallible. I'm okay with being certain meaning being infallible, but that "that p" part has got to go.

Yes, I agree.

Yes, and that implies that one is infallible about p.

Being confident, however, doesn't imply being confident that p.

Uh. But, I agree with that!

That's right, but being confident doesn't imply being confident about p whereas being infallible does imply being infallible that p.

So, they are not parallel.

I'm working on it. Sometimes, it won't let me scroll down to times new roman; either that, or it just takes too darn long (a cousin to too long). I'm on dial up, and that makes getting around on this forum horrific.

[INDENT]Of course, if I'm confident that p, then I'm confident (for being confident that p implies being confident), but that I'm confident doesn't imply that I'm confident that p.
[/INDENT]Being confident that p implies that I'm confident in so much that I am confident that p.

I should never have brought up being confident in gereral. It was misleading, but my only reason for including it was to further illustrate that there's a difference, but it's a moot point since we agree.

Here's something more interesting:

1: being certain (confident)
2: being certain (confident) that p.
3: being certain (infallible)
4: being certain (infallible) that p.

3 implies 4 but 1 doesn't imply 2. Being infallible implies that I am infallible in regards to all p, but being confident doesn't imply that I am confident about all p. So, 2 can imply 1 whereas 4 can't imply 3.

Hope that helps.

I have proof that god exists. I can show you logically that god exists.

I have evidence that god exists. I can show you physically that god exists.

I find it best to just categorize them both that way. I thought they were interchangeable at first, but it seems the concept of proof is logic while the concept of evidence is physical.

I think there's only Persuasion. The word proof is useful, of course. But what does it really mean to prove something, beyond a strong use of the word persuasion?

What about antecedent skepticism? Isn't all of our knowledge founded upon a leap of faith in our sanity, and in our general ability to ascertain "truth?"

Is Certainty another idol, another plug for the god-shaped hole? And I refer to certainty with a capital C.

I think there's only Persuasion. The word proof is useful, of course. But what does it really mean to prove something, beyond a strong use of the word persuasion?

What about antecedent skepticism? Isn't all of our knowledge founded upon a leap of faith in our sanity, and in our general ability to ascertain "truth?"

Is Certainty another idol, another plug for the god-shaped hole? And I refer to certainty with a capital C.

There is only a consensus that the Earth is round. You think so. I think so. Most people think so. It's only proven to the point that we are persuaded.

Perhaps we are brains in a vat. In the practical sense this is ridiculous, but I am trying to make a point. If you were the only person who thought the Earth was round, you would be repeatedly told that you were insane, and you would start to doubt yourself.
This is an exaggerated sort of example, but it will serve well enough.

I refer to capitalization in order to call attention to what I would call religious feelings for certain concepts. As I said in another post, the philosophical tradition is full of round-about theologians, and I am being metaphorical. Plato, Spinoza, Hegel, Kant. Just to name a few. And before someone says Kant is anti-metaphysics, let's consider the categorical imperative. Kant was sneaky. He wanted to play scientist and saint simultaneously. Russell and Wittgenstein liked the uniforms that referees wear.