I also agree that we are fallible. I just don't agree we need some fancy term like "epistemically certain" to remind us of such. Unless a new term clarifies, instead of confuses, it is useless. In other words, I see no reason to use "e-certain". I'll stick with my commonsense, without showy, intellectual rapages.

Here, did you mean "certain" as in certain (to be sure - ie. I'm certain he will come to the party), or certain (specificity - ie. I picked a certain dress to wear this evening)? I think you meant the latter, but I just wanted to make sure.



I often times don't know that I know something. I often doubt myself, but then find out later that I knew all along. I often times don't know how I feel, or what mental state I'm in. And, even after intense introspection, I still don't think I know any more than I did. Well, not e-certainly, that's for sure.

Basically, I don't think I can trust my sanity enough to claim that I'm e-certain (using it as we've addressed it) about anything. But, I suppose others can...

I think the point of using "e-certain" is to distinguish between psychological or subjective certainty, and objective certainty. The former refers to one's feeling or conviction that some belief one holds is true. It does not imply truth, since one can be convinced that what one believes is true, and be mistaken. The latter refers not to feeling or conviction of truth, but to the impossibility of mistake. If my belief must be true, then I am e-certain. The question is whether I am e-certain about any proposition I believe is true. Some people, for instance, think that I cannot be mistaken if I believe that I am in pain; or that I exist.

What is ambigious about the contradiction, X exists and X does not exist? I suppose the answer lies in paraconsistent logic?

Here, did you mean "certain" as in certain (to be sure - ie. I'm certain he will come to the party), or certain (specificity - ie. I picked a certain dress to wear this evening)? I think you meant the latter, but I just wanted to make sure.

I often times don't know that I know something. I often doubt myself, but then find out later that I knew all along. I often times don't know how I feel, or what mental state I'm in. And, even after intense introspection, I'm still not e-certain about my feelings.

I don't think I can trust my sanity enough to claim that I'm e-certain (using it as we've addressed it) about anything. But, I suppose others can...

He means "certain" in the first sense.

I generally believe I know that p when I know that p. But not all the time. Sometimes I knew that p all along, but I did not believe I knew that p. And, of course, sometimes I believe I know that p, and it turns out that I did not know that p, either because p was false, or because my justification for p was insufficient. Or both.

As I pointed out, many philosophers would claim that when I believe I am in pain, I cannot be mistaken. And that, therefore, when in pain, I am e-certain that I am in pain.

As I pointed out, many philosophers would claim that when I believe I am in pain, I cannot be mistaken. And that, therefore, when in pain, I am e-certain that I am in pain.

Commonsense can go terribly wrong at times. Especially with modal logic (Wiki, SEP). That's the problem. Try discussing epistemology only using commonsense. You will get into trouble. Especially with the dread modal fallacy.

Nothing. You are confusing matters. That's not the sentence that fast was referring to. This is:
[INDENT][INDENT]"Is it possible to believe that one exists, and one does not exist?"
[/INDENT][/INDENT]

If my belief must be true, then I am e-certain.

Well, I think they would be wrong. There are many cases of the phantom limb phenomenon in which I would say that that person was wrong about actually being in pain.






What does this mean? When must a belief be true?

I never said that one should only discuss matters using commonsense. I don't know why you inferred this from what I wrote.

I'm sorry, but I still don't understand how I'm confusing matters. How is what you typed different from what I typed? If one believes that one exists and also believes one does not exist, and we meant the latter belief to be the negation of the former belief, I don't see how this wouldn't be a contradiction or how it would be ambiguous.

What does this mean? When must a belief be true?

The fact that the limb does not exist does not mean that the person is not in pain. In fact, the pain is "referred pain". The pain is (of course) not in the non-existent limb, but the person cannot be mistaken about feeling pain. The pain does not have to be where the cause of the pain is.

An example of a belief having to be true is my belief that I exist, since I could not believe it unless it was true. Of course, that I exist need not be true, but what must be true is that I exist if I believe I exist.

Yes, it's possible that I'm mistaken and that the cat is on the floor, but I'm not mistaken, and that's what's important-that I'm not mistaken despite the possibility I could have been. I don't have to be certain that the cat is on the table in order to know the cat is on the table. In other words, I don't have to know to the extent that it's impossible that I could have been mistaken.

I didn't. I inferred some possible hate against something that goes against commonsense:
[INDENT]"I'll stick with my commonsense, without showy, intellectual rapages."
[/INDENT]

Fast, you bring up that great distinction, and kennethamy has pointed it out earlier. I understand, and agree, with all you have written.

How does e-certainty fit into all this, from your perspective, though? That's what I'm not quite grasping.

--



Sorry for being unclear. There was no hate implied against those things which go against commonsense. I was merely noting that those things I do regard as commonsense, I don't see the need to use a technical term for, unless I'm given a good enough reason to do so (for instance, if it help clarifies an issue).

I made rapage up. It simply refers to when an intellectual rapes language, creating technical terms for no good reason, often times just to sound intelligent or flaunt aptitude for a particular subject. Those technical terms created in this fashion are called rapages. There's a verb "rapaging", too, but I don't like it, so I don't think I'm going to condone its usage.

Do you, perhaps mean, "rampage" and "rampaging"?


rampage definition ′pāj′; for v., also ram pāj′)
intransitive verb rampagedrampagingramp

noun
an outbreak of violent, raging behavior chiefly in on the (or a) rampage on the (or a) rampage

Nope, I meant "rapage", as in, the word I just stated I made up.

But then, aren't you, yourself, "rapaging" by using the non-word, "rapage"?

Yes, that was the irony. I'm glad someone discovered it. :a-ok:

As we speak I'm reading an article on e-certainty, so hopefully this will help me understand why it (e-certainty) is worth using.

What article is that? There is certainly a difference between being certain and feeling certain, if that is what you mean.

Certainty and Irrevisability

Does this guy know what he's talking about (admittedly, I don't know if this guy is a reliable source), or am I just confusing myself more?

Sorry for being unclear. There was no hate implied against those things which go against commonsense. I was merely noting that those things I do regard as commonsense, I don't see the need to use a technical term for, unless I'm given a good enough reason to do so (for instance, if it help clarifies an issue).

I made rapage up. It simply refers to when an intellectual rapes language, creating technical terms for no good reason, often times just to sound intelligent or flaunt aptitude for a particular subject. Those technical terms created in this fashion are called rapages. There's a verb "rapaging", too, but I don't like it, so I don't think I'm going to condone its usage.

As for the rest of your post: Since I am not versed in formal logic, it's going to take me more time to respond. The links you keep handing me can best be understood by having some grasp on the subject matter, and I don't. So, I can read and interpret the information you're providing me, but I just don't have the... context, to conceptualize everything, ya know? I don't really understand the theory behind it. Bottom line: Don't think I'm ignoring you; it's just a lot to take it in for a noob logician. I'm trying, though.

Certainty and Irrevisability

Does this guy know what he's talking about (admittedly, I don't know if this guy is a reliable source), or am I just confusing myself more?

In this context, being certain comes across to me as ambiguous. John may be certain [being certain], but that is different than whether some proposition (p) is certainly true [being certain]. It sounds to me that John being certain is equivalent to John feeling certain since in both cases, it's John that is certain--as opposed to something that is not John (like p).

In other words, John is certain that p is true (in this case, John is certain ... feeling certain), and that is different than whether or not p is certainly true (where in this case, p is certain--or certainly true).

So yes, there is certainly a difference; that's one thing we can always count on.

In this context, being certain comes across to me as ambiguous. John may be certain [being certain], but that is different than whether some proposition (p) is certainly true [being certain]. It sounds to me that John being certain is equivalent to John feeling certain since in both cases, it's John that is certain--as opposed to something that is not John (like p).

In other words, John is certain that p is true (in this case, John is certain ... feeling certain), and that is different than whether or not p is certainly true (where in this case, p is certain--or certainly true).

So yes, there is certainly a difference; that's one thing we can always count on.