A whale has some properties that scientists use to classify it as a mammal and not a fish. If there is a fact here it is a linguistic one. If our biological taxonomy was based on superficial appearences then whales would most likely be classified as a fish and that would be considered a fact.

The substances we encounter in the world around us have a vast array of properties. We choose which properties are going to be used for classifying them.

I'm not sure what you mean by "meaning." Words have meaning, and the kind of meaning that words have is lexical; hence, words have lexical meaning. In fact, they denote lexical meaning, or stand in place of lexical meaning. Not only that, but words (not all words but many words) refer, and what they refer to are referents. So, all words (or at least almost all) have lexical meaning, and some words (but not all or almost all) have referents.

The interesting question is, do the referents of referring terms have meaning? Well, if so, it's certainly meaning of a different kind, as objects in the world do not have lexical meaning. When you ask, "What meaning would the orbit of our planet have around the sun if there were no humans," I have to say that whatever you mean by "meaning" it is not lexical meaning, since only words have lexical meaning.

It is not that it has "some properties". It is that if whales were classified as fish they could not be fit into the evolutionary order. It would make no sense. Fish is the name of a definite species. To classify whales as fish would be as wrong as classifying whales as cats. Only no one would do the latter because of appearances, and people have done the former because of appearances. But the one is as wrong as the other. We could not make sense of evolution if we classified whales as fish. For example, we would be unable to explain the similarity of the DNA of whales to the DNA of humans as contrasted with the DNA of fish. We can when we classify whales as mammals. Much more is involved than simply clumping properties together. As this link say succinctly, whales are not fish because whales could not have evolved from fish.

Whales

But that doens't negate my point. Biologists have decided to classify living things according to their DNA. And DNA is one of the properties that animals have. We could have decided to clssify them by whether they were sea-dwelling creatures or land-dwelling creatures. But that system is too simple for our needs. I'm not making the claim that we don't have reasons for the taxonomies we choose to use. That would be a silly claim.

Onece we decide on a classification system then we need to follow the rules established by that system or we simply end up with a different system of classification.

Meaning equates to value since what we find the most meaning in we value highly....

In fact, fictional objects have no properties and thus do not exist.

You're a christian, aren't you? So I assume that you think that at least one god exists, but gods are fictional.

Here is a wild guess, but I suppose that fast does not think that there is no God so he does not think that gods are fictional.

Except that DNA tells us about the structure of the world of life, and whether creatures are sea-dwelling does not. That fish and whales both dwell in the sea is a trivial matter, that tells us nothing about how they are related to each other. But that their DNAs are so different tells us pages about them.

Well, I reject the idea that the fictionality of a thing can be decided by whether or not it exists and somethings existence can be decided by whether or not it's fictional.

It is a much more useful system of classification for our purposes. I've never claimed that we wouldn't consider one taxonomy better than another. We have reasons for adopting the classification systems that we use.

It's not.

I speculate that the word "abstract" is ambiguous. We say that things like ideas and concepts are abstract on the one hand, yet we also say that abstract objects (or abstract entities) are non-spatiotemporal on the other hand, yet that doesn't add up because although things like ideas and concepts have no location, they are temporal. Actual abstract objects (as opposed to concrete objects) are both without location and non-temporal, so although things like ideas and concepts are abstract, they are not abstract objects (as opposed to concrete).

Some may refer to mental entities as quasi-abstract.

---------- Post added 03-09-2010 at 09:07 AM ----------

Okay, but this meaning that you speak of isn't lexical meaning.

---------- Post added 03-09-2010 at 09:16 AM ----------

I'm thinking (guessing really) that the class of fictional object exists, but don't take what I say of the class to be any indication of what I would say about fictional objects.

Keep in mind (because I am) that a fictional object is not a kind of object. In fact, fictional objects have no properties and thus do not exist.

---------- Post added 03-09-2010 at 09:07 AM ----------

Okay, but this meaning that you speak of isn't lexical meaning.

---------- Post added 03-09-2010 at 09:16 AM ----------

You must be using "property" in some stipulated or techneical sense. In standard usage we attribute properties to all sorts of fictional characters.

I speculate that the word "abstract" is ambiguous. We say that things like ideas and concepts are abstract on the one hand, yet we also say that abstract objects (or abstract entities) are non-spatiotemporal on the other hand, yet that doesn't add up because although things like ideas and concepts have no location, they are temporal. Actual abstract objects (as opposed to concrete objects) are both without location and non-temporal, so although things like ideas and concepts are abstract, they are not abstract objects (as opposed to concrete).

You must be using "property" in some stipulated or techneical sense. In standard usage we attribute properties to all sorts of fictional characters.

Yes we do. The question is how something that does not exist can have a property. It cannot. So, when we appear to be ascribing properties to non-existents we must be doing something else.

Yes we do. The question is how something that does not exist can have a property. It cannot. So, when we appear to be ascribing properties to non-existents we must be doing something else.

But I believe that many think justice is an abstract object. It even states so in the Wiki.

How do I know when I've found an abstract object, as opposed to a concept or idea? It seems a bit difficult. I usually don't think of something and say, "Oh, that's atemporal! I know it's an abstract object now!". I would have thought three was just a concept (not an abstract object) until you brought it to my attention. But you distinguish the concept three from the abstract object three. And how do I know when to make this distinction again?

We are simply using words correctly when we make such ascriptions. We are doing nothing else.
In standard English there is no rule saying we can't ascribe properties to an imaginary character or object.

But I believe that many think justice is an abstract object. It even states so in the Wiki.

How do I know when I've found an abstract object, as opposed to a concept or idea? It seems a bit difficult. I usually don't think of something and say, "Oh, that's atemporal! I know it's an abstract object now!". I would have thought three was just a concept (not an abstract object) until you brought it to my attention. But you distinguish the concept three from the abstract object three. And how do I know when to make this distinction again?