numbers vs. words

@Extrain,

[QUOTE=Extrain;157671]? That's precisely what's wrong; you have the situation backwards. No fictional character exists with that name. No physical person exists with that name either.[/QUOTE]I think you may be confusing 1) fictional characters with 2) characters in fiction.

1) Fictional characters do not exist.
2) Characters in fiction do exist.

1) Because fictional characters do not exist, fictional characters are neither concrete nor abstract.

2) Because characters in fiction do exist, they are either concrete or abstract. Because characters in fiction were created, they are in time, and because they are in time, they are not non-spatiotemporal, and because they are not non-spatiotemporal, they are not abstract, and because they are not abstract, they are concrete.

[QUOTE]If "Sherlock Holmes is a detective" appeared in one of Arthur Conan Doyle stories, then that token sentence would not be true--since that token is what we call "a bit of fiction" since "Sherlock" does not even have a referent within the story.[/QUOTE]The sentence is ambiguous. But, context disambiguates it. Once it's disambiguated, we then know what proposition is being expressed, and once we know that, we can determine whether or not it's true or false.

After watching the movie, she (and it need not even be a child) says to me, "Sherlock Holmes was a smart lawyer." I respond, "Sherlock Holmes is a detective." The sentence is ambiguous. It could mean A) "Sherlock Holmes is a detective" (and that of course is false, for Sherlock Holmes is not a detective, as Sherlock Holmes can't be a detective since Sherlock Holmes does not exist), or it could mean B) "The character in fiction depicted as having the name Sherlock Holmes is depicted as being a detective" (and that of course is true, for the character in fiction is in fact being depicted as being a detective).

Once the ambiguous sentence is disambiguated by context, we can figure out the proposition being expressed. What is being discussed in the example above is the character in a work of fiction, so we know that what is meant is B (and not A).

@Extrain,

Extrain;157695 wrote:

This shouldn't be problematic. It doesn't seem right to me to say that ideas have to be "ideas of something", anyway. Ideas are just ideas. I can have an idea of a magic golden mountain, and magic golden mountains don't exist. But surely I can have a magic-golden-mountain-idea. The idea itself is a magic-golden-mountain-idea. I can talk about that idea, entertain it with others, think about that idea, adding and substracting certain qualities to it, and even write about that idea in fiction. But it is not an idea of something.

OK. So that makes "magic-golden-mountain" an adjectival phrase. Just as there can be sudden ideas, or important ideas, so there can be magic-golden-mountain ideas. But adjectives imply abstract entities: if there are sudden things, then there is such a thing as suddenness, and if there are important things, then there is such a thing as importance. So if there are magic-golden-mountain things, there must be such a thing as.....what? Magic golden mountains? Magic-golden-mountain-ness?

I have no settled view on this point. I am just trying to explore the logical implications of denying the existence of imaginary/fictitious (non-)objects. I am trying to satisfy myself that no paradoxes arise. You yourself, during the course of this thread, have pointed out that there are problems.

Extrain;157695 wrote:

This is why it just sounds silly to say, "I have an idea, but that idea is empty." If your idea is empty, then you don't even have an idea. It's simply not there. It's like saying, "I am having a thought right now, but that thought isn't about anything." If your thought is not about anything, then you don't have a thought at all.

I agree with this. I was just using "empty idea" as a reductio ad absurdum.

@Extrain,

Extrain;157679 wrote:

I do take stories to be really existent abstract objects, but not fictional characters.

Stories are concrete.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;157718 wrote:

So people have asked, how is it possible that life arose from "dead" matter, implying that it could not have done so, when all the evidence we have is that is precisely what did occur. Thus the name, "counter-evidential intuition".

"How is it possible that life arose from dead matter?" could simply be a rhetorical question implying disbelief. But, on the other hand, it could be a genuine question asking by what process life arose from dead matter.

@ACB,

ACB;157948 wrote:

So if there are magic-golden-mountain things, there must be such a thing as.....what? Magic golden mountains? Magic-golden-mountain-ness?

No idea. It is your view, not mine. One thing is clear, there are no magic golden mountains, so it does not follow from the fact that there is the phrase (or idea, or a concept) magic golden mountain, that there is a magic golden mountain. What could be clearer than that?

@ACB,

ACB;157952 wrote:

"How is it possible that life arose from dead matter?" could simply be a rhetorical question implying disbelief. But, on the other hand, it could be a genuine question asking by what process life arose from dead matter.

If X is not alive, then X is dead? My carpet is not alive, but it's not dead either.

@ACB,

ACB;157952 wrote:

"How is it possible that life arose from dead matter?" could simply be a rhetorical question implying disbelief. But, on the other hand, it could be a genuine question asking by what process life arose from dead matter.

Not, I think, with the trope, "How is it possible".

@fast,

fast;157945 wrote:

I think you may be confusing 1) fictional characters with 2) characters in fiction.

1) Fictional characters do not exist.
2) Characters in fiction do exist.

1) Because fictional characters do not exist, fictional characters are neither concrete nor abstract.

2) Because characters in fiction do exist, they are either concrete or abstract. Because characters in fiction were created, they are in time, and because they are in time, they are not non-spatiotemporal, and because they are not non-spatiotemporal, they are not abstract, and because they are not abstract, they are concrete.

The sentence is ambiguous. But, context disambiguates it. Once it's disambiguated, we then know what proposition is being expressed, and once we know that, we can determine whether or not it's true or false.

After watching the movie, she (and it need not even be a child) says to me, "Sherlock Holmes was a smart lawyer." I respond, "Sherlock Holmes is a detective." The sentence is ambiguous. It could mean A) "Sherlock Holmes is a detective" (and that of course is false, for Sherlock Holmes is not a detective, as Sherlock Holmes can't be a detective since Sherlock Holmes does not exist), or it could mean B) "The character in fiction depicted as having the name Sherlock Holmes is depicted as being a detective" (and that of course is true, for the character in fiction is in fact being depicted as being a detective).

Once the ambiguous sentence is disambiguated by context, we can figure out the proposition being expressed. What is being discussed in the example above is the character in a work of fiction, so we know that what is meant is B (and not A).

I disagree. "Sherlock Holmes is a detective" is neither true in the story nor true outside the story. No one talks about Sherlock Holmes. One only talks about stories. Characters in fiction don't exist. No character in fiction bears the name "Sherlock Holmes."

---------- Post added 04-29-2010 at 09:11 AM ----------

fast;157949 wrote:

Stories are concrete.

No, they are not. They can't be. Stories are expressed by words and such. But stories are not just words; stories are what the words express.

@Extrain,

[QUOTE=Extrain;157961]I disagree. "Sherlock Holmes is a detective" is neither true in the story nor true outside the story. No one talks about Sherlock Holmes. One only talks about stories. Characters in fiction don't exist. No character in fiction bears the name "Sherlock Holmes."[/QUOTE]What do you think it means to say of something that it's a character in fiction? It's certainly not to imply that there is a living character in a work of fiction. If you did think it would mean that, then I could see why you are mistaken when you say characters in fiction do not exist. To say that a character exists within a work of fiction isn't to say what you may think it does. Be more delicate in your consideration before coming to hold what you do so firmly. Sometimes, in language, we ought not take what is said so literally, for the propositions actually being expressed are not what the uttered sentences seem to be.

Recall the boy in the museum pointing to a picture of George Washington and saying, "Look ma, it's George Washington." Literally, the uttered sentence is not true, but the proposition expressed by the sentence is not merely a function of the sentence but also of the context in which it is uttered. Be careful.

[QUOTE]No, they are not. They can't be. Stories are expressed by words and such. But stories are not just words; stories are what the words express.[/QUOTE]There is much confusion and much disagreement over what ought and what ought not be considered concrete, but be I mistaken or not, I gave you my reasons for thinking what I do.

@fast,

fast;157989 wrote:

What do you think it means to say of something that it's a character in fiction? It's certainly not to imply that there is a living character in a work of fiction. If you did think it would mean that, then I could see why you are mistaken when you say characters in fiction do not exist. To say that a character exists within a work of fiction isn't to say what you may think it does. Be more delicate in your consideration before coming to hold what you do so firmly. Sometimes, in language, we ought not take what is said so literally, for the propositions actually being expressed are not what the uttered sentences seem to be.

Exactly. That's why a character in fiction does not exist. There is nothing satisfying the description "character in fiction" or "Sherlock."

[QUOTE=fast;157989] Recall the boy in the museum pointing to a picture of George Washington and saying, "Look ma, it's George Washington." Literally, the uttered sentence is not true, but the proposition expressed by the sentence is not merely a function of the sentence but also of the context in which it is uttered. Be careful.[/QUOTE]
...and you are telling ME to be careful about not being deceived by langague use....

The proposition expressed by the boys sentence is literally false. It is not true in the context of the museum because he is not pointing to George Washington in the context of the museum; he is pointing to the picture. Analogously, "Sherlock" points to nobody within the context of fiction either.

"Sherlock Holmes is a detective" is literally false as it is uttered by a mother to her boy's questions outside of fiction.

"Sherlock Holmes is a detective" is literally false as this sentence appears in fiction.

So we can only say this:

(G) "Sherlock Holmes is a detective" is true-in-the-story.

But, "Sherlock Holmes is a detective" is literally false in fiction.

(G) is about the story. It is not about Sherlock Holmes. So,

"'Sherlock Holmes is a detective' is true-in-the-story" is true. But,

"'Sherlock Holmes is a detective' is true in the story" is actually false.

Even better,

"'Sherlock Holmes is a detective' appears in the story" is true. This is about the story, not about Sherlock Holmes.

@Extrain,

Extrain;158512 wrote:

"'Sherlock Holmes is a detective'' is true' is false.

It is not the case that, Sherlock Holmes is a detective, is true. But what about, Sherlock Holmes is not a detective. Is that true? Or is that false?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;158514 wrote:

It is not the case that, Sherlock Holmes is a detective, is true. But what about, Sherlock Holmes is not a detective. Is that true? Or is that false?

It's false also. Russell would even agree.

@Extrain,

Extrain;158519 wrote:

It's false also. Russell would even agree.

Well, I think the proposition "Sherlock Holmes is not a detective" is true, and so do you--I thought.

@fast,

fast;158537 wrote:

Well, I think the proposition "Sherlock Holmes is not a detective" is true, and so do you--I thought.

No, it's false because there does not exist an entity, in this case, named "Sherlock" that does not have the property of being a detective to make that statement true.

"Sherlock Holmes is a detective" is false.
"Sherlock Holmes is not a detective" is false. But,

It's not the case that "'Sherlock Holmes is a detective' is true" is true.

There is a scope ambiguity here about "not."

If either of the former statements above were true, then you would be committing to the existence of something you didn't want to commit to, which is precisely the problem.

"Extrain is not rich" is true. But the statement is true only if Extrain exists and is not rich.

Here are some possible Russellian formulations:

∃x(Sx & ∀y(Sy → y=x) & Dx)

says, there exists one and only one Sherlock and that thing is a detective. This is false.

∃x(Sx & ∀y(Sy → y=x) & ~Dx)

says, there exists one and only Sherlock and that thing is not a detective. This is also false.

~∃x(Sx & ∀y(Sy → y=x) & Dx)

says, it is not the case there exists one and only one Sherlock and that thing is a detective. This is true.

Though I am not committed to formulating proper names this way, the last formulation is your best bet.

@Extrain,

[QUOTE=Extrain;158512]The proposition expressed by the boys sentence is literally false.[/QUOTE]See, this is where you have it wrong. I'm talking about the proposition (the proposition, I say). The proposition being expressed is not what you think it is. You cannot read the sentence and determine the proposition being expressed without considering the context in which the sentence is used. The context helps determine what is being expressed by the sentence, and what you think is literally being expressed isn't what's being expressed.

The boy does not think it's actually George Washington, nor is he meaning to convey that it is. If the boy was severely mentally challenged such that he could not distinguish between a real live person and a portrait, then maybe he is meaning to convey what you think he is. Don't take things literally when context demands of us to do otherwise. Speaking in shorthand can sometimes make determining the proposition problematic, but context usually help to dissolve any present ambiguity.

---------- Post added 04-30-2010 at 06:28 PM ----------

Extrain;158547 wrote:

No, it's false because there is no entity with the property of being a detective to make that statement true.

"Sherlock Holmes is a detective" is false.
"Sherlock Holmes is not a detective" is false.

I have to run right now. Please read the question Kennethamy asked you again.

@fast,

fast;158549 wrote:

See, this is where you have it wrong. I'm talking about the proposition (the proposition, I say). The proposition being expressed is not what you think it is. You cannot read the sentence and determine the proposition being expressed without considering the context in which the sentence is used. The context helps determine what is being expressed by the sentence, and what you think is literally being expressed isn't what's being expressed.

The boy does not think it's actually George Washington, nor is he meaning to convey that it is. If the boy was severely mentally challenged such that he could not distinguish between a real live person and a portrait, then maybe he is meaning to convey what you think he is. Don't take things literally when context demands of us to do otherwise. Speaking in shorthand can sometimes make determining the proposition problematic, but context usually help to dissolve any present ambiguity.

No, you have it wrong. It doesn't matter what the boy thinks, or what he is intending to convey. "George Washington" refers to George Washington, not the picture of George Washington. So what the boy literally says is literally false.

This is exactly the problem. Your theory of reference (whatever it is) is all messed up. In some places you say a term X refers to Y regardless of someone's intentions. In other places you say the exact same term X refers to Z--to something completely different--precisely because of someone's intentions.

@fast,

fast;158537 wrote:

Well, I think the proposition "Sherlock Holmes is not a detective" is true, and so do you--I thought.

Then I suppose that the LEM does not apply to the proposition that SH is a detective. For, according to Extrain, SH is a detective is false, and SH is not a detective is also false. I don't believe that Russell believes that. I think he believes that there is a scopic ambiguity. That the negation, "not" has different scopes. So that it is true that SH is not a detective. And it is false that SH is a detective.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;158558 wrote:

Then I suppose that the LEM does not apply to the proposition that SH is a detective. For, according to Extrain, SH is a detective is false, and SH is not a detective is also false. I don't believe that Russell believes that. I think he believes that there is a scopic ambiguity. That the negation, "not" has different scopes. So that it is true that SH is not a detective. And it is false that SH is a detective.

Look, no proposition got asserted by someone's saying, "SH is not a detective" on my view. So no one is violating LEM. So technically, it's truth-valueless.

Besides, I am not sure that's right about Russell, anyway, since he did hold that propositions were identical to the conjunction of the referent and a universal. So in this case, there is no referent. "SH" is empty. So if Russell is going to be consistent with his own view, no proposition got asserted either.

What you are attempting to talk about would be in line with Russell's description theory of proper names (which I think is false--though I think his theory of definite descriptions is correct). He would still think the "not" goes outside the (EX) quantifier, not inside the quantifier.

It seems Russell should be saying something like,

It's not the case that "'Sherlock Holmes is a detective' is true" is true.

@cws910,

I suppose then, mathematical statements are true within the formalism, and mathematical objects have no existence independent of the formalism.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;158627 wrote:

I suppose then, mathematical statements are true within the formalism, and mathematical objects have no existence independent of the formalism.

So you think "two apples and two apples makes four apples" is false?:rolleyes:

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numbers vs. words

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