numbers vs. words

@Extrain,

Extrain;154720 wrote:

Ahab wrote:

Please show me where I have claimed that fictional characters are real.

If someone can refer to imaginary beings, then those beings would be real (though non-physical).

Huh? You are simply repeating your claim.
I have never claimed that referring to an imaginary being equates to it being real.

Quote:

I disagree that fictional talk is a perfectly good guide in asserting the existence of imaginary beings.

It does little good to continually attribute a position to me which I have explicitly rejected.
Reference is only possible if the referent is identifiable.

I'm done discussing this with you.

@Ahab,

Ahab;154813 wrote:

Huh? You are simply repeating your claim.
I have never claimed that referring to an imaginary being equates to it being real.

Like I continue to say over and over agin, reference is a logical relation, and relations can only hold between really existent things (whether physical or non-physical).

(1) If we can refer to imaginary beings, then they would exist.
(2) But imaginary beings don't exist.
(3) Therefore, we cannot refer to imaginary beings.

Take your pick. Either imaginary beings exist and we can refer to them, or imaginary beings don't exist and we cannot refer to them. These options are mutually exclusive and cannot both be true.

Ahab;154813 wrote:

It does little good to continually attribute a position to me which I have explicitly rejected.
Reference is only possible if the referent is identifiable. I'm done discussing this with you.

Like I continue to say over and over again, I can show your view is false. So it's not my problem:

(A) Someone can refer to something without Identifying that thing. Someone can still use the name "Richard M. Nixon," mistakenly thinking it referred to Einstein, but he would really be referring to "Richard M. Nixon" though talking about Einstein. It simply doesn't matter whether he knows this or not. He is in error.

(B) In contrast, someone can Identify something without referring to it. I can identify Einstein as the physicist who rejected Quantum Physics and proposed the Special Theory of Relativity, but mistakenly think "Richard M. Nixon" referred to this person, namely, Einstein. It simply doesn't matter whether he knows this or not. He is in error.

To make my point even more plausible with respect to Language Usage, English speakers will typically unanimously agree with what I just said. This is why we constantly correct the errors of the person in situation (A)/(B).

So contrary to what you think, Identifiability is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to refer to something.

---------- Post added 04-21-2010 at 12:41 PM ----------

Ahab's view about imaginary beings strongly resembles Meinong's view of sorts, which is almost unanimously rejected among mainstream philosophers today, and for good reason.

On Meinong From Wiki:

Quote:

He is most noted, however, for his Theory of Objects (, 1904), which grew out of his work on intentionality and his belief in the possibility of intending nonexistent objects. The theory is based around the purported empirical observation that it is possible to think about something, such as a golden mountain, even though that object does not exist. Since we can refer to such things that do not exist, they must have some sort of being. Meinong thus distinguishes the "being" of a thing, which it possesses in virtue of its ability to be intended toward, from a thing's "existence", which is the substantive ontological status ascribed, for example, to horses but denied to unicorns. The "place" that such things exist has been nicknamed Meinong's jungle.

Quote:

Historically, Meinong has been treated as an eccentric who was dealt a well-deserved death blow in Bertrand Russell's famous essay On Denoting, especially by Gilbert Ryle. However, Russell himself spoke (and wrote) highly of the vast majority of Meinong's work. Further, Meinongians such as Terence Parsons and Roderick Chisholm established the consistency of a Meinongian theory of objects, while others (e.g., Karel Lambert) have defended the usefulness of such a theory.
Meinong is also seen to be controversial in the field of philosophy of language for he is often attributed to the view that "existence" is merely a property of an object, just as color or mass might be a property. Closer readers of his work, however, accept that Meinong held the view that objects are "indifferent to being"[1] and that they stand "beyond being and non-being".[1] On this view Meinong is expressly denying that existence is a property of an object. For Meinong, what an object is, its real essence, depends on the properties of the object.[2] These properties are genuinely possessed whether the object exists or not, and so existence cannot be a mere property of an object.

Quote:

Meinong holds that objects can be divided into three categories on the basis of their ontological status. Objects may have one of the following three modalities of being and non-being:

Existence (Existenz, verb: existieren), or actual reality (Wirklichkeit), which denotes the material and temporal being of an object

Subsistence (Bestand, verb: bestehen), which denotes the being of an object in a non-temporal sense.

Absistence or Being-given (Gegebenheit, as in the German use es gibt, i.e. "there are", "it is given"), which denotes being an object but not having being.

Certain objects can exist (mountains, birds, etc.); others cannot in principle ever exist, such as the objects of mathematics (numbers, theorems, etc.): such objects simply subsist. Finally, a third class of objects cannot even subsist, such as impossible objects (e.g. square circle, wooden iron, etc.). Being-given is not a minimal mode of being, because it is not a mode of being at all. Rather, to be "given" is just to be an object. Being-given, termed "absistence" by J.N. Findlay, is better thought of as a mode of non-being than as a mode of being. Absistence, unlike existence and subsistence, does not have a negation; everything absists. (Note that all objects absist, while some subset of these subsist, of which a yet-smaller subset exist.) The result that everything absists allows Meinong to deal with our ability to affirm the non-being (Nichtsein) of an object. It is given or absists, as evidenced by our act of intending it, which is logically prior to our denying that it has being.

@Extrain,

[QUOTE=Extrain;154720]Ok, I guess "The Fountain of Youth" is a name after all. I had no clue there was a physical object dubbed with that name in St. Augustine (shows you how much I know). [/QUOTE]

Extrain;154720 wrote:

But my point still stands. If there were no object that anyone ever actually named "The Fountain of Youth," then this string of words stands as a definite description. That is why the word "only seems to be referring" is relevant in this case. If it only seems to refer, then it is a good chance it is not a name. In fact, it is more likely not a name than a description. You might want to check out Russell's article I suggested where he discusses the same thing.

And I agree. "Although" would be a different word. That's exactly the point of my post. Names come into existence when someone "baptizes" a person, place, or thing with a symbol in order to refer to something within language. And a name can be any such symbol, so long as someone uses that symbol that way.

Every word is a term, but not every term is a word. For example, I have a cat, my cat has a name, and the name of my cat is "Crooked Tail Kitty." The name "Crooked Tail Kitty" is a term, and it's a term consisting of three words, but "Crooked Tail Kitty" is not a word. Thus, there is a distinction between words and terms.

Now, just because the name "Crooked Tail Kitty" is a name, that's not to say the name "Crooked Tail Kitty" is not also a term; it is a term. I say that the term, "Crooked Tail Kitty" is a referring term, but the reason why I think it's a referring term is obviously different than why you think it's a referring term. You think it's a referring term because there is a referent to the term. I think it's a referring term for a very different reason. I think it's a referring term because the term can refer--not because it does refer.

You said:

If there were no object that anyone ever actually named "The Fountain of Youth," then this string of words stands as a definite description.

In response to that, I ask, isn't it still true that "The Fountain of Youth" is a term? I think it is. Here's another example. Consider the description, "The fiftieth state of the USA." Just because it's a description, that's not to say it's not a term is it? Why would it be any less of a term had it been uttered 200 years ago? It failed to succeed back then, but it fails no longer, yet it has always been a referring term.

THE IMPORTANT STUFF:

There's something very unfortunate going on that you are unaware of. The very term itself (the term, "referring term" that is) brings a kind of confusion to the table that parallels the confusion that the term "free will" brings to the table. The very term itself leads the unwary to think that free will is a kind of will, but it's not, and that has been the source of great confusion for years. Things are not as they seem for the term "free will," and like that term, so too is it the case with the term, "referring term" that it sparks great confusion. You are led to think that a referring term is a term that refers just like the unwary are led to think that free will is a kind of will.

We ought not fall into the trap of thinking that we can take the meaning of "free" and the meaning of "will" and therefore make a sound judgment on what the term "free will" means, for the meaning of "free will" is a term in its own right and not subject to mean what each word that comprises the term means--that, my friend, is a mistake. That is also the case with the term, "referring term." Kennethamy has already told you (and you did not heed what he said) that the term "referring term" is a term of art.

@fast,

Fast, in all respect, you are making the matter complicated where it is simple, and simple where it is complicated. You need to keep the following truth in mind: what our words are actually doing is a direct function of both how we use them, and whether or not they actually refer in fact.

fast;155239 wrote:

Every word is a term, but not every term is a word. For example, I have a cat, my cat has a name, and the name of my cat is "Crooked Tail Kitty." The name "Crooked Tail Kitty" is a term, and it's a term consisting of three words, but "Crooked Tail Kitty" is not a word. Thus, there is a distinction between words and terms.

That's fine with me. It doesn't matter to me what you are willing to call "terms" or not.

[QUOTE=fast;155239] Now, just because the name "Crooked Tail Kitty" is a name, that's not to say the name "Crooked Tail Kitty" is not also a term; it is a term. I say that the term, "Crooked Tail Kitty" is a referring term, but the reason why I think it's a referring term is obviously different than why you think it's a referring term. You think it's a referring term because there is a referent to the term. I think it's a referring term for a very different reason. I think it's a referring term because the term can refer--not because it does refer.[/QUOTE]

Like I said, so can "although" be a referring term. Names can be anything you want. "eight donuts high" can be a name too. My point is that since no one has actually named anything "the fountain of youth" during Ponce de Leon's day, it was not a name of anything, and sounds just like a definite description. So does "the King of France." So does "crooked tall kitty." So they are not referring terms since none of them are referring. You don't understand that someone certainly (I'm sure) has already named their cat "crooked tall kitty." Right? Isn't that possible? So it is very likely that same string of words has been used to function as a name in fact given all the 100's of millions of kittens out there past, present, and future. But those very same words I just typed are not the same words someone else used to give their cat that name. This is why "The Fountain of Youth" as it is uttered today refers to that fountain of youth down in St. Augustine Florida, but those are not the same words Ponce de Leon used during the 16th century. As Ponce de Leon used those words, those words didn't function as a name to refer to anything at all, even if he thought they did. As we use those same type of words now to refer to the fountain of youth in St. Augustine Florida, those words DO function as a name.

Notice, "Neptune" was a term given to the object astronomers could not directly observe, but used this term to refer to something (they were not sure it was a planet yet) which was causing the perturbations in Uranus' orbit. So "Neptune" first functioned as definite description because the description associated with that term was "something causing the perturbations in Uranus' orbit." It didn't function as a name until later, until scientists actually dubbed the existing body with the name "Neptune." So appearances are not always what they seem on the surface.

WE HAVE TO PAY ATTENTION TO HOW OUR WORDS ARE USED, and whether they are the same words used back then as the words used now.

So the point you're not understanding is that something either is or is not referring. That's a VERB. If a term (or a string of words) is not referring to anything, it is not a referring term. Period. I don't understand why this is so difficult to understand for you and Kennethamy.

So saying that something, call it "a," can possibly be an F, is not to simultaneously hold that that thing is actually an F. Either it is an F, or it is not an F. It is not both possibly an F and actually an F at once. You guys are holding this view:

If something is possibly an F, then it is actually an F.

Why? Just because Bill can possibly run, doesn't mean Bill is actually running. I'm serious, why would you hold such a view? Something cannot be both referring and not referring at once. You guys have your types and token words confused. "John" as I just now typed it, is NOT a referring term! I need a context. "John," in "John, my friend, likes basketball," now IS a referring term. In both instances, they are different words entirely; they are NOT the same word.

[QUOTE=fast;155239] You said:[/QUOTE]

fast;155239 wrote:

If there were no object that anyone ever actually named "The Fountain of Youth," then this string of words stands as a definite description.

Yes, because no one was acquainted with any actual object they dubbed with that string of words. Does it not sound like a fictional description to you, rather than a name of something? That's what definite descriptions are. They are called "definite" because they start with the definite article "the" and can pick out one and only object at a time, only if there is one and only one object satisfying that description at a time. But they don't refer, just as "the present King of France" doesn't refer to any particular individual King of France. "The King of France" isn't a name at all.

[QUOTE=fast;155239] In response to that, I ask, isn't it still true that "The Fountain of Youth" is a term? I think it is. Here's another example. Consider the description, "The fiftieth state of the USA." Just because it's a description, that's not to say it's not a term is it? Why would it be any less of a term had it been uttered 200 years ago? It failed to succeed back then, but it fails no longer, yet it has always been a referring term.[/QUOTE]

Calling it "a term" is not my concern. The fact of the matter is this: "The fiftieth State of the USA" is a non-rigid definite description, just like "The King of France" is. This description now designates Hawaii, and always did designate Hawaii. But it is just as easily possible that it could have designated Alaska instead. So "the 50th State of the USA" is a non-rigid, non-directly referential definite description.

Take this example: "the number when you divide 4 in half" is a rigid definite description, on the other hand, although it is not directly referential because the number to which we are referring is mediated by this description. So it is necessarily true that this description designates the same number necessarily in every possible word in which that description is uttered. Not so with "the king of france" or "the 50th State of the USA"--they can designate different individuals in different possible worlds because things could have always been otherwise.

Names are different: the designate the same individual in all possible worlds in which that individual exists. So names are always both rigid and directly referential, unlike definite descriptions. (And "Santa Claus" is not actually a name; it is purported name; or it is a name, nevertheless, but an empty name regardless. So it is much more probable it is a definite description associated with the partial description "the fat jolly man in a red suit who delivers presents to children on Christmas," rather than a name anyway. I seriously doubt anybody ever encountered a man who lived at the North Pole named "Nicholas" and gave him the name "Saint Nick." But that's what would happen for "Saint Nick" to be referring name.)

[QUOTE=fast;155239] THE IMPORTANT STUFF:[/QUOTE]

fast;155239 wrote:

There's something very unfortunate going on that you are unaware of. The very term itself (the term, "referring term" that is) brings a kind of confusion to the table that parallels the confusion that the term "free will" brings to the table. The very term itself leads the unwary to think that free will is a kind of will, but it's not, and that has been the source of great confusion for years. Things are not as they seem for the term "free will" either, and like that term, so too is it the case with the term, "referring term" that it sparks great confusion. You are led to think that a referring term is a term that refers just like the unwary are led to think that a free will is a kind of will.

We ought not fall into the trap of thinking that we can take the meaning of "free" and the meaning of "will" and therefore make a sound judgment on what the term "free will" means, for the meaning of "free will" is a term in its own right and not subject to mean what each word that comprises the term means--that, my friend, is a mistake. That is also the case with the term, "referring term." Kennethamy has already told you (and you did not heed what he said) that the term "referring term" is a term of art.

Slow down. The problem of Free Will in philosophy deserves much more consideration than this. And I don't see any analogy between how we use "Free Will" in metaphysics with the adjective "referring" and the verb "to refer" in the philosophy of language. I don't see any linguistic confusions on my part. Rather, I see the linguistic confusions to be quite frequent on yours and Ken's side of the discussion.

And I don't know what Ken means by "a term of art." That's metaphorical and fanciful language, and it doesn't resolve anything. And honestly, I am confident Kennethamy is wrong anyway. Ken himself admitted he needed to "get his ducks in row" with respect to the objections I have been throwing his way. So with all due respect to Ken, just because Ken said something doesn't mean it is correct.

@Extrain,

Extrain;155252 wrote:

You guys are holding this view:

If something is possibly an F, then it is actually an F.

Why? Just because Bill can possibly run, doesn't mean Bill is actually running. I'm serious, why would you hold such a view?

That's absurd. We hold no such view.

@fast,

fast;155239 wrote:

I think it's a referring term for a very different reason. I think it's a referring term because the term can refer--not because it does refer.

Fast, if I am understanding you correctly, this may at least be one reason why I find your postion so troubling.

To quote Strawson: "'Mentioning', or 'referring', is not something an expression does; it is something that some one can use an expression to do. "
This is from Strawson's article 'On Referring' that Mickalos mentioned earlier in this thread.

Words or terms or expressions don't just sit and refer on their own. We use them to refer to things. If we can't use an expression or term to refer then why call it a 'referring term'?
It seem analogous to our using a tool to hammer. We could call it a hammering tool. But the tool doesn't just sit there and try to hammer on its own when we are not using it to hammer.

Now you and I don't agree on whether or not we can use a term like 'Clark Kent' to refer an imaginary person who bears that name. I doubt we will ever agree on that. But if I did agree with you, then I would not think that 'Clark Kent' could be used to refer to Clark Kent and so would not consider it to be a referring term.
Since I don't agree with you, I think people can use 'Clark Kent' to refer to Clark Kent. In fact I think that is one reason why we give imaginary persons names: so that we can refer to them.

I'm assuming that you still want to call it a referring term because you think a word or expression can somehow refer even when it is not used that way. What is puzzling me is why you think that.

@fast,

fast;155274 wrote:

That's absurd. We hold no such view.

I thought you held the view that referring terms either refer or fail to refer. Kennethamy said that it is possible referring terms do or do not refer. So some terms that are possibly referring fail to refer, and some terms that are possibly referring actually refer. That's certainly the view being advanced here.

---------- Post added 04-22-2010 at 02:40 PM ----------

Ahab;155281 wrote:

Fast, if I am understanding you correctly, this may at least be one reason why I find your postion so troubling.

To quote Strawson: "'Mentioning', or 'referring', is not something an expression does; it is something that some one can use an expression to do. "
This is from Strawson's article 'On Referring' that Mickalos mentioned earlier in this thread.

Words or terms or expressions don't just sit and refer on their own. We use them to refer to things. If we can't use an expression or term to refer then why call it a 'referring term'?.

Yeah, and Strawson ended up having to contend with the terrible Meinongian and potentially contradictory consequence (I already quoted extensively) of his view that some non-existent things (fictional entities) can exist in some fashion.

@Extrain,

[QUOTE=Extrain;155291]I thought you held the view that referring terms either refer or fail to refer.[/QUOTE]Yes, but that is different.

Non-referring terms can't (and thus don't) refer.
Referring terms can refer, but not all referring terms successfully do so.

There is a difference between a non-referring term that doesn't refer and a referring term that doesn't refer. The difference is that a non-referring can't while a referring term can.

The term "although" doesn't refer just like the term "unicorn" doesn't refer, but the important difference is that one can and one cannot.

You tried to reason that naming a person "although" would serve as an example of the word referring, but as I had pointed out, it wouldn't be the same word. Never can the word "although" (the one I'm talking about) refer.

Yes, some words are ambiguous; hence, some words have more than one meaning, but haven't you ever noticed separate entries for what seems like the same word? This is not a case of the same word having different definitions. This is a case of a different word having different definitions.

[QUOTE]Kennethamy said that it is possible referring terms do or do not refer. [/QUOTE]Yes, some referring terms refer, and some referring terms do not refer.

[QUOTE]So some terms that are possibly referring fail to refer, and some terms that are possibly referring actually refer. That's certainly the view being advanced here.[/QUOTE]That's not what you said earlier. Just because something is possibly the case, that doesn't make it true that something is actually the case. For example, just because it's possibly the case that the term "unicorn" refers, that's no good reason to think it's actually the case that it refers.

@fast,

fast;155274 wrote:

That's absurd. We hold no such view.

Hey Fast, I hope the following distinctions are clear:

Like Ahab, I hold that word usage is a necessary condition for that word to refer to something. But I disagree with Ahab that word usage is a sufficient condition to guarantee successful reference. This is why Ahab thinks someone can refer to an imaginary being by using "Santa Claus," whereas I don't. It's absurd.

Ahab holds that the necessary and sufficient condition for terms to refer is that we use them that way. And terms don't refer by themselves.

I hold that initially "baptizing" a word to function as a name is a necessary condition for that word to refer to something (but unlike Ahab, I don't think it is sufficient for reference). But, contrary to Ahab, I hold that the word refers to that thing by itself irrespective of whether someone is using it that way or not, because someone can misuse a name in thinking it refers to someone else when it really doesn't, just as someone can mistakenly use "Richard Nixon" to try to refer to Einstein when he is really talking about Einstein when he says "Richard Nixon was the physicist who rejected quantum mechanics and proposed the STR."

@Ahab,

Ahab;155281 wrote:

Words or terms or expressions don't just sit and refer on their own.

I wouldn't be so sure about that. I think it's possible that words refer independent of our individual use just as it's possible that words have meaning independent of our individual use.[/COLOR]

@fast,

fast;155312 wrote:

I wouldn't be so sure about that. I think it's possible that words refer independent of our individual use just as it's possible that words have meaning independent of our individual use.[/COLOR]

Right. Just because someone says "Richard Nixon is the famous physicist of the 1940's who rejected Quantum Mechanics and Proposed the Special Theory of Relativity" he is not thereby saying something true. He is saying something false, because "Richard Nixon" refers to Richard Nixon, not Einstein, regardless of how someone used the name "Richard Nixon."

---------- Post added 04-22-2010 at 04:10 PM ----------

fast;155306 wrote:

Yes, but that is different.

Non-referring terms can't (and thus don't) refer.
Referring terms can refer, but not all referring terms successfully do so.

There is a difference between a non-referring term that doesn't refer and a referring term that doesn't refer. The difference is that a non-referring can't while a referring term can.

"Referring" is a success term just as kicking is a success term. One cannot be kicking without actually kicking. One cannot be referring without actually referring. What do you not understand?

Either a term is referring or not. It can't both be referring and not be referring.

[QUOTE=fast;155306] The term "although" doesn't refer just like the term "unicorn" doesn't refer, but the important difference is that one can and one cannot.[/QUOTE]

"Although" doesn't refer because no one uses it that way and it doesn't have a referent. "Unicorns" doesn't refer because there are no unicorns.

[QUOTE=fast;155306] You tried to reason that naming a person "although" would serve as an example of the word referring, but as I had pointed out, it wouldn't be the same word. Never can the word "although" (the one I'm talking about) refer.[/QUOTE]

I pointed out the same thing. So what's the difference?

[QUOTE=fast;155306] Yes, some words are ambiguous; hence, some words have more than one meaning, but haven't you ever noticed separate entries for what seems like the same word? This is not a case of the same word having different definitions. This is a case of a different word having different definitions.[/QUOTE]

Like what exactly? Are you talking about ambiguity (two different words) as in the word "bank" having to different meanings altogether, as in "the bank next to the shore" and "the bank where you draw your money out"? Or you talking about a classic cases of polysemy (same word, with slightly different meanings) as in "the tide is rising" and "the average life expectancy is rising"? It's odd to say "the average life expectancy is rising faster than the tide is rising." "Rising" has the same core meaning in both contexts, but it means something a little different with respect to what is rising.

[QUOTE=fast;155306] Yes, some referring terms refer, and some referring terms do not refer.[/QUOTE]

This is a contradiction. Would you please logically show me why it is NOT a contradiction? Here is what I see:

R=referring
t=term

If a term is referring then,

R(t) is true.

If a term is not referring then,

~R(t) is true.

But t cannot both be referring and not referring. So it must be one or the other, but it can't be both.

[QUOTE=fast;155306] That's not what you said earlier. Just because something is possibly the case, that doesn't make it true that something is actually the case. For example, just because it's possibly the case that the term "unicorn" refers, that's no good reason to think it's actually the case that it refers.[/QUOTE]

Right. Equally absurd to suppose is that if its possible that "unicorn" is a referring term that it is actually a referring term. See? There is no such logical entailment. Further, there isn't even any reason to suppose that "unicorn" is a referring term anyway. Why hold this?

@fast,

fast;155312 wrote:

I wouldn't be so sure about that. I think it's possible that words refer independent of our individual use just as it's possible that words have meaning independent of our individual use.[/COLOR]

Maybe it depends on what you mean by 'independent of individual use.'

Certainly I can tell you what a word is used to refer to without actually using that word to refer. And I can tell you what a word means without actually using that word in a sentence. But I can only do that if in fact those words are used in the ways I just specified.

In the same way, I can specify how the Bishop or the Pawn is moved in a game of chess without actually using them in a game of chess. But I can only do that if in fact that is how they are used in the game.

But you seem t be saying that it makes sense to say that a word is a referring term even if it is not possible to use it to refer.
Why would you call 'Clark Kent' a referring term when it cannot be used to refer to Clark Kent?
Wouldn't it be more consistent and logical to say that "Clark Kent' is not a referring term because it cannot be used to refer to Clark Kent?

I still am looking for an explanation as to why you think it should be classified as a referring term in the first place.

@Ahab,

Ahab;155321 wrote:

In the same way, I can specify how the Bishop or the Pawn is moved in a game of chess without actually using them in a game of chess. But I can only do that if in fact that is how they are used in the game.

But you seem t be saying that it makes sense to say that a word is a referring term even if it is not possible to use it to refer.
Why would you call 'Clark Kent' a referring term when it cannot be used to refer to Clark Kent?
Wouldn't it be more consistent and logical to say that "Clark Kent' is not a referring term because it cannot be used to refer to Clark Kent?

I still am looking for an explanation as to why you think it should be classified as a referring term in the first place.

This is right. Fast, why are you contending that some referring terms don't refer in the first place? It's useless. There is no reason to even suppose this. It is completely inconsequential.

@Extrain,

[QUOTE=Extrain;155316]"Referring" is a success term just as kicking is a success term. One cannot be kicking without actually kicking. One cannot be referring without actually referring. What do you not understand? [/QUOTE]What I don't understand is why you think what kind of term "free" is has a bearing on what the term "free will" means. You are treating "referring term" as if it's two separate terms. You are trying to tell me what kind of term a term is instead of understanding that "referring term" is a single term in its own right.

"Referring term" is ambiguous between A) "referring term" (a single term) and B) "referring" "term" (hence, a kind of term--one that refers), but until you quit treating the term "referring term" as two separate words and think of it collectively as a noun, you're going to continue to fail to see what I'm saying.

More later.

@fast,

fast;155333 wrote:

What I don't understand is why you think what kind of term "free" is has a bearing on what the term "free will" means. You are treating "referring term" as if it's two separate terms. You are trying to tell me what kind of term a term is instead of understanding that "referring term" is a single term in its own right.

What? Why are you talking about "free will"? This has nothing to do with that philosophical question.

"Term" is a noun.
"Referring" is a predicate.

Either a term is referring or not referring. If it is referring it refers. If it is not referring it does not refer. You don't just get to make up your own meanings of words here.

[QUOTE=fast;155333] "Referring term" is ambiguous between A) "referring term" (a single term) and B) "referring" "term" (hence, a kind of term--one that refers), but until you quit treating the term "referring term" as two separate words and think of it collectively as a noun, you're going to continue to fail to see what I'm saying.[/QUOTE]

That's right, I don't see what you're saying at all. I don't even know why you are saying this. Do you realize that any string of symbols can be a referring term? It just takes a community of English speakers to start using "#$%#$" to refer to Obama, and that string of symbols suddenly becomes a name that refers to the current president of the united states.

So truly, can you give me any good reasons for the distinctions you're making here? What consequences does this have for any theory of reference? So long as a term is not referring, it is not going to be referring. tautology. Why call it "a referring term" if it doesn't refer anyway? If a term is of the referring kind, then it can't not be referring.

Further, there is no "ambiguity" here. You are just inventing some obscure thesis that "referring" can also mean "not-referring" for no reason that I can see. The obscurity is yours, not mine. It is just plain senseless to call a term "referring" when it doesn't refer. What's the point?
Please read this:

Reference (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

@Extrain,

Let me try to throw some more light on the dispute about the meaning of "referring term". Consider the expression "fighting men" in these two phrases:

1. the bravely fighting men
2. the parade of fighting men

In (1), "fighting" means "who are/were (actually) fighting". In (2), it means "capable of fighting". (Men on parade are not actually fighting.) Likewise, the word "referring" in "referring term" could mean either (1) "actually referring" or (2) "capable of referring". Extrain is using it in sense (1), while Fast is using it in sense (2). In the former it is a verb, in the latter an adjective.

If (1) is the accepted sense of "referring term" in the philosophy of language, I think we should stick to that sense in this discussion. Fast could use a different expression for sense (2), e.g. "potentially referring term" or "term with referring capacity".

Whether the word "unicorn" is capable of referring is a separate matter.

@ACB,

ACB;155510 wrote:

Let me try to throw some more light on the dispute about the meaning of "referring term". Consider the expression "fighting men" in these two phrases:

1. the bravely fighting men
2. the parade of fighting men

In (1), "fighting" means "who are/were (actually) fighting". In (2), it means "capable of fighting". (Men on parade are not actually fighting.) Likewise, the word "referring" in "referring term" could mean either (1) "actually referring" or (2) "capable of referring". Extrain is using it in sense (1), while Fast is using it in sense (2). In the former it is a verb, in the latter an adjective.

If (1) is the accepted sense of "referring term" in the philosophy of language, I think we should stick to that sense in this discussion. Fast could use a different expression for sense (2), e.g. "potentially referring term" or "term with referring capacity".

Whether the word "unicorn" is capable of referring is a separate matter.

But I have already addressed adjectives, verbs, potentiality vs. actuality. Quite honestly, I can't see what the problem is, since I agree with you.

Both (1) and (2) are true. If every word was capable of referring, or potentially referring, then this is just trivially true, and no one would disagree with that. "gleecher, &&&, bloog, GFFO, 456, although, boiling, idea, etc" can all be set aside by English speakers as names of people if they wanted them to. But any word or set or words is not actually a referring word or set of words until two conditions are met:

(a) English speakers dub a sign or a symbol as a name to refer to one and only one thing at a time
(b) That name actually refers to that thing because that thing really exists.

Now there is no sense in calling a word or a set of words (signs and symbols) a "referring term" unless both conditions are met. How much more logical and sensible can you get? It is any wonder this has to be explained to people. To think anything else either leads to Fast's contradiction, or to Ahab's countenancing that imaginary beings, or fictional characters, have some sort of "being" just short of existence. But existence doesn't come in degrees.

@fast,

fast;155312 wrote:

I wouldn't be so sure about that. I think it's possible that words refer independent of our individual use just as it's possible that words have meaning independent of our individual use.[/COLOR]

I should clarify that when I am talking about the use of a word I am referring to its correct use. Obviously, words are often used incorrectly.
Language use is a normative practice.

@Extrain,

Extrain;155542 wrote:

But any word or set or words is not actually a referring word or set of words until two conditions are met:

(a) English speakers dub a sign or a symbol as a name to refer to one and only one thing at a time
(b) That name actually refers to that thing because that thing really exists.

Now there is no sense in calling a word or a set of words (signs and symbols) a "referring term" unless both conditions are met.

Agreed. But it would be useful to have a name for the class of terms (names or descriptions) that meet condition (a) but not condition (b). That class includes "Santa Claus" and "unicorn" but not "and" or "although". It makes sense to say "I pretend to talk about Santa Claus" or "he believes there are unicorns", but it does not make sense to say "I pretend to talk about And" or "he believes there are althoughs". I think this is the distinction that Fast has in mind.

I think Fast and Kennethamy regard the expression "referring term" as grammatically equivalent to "washing machine". A washing machine is not necessarily one that is washing. That is where the confusion has arisen.

@cws910,

[QUOTE=Extrain;155340]Either a term is referring or not referring. If it is referring it refers. If it is not referring it does not refer. [/QUOTE]No argument here. Either a term is a referring term or it isn't; we do at least agree on that. What we don't agree on is what it means to say of a term that it's a referring term.

[QUOTE]You don't just get to make up your own meanings of words here.[/QUOTE]Ah, but don't we! Ordinarily, I would be fighting along side you on this issue, as I dislike it when people try to use stipulative definitions while trying to pawn them off as lexical definitions. But, this isn't such a case. You keep speaking of the lexical usage of the term "referring" when you speak of the term "referring term," as if it has a bearing on the issue, and that is the mistake I believe you are making, for although the term "referring" is in our lexicon, we cannot therefore conclude that the term "referring term" means what you think it means based on such a thing.

You think that a term that refers is a referring term, and though all terms that refer are referring terms, not all referring terms refer, but you think that's a mistake that I am making, but your argument to demonstrate that I am making a mistake doesn't add up because you don't consider the fact you ought to be considering the term "referring term" as a single term in its own right.

The reasoning that you employ would work well if you were talking about the term "toy car," for what the term "toy" means has a direct bearing on what the term "toy car" means, but I deny that the term "referring" has as a direct meaning on the term "referring term" as does the term "toy" have on "toy car."

Sometimes, we can tell what a multi-worded term means by having an understanding of what each word that comprises the term means, but that it is sometimes the case isn't to say that it is always the case. It is not the case with the term "referring term," and it's not the case with the term "free will." It is the case with the term "toy car". The term "toy car" is not a technical term, but the term "referring term" is.

Determining what the meaning of a technical word is can sometimes be (as has been eluded to) a work of art. That you turn to the lexical usage of "referring" and point out the fact that it's a success term is fine as a starting point, but because the term is much unlike the term "toy car" in that it's a technical term is what in part fuels my resistance.

Maybe my ducks are not in line either, and perhaps I too should sit out a spell to gather them together.

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