But now I agree, because now you are talking about a person using a term as if it referred;you are not talking about the term.

Read what Fast just said about this. Using a term as if it referred does not entail that it is referring term.



But this is a non-sequiter. It doesn't follow from what you just agreed to.



huh?

But persons search for things, terms don't search for things. It is true that someone can search for the Fountain of Youth, just as it is true that a person can believe that Santa Claus has black boots. But it is not true that Santa Claus has Black Boots, nor is it true that the Fountain of Youth gives you long life--because these terms don't refer.

Moreover, people don't refer like terms refer (as Fast pointed out). "The Fountain of Youth" doesn't refer to the fountain of youth. But I can certainly mistakenly use the description to think it refers to a really existent fountain of youth. But I surely can't use the term to refer to the Fountain of Youth.


---------- Post added 04-19-2010 at 01:26 PM ----------



Very true. If "refer to" is intensionally analogous to "searching for" then, apparently, Ken's view is inconsistent.

Thanks. But ... :
Again, it all goes back to what it means to say of a term that it's a referring term.

I have to think about this, and get my ducks into a row. I did not say that "The Fountain of Youth" refers to the fountain of youth. I said it purports to refer to the fountain of youth. How about, "seems to refer"? Something like that seems right. No one knows whether or not there are ETs. Does "ET" refer or not? The answer seems to me that we don't know, but it certainly purports to refer to ETs. What would you say?

Thanks. But ... :

I am not arguing that "Santa" is not a referring term. I think "Santa" is a referring term. I just don't think it's therefore a referring term; hence, my individual use of that term doesn't therefore make the term a referring term. It's a referring term (if it is) for another reason.

You think that a term is a referring term if it's a term that refers, and though all terms that refer are referring terms, that's not to say that only terms that refer are referring terms.

Again, it all goes back to what it means to say of a term that it's a referring term.

The term "The Fountain of Youth" brings something to the table that the term "although" cannot bring, and that is the possibility of reference. The term "although" cannot refer, but the term, "The Fountain of Youth" both can and can not refer. It all depends on the possibility of instantiation.

Here's an example that better exemplifies my point. Consider the term, "the first man on Mars."

What is he to do when a man lands on Mars? Declare that it was, but is no longer, a non-referring term? The possibility of reference is more important than the actuality of reference when it comes to deciding whether or not a term is a referring term or a non-referring term.

Extrain would have us believe that the term is a non-referring term, but we both believe that it is a referring term, not because it succeeds to refer but because the possibility that it might refer remains.

I see little reason to call a word a referring term unless I can use it to refer.

Which is true, but that's not the only reason why it IS a referring term. You just assume relations, such as the reference relation, can hold between existent and non-existent things--which is absurd.

if A="Santa claus"
If B=Santa claus.

and R=reference relation.

Then,

R(a,b)

is false because B doesn't exist. Therefore, "Santa Claus" does not refer to Santa Claus.

So if you want to continue on appealing to phenomenological language use as a guide to your metaphysical conclusions, by all means. But your conclusions are very unpalatable, not to mention irrational.

Suppose we find out there really is a jolly fat man with a red suit who lives at the north pole and delivers presents to some children on Christmas. It's certianly possible. It's still not true that "Santa Claus" refers to this man. Simply because no one gave that man the name. After all, his name could be Cliff Robertson, for all we know, and not "Saint Nick."

Scientists used to think there was this stuff called "phlogiston." But they found out there is good reason to think phlogiston doesn't exist--and it doesn't. So in this case, it's not that "phlogiston" used to refer, but now doesn't. It's that people only mistakenly thought "phlogiston" used to refer, but it really doesn't. So "phlogiston" was never a referring term.

To use words according to standard usage is not absurd, nor is it irrational.

You still have not given an adequate explanation as to why you keep presupposing existence for reference. As far as I can tell, that presupposition flies in the face of standard usage.

I agree with this. But when scientists used 'phlogiston' to refer they thought that they were referring to a real substance. But phlogiston is not a real substance. I would consider that to be a case of reference failure.

When people refer to Santa Claus or Clark Kent or Doc Savage, they don't think they are referring to real beings. They know those are imaginary beings. Those names were never intended to be used to refer to real persons.

I see no reason for classifying these latter cases as reference failures.

But that's a lame reason to consider it to be a referring term. Should I then contend that all words are referring terms because there is a possibility that "although" might refer to something really existent after all?

No, I suppose not. Still, the term "although" cannot refer, yet the term "Fountain of Youth" can. Whether a term can or cannot refer seems to me to be important.

It's my understanding that the term "referring term" is a technical term. Given that, what would be a good source that conveys the definition?

I never said it was! I just said conventional usage is not always the best guide for constructing metaphysical theories--which is what you are doing.

You just seem to think we are unable reflect on what are words are actually doing apart from our usage of it. There is nothing wrong with being mistaken about the functions of our own words....sheesh.

huh? If those names were never intended to be used to refer to real persons, then it follows they are not referring terms and the community never perceived that they were!

Well, then you are going against common usage. "To refer" is a transitive verb, so it needs a direct object; that's what transitive verbs ARE--it is defined that way by linguistic communities.

And I've already told you! Reference is a relation as defined by the dictionary. And logically, if neither of the terms of the relata relate, then necessarily, the relation does not hold between the two objects--which logically falls out of the definition.

Huh? I'm not constructing any metaphysical theory. In my first post on this particular topic I wrote:
"I don't happen to share your concept of reference. Reference does not presuppose reality or existence. It presupposes identifiability."

And since then I've been trying to point out why I find your conception of reference to be lacking because people do use names to refer to fictional characters. This usage is well-attested in the case of fictional characters. And we both agree that those fictional characters are not real.

Words don't magically do things apart from our usage of them. Words are like tools that we can use. And the rules for their use are set by convention.

If a transitive verb cannot take as its grammatical object something that is thought to be imaginary it would be impossible for people to write fictional stories or tell tales of fantasy.

Yes there is a relation, but the lexical definition doesn't say or even imply that it is a relation like that of touching an object. There simply is no grammatical rule that states the referent has to be an existing object.

Of course, I think you are mistaken about the use people make of the names of fictional characters. Maybe I spent too many years with a bunch of literary nerds in college, but I just can't take seriously your view that people don't intend to use those names to refer to the fictional characters themselves.

Really? Why would people give those fictional characters names if they didn't intend on using those names to refer to those imaginary beings?


Were you taught in grammar school that the names of fictional characters are not really names because we can't use them to refer to imaginary beings? Or can you show me a lexical definition that would support such a claim?

You really need to start taking seriously the implications of reference to fictional characters as regards your conception of reference.

I have to think about this, and get my ducks into a row. I did not say that "The Fountain of Youth" refers to the fountain of youth. I said it purports to refer to the fountain of youth. How about, "seems to refer"? Something like that seems right. No one knows whether or not there are ETs. Does "ET" refer or not? The answer seems to me that we don't know, but it certainly purports to refer to ETs. What would you say?

But people can't refer to non-existent things. It's impossible.

Of course!!!! But grammatical/syntactical rules of use do not have anything to say about whether or not terms are successfully referring or not. This is where philosophy comes in. You confuse linguistics with the philosophy of language. They are not the same disciplines.

We are not talking about grammatical direct objects. We are talking about whether those grammatical direct objects have existing referents--really existing objects, whether physical or non-physical. And if they don't, whether those grammatical direct objects are really referring terms. So you conclude that Santa Claus must really exist because it is a distasteful result for you that it would be impossible for people to really write stories about Santa Claus? That's crazy!

Dictionaries are not philosophical/logical discourses. But if something does, in fact, refer to something else, logically speaking, that something else must exist. We are not engaging in lexicography or mere linguistics. We are not discussing mere grammar alone. We are discussing philosophy of language.

You don't even pay attention to what I say....The problem of reference doesn't begin in fictional contexts, it begins outside those contexts--in ordinary everyday contexts. honestly, I'm exhausted having to contend with this. We've all gone over this several times...

If you think fictional characters are real, or that names refer to imaginary beings, then that's your ontology, and hence, that's your metaphysical theory.

I seriously do not respect this alleged so-called "Wittgensteinian commonsense" approach to philosophy because it's lazy.

Do you think we never intend to say anything truthful by using our language? If we do, and if our language is going to be truthful in fact, then parts of our language have to be connected to a really existent outside world.

So the problem is this:

"Sherlock Holmes is a detective" is literally false, either because:

(1) "Sherlock Holmes" doesn't refer to Sherlock Holmes, or
(2) "Sherlock Holmes" does refer to Sherlock Holmes, and Sherlock Holmes is really an existent abstract object, but Sherlock Holmes doesn't have any of those physical properties we ascribe to him.

So either way, "Sherlock Holmes is a detective" is false.

That's what is problematic if we want to maintain the truth-preserving aspect of our language use.

How many times do we have to go over this...

You're funny. Try what Russell would say in his "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description":

If it only "seems to" refer, then it doesn't actually refer because it is not a name we are acquainted with at all. Period. We know this or that word (i.e., name) refers if and only if we have some kind of direct access to that thing when we gave it that name ourselves, or when we use that name the way other people do, because that same usage stretches all the way back to the first individual who first dubbed that thing with the name in question--This is exactly why "The Fountain of Youth" is not a referring term. No one succeeded in assigning an actual referent to it in the beginning because no one had direct contact (acquaintance) with the Fountain of Youth at all.

If you ask any normal English speaker if he really believed in Santa Claus, he would tell you "no." If you asked him why, he would tell you because Santa Claus does not exist. The philosophical problem concerning reference begins here. It doesn't begin with the speaker saying "Santa Claus wears black boots" to his child in fictional contexts. It begins when you ask him outside of fictional language contexts whether he thinks a person named "Santa Claus" lives at the North Pole, and he would say "no, no such person as Santa Claus lives at the North Pole." Adults merely pretend to assert things about imaginary beings, they don't actually assert things they think are literally true.

Why slip in the word "only"?

If it ONLY seems to refer, then no, it doesn't refer, but that it seems to refer doesn't imply that it does or doesn't. I saw a person today that seemed like a woman, and I suppose the person seemed like a woman because she was a woman; hence, although some things may seem to be something they are not, some things are in fact what they seem to be.

The name of my cat seems to refer to my cat, and in that case, things are just as they seem to be. The term "unicorn" seems to refer, and if there are in fact unicorns, then the term does just what it seems to do. The term "although" doesn't seem to refer like the term "unicorn" seems to.

By the way, since you bring it up, if you name your child "although," then we're not dealing with the same word anymore, and no, I don't mean that it would be the same word but ambiguous. I mean it would be a completely different word.

Also, I'll have you know, I have been to the Fountain of Youth. It's in St. Augustine. If you're ever in the area, check out nearby Saint George Street. It's a happening little place.

No one agrees with me that the name of an imaginary being can be used to refer to what it names.

So fictional characters are neither imaginary beings, nor are they really existing abstract objects like concepts and numbers are really existing abstract objects.

Why slip in the word "only"?

If it ONLY seems to refer, then no, it doesn't refer, but that it seems to refer doesn't imply that it does or doesn't. I saw a person today that seemed like a woman, and I suppose the person seemed like a woman because she was a woman; hence, although some things may seem to be something they are not, some things are in fact what they seem to be.

The name of my cat seems to refer to my cat, and in that case, things are just as they seem to be. The term "unicorn" seems to refer, and if there are in fact unicorns, then the term does just what it seems to do. The term "although" doesn't seem to refer like the term "unicorn" seems to.

By the way, since you bring it up, if you name your child "although," then we're not dealing with the same word anymore, and no, I don't mean that it would be the same word but ambiguous. I mean it would be a completely different word.

Also, I'll have you know, I have been to the Fountain of Youth. It's in St. Augustine. If you're ever in the area, check out nearby Saint George Street. It's a happening little place.

So what are fictional characters? Simply descriptions?

Fictional characters are imaginary beings.

From dictionary.com

fictional character
noun

an imaginary person represented in a work of fiction (play or film or story); "she is the main character in the novel"

I draw a diferent lesson from your example. A competent user of English understands that one can use a name to refer to an imaginary being. That is why they will answer the question regarding Santa's existence with "no". After all, isn't that one of the reasons we give our fictional characters proper names: in order to be able to refer to them?
It is an incompentent user of English who will go on to affirm that Santa Claus must be a real person if one uses "Santa Claus" to refer to Santa.

You think so because you have misconceived what reference is. There is no grammatical rule of conventional usage that forbids language users from using a name to refer to imaginary beings.

Questions of sense and meaning are determined before questions of truth.

My wife is a devout Catholic. I am a lapsed Catholic. I don't believe the Christian God exists. Do you really think it is impossible for me to refer to that God? That is an absurd idea!

If you don't use language according to the rules you end up talking nonsense. You can't ignore those rules simply because you claim to be discussing the philosophy of language.

The problem of reference begins within grammar. What does it mean to refer to a real object? What does it mean to refer to an abstract object? What does it mean to refer to an imaginary being?

You've focused in on one particular aspect of language use: how we can make truthful assertions about the world we live in. That is alright as long as you bear in mind that this aspect is just one of the many language games people can play. I think you've lost that perspective.

Please show me where I have claimed that fictional characters are real.

You are mistaken. There is no way for language to literally be connected to the world around us. That is why metaphysics as it has been traditionally practiced is a dead end. There is no way to get outside of language and describe mind-independent, language-independent, metaphysical necessities in reality. What philosophers thought were descriptions of de re necessities are actually norms of representation.

All you've done is distort language use by looking at it from only one perspective.

Competent users of the language know that they can talk about Sherlock Holmes, that they can describe him, that they can refer to him and that they can say it is true that he was a detective.

I don't think we are going to go over this anymore. I'm rather tired of hearing you claim that it is impossible to use words to refer to non-existent things when it is quite clear to me that people do that precise thing all the time.

It is true that we cannot refer to an existing object in the world if it doesn't really exist. That doesn't entail that language cannot be used to refer to non-existent or imaginary objects. If we can describe non-existent things like fictional characters then we can refer to them.

This simply makes no sense. If people didn't' know what 'The Fountain of Youth' purportedly referred to then they could not have verified that it doesn't actually exist. Same goes for 'phlogiston' and 'Vulcan'.

People don't always use a name in the same way as it was first used. "Zeus" was originally used to refer to a real being. Now it is used to refer to a mythological being.

This 'causal theory' of 'baptizing' someone or something with a name is a false theory.