numbers vs. words

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Extrain
 
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2010 10:36 pm
@Ahab,
[QUOTE=Ahab;146370] What I'm working with is the standard manings of our words and expressions.. I think meaning comes before questions of truth.[/QUOTE]

I am not sure this is true. But for the sake of argument I am going to assume it is.

So let me try my hand at it.

(A) I have beliefs, yes, I possess beliefs, and my beliefs are a part of me. And it is intuitively clear that my own beliefs may not be your beliefs, right? So I may believe the Broncos won the SuperBowl last season, and you may believe the Broncos didn't win the SuperBowl last season. So what you believe and what I believe are different things, namely,

The Broncos won the superbowl last season.

And,

The Broncos didn't win the superbowl last season.

So what you believe is true, and what I believe is false. So how is it that the latter can be true but the former is false?

The latter is true partly for two reasons. The proposition expressed in the sentence is true because the Broncos didn't win the superbowl last season, and also because it couldn't be true unless the meanings of the parts of the proposition expressed in the sentence had the semnatic values that they did. After all, if the proposition had the same meaning as the former proposition, it would be false. So when I believe X, I stand in a cognitive relation to X as if it were true. But I don't necessarily stand in that same cognitive relation to X as if it were true when I hate X. I just hate X itself, I don't hate X is true. X just is the object of my hate, but X has no propositional content at all since when I hate X I am not always hating X is true. So even if I hate

John's recovering from his illness

I can't hate the proposition exrpessed by,

"John recovered from his illness."

On the other hand, I can believe the proposition designated by the sentence,

"John recovered from his illness."

So what I hate in the former case isn't what I believe in the second case.
So when I believe the proposition expressed by,

"John recovered from his illness,"

I am standing in a belief relation to a proposition believed that is either true or false, whereas I can't stand in the belief relation to the meanings of the words,

John's recovering from his illness

because there is nothing asserted in this meaningful propositionless string of words concerning whether John did or did not actually recover from his illness. So i can't believe

John's recovering from his illness

because nothing has been said, so how can I believe it? I can't. I can only believe the proposition expressed by the actual sentence,

"John recovered from his illness." So I stand in a belief-relation to a proposition expressed by that sentence. So I believe the proposition

<John recovered from his illness>

and this proposition can be true or false.

(B) I have hopes, yes, I possess hopes, and my hopes are a part of me. And it is intuitively clear that my own hopes may not be your hopes, right? You may hope to be a great scientist one day, and I may hope to be a great cook one day. So what we hope may not be the same. So if you hope to,

be a great scientist one day.

How is,

be a great scientist one day,

true? It isn't true, because it doesn't have any propositional content at all, and nothing got asserted by your hoping it. You just hope to,

be a great scientist one day.

Of course you may hope that you will be a great scientist so that you hope the proposition expressed by

"I am a great scientist"

will one day be true.

So of course you can hope propositions. You can hope the proposition expressed by

"I am a great scientist"

will be true one day.

Therefore, you can hope propositions, simply because you can hope the proposition expressed by

"I am a great scientist"

will be true one day.

Therefore, you can stand in hoping relations to propositions you hope to be true one day.

Q. E. D.

---------- Post added 03-31-2010 at 12:03 AM ----------

More objections:

[QUOTE=Ahab;146370] There is no meaning to the expression "i hope the proposition that London is in England"[/QUOTE]

That's right. But so what? You haven't shown the proposition expressed by,

"I believe the proposition that London is in England" is false or meaningless.

You've only demonstrated by example the proposition expressed by,

"I hope the proposition London is in England" is false and meaningless. And it IS false and meaningless.

[QUOTE=Ahab;146370] What does it mean to say: 'I fear the propositon that I will be fired? '[/QUOTE]

It means NOTHING. But so what? We are talking about belief-attitudes, not hope-attitudes. Like I said in my initial criticism of your argument it doesn't make any sense for you to be presupposing that hope-attitudes must always stand in direct relations to propositions anyway. So you have not demonstrated the proposition expressed by,

"I believe the proposition that p"

is false or meaningless at all.

You've only demonstrated the proposition expressed by,

"I hope the proposition that p"

is false and meaningless.

[QUOTE=Ahab;146370] What I'm working with is the standard manings of our words and expressions.. I think meaning comes before questions of truth.[/QUOTE]

This is exactly the source of our disagreement. We need to work with both truth and meaning. Do you remember what I said in one of my very first posts that we can't work with "standard conventional meanings" of attitude-ascriptions if you are going to demonstrate anything at all? You can try relagating truth to meaning. But truth is logically prior to meaning. This is exactly why you're having such a hard time convincing me the proposition expressed by,

"John believes the proposition that p" is even false at all

because you are working with other cognitivie attitudes such as "hoping-that" and "fear-that," to try to demonstrate YOUR very own proposition expressed by

"believing the proposition that p"

is false or meaningless. But you still haven't succeeded in this task yet.

Can you show me why you think that the proposition expressed by,

"John believes the proposition that p"

is nonsensical or false?...because I don't see this at all.

All this makes perfect sense to me.

If I believe that London is in England, then surely I can also believe the proposition that London is in England, because "London is in England" is a sentence that directly expresses the proposition

<London is in England>.

So <London is in England> is a proposition which I believe, and which someone else can believe too. So we can both believe the same thing, and we can express the contents of our beliefs by our individual token utterances of them.

Why is this nonsensical? Please don't say again that it is because,

"I hope the proposition that London is in England"

is nonsensical, because I don't care that it is, since I already completely agree with you. In any case, the following sentence IS meaningful:

"I hope the proposition expressed by the sentence 'I am a great cook' will be true on day."

So is the proposition expressed by it meaningful, too, namely:

I hope the proposition expressed by the sentence "I am a great cook" will be true one day.

Therefore, I can stand in hoping-relations to propositions hoped to be true one day.

And this conclusion is meaningful too.

What is not meaningful is:

I hope the proposition I am great cook. Or,

I hope the proposition expressed by "I am a great cook." But certainly,

I hope the proposition expressed by "I am a great cook" will be true some day,

is meaningful.

What is also very meaningful is,

I believe the propostion I am a great cook.

and,

I believe the propositon expressed by "I am a great cook."

and,

I believe the proposition <I am a great cook>

Those are all very meaningful.
 
fast
 
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2010 10:12 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;146371 wrote:
(2) Necessarily, Words=symbols, sounds. (premise is logically true)
I think I see where you're coming from now.

Thanks.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2010 02:07 pm
@fast,
fast;146720 wrote:
I think I see where you're coming from now.

Thanks.


No worries.Smile If someone says numbers are words, you have to remember, he or she means exactly what he or she says. It is false, and it is not difficult to demonstrate that it is false either. I think the consenus now among many philosophers is that numbers are cardinal sets or other--having something to do with the null set {null} and sets within sets built accordingly. You can find this idea anywhere online, I'm sure. And truthfully, I don't know what I believe myself. But I'm *positive* (lol) numbers are not concepts, words, ideas, or linguistic meanings--numbers are represented by these things--they are not actually these things.
 
fast
 
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2010 02:56 pm
@Extrain,
[QUOTE=Extrain;146799]No worries. If someone says numbers are words, you have to remember, he or she means exactly what he or she says. It is false, and it is not difficult to demonstrate that it is false either. I think the consenus now among many philosophers is that numbers are cardinal sets or other--having something to do with the null set {null} and sets within sets built accordingly. You can find this idea anywhere online, I'm sure. And truthfully, I don't what I believe myself. But I'm positive numbers are not concepts, words, ideas, or linguistic meanings--numbers are represented by these things--they are not actually these things.[/QUOTE]
I had thought that you were committing the modal fallacy, but I didn't consider that the proposition "words are symbols" is true by definition and thus not a contingent truth.

As far as numbers go, I will say that they have properties (for example, the properties of being odd or even), and because I think that to say of something that it has properties is to say it exists, I will also say that numbers exist. I can't say with complete confidence that abstract objects exist, but supposing they do, I'd say that numbers are abstract objects. I think the term, "number" is a referring term, and I think it refers to a class, and the class that I think it refers to is the class of all numbers. An example of a number that belongs to the number class is the number three. I think the number three is also a class (a subclass to the superclass of all numbers). The word, "three" (and the numeral "3") is also a referring term, and it refers to the number three (which of course belongs to the class of all numbers). What then is the number three? It's the class of all triples. What then is a triple? I'm still working on that one, but I think it's something like the relationship between what you would refer to as three objects. The fact the number three isn't concrete (or physical in any way) explains why we can't look to the world and find a three, as there are no threes to be found--they can no more be found than can the mind of a person be found by a neurosurgeon. However, I also deny that the number three is a product of the mind; hence, numbers are mind-independent; furthermore, we should think that anyway, if in fact numbers are abstract objects (not to be confused with the ideas or concepts that we have of numbers-which are mind dependent); moreover, the fact that triples (kind of like relationships between three actual objects) did exist prior to humans (like the fact Earth is the third planet from the sun) shows that numbers are in fact a discovery (and not an invention by people.) Anyhow, those are my thoughts on the issue.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2010 05:58 pm
@fast,
fast;146831 wrote:

I had thought that you were committing the modal fallacy, but I didn't consider that the proposition "words are symbols" is true by definition and thus not a contingent truth.


So did I at first...Smile

In any case, that's the key--that "words are symbols or sounds" is logically, analytically, necessarily, and a priori true.

[QUOTE=fast;146831] As far as numbers go, I will say that they have properties (for example, the properties of being odd or even), and because I think that to say of something that it has properties is to say it exists, I will also say that numbers exist.[/QUOTE]

Absolutely.

[QUOTE=fast;146831] I can't say with complete confidence that abstract objects exist, but supposing they do, I'd say that numbers are abstract objects.[/QUOTE]

Yes. What would numbers be, other than abstract objects? Physical objects? Words on a paper? Sounds uttered? That's not right at all, because that kind of hypothesis leads to contradictions.

[QUOTE=fast;146831] I think the term, "number" is a referring term, and I think it refers to a class, and the class that I think it refers to is the class of all numbers.[/QUOTE]

Sure, if you take "number" that way. But then "number" would refer to set of all numbers, another abstract object. You might take the term "numbers" as referring to all possible numbers, but I don't think it is exactly a "referring term," at least not in the way that "numeral" is a referring term which refers to some (unspecified) particular number.

[QUOTE=fast;146831] An example of a number that belongs to the number class is the number three.[/QUOTE]

Yes. But keep in mind "number" would then refer to a class of things. That class is an abstract object, if you treat "number" that way.

[QUOTE=fast;146831] I think the number three is also a class (a subclass to the superclass of all numbers). The word, "three" (and the numeral "3") is also a referring term, and it refers to the number three (which of course belongs to the class of all numbers). What then is the number three? It's the class of all triples. What then is a triple? I'm still working on that one, but I think it's something like the relationship between what you would refer to as three objects. The fact the number three isn't concrete (or physical in any way) explains why we can't look to the world and find a three, as there are no threes to be found--they can no more be found than can the mind of a person be found by a neurosurgeon. However, I also deny that the number three is a product of the mind; hence, numbers are mind-independent; furthermore, we should think that anyway, if in fact numbers are abstract objects (not to be confused with the ideas or concepts that we have of numbers-which are mind dependent); moreover, the fact that triples (kind of like relationships between three actual objects) did exist prior to humans (like the fact Earth is the third planet from the sun) shows that numbers are in fact a discovery (and not an invention by people.) Anyhow, those are my thoughts on the issue.[/QUOTE]

That sounds generally correct. I would say something very similar. Based on what you said, we at least know several things about numbers (and possibly even more things).

Numbers exist independently of the mind.
Numbers are not human inventions (per se), (but I know that some might argue against this [just for the record, I wouldn't argue against it though.])
Numbers are not concepts "in the mind."
Numbers are not physical objects.

But you say numbers are a "discovery." I don't think that's right, at least not in the empirical sense. Even if no physical objects existed at all, and we were just left to our own thoughts with only our ability to reflect on this or that, surely we could still know about numbers. Socrates shows this point rather well in the Meno, when he demostrated that an illiterate slave boy could understand very complex divisions, multiplications, additions and substractions without any one actually teaching him. The slave boy discovered how to do this on his own accord without the guidance of a teacher. The teacher just asked questions. It's an interesting Dialogue concerning a question every Cognitive Scientist today thinks about. Is learning just "remembering" or is it "taught"?
 
fast
 
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2010 09:27 pm
@Extrain,
[QUOTE=Extrain;146919]Sure, if you take "number" that way. But then "number" would refer to set of all numbers, another abstract object.[/QUOTE]I wouldn't put up a fight against the use of the word "set," but I would still prefer to use the word "class."

[QUOTE]You might take the term "numbers" as referring to all possible numbers, but I don't think it is exactly a "referring term," at least not in the way that "numeral" is a referring term which refers to some (unspecified) particular number. [/QUOTE]I just thought of something. What is the difference between the word "number" and a numeral? Not too much I suspect. For example, the term, "number three" and the numeral 3 refer to the same thing. I never thought of that before.

[QUOTE]Yes. But keep in mind "number" would then refer to a class of things. That class is an abstract object, if you treat "number" that way.[/QUOTE]Yes. The term "number" refers to a class, and the term "number three" refers to a class. The latter is a subclass (or subset, if you prefer) of the former.

You say (and I agree) that numbers are not inventions, yet you also disagree with me when I say that numbers are discovered. I'm not sure I understand how numbers are neither. We would not discover them like we would discover concrete objects, but discover them we have done I would have thought.

[QUOTE]Is learning just "remembering" or is it "taught"?[/QUOTE]I don't think I understand. I know there is a difference between intelligence and knowledge, and I know that if we are not knowledgeable about something, then we are ignorant about something, and I know the cure for ignorance is knowledge, and one way to gain knowledge is to learn, and one way to learn is to be taught.

I wouldn't think that learning is remembering, nor would I think that learning is taught-ways of learning maybe. I'm not even sure how I ought to interpret, "learning is taught," but if someone said that learning is taught, I'd think that (maybe) someone was (possibly) conveying the fact that we can be taught (oh say) something like better studying habits to make learning easier. Just speculating.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2010 11:23 pm
@fast,
fast;146971 wrote:
I wouldn't put up a fight against the use of the word "set," but I would still prefer to use the word "class."


No worries. I wouldn't either. I can't say I am all too familiar with set-theory anyway, and wouldn't start using unless I knew what I was doing. It's a very "raw" kind of way of looking at things, actually.

[QUOTE=fast;146971]I just thought of something. What is the difference between the word "number" and a numeral? Not too much I suspect. For example, the term, "number three" and the numeral 3 refer to the same thing. I never thought of that before.[/QUOTE]

Exactly, in my last post I thought the same thing. That is precisely why numbers can't even be numerals--simply because numerals are names. "numeral" is a word (or a name) for an actual numeral that just so happens to be another name for an actual number--so now you got one name naming another name: "numeral" is not a numeral, it is a word that refers to another word. "3" is a numeral. "4" is numeral, "2" is numeral. But "3" is analgous to "three"--and now I am merely mentioning the numeral, not using it. That is why the use/mention distinction in our language is so important to understand. And that is why the argument works so well against the theory that numbers are words--because then they would have to be just names that don't name anything,and thus, they would be totally meaningless words!! It's amazing what you can actually accomplish using language alone.

[QUOTE=fast;146971] Yes. The term "number" refers to a class, and the term "number three" refers to a class. The latter is a subclass (or subset, if you prefer) of the former.[/QUOTE]

I'm not confident that is correct, unless you actually know what you're saying with set theory. "number" is not made explict just like the word "tiger" isn't made explicit. We are neither referring to the class of all tigers when we just mention it, nor are we referring to any specific tiger either. If I say "that tiger" while pointing to some tiger then I am referring to something. But just mentioning the word "tiger" doesn't refer to anything. We need a context and a background to know what we are referring to. For instance, suppose I ask you the question, "what is the value (number) of 2+2"? Now you know what I am referring to, because I just gave a description that guides you in being able to point out which number I am actually talking about, namely, the number 4.

So I guess the moral, here, is that there are rules of the use of our own language. We can mentions words, but they are not performing any functions by our just mentioning them. We need a specified context before we know what we're talking about when we use them. Here's a good example! Suppose I say something like this without a context, just out of the blue:

"The tiger is fierce."

What I am referring to? A tiger? All tigers? Am I just obliquely saying that tigers are really fierce creatures by nature or something, as if I were in a kung fu movie wanting to learn from my master "the kung fu move of the tiger"? The problem I'm driving at, is how to determine it's truth value. If the statement is saying, "all tigers are fierce," I'm sure this can be falsified by at least one cowardly tiger out there; after all, there are cowardly tigers just as there are cowardly lions like in the Wizard of Oz:). I can't rightly say that the pronoun "the tiger," refers to a particular tiger either, because nothing is helping me to point out which tiger it is I may be referring to. So we need a specified context, it seems, to be able to rightly, or meaningfully, use our language at all.

There's a dilemma here with the above sentence. It seems perfectly meaningful; it even seems true. But how do I know whether or not it is true? I can't, because I don't even know everything that the sentence is even saying! For if I did completely understand what were being said by someone's purported use of the sentence in order to say something truthful, then I would also be able, in principle, to determine whether it were also true or false, which I can't do, because no context is available in order to make this evaluation. So by asserting it, the speaker is purporting to say something about the world, but it is debatable whether he is. So it is debatable whether or not he should be saying it as if it were true. So is the speaker violating some implicit rule in our language which specifies our correct use of it? What is that rule? Is there a rule? So it's just weird.

Sorry for the ramble. I just find this interesting, I guess.Surprised

[QUOTE=fast;146971]You say (and I agree) that numbers are not inventions, yet you also disagree with me when I say that numbers are discovered. I'm not sure I understand how numbers are neither. We would not discover them like we would discover concrete objects, but discover them we have done I would have thought.[/QUOTE]

What do you mean by "discovery"? I just mean empirical discovery is not necessarily how we know numbers exist. We know them through our use in the quantifying things, and this can happen without experience because I can quantify my own thoughts. So numbers aren't discovered, not in that sense of "discovering." The implict (not explict) awareness of numbers immediately arises as soon as we start compartmentalizing our own thoughts. Experience doesn't necessarily have to be the occasion to know numbers exist--that's all I'm saying.

[QUOTE=fast;146971] I don't think I understand. I know there is a difference between intelligence and knowledge, and I know that if we are not knowledgeable about something, then we are ignorant about something, and I know the cure for ignorance is knowledge, and one way to gain knowledge is to learn, and one way to learn is to be taught.[/QUOTE]

I think you may be missing the point altogether. The question isn't about the difference between intelligence (IQ?) and knowledge, or in what manner one or the other is acquired. The question is where does that knowledge come from--the world experienced, or from somewhere else? Experience doesn't always directly give us the information that we want. We too often structure that information to make it intelligible. So the question is, how do we know how to structure things intelligibly if the world doesn't tell us how to do it? And this is a HUGE question for A.I.--people have been trying to get computers to do things they still can't do. And I can give you examples that even the "smartest" machine can't do that a 6 year old can.

[QUOTE=fast;146971]I wouldn't think that learning is remembering, nor would I think that learning is taught-ways of learning maybe. I'm not even sure how I ought to interpret, "learning is taught," but if someone said that learning is taught, I'd think that (maybe) someone was (possibly) conveying the fact that we can be taught (oh say) something like better studying habits to make learning easier. Just speculating.[/QUOTE]

"Remembering" is just a colloquial way of saying that we already implicitly know something without that knowledge ever having arisen to conscious awareness, and having never been taught this knowledge by the outide world or other people. The world will often "occasion" this knowledge coming to light, but this knowledge is not actually contained in any of the experience that we have of the world. So the question is, where does this knowledge come from?

This question is very problematic, because you see this question spring up all the time in Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence. If we could somehow collapse the distinction between "remembering" and "learning" we would be able to make computers think just like us. But we haven't yet. Therefore, there is something deeply problematic that we don't understand about the process of "learning" at all. Machine's can "learn" in many respects. But there are very simple tasks they still can't do, no matter how much we try to "teach" or "program" them the way that we want them to behave.

Here's an example of a very simple task we cannot program a maching to do. We can program a machine to obey the command "turn 90 degrees to the left," and we can a program a machine to tell us which direction it is facing when it is actually facing that direction.

So we can then tell the machine to "turn 90 degrees to the left"--and the machine will turn 90 degrees to the left. Then we can ask it, "now which direction are you facing,"--and the machine will tell us "I am facing north." But when we ask the machine before it has turned 90 degrees to left, "which direction will you be facing if you turn 90 degrees to left?" the maching cannot tell us this. And I'm dead serious. Now matter how hard we've tried, we still can't program a machine to do this. It's fundamentally weird--the conclusion is that there is something fundamentally important about our own knowledge about our own spatial orientation a machine doesn't have about its own spatial environment. So there is something about our own self-consciousness that is immediately connected to our own bodies that is significant that even a machine whose entire "sensory appartus" is actually spatially located can't learn or tell us anything about. So it still can't tell us what would happen if it turned 90 degrees to the left. But a 6 year old knows how to do this and knows the appropriate answer to give (assuming the child knows what "turn 90 degrees to the left" means--and if he doesn't, he could easily be taught, unlike machines.)

I find this very interesting.
 
fast
 
Reply Thu 1 Apr, 2010 07:37 am
@Extrain,
[QUOTE=Extrain;146982]I'm not confident that is correct, unless you actually know what you're saying with set theory. "number" is not made explict just like the word "tiger" isn't made explicit. We are neither referring to the class of all tigers when we just mention it, nor are we referring to any specific tiger either. If I say "that tiger" while pointing to some tiger then I am referring to something. But just mentioning the word "tiger" doesn't refer to anything. We need a context and a background to know what we are referring to. For instance, suppose I ask you the question, "what is the value (number) of 2+2"? Now you know what I am referring to, because I just gave a description that guides you in being able to point out which number I am actually talking about, namely, the number 4. [/QUOTE]We're covering too many topics at once. I'll expound on the issue bolded above, but what I have to say has nothing to do with the all too familiar distinction between the mention and use of a word.

Referring terms refer to their referents independent of our individual use of the terms. Yes, you can use terms to refer to things, but the actual terms themselves refer despite how you use terms. A child can mistakenly use the term "horse" when referring to a zebra, but never is it true that the term, "horse" actually refers to zebras.

The term "zebra" does refer, as it is a referring term, but it does not alone refer to a concrete object like the term, "Crooked Tail Kitty" does--the name of my cat by the way. The term "zebra" refers to the class of all zebras, and recall, a class is an abstract object.

Note that if I had all the zebras in the world in my back yard, it would be false that the class of all zebras are in my back yard, for no abstract object has a physical location, so it's important not to confuse the class of all zebras (an abstract entity) with all the zebras (concrete objects).

I wonder, what is the distinction between a class and a set? Would all the zebras be a set? I think maybe so, but I wouldn't say that all the zebras is a class, even though there is a class of all zebras. Distinctions!
 
Extrain
 
Reply Thu 1 Apr, 2010 08:37 am
@fast,
fast;147059 wrote:
Referring terms refer to their referents independent of our individual use of the terms. Yes, you can use terms to refer to things, but the actual terms themselves refer despite how you use terms. A child can mistakenly use the term "horse" when referring to a zebra, but never is it true that the term, "horse" actually refers to zebras.


It is true that "horse" never refers to zebras, but that is not because there is something "magical" about that string of symbols that refers all by itself indepedent of its proper function english users have actually dubbed as its proper use by applying it to the correct things. This is precisely why someone, like a child, can use the term incorrectly. There are rules of use. And those rules are stipulated by the Language users whenever they use the words. So I don't see this is an objection to anything that i said at all.

[QUOTE=fast;147059]The term "zebra" does refer, as it is a referring term, but it does not alone refer to a concrete object like the term, "Crooked Tail Kitty" does--the name of my cat by the way. The term "zebra" refers to the class of all zebras, and recall, a class is an abstract object.[/QUOTE]

You obviously didn't understand the example I gave. I asked how you would know that,

The tiger is fierce

is true if you didn't know whether "the tiger" meant the tiger standing before me, or if I meant all tigers? You don't know this. Therefore, we have conventions of use. The word doesn't just "magically" have reference. We need a context because it is not always clear what it refers to. Suppose I mention "John." Can you tell me that "John" just magically refers to the one and only one individual John? Absolutely not! How would you know WHICH John I was referring to. You wouldn't! Because we need to know who we are talking about when we use that name.--this is provided by context. And "John" sure as heck doesn't refer to the class of all Johns, or the set of all johns, either. Because then there could only be one john. And when I say to my friend "Hey john, do you want to come over for dinner"?, I am not saying, "Hey class john do you want to come over for dinner?" That's absurd.

[QUOTE=fast;147059] Note that if I had all the zebras in the world in my back yard, it would be false that the class of all zebras are in my back yard, for no abstract object has a physical location, so it's important not to confuse the class of all zebras (an abstract entity) with all the zebras (concrete objects).[/QUOTE]

perhaps. But it actually might very well true that the SET of all zebras are in your backyard, even if that is an abstract object. Did you ever consider that?

[QUOTE=fast;147059] I wonder, what is the distinction between a class and a set? Would all the zebras be a set? I think maybe so, but I wouldn't say that all the zebras is a class, even though there is a class of all zebras. Distinctions![/QUOTE]

I think that's right. But what's your point? I am not necessarily disagreeing with you about distinctions between sets and classes anyway (although I might).

I might say something like all zebras are in a class of such and such kind and varitey of animal, just like we taxonimize species and genus. But I don't think I would say all zebras are a class. Classes refer to kinds, and these classes don't cease to exist as soon as one zebras dies. however, if all zebras were a set, then when one zebras dies that set ceases to exist, and a new set springs into existence, or perhaps it was already there as a subset of the original set. The older set just ceased to exist.
 
fast
 
Reply Thu 1 Apr, 2010 09:42 am
@Extrain,
[QUOTE=Extrain;147078]You obviously didn't understand the example I gave. I asked how you would know that,[/QUOTE]
Extrain;147078 wrote:


The tiger is fierce

is true if you didn't know whether "the tiger" meant the tiger standing before me, or if I meant all tigers? You don't know this. Therefore, we have conventions of use. The word doesn't just "magically" have reference.
If you utter the sentence, "the tiger is fierce," then the sentence expresses a proposition that is either true or false, and it does so despite the fact that I do not know whether the proposition being expressed is true or false, even when I don't know because I'm unaware of the context in which the sentence is uttered. Truth (after all) is independent of knowledge.

However, the issues you bring up is far removed from what I discussing (well, maybe not that far Smile). You're talking about meaning (in this case, the meaning of the sentence), and you're also talking about reference (in this case, what you would be referring to), but I'm talking neither about sentences (meaning or reference), yet I am talking about words, but I am not talking about the meaning of words (which is where how people collectively use words come into play). I am talking about words and what they refer to (if they do).

"John" refers to John of course. Which one, I do not know.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Thu 1 Apr, 2010 02:55 pm
@fast,
fast;147091 wrote:
If you utter the sentence, "the tiger is fierce," then the sentence expresses a proposition that is either true or false, and it does so despite the fact that I do not know whether the proposition being expressed is true or false, even when I don't know because I'm unaware of the context in which the sentence is uttered. Truth (after all) is independent of knowledge.


Actually, we ARE talking about the same subject, namely, the possibility of reference and meaning without knowing context, or without knowing one's intentions. But we're not talking about the same problem.

I didn't say the proposition expressed by the sentence "the tiger is fierce" is not merely known to be true or false, or that you just don't know whether it is true or false. I said, there is not any proposition expressed by the sentence at all because we don't know what the prounoun "the tiger" is referring to. On the surface of it, I just mean exactly what I say, "the tiger is fierce," and I assure you, I don't mean all tigers, some tigers, or a tiger. I just mean "The tiger is fierce." You and I are walking down the street together when I say this to you. It only appears meaningful, but it is not clear what that meaning is. Therefore, words just don't magically have reference without a context or a speaker intention.

[QUOTE=fast;147091]""John" refers to John of course. Which one, I do not know.[/QUOTE]
No, it's not that the word "John" refers to John, but I do not know which John it is referring to. It is rather that "John" does not have reference at all, without my first knowing which context I am in when I talk about John. The word "John" doesn't have any reference all by itself without the speaker intending to refer to this or that individual by his use of the word "John." Words don't have reference magically, especially proper names, simply because there are more than one persons referred to by that same word--in this case, "John."

Notice, "I" or "you" don't have a magical reference either, because who "I" designates depends on who utters it--that's the context in which "I" is given reference. The same with "you." "You" doesn't have any magical reference either because "you" designates only the person to whom I intend to refer by my use of that word as in "You gave yourself the screename 'fast.'" Now you know I am talking about you, not somebody else when I use the word "you." Make sense? The same goes for our use of proper names. "Alber Einstein" refers to Albert Einstein because we all have agreed that it refers to the famous physicist of the 20th century. But the word "Albert Einstein" doesn't magically refer to that Albert Einstein without our dubbing that it did refer by commonly accepted conventional usage (which is context). So names don't refer magically all by themselves without context, especially if there are more the one Albert Einstein's which I'm sure there are.

Do you think my sounds and symbols magically refer without my intentions?

This is why propositions are distinct kinds of things from sentences. In this case of the the tiger, there is nothing about the tiger that gets said, there is nothing about the tiger that gets understood, and there is nothing about the tiger that is truth-valuable by my merely uttering the sentence, simply because I myself, nor do you, know which tiger (s) (all, some, or one) I am referring to by my utterance of "the tiger" in the sentence "the tiger is fierce."

So can you tell me which proposition I mean to express by the use of this sentence without knowing what "the tiger" refers to? No. You couldn't tell me at all, because the sentence doesn't even express a proposition without my intending which proposition I want to express.

[QUOTE=fast;147091] However, the issues you bring up is far removed from what I discussing (well, maybe not that far Smile). You're talking about meaning (in this case, the meaning of the sentence), and you're also talking about reference (in this case, what you would be referring to), but I'm talking neither about sentences (meaning or reference), yet I am talking about words, but I am not talking about the meaning of words (which is where how people collectively use words come into play). I am talking about words and what they refer to (if they do).[/QUOTE]
And I am saying that words just don't magically succeed in referring on their own without a context and without speaker intentions.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 1 Apr, 2010 03:08 pm
@Extrain,
Extrain;147175 wrote:
Actually, we ARE talking about the same subject, namely, the possibility of reference without context, or without intentions. But we're not talking about the same problem.

I didn't say the proposition expressed by it is not merely known to be true or false, or that you just don't know whether it is true or false. I said, there is not any proposition expressed by the sentence at all. On the surface of it, I just mean exactly what I say, "the tiger is fierce," and I assure you, I don't mean all tigers, some tigers, or a tiger. I just mean "The tiger is fierce." You and I are walking down the street together when I say this to you. It only appears meaningful, but it is not clear what that meaning is. Therefore, words just don't magically have reference without a context.

Do you think my sounds and symbols are magical without my intentions? Do you think my words magically have meaning merely because I can string the letters "a"-"b"-"c"-"d"-"e"-"f"-"g" together on paper, or uttter "a"-"b"-"c"-"d"-"e"-"f"-"g"- together in what appears and sounds to you like a sentence with the same syntax and grammatical structure just like any other sentence you can understand? In this case of the the tiger, there is nothing about the tiger that gets said, there is nothing about the tiger that gets understood, and there is nothing about the tiger that is truth-valuable by my merely uttering the sentence, simply because I myself don't know what I mean by the "the tiger." I just mean, "The tiger is fierce." Therefore, words just don't magically have reference without context.

So can you tell me what proposition I mean to express by this sentence, if I just told you what I meant, now that you know my intentions, or "lack" thereof?


But words just don't magically refer or mean things without a context and without speaker intentions.


Precisely, because you don't know the context or my intentions. This should be obvious to you by now.


I think that Russell held that "this" and "that" were logically proper names because they could not fail to refer when uttered.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Thu 1 Apr, 2010 03:22 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;147181 wrote:
I think that Russell held that "this" and "that" were logically proper names because they could not fail to refer when uttered.


That's right, since "the" and "that" are ostensible terms which are meant to pick out an object. But if I don't intend to pick out an object by my use of "the" in my utterance of the sentence "the tiger is fierce"--what proposition is it that I am asserting by my use of that sentence? None. I am being duplicitous concerning my own intentions. So the speaker (myself) is violating the rules of language use, because he is acting like he is asserting something, but he is not. So, context and speaker intention tell us which proposition gets expressed by that sentence, and if there is no context, and there is no intention, then there is no proposition that is expressed.

This is why sentences have to be distinct from propositions. Which propositions get expressed by those sentences are entirely dependent on context, meaning, and speaker intention.

All I need to do to construct a sentence that is grammatically and syntactically well-formed, on the other hand, is to obey the grammatical and syntactical rules of my own language that I am using. But I don't have to have any intentions. That is why the sentence "the tiger is fierce" is so deceptive, because it is not saying or expressing anything (a proposition) just out of the blue. You need context and intention.

Even in fiction we have a context, and statements made within fiction are truth-valuable. The context is fiction, and the intention is the writer's intention. So words don't magically have reference (but they might have some meaning in and of themselves) without context and intention.
 
Ahab
 
Reply Thu 1 Apr, 2010 06:33 pm
@Extrain,
Extrain;147188 wrote:

But if I don't intend to pick out an object by my use of "the" in my utterance of the sentence "the tiger is fierce"--what proposition is it that I am asserting by my use of that sentence? None. I am being duplicitous concerning my own intentions. So the speaker (myself) is violating the rules of language use, because he is acting like he is asserting something, but he is not. So, context and speaker intention tell us which proposition gets expressed by that sentence, and if there is no context, and there is no intention, then there is no proposition that is expressed.


Very interesting discussion. Have found myself to be in basic agreement with the position you've taken on this issue. The sentence 'The tiger is fierce" has a meaning but that meaning has to be distinguished from what is said by the use of the sentence on a given occasion. What is said by the use of a sentence can be foolish or wise, true or false, but the meaning of the sentence can't be any of these.

But I don't think you are violating the rules of language use by uttering that particular sentence. Although you may have broken some moral ones.Smile

Perhaps I can best illustrate this by presenting an analogous situation. A person who has played chess for many years plays a game with his young nephew who is still very new to the game. It would be quite easy for the elder person to beat the youngster at the game. But he doesn't wish to discourage the young lad. In fact he wishes to do quite the opposite: encourage the lad's interest in the game. But simply throwing away the game won't do either. He has to play the game well enough that it appears he is really trying to win. In effect, he is deceiving the lad. But he need break none of the rules of chess to accomplish that deception.

If you wish to deceive someone into thinking you believe something you don't, then you need to obey the rules of language. You are using the rules in order to accomplish your act of deception.

Also, I'm not so sure about the 'speaker's intention' telling us what is being expressed by the use of the sentence. Otherwise, how could we hide our real intentions when we use a sentence to say something misleading?
An assertion by someone is one of the criteria used to determine what she believes, but that criterion is defeasible.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 1 Apr, 2010 06:37 pm
@Extrain,
Extrain;147188 wrote:
That's right, since "the" and "that" are ostensible terms which are meant to pick out an object. But if I don't intend to pick out an object by my use of "the" in my utterance of the sentence "the tiger is fierce"--what proposition is it that I am asserting by my use of that sentence? None. I am being duplicitous concerning my own intentions. So the speaker (myself) is violating the rules of language use, because he is acting like he is asserting something, but he is not. So, context and speaker intention tell us which proposition gets expressed by that sentence, and if there is no context, and there is no intention, then there is no proposition that is expressed.

This is why sentences have to be distinct from propositions. Which propositions get expressed by those sentences are entirely dependent on context, meaning, and speaker intention.

All I need to do to construct a sentence that is grammatically and syntactically well-formed, on the other hand, is to obey the grammatical and syntactical rules of my own language that I am using. But I don't have to have any intentions. That is why the sentence "the tiger is fierce" is so deceptive, because it is not saying or expressing anything (a proposition) just out of the blue. You need context and intention.

Even in fiction we have a context, and statements made within fiction are truth-valuable. The context is fiction, and the intention is the writer's intention. So words don't magically have reference (but they might have some meaning in and of themselves) without context and intention.


But if Russell is right, then what you wrote:

But words just don't magically refer or mean things without a context and without speaker intentions.

seems to be wrong, since "this" or "that" refer without context, and without speaker intentions.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Thu 1 Apr, 2010 06:44 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;147242 wrote:
But if Russell is right, then what you wrote:

But words just don't magically refer or mean things without a context and without speaker intentions.

seems to be wrong, since "this" or "that" refer without context, and without speaker intentions.


In that case, Russell would be wrong. Obviously so. And I'm pretty sure Kaplan would say so, too.

Don't forget, there is also a thing called "logical context."
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 1 Apr, 2010 06:49 pm
@Extrain,
Extrain;147243 wrote:
In that case, Russell would be wrong. Obviously so. And I'm pretty sure Kaplan would say so, too.


Well, I don't want to reduce it to a battle between Russell and Kaplan. I was simply pointing out, that if there are logically proper names, then some terms do refer without speaker intentions.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Thu 1 Apr, 2010 06:50 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;147248 wrote:
Well, I don't want to reduce it to a battle between Russell and Kaplan. I was simply pointing out, that if there are logically proper names, then some terms do refer without speaker intentions.


That's logical context, then.

---------- Post added 04-01-2010 at 06:53 PM ----------

Ahab;147240 wrote:
Very interesting discussion. Have found myself to be in basic agreement with the position you've taken on this issue. The sentence 'The tiger is fierce" has a meaning but that meaning has to be distinguished from what is said by the use of the sentence on a given occasion. What is said by the use of a sentence can be foolish or wise, true or false, but the meaning of the sentence can't be any of these.

But I don't think you are violating the rules of language use by uttering that particular sentence. Although you may have broken some moral ones.Smile


The rules aren't broken by merely uttering the sentence. The rules are broken by intending to say something truthful, without having specified a context or having pointed to anything, by using that sentence. "The tiger is fierce" is just like this if I intended to say something truthful without pointing to any tigers, or if I am unclear whether or not I am talking about all tigers.

And the rules just are "moral" rules in this case. That's what rules are. What ought, and ought not to be said, in a given context if you intend on saying something truthful. Language rules are about correct use of language, not the mentioning of terms within a language. that's why I haven't broken any rules by mentioning, "the tiger is fierce"--since I am not intending to say anything by mentioning it.

---------- Post added 04-01-2010 at 08:07 PM ----------

Actually, now I am thinking that, ideally, everything I am saying about

"The tiger is fierce"

is correct, but that in most cases, I think speaker intention would be immediately given--by intonation, phonetics, voice inflection, body language, etc-- if you heard someone intending to say something truthful by using this sentence. In other words, the speaker's intentions would immediately fall out of these other variables so that you could quickly tell that what the person really implied was that,

"All tigers are fierce."

But then it is immediately truth-valuable, and does say something. So I think the speaker implications have to be taken into account. But I am not so much concerned with speaker implications, I am concerned with somebody insisting on using a sentence purportedly expressing something true, but for which reference fails to happen altogether. In that case, the speaker is violating the rules of language use.

So I am really not sure that somebody is saying anything at all in the following scenario.

Suppose a kung fu student wants to learn "the moves of the tiger" from his kung fu master and he asks, "master, would you teach me the moves of the tiger"? And suppose his master asks him why he wants to learn the "kung fu moves of a tiger,"--and the student says, "because master, the tiger is fierce." It might look like this:

If the student who uses the the sentence "the tiger is fierce" in order to express something truthful without being committed to the truth of the proposition expresses by "all tigers are fierce," or without pointing to any tiger and intending to mean "that tiger is fierce," then he is not saying anything at all--and he is violating the rules of language.

After all, it's easy to imagine that the master is also some pompous philosopher who studies logic in his own spare time, and then asks the student rather condescendingly, "come on, son, you don't really think all tigers are fierce, do you? I am sure their are some tigers that are really cowards." And the student said, "of course not master, I wouldn't think that." But suppose the logical kung fu master then asks his student, "well, do you mean that you have some particular tiger in mind when you say 'the tiger is fierce'"? And if the student said "no, I don't have any particular tiger in mind that I am thinking about," but still insisted that the tiger is fierce, then the student wouldn't be saying anything by his use of that sentence.

So the master then says to the student, "Ok, I get it, then. You just think the tiger is fierce, but don't think all tigers are fierce. And you're not acually thinking about the any particular tiger when you use that sentence, either. But you still insist on asserting that it is true that the tiger is fierce." And if the student said, "yes, I think it is true that the tiger is fierce, even though I don't think all tigers are fierce, nor am I thinking of any particular tiger that is fierce when I say that either. Nor am I saying that some tigers are fierce. I just think that 'the tiger is fierce' is true. Of course it is true. Who would think that the tiger wasn't fierce anyway? The tiger is just a fierce creature, even though not all tigers are fierce. And moreover, it is true that the tiger is a fierce creature." then the student would not be saying anything at all, because no one could even determine what it is that he is even saying! "All"? "Some"? "One"? What is "the tiger" referring to at all? And even more, what does the student mean by using it? Maybe truth and meaning are intimately connected to linguistic reference somehow, necessarily so, so that they have to be so connected to make sense of purportedly truthful propostions?

How can the alleged proposition expressed by this sentence even be true or false, since there are no entities, or class of entities, to which the student is intending to refer by his use of that sentence, "the tiger is fierce."? So no reference is made to anything, so the alleged proposition expressed by that sentences is not even truth-valuable at all!! It's truth value is indeterminate, but purported by the student to be true, and so nothing is being said.

""The tiger is fierce" is true even though I don't know how it could be."

huh? That's just weird!

What, exactly, is being said here?
 
Ahab
 
Reply Fri 2 Apr, 2010 07:31 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;147249 wrote:



The rules aren't broken by merely uttering the sentence. The rules are broken by intending to say something truthful, without having specified a context or having pointed to anything, by using that sentence. "The tiger is fierce" is just like this if I intended to say something truthful without pointing to any tigers, or if I am unclear whether or not I am talking about all tigers.

Sorry, I appear to have misunderstood you. When you used the word 'duplicitous' I thought you meant to indicate that you were trying to deceive the listener.

Quote:

And the rules just are "moral" rules in this case. That's what rules are. What ought, and ought not to be said, in a given context if you intend on saying something truthful. Language rules are about correct use of language, not the mentioning of terms within a language. that's why I haven't broken any rules by mentioning, "the tiger is fierce"--since I am not intending to say anything by mentioning it.

I'm not sure I agree that failing to say what one intends is always breaking a rule of language use.
Another analogy: if I intend to checkmate the King by moving the Bishop to a particular square on the board and fail to do so because I overlooked a counter move that was available to my opponent, I haven't broken any rules. The move I made with the Bishop was legal. I just failed to accomplish what I had intended.

Edited comment: My analogy could be made more apt. Suppose you move the Bishop one square short of the one you intended to move it to. This results in a failure to even check the King let alone checkmate it. But the move you made is still legal.

Quote:


---------- Post added 04-01-2010 at 08:07 PM ----------

Actually, now I am thinking that, ideally, everything I am saying about

"The tiger is fierce"

is correct,


Yes. So it appears we really are in agreement on this.

Quote:


but that in most cases, I think speaker intention would be immediately given--by intonation, phonetics, voice inflection, body language, etc-- if you heard someone intending to say something truthful by using this sentence. In other words, the speaker's intentions would immediately fall out of these other variables so that you could quickly tell that what the person really implied was that,

"All tigers are fierce."

But then it is immediately truth-valuable, and does say something. So I think the speaker implications have to be taken into account. But I am not so much concerned with speaker implications, I am concerned with somebody insisting on using a sentence purportedly expressing something true, but for which reference fails to happen altogether. In that case, the speaker is violating the rules of language use.

So I am really not sure that somebody is saying anything at all in the following scenario.

Suppose a kung fu student wants to learn "the moves of the tiger" from his kung fu master and he asks, "master, would you teach me the moves of the tiger"? And suppose his master asks him why he wants to learn the "kung fu moves of a tiger,"--and the student says, "because master, the tiger is fierce." It might look like this:

If the student who uses the the sentence "the tiger is fierce" in order to express something truthful without being committed to the truth of the proposition expresses by "all tigers are fierce," or without pointing to any tiger and intending to mean "that tiger is fierce," then he is not saying anything at all--and he is violating the rules of language.

After all, it's easy to imagine that the master is also some pompous philosopher who studies logic in his own spare time, and then asks the student rather condescendingly, "come on, son, you don't really think all tigers are fierce, do you? I am sure their are some tigers that are really cowards." And the student said, "of course not master, I wouldn't think that." But suppose the logical kung fu master then asks his student, "well, do you mean that you have some particular tiger in mind when you say 'the tiger is fierce'"? And if the student said "no, I don't have any particular tiger in mind that I am thinking about," but still insisted that the tiger is fierce, then the student wouldn't be saying anything by his use of that sentence.

So the master then says to the student, "Ok, I get it, then. You just think the tiger is fierce, but don't think all tigers are fierce. And you're not acually thinking about the any particular tiger when you use that sentence, either. But you still insist on asserting that it is true that the tiger is fierce." And if the student said, "yes, I think it is true that the tiger is fierce, even though I don't think all tigers are fierce, nor am I thinking of any particular tiger that is fierce when I say that either. Nor am I saying that some tigers are fierce. I just think that 'the tiger is fierce' is true. Of course it is true. Who would think that the tiger wasn't fierce anyway? The tiger is just a fierce creature, even though not all tigers are fierce. And moreover, it is true that the tiger is a fierce creature." then the student would not be saying anything at all, because no one could even determine what it is that he is even saying! "All"? "Some"? "One"? What is "the tiger" referring to at all? And even more, what does the student mean by using it? Maybe truth and meaning are intimately connected to linguistic reference somehow, necessarily so, so that they have to be so connected to make sense of purportedly truthful propostions?

How can the alleged proposition expressed by this sentence even be true or false, since there are no entities, or class of entities, to which the student is intending to refer by his use of that sentence, "the tiger is fierce."? So no reference is made to anything, so the alleged proposition expressed by that sentences is not even truth-valuable at all!! It's truth value is indeterminate, but purported by the student to be true, and so nothing is being said.

""The tiger is fierce" is true even though I don't know how it could be."

huh? That's just weird!

What, exactly, is being said here?


In your scenario if I were the Kung Fu master I would have assumed that the student was talking about the moves called 'the moves of the tiger'. And that he desired to learn those moves because he thought they were fierce.

But if, as in your scenario I thought the student was attempting to say something about real tigers I would think that what he meant by the assertion "the tiger is fierce' is that tigers are fierce animals. But to say that tigers are fierce animals is to not commit one to the belief that tigers are always fierce. Don't we say that humans are rational beings? Certainly humans don't always act rationally.

Of course if there is uncertainty as to what a person is trying to say we can usually simply ask them to clarify what they meant.
 
fast
 
Reply Fri 2 Apr, 2010 08:47 am
@Extrain,
[QUOTE=Extrain;147175]I didn't say the proposition expressed by the sentence "the tiger is fierce" is not merely known to be true or false, or that you just don't know whether it is true or false. I said, there is not any proposition expressed by the sentence at all because we don't know what the prounoun "the tiger" is referring to. [/QUOTE]

It did dawn on me that (maybe) you were uttering a sentence that did not express a proposition, but I still don't believe any of this counters the point I was trying to make.

The term, "the tiger" is a referring term (just as the term "tiger" is a referring term), and that is true even if there is no tiger for the term "the tiger" to refer to. See, when I say that a term is a referring term, that does not imply what it may appear to imply, and there's a reason for that. For example, "my pet elephant" is a referring term, and it's a referring term even though I have no pet elephant.

By saying that a term is a referring term, I am denying that the term is a non-referring term. What needs to be distinguished is the difference between a non-referring term and a referring term that fails to refer (as opposed to a referring term that succeeds in referring).

1) non-referring terms (e.g. "not", "although", "however")
2) referring terms that successfully refer (e.g. "my cat" "tiger")
3) referring terms that fail to refer (e.g. "my elephant" "unicorn")

If "the tiger" as used by you has no referent, then that does not render it a non-referring term. It remains a referring term but just not one that successfully refers. Notice that I included "tiger" in group two above, and that is because the term, "tiger" does refer, and what it refers to is the tiger class.
 
 

 
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