numbers vs. words

@kennethamy,

[QUOTE=kennethamy;142533][...] The same would, of course, go for Wiley. Apparently Wiley does not exist, although there is, of course, a cartoon character who is Wiley. But that does not count, since the question is whether Wiley exists, not whether a cartoon character who is Wiley. If the question were whether there is a cartoon character, Wiley, the answer would be yes, since there is a cartoon character what has the properties of Wiley.[/QUOTE]

He won't accept that because he doesn't think you have a basis for thinking that the referent of the term, "Wile E. Coyote" is a living creature. He believes that the referent of the term, "Wile E. Coyote" is the cartoon character.

In addition to that, and although he believes as we do in that there is no actual living creature that we would call Wile E. Coyote, he is willing to accept that the proposition, "Wile E. Coyote does not exist" is true, so he does not have the same understanding as do you when it comes to what the word "exist" means.

---------- Post added 03-23-2010 at 01:52 PM ----------

Ahab;142549 wrote:

This is all fine and good when it comes to real objects that exist in the world. But we have been talking about imaginary creatures. When someone thinks up or creates such an imaginary creature she decides what properties she wants it to have. In that situation she is not discovering properties, she is making them up.

Saying that there are properties and there actually being properties is not the same thing. Imagined objects do not have ACTUAL properties. I can imagine a dog with a yellow horn protruding out it's head, but the imagined dog does not have properties, for there are no actual properties. An imagined property is NOT a KIND of property. Yes, we can call it a fictional or imagined property, but there are still no properties, no actual properties that is.

---------- Post added 03-23-2010 at 01:56 PM ----------

ughaibu;142559 wrote:

It cant be, so Fast has given an incomplete story.

What's your question?

@fast,

fast;142660 wrote:

He won't accept that because he doesn't think you have a basis for thinking that the referent of the term, "Wile E. Coyote" is a living creature. He believes that the referent of the term, "Wile E. Coyote" is the cartoon character.

In addition to that, and although he believes as we do in that there is no actual living creature that we would call Wile E. Coyote, he is willing to accept that the proposition, "Wile E. Coyote does not exist" is true, so he does not have the same understanding as do you when it comes to what the word "exist" means.

That is not an accurate account of my position.

I think that Wiley E. Coyote refers to an imaginary creature. That imaginary being is depicted in cartoons.

I don't think imaginary beings exist. And I think it safe to assume that neither you nor Kennethamy think so either.

To imagine an imaginary being is not the same as imagining a being you think may exist in the world. In the latter case you can often determine a way to find out if that imagined being actually does exist.
I think you'd have to be insane to try to set up an experiment to determine whether or not Wile E. Coyote is a real coyote. Smile

@fast,

fast;142660 wrote:

He won't accept that because he doesn't think you have a basis for thinking that the referent of the term, "Wile E. Coyote" is a living creature. He believes that the referent of the term, "Wile E. Coyote" is the cartoon character.

In addition to that, and although he believes as we do in that there is no actual living creature that we would call Wile E. Coyote, he is willing to accept that the proposition, "Wile E. Coyote does not exist" is true, so he does not have the same understanding as do you when it comes to what the word "exist" means.

---------- Post added 03-23-2010 at 01:52 PM ----------

Saying that there are properties and there actually being properties is not the same thing. Imagined objects do not have ACTUAL properties. I can imagine a dog with a yellow horn protruding out it's head, but the imagined dog does not have properties, for there are no actual properties. An imagined property is NOT a KIND of property. Yes, we can call it a fictional or imagined property, but there are still no properties, no actual properties that is.

[CENTER]:shifty:
In the Spanish modern language there are two verbs for to be. One indicates the position, the other the properties. I allways mix it up which means I call the plaza a church instead of putting the CXhurch on a square.
Ser y Estar for those interested

In Dutch we mixed the Old Latin with German and Vulgar Latin and Frankish. Still words give witness to our Older Languages. To Be =
Ben in Dutch has a hint of the future...
Wezen (o.Ind) is Being Present (verb) and Presence / Being (noun)

I do know about Wicca a bit. Old Magic spells I put on pots. But to disuss existence... Surely most things exist. But not All is animated. We yust do not like soul-less objects and project human qualities to it. To our pets, I even did to my computers.

Pepijn Sweep
:shifty:
[/CENTER]

@fast,

fast;142660 wrote:

Saying that there are properties and there actually being properties is not the same thing. Imagined objects do not have ACTUAL properties. I can imagine a dog with a yellow horn protruding out it's head, but the imagined dog does not have properties, for there are no actual properties. An imagined property is NOT a KIND of property. Yes, we can call it a fictional or imagined property, but there are still no properties, no actual properties that is.

I agree that the properties are not real, they are imagined. But an imaginary being does have those imaginary properties. If that imaginary dog with a yellow horn didn't have the property you just assigned to it, then I could have no way of distinguishing it from an imaginary dog with a blue horn. And a cartoonist could not make an accurate depiction of those two dogs if he didn't know that their horns are colored differently.

@Ahab,

[QUOTE=Ahab;142666]That is not an accurate account of my position.[/QUOTE]Sorry about that.

[QUOTE]I think that Wiley E. Coyote refers to an imaginary creature.[/QUOTE]Well, this is getting even more complicated. First, no thing actually refers. Only terms refer.

There are now even more possibilities on the table:

A) the term refers to the idea/concept of Wile E. Coyote
B) the term refers to the imaginary creature Wile E. Coyote
C) the term refers to the character in fiction
D) the term refers to the actual living coyote that we will never see running

I vote D. I thought you voted C. Apparently you're voting B.

[QUOTE]I don't think imaginary beings exist. And I think it safe to assume that neither you nor Kennethamy think so either. So why would I think that this imaginary being exists?[/QUOTE]Well, what I was saying is that you believe C exists. None of us believe D exists.

@fast,

fast;142674 wrote:

Sorry about that.
A) the term refers to the idea/concept of Wile E. Coyote
B) the term refers to the imaginary creature Wile E. Coyote
C) the term refers to the character in fiction
D) the term refers to the actual living coyote that we will never see running

[CENTER]it was an idea of Walt Disney
Snowwhite was cleaner by dwarfs
she is a character
The Princess of the Light Parade is real
She was Miss Orange County
in Europe Castles are Real
:bigsmile: Laughing

[/CENTER]

@Ahab,

[QUOTE=Ahab;142669]I agree that the properties are not real, they are imagined. But an imaginary being does have those imaginary properties. If that imaginary dog with a yellow horn didn't have the property you just assigned to it, then I could have no way of distinguishing it from an imaginary dog with a blue horn. And a cartoonist could not make an accurate depiction of those two dogs if he didn't know that their horns are colored differently.[/QUOTE]You mentioned earlier that the word, "properties" is an issue, and I think you're right. There's no way I'm going to concede that an imagined property is a kind of property.

I have a friend that has an imaginary friend, and according to my friend, his imaginary friend follows him wherever he goes. One day, my friend and I walked into an empty office building, so there were two people (not three) in the office building. We can't count an imaginary person as a person, for an imaginary person is not a kind of person no more than an imaginary friend is a kind of friend. My friend can come up with all the make-believe characteristics he wants to describe his imaginary friend, but never will that imaginary friend have properties, for that imaginary friend does not exist.

I don't think imaginary properties exist. That's not to say we can't imagine properties; for example, we can imagine a dog with a yellow horn, and we can imagine a dog with a blue horn, but never are there properties. To say there are imaginary properties isn't to imply there are properties. In fact, I'd say it's a denial that there are properties. Yet, even though you admit that the properties are fictional, you also talk as though they are a kind of property when you bring up the cartoonist.

@fast,

fast;142674 wrote:

Sorry about that.

Well, this is getting even more complicated. First, no thing actually refers. Only terms refer.

There are now even more possibilities on the table:

A) the term refers to the idea/concept of Wile E. Coyote
B) the term refers to the imaginary creature Wile E. Coyote
C) the term refers to the character in fiction
D) the term refers to the actual living coyote that we will never see running

I vote D. I thought you voted C. Apparently you're voting B.

Well, what I was saying is that you believe C exists. None of us believe D exists.

The name Wile E. Coyote refers to what the creator conceives, imagines, thinks Wiley E. Coyote is.

That imaginary being is depicted in cartoons. So we can use the name Wile E. Coyote to refer to that depiction as well as to the imginary coyote.

I didn't creat Wile E. Coyote myself, but I believe it is safe to assume that the creator of Wile E. Coyote did not think he was imagining a real creature. I believe he thought he was imagining an imaginary creature.

What still confuses me is why you would think a cartoon character like Wile should be considered to be a depicton of a real coyote.

@Ahab,

Your premises are so wide open formulated that it allways makes some sense. Try replacing objevct Coyote by President O'Barack and your postulates still make the same sense. Another message...
Laughing

@fast,

fast;142683 wrote:

You mentioned earlier that the word, "properties" is an issue, and I think you're right. There's no way I'm going to concede that an imagined property is a kind of property.

I have a friend that has an imaginary friend, and according to my friend, his imaginary friend follows him wherever he goes. One day, my friend and I walked into an empty office building, so there were two people (not three) in the office building. We can't count an imaginary person as a person, for an imaginary person is not a kind of person no more than an imaginary friend is a kind of friend. My friend can come up with all the make-believe characteristics he wants to describe his imaginary friend, but never will that imaginary friend have properties, for that imaginary friend does not exist.

I don't think imaginary properties exist. That's not to say we can't imagine properties; for example, we can imagine a dog with a yellow horn, and we can imagine a dog with a blue horn, but never are there properties. To say there are imaginary properties isn't to imply there are properties. In fact, I'd say it's a denial that there are properties. Yet, even though you admit that the properties are fictional, you also talk as though they are a kind of property when you bring up the cartoonist.

If you imagine that imaginary dog having a blue horn then that is the property it has. Of course it is an imaginary property. No one is going to go looking for a blue-horned dog in their back yard.

How could someone distinguish between the imaginary blue-horned dog and the imaginary yellow-horned dog if they didn't have different imaginary properties?

@cws910,

[QUOTE=Ahab;142688]The name Wile E. Coyote refers to what the creator conceives, imagines, thinks Wiley E. Coyote is. [/QUOTE]I don't think so. If that was the was the case, we should be saying that Wile E. Coyote exists.

[QUOTE]That imaginary being is depicted in cartoons.[/QUOTE]I'm fine with that.

[QUOTE]So we can use the name Wile E. Coyote to refer to that depiction as well as to the imginary coyote. [/QUOTE]That is problematic. If there is no depiction yet there is an imagined coyote, then we have a problem.

[QUOTE]I didn't creat Wile E. Coyote myself, but I believe it is safe to assume that the creator of Wile E. Coyote did not think he was imagining a real creature. [/QUOTE]I would agree that he didn't believe that what he imagined was real, if that's what you mean.

[QUOTE]What still confuses me is why you would think a cartoon character like Wile should be considered to be a depicton of a real coyote.[/QUOTE]No, the cartoon character is a depiction of something, but it's not a depiction of an actual living Wile E. Coyote. It's a depiction of something that someone has in mind, most likely a cartoonist.

---------- Post added 03-23-2010 at 04:14 PM ----------

[QUOTE=Ahab;142695]How could someone distinguish between the imaginary blue-horned dog and the imaginary yellow-horned dog if they didn't have different imaginary properties?[/QUOTE]I think this is embarking on a topic that isn't discussed all that often-the categorization of things that do not exist. I've heard it mentioned a couple of times, but conversations never seem to go anywhere.

It can, at times, be hard enough to distinguish between things that actually do exist, but the act of trying to distinguish things from other things that none of which exist can be quite interesting. I figure they all weigh the same, so I lump 'em all together. Just kidding; they lack weight, of course.

By the way, neither of them are blue, and neither one of them are yellow, but what else is there to expect from properties THAT DO NOT EXIST. There's nothing to distinguish.

@fast,

fast;142698 wrote:

I don't think so. If that was the was the case, we should be saying that Wile E. Coyote exists.

Why would I think Wile exists if his name refers to what his creator imagined? Surely you don't think everything we imagine exists, do you?

Quote:

That is problematic. If there is no depiction yet there is an imagined coyote, then we have a problem.

Well certainly you and I would not know about Wile E. Coyote if his creator had not depicted him in words or pictures. That doesn't seem problematical to me.

Quote:

No, the cartoon character is a depiction of something, but it's not a depiction of an actual living Wile E. Coyote. It's a depiction of something that someone has in mind, most likely a cartoonist.

Isn't saying 'something someone has in mind" essentially the same as saying 'what someone imagines that this imaginary being is'? You seem ok with the first but not the second expression.. What is it in the second expression that you object to?

---------- Post added 03-23-2010 at 01:33 PM ----------

fast;142698 wrote:

I think this is embarking on a topic that isn't discussed all that often-the categorization of things that do not exist. I've heard it mentioned a couple of times, but conversations never seem to go anywhere.

It can, at times, be hard enough to distinguish between things that actually do exist, but the act of trying to distinguish things from other things that none of which exist can be quite interesting. I figure they all weigh the same, so I lump 'em all together. Just kidding; they lack weight, of course.

By the way, neither of them are blue, and neither one of them are yellow, but what else is there to expect from properties THAT DO NOT EXIST. There's nothing to distinguish.

Then why did you say the one imaginary dog had a yellow horn? For that matter, why did you say it was a dog with a yellow horn?

---------- Post added 03-23-2010 at 02:02 PM ----------

fast;142698 wrote:

No, the cartoon character is a depiction of something, but it's not a depiction of an actual living Wile E. Coyote.

Again, you bring in this real coyote. I don't understand. The creator of Wile never thought he has imagining a real coyote. He thought he was imagining an imaginary one.

And the cartoonist isn't trying to depict a real coyote. He is trying to depict an imaginary one.

@Ahab,

Why would you think that what the idea is an idea of is an imaginary coyote? An imagined friend is imaginary, but it's imagined to be real. Who imagines things to be imaginary?

@fast,

fast;142717 wrote:

Why would you think that what the idea is an idea of is an imaginary coyote? An imagined friend is imaginary, but it's imagined to be real. Who imagines things to be imaginary?

I can imagine my friend, Joe, taking an airplane ride to San Francisco. Then I am imagining a real person taking a trip. Just because I can imagine Joe in certain situations doesn't make him imaginary.

If I imagine Wile E. Coyote chasing the Roadrunner I am imagining two imaginary beings. I don't for a moment think that they are real.

If I were trying to imagine a real coyote I wouldn't imagine one that could fall hundreds of feet, be flattened into a pancake by a huge boulder, then pop back into normal shape without a scratch and resume running after the Roadrunner!

Why do you think that when we imagine Wile we imagine him to be a real coyote?

@Ahab,

[CENTER]:bigsmile:
Ik ben een Heer van stand zei Heer O.B.Bommel tegen Tom Poes. Ik kan niet als ieder ander naar de Bank gaan. Bovendien zeiden ze niet voldoende cijfers en letters te hebben om ....

To Be Continued:lol:
[/CENTER]

@Pepijn Sweep,

I am a Lord of state OBBommel Lord said to Tom Puss. I can not like everyone else go to the Bank. Moreover, they said not to have sufficient numbers and letters to ....?

@fast,

fast;142683 wrote:

There's no way I'm going to concede that an imagined property is a kind of property.

How can you avoid the concession?
1) being imaginary is a property
2) therefore imaginary properties exist.
If imaginary properties aren't properties, then what do you reckon they are?

@Ahab,

Ahab;142707 wrote:

Why would I think Wile exists if his name refers to what his creator imagined? Surely you don't think everything we imagine exists, do you?

Again, you bring in this real coyote. I don't understand. The creator of Wile never thought he has imagining a real coyote. He thought he was imagining an imaginary one.

And the cartoonist isn't trying to depict a real coyote. He is trying to depict an imaginary one.

Talk of fictional entities is a difficult issue, and I am not sure how to make room for this talk in theories of linguistic reference and existential commitment. So I don't have a firm stance on the issue.

Questions:

Can statements made about fictional entities be true and false? or are they truth-valueless altogether? And suppose they are true and false: are they "literally" or "robustly" true and false, or are these statements only "pretended" (by us) to be true and false?

It's clear that the "real" Wiley coyote doesn't exist. But does Wiley coyote, the imagined character about whom we can discuss, exist?

And what about our linguistic utterance such as "Wiley got flattened by a gigantic rock." Are we committing to the existence of such an imagined character by uttering these kinds of fictional statements? Or do our acts of uttering (and perhaps believing) these statements consist merely in a kind of implict pretense of existential commitment, as opposed to actual existential commitment?

questions to seriously ponder...since whatever answers we concoct will have definite implications for our ontologies and linguisitic theories of reference concerning other putative abstract entities such as concepts, properties, propositions, numbers, meanings, etc...

---------- Post added 03-23-2010 at 08:26 PM ----------

fast;142674 wrote:

There are now even more possibilities on the table:

A) the term refers to the idea/concept of Wile E. Coyote
B) the term refers to the imaginary creature Wile E. Coyote
C) the term refers to the character in fiction
D) the term refers to the actual living coyote that we will never see running

I vote D. I thought you voted C. Apparently you're voting B.

This is a good question; I am inclined to go with (B) or (C). But I am not sure why you are opting for (D), since nobody (that I know of) even intends for their use of the purported name "Wile E. Coyote" to refer to an actual living coyote except you (even though you clearly don't think an actual living coyote exists). So why choose (D) anyway? Your choice seems plainly contrary to most people's (excepting schizophrenics') actual practice of using fictional names...

@cws910,

cws910;116515 wrote:

As I said to kennethamy, I am not talking about CREATING beauty, merely describing it. For that matter, I am not debating about beauty, it is merely an example. I am asking whether or not words contain equal power to numbers in describing the universe and its workings, and whether we could or could not use words as a substitute for math in physics and science.

At least we should translate many math important principles into words...as support, not as a substitution...

@PappasNick,

[QUOTE=PappasNick;142565] I agree that there can be fuzziness (subjectivity) to the idea 'rock', but a typical rock is nonetheless, in my opinion, an objective phenomenon while the idea 'one' is at most only as objective as the object (rock) in question. . [/QUOTE]A rock is a material object. Material objects have objective, measurable scientific properties.
One is not a material object but a conceptual ideal. Conceptual ideals are independent of material objects.
Of course all objective properties are represented in by numbers or mathematical formulas.
Very soon this discussion will degenerate into a disagreement about what is "real" and what "exists" and if there are different kinds of objects, realities and existence and the relationship between concepts and objects.
[QUOTE=PappasNick;142565] If the object being described is fuzzy, isn't the concept (oneness) applied to it imprecise to the degree that the object is fuzzy? How can we say 'one rock' if we are not sure that what we are describing is indeed a rock? . [/QUOTE] When you say the word "one" what do you think of? What other question than "one what"? can you ask? In my mind one is a rather precise concept even when not attached to any particular object. Rock or any other material object on the other hand leads to a rather lengthy inquiry regarding additional specific properties. Of course I think the mathematical representation of material or objective reality is not a matter of convention but an important message about reality itself.

Philosophy Forum

numbers vs. words

Quick Links

My Account

able2know