a) it's odd, a successor to the number two, and a multiple of six.

There are no abstract objects on the table. In fact, it would be impossible for an abstract object to be on the table, for no abstract object has a location.

Whoa, boy! What is this stuff? Now I am convinced I have not a clue what you're talking about

Agreed, but you are not respondng to my question. Are the groups of marbles on the table?

If so, how can you deny that there are more than four objects on the table?

That's generally not a bad idea.


Do you put as much stock in the previous word as you do that one? Is Rudolph a fictional character?

It would be an error to count each group AND to count the individual marbles that make up each group.

Don't give me this common sense crap, this is philosophy! Are the groups of marbles objects? Are they abstract objects or physical objects?

Rudolph is an imaginary creature. Not a human person. But don't you think that if Santa (the imaginary person) is being represented in a story that his reindeer Rudolph (the imaginary creature) is also?

That seems quite consistent with the dictionary defintion. When explaining a word are we required to list all of the possible circumstances in which it can occur? I think not.

The groups of marbles are objects, and The referent of "group of marbles" are the marbles, not the marble class.

Not only that, I wish I were more fluent in my own language.

So you've had a non-philsopher tell you that it was not correct to use the word "Superman" to refer to the alien who was sent to earth from the planet Krypton because Superman does not exist?

I've never been told outside of a philosophy discussion that one could not use a word to refer to an imagined person, event or thing because that imagined person, event or thing does not exist. If it is part of standard usage that we are forbidden to use a word to refer to an imaginary creature or attribute a property to an imaginary person, shouldn't it be easy to find such a rule in all of our dictionaries?

I don't believe that non-philosophers use the term "refer" in the kind of technical sense we are talking about. They use it in the sense that if makes clear who or what we are talking about. "When you said that he struck the woman, who were you referring to?" "Give the gin to the lady at the corner table". "There are two ladies at the corner table, which one are you referring to?" The assumption is always that the referent exists.

I agree with you completely up until the last sentence. When people start talking about imaginary things then I don't think they assume that the referent exists. When they talk about King Kong, they don't believe that King Kong exists. I know people who make up imaginary scenarios in which they try and explain away all the contradictions in the Sherlock Holmes stories because they find it entertatining to imagine Mr. Holmes as a real, historical character. But they still know (unless they have gone over the edge) that this is all pretence and that Holmes really was a creation of Arthur Doyle's imagination.

I seem to have an attraction toward mythology and fantastic literature and maybe that attraction has blinded me in regard to this issue of referentiality. I really have trouble understanding why it seems so apparently obvious to many philosophers that the referent has to exist since it seems clear as day to me that it need not.:perplexed:

Is the group of marbles the same thing as the marbles? I'm having trouble understanding your distinction between a group and a class.

the answer to that question squarely depends on whether or not a class has properties, and if they do (which I guess they do), then like it or not, I'm forced into the conclusion that they exist--be there a need to say it or otherwise.

But I've given a clear counter example to this. In all Euclidean dimensions n, for any n-cube with side s, the number of vertices is 2^n, the bulk is s^n and the surface is s^(n-1).2n. It makes no difference whether the cubes are imaginary, (n>3), or non-imaginary. If, as you claim, anything with properties exists, then hypercubes have the same existential status as the squares of your ceiling tiles. What is your answer to this problem?

Further, you say that some things cant exist because they dont have properties, but you also say that some things have no properties because they dont exist. This is a vacuous claim as the terms are codependent, neither qualifies the other. As it stands, I dont see any reason for a person to accept your position, and I see clear reasons to reject it.

Would you by chance be assuming that imaginary numbers do not exist? They have properties. It's a misnomer to call an imaginary number imaginary.

That's not exactly what I said. What I am saying is, "to say of something that it exists is to say of something that it has properties."

If X has properties, then X exists. If X does not have properties, then X does not exist.

For example. Rudolph (not to be confused with the character Rudolph) does not have properties; thus, Rudolph does not exist.

The character Rudolph (not to be confused with Rudolph) does have properties; thus, the character Rudolph exists.

Rudolph has no red nose. The character Rudolph does have a red nose.:letme-at-em:

Would you by chance be assuming that imaginary numbers do not exist?

If X has properties, then X exists. If X does not have properties, then X does not exist.

We represent the character Rudolph with a red nose because that is what Rudoph has. A fictional character is a representation of an imaginary being.

I'm not talking about imaginary numbers, I'm talking about cubes in Euclidean spaces of more than three dimensions. There are no such spaces outside the human imagination, therefore there are no such cubes outside the human imagination. In short, such hypercubes are irreducibly imaginary.The set of properties of hypercubes is exactly the same as the set of properties of cubes in zero, one, two and three dimensions. So, if a person accepts your view, then that person is as committed to the existence of imaginary cubes as they are to the existence of the cubes that they encounter in actuality. This means that any cube in a Euclidean space of any dimensionality has the exact same existential status as any other cube in any other space of any other dimensionality. As far as I can see, this commits you to one of two positions, either:
1) there are no actual cubes in zero, one, two or three dimensions. What appear to be such cubes are only representations.
2) all cubes in spaces that are irreducibly imaginary exist in exactly the same sense that the cubes in actuality do.
I see no reason to accept either claim.

Rudolph doesn't exist, so he has no nose.

I'm sorry, but I need a simpler example. I just know nothing about what you're talking about.

You dont need to know the details, you just need to accept that I'm a reliable source for this.
1) in all Euclidean spaces, the set of properties of cubes is the same
2) if a thing has properties, then that thing exists
3) therefore cubes in all Euclidean spaces exist
4) Euclidean spaces of more than three dimensions are irreducibly imaginary
5) therefore imaginary cubes exist
6) and, imaginary cubes have the same existential status as actual cubes.

Sure, why not? They're all abstract objects. Isn't their existence acknowledged purely because it's useful to do so?