In Plato's Phaedo, Socrates talks of "misologists" who are haters of reason and argument, and he advises no one to discuss anything with them. He tells us that they became that way because, like misanthropes (haters of people) they encountered some bad arguments, and they concluded that are argument is bad in the way that misanthropes encounter bad people, and conclude that all people are bad. Both groups are, of course, the victims of bad argument themselves. The fallacy of hasty generalization. Rorty and his epigone are, misologists.
...and just notice the same kind of "misologist" demise of critical thinking witnessed here, too.
Frege, Russell=shallow persons.
So, all analytic philosophy=shallow
So, all Logic=shallow.
Therefore, all critical thinking=shallow.
Philosophical thesis of Materialism=bad.
All philosophy should be metaphorical, relativistic, pragmatic, and dogmatically Eastern.
The dogmatism swings both ways.
It's always wise to use the right tool for the job at hand. What is dogmatism a tool for?
If A, B, and C are non-existent things which are a subset of the real, then clearly A, B, and C don't exist. But you insist on telling everyone that though A, B, and C don't exist, they are still nevertheless "real"--whatever that means.
So I don't understand your distinction whatsoever. And anyone who claimed he did, doesn't know what he is talking about.
Can you show us how non-existence can be "real"?
After all, nothing is just nothing. If nothing were something, then nothing would be something, and hence no longer nothing. So nothing would be not nothing. Negation applied to a negation makes something something. So "nothing is something" is a contradiction. So if A does not exist, then clearly A is not "real," either. A is nothing.
No one can make sense of nothing. Neither can you. Nothing is just nothing.
As you can see, this is just gibberish talk...good look in trying to make any sense of it--I sure as hell can't even make sense of what I just said!
Anyone who chooses to go down this linguistic route of talking just gets lost in the syntax of grammar, that's all.
So I strongly recommend paying attention to the meanings of your own words.
The wind exists. Wind is a real thing. Wind is caused and in turn is a cause. It isn't a particular object, though, even though it can be sensed. It's air in motion. We don't know exactly what air is and we don't know in an ultimate way what motion is. Our physicists are still working on the details. We know that wind is air in motion, though.
This is Jeeprs way of trashing the entire Western tradition altogether with faulty generalizations, bad arguments, and mischaracterizations of every philosopher within it.
Wind is a great thing to bring in. It seems to me that wind exists, yes, but in what way? Is wind anything other than a concept and the qualia thereby organized? I agree on the air and motion point as well. How much of our experience is experienced outside of these imperfect conceptions-in-progress? Not much at all, if any of it. Even the word basketball already integrates the perceived inflated sphere into its context, as an object we use to play a particular game.
I see a lamp in front of me. It's only cut out as a separate object by my automatic process of thinking of it in terms of its use for me. It's base is on a shelf. The "matter" (another complex abstraction) of this lamp's base is in direct contact with the shelf. But I know/assume-from-experience that the lamp isn't stuck to or a part of the shelf. For me, objects are inconceivable apart from the concepts that delineate them.
So, paying strict attention to the meanings of these words, which are not my own, as I did not write this piece, this particular passage conveys the essential distinction that is being made:
Existence is of objects, while reality also covers ideas beyond objects. A number is only real, while a baseball exists. The gross national product is only real, while Antarctica exists. The probability of the sun not rising tomorrow is real, while the sun itself exists.
Question: what is the matter with this passage?
Hi Extrain - taken you off ignore again - please reference this statement: demonstrate exactly where, and how, I have trashed the entire Western tradition altogether with faulty....etc.
It seems a great historic tragedy that Aristotle, who remained under the influence of Plato for nearly twenty years, failed to continue the line of teaching begun by Pythagoras and clarified by Plato. But Aristotle was not content to be a "transmitter." Plato claimed no originality for his ideas, giving the credit to Socrates and Pythagoras. Aristotle's failure in this direction may be due to the fact that, while both Pythagoras and Plato were Initiates of the Mysteries, Aristotle was never initiated and depended on logical speculation for the development of his theories. This accounts for his many divergences from the teachings of Plato, whose philosophy was based upon the wisdom of the ancient East. According to Diogenes Laertius, Aristotle fell away from his teacher while Plato was still alive, whereat Plato remarked, "Aristotle has kicked me, as foals do their mothers when they are born." While there is evidence that Aristotle never lost his high personal regard for Plato, the fact remains that in his later writings he never mentions Plato except to refute his doctrines, maintaining that the Platonic method is fatal to science.
There is an idea that I am trying to spell out which I think is important. But before I go down the track of trying to fully elaborate it, I would like to present a brief summary of it, to see if it stands up to criticism.
Reality and Existence
The reason I have called this 'non-metaphysical' is that metaphysics started with Aristotle.
very good. that is close to what I am thinking. I think there is a very elusive element in Plato's thought which got muddled by the Aristotlean concepts of 'substance' and 'essence'. It is this intuition of the nature of 'ratio' 'form' and 'idea', which started with Pythagoras, and by which everything is related and made comprehensible. It is as if all of the logic by which everything is related is imprinted in the fabric of the cosmos, and individual beings only exist because they manifest these underlying 'ideas' and 'archetypes' (to paraphrase pythagorism). I think this is the authentic view of the ancient philosophers. It is very hard for us to penetrate, because in our world, the individual is the sole reality.
Once you project it as 'spiritual substance' however, or try and envisage a separate realm in which these archetypes inhere - which is what I think Aristotle tried to do - then it all breaks down. These forms are transcendent, and the meaning of 'transcendent' is literally 'beyond existence'. Now I think this is why Plato spoke of noesis. I think noesis corresponds with the Indian 'Samadhi' or 'Dhyana'. It is only on that level that the forms can be apprehended because in this mode of being, the mind transcends itself. There was a remark earlier on that Plato was not a mystic. In fact he was an initiate of Orphism, while Aristotle was not. A theosophical comment on the relationship between the two: The reason I have called this 'non-metaphysical' is that metaphysics started with Aristotle. Plato and the pythagoreans were prior to that. I suppose it is 'mystical' but the feeling I have is that they see and know something actual about reality, which we don't know. I suppose I am saying, they were spiritually enlightened, and I think they were. I am still just thinking about all this. It is an interesting idea and worth contemplating.
[INDENT]What about these things? Do we say that justice itself is something? Of course. And the fair and the good? Surely. Then have you ever seen any of these sorts of things with your eyes? In no way. But then have you grasped them with any other sense through the body. I am talking about all (of them), for instance about size, health, strength, in a word about the essence (ousia)
Well then, consider what then follows if you also accept my hypothesis. For it seems to me that if anything else [material particulars] is beautiful besides Beauty Itself, it is beautiful on account of nothing else than because it partakes of Beauty Itself. And I speak in the same way about everything else. Do you accept this sort of cause or explanation?
In this passage, Plato introduces two predication relations, Being and Partaking. Understanding how Being and Partaking function to 'tie' together the various subjects and properties mentioned in his metaphysical discussions is crucial to reconstructing his metaphysics and epistemology. At first blush, it seems that there are two kinds of subjects of which properties are predicated, namely Forms and material particulars. (I exempt souls from this list). Similarly, at first blush it seems that there are Forms for every property involved in the changes afflicting material particulars. For instance, since particulars, e.g. Helen of Troy, change from being not-beautiful to being beautiful, there is the Form Beauty Itself. In this passage, Plato asserts that particulars like Helen, because she is not the Form but rather is a material particular, is related to, or 'tied to' Beauty in virtue of what he calls 'partaking.' Beauty Itself, on the other hand, not being something 'other than Beauty', does not partake of Beauty-it simply is beautiful. Generalizing from what is said here about Beauty Itself, it seems that Forms inherit from the Socratic Properties their self-predicational status: Beauty is beautiful; Justice is just; Equality is equal. Partaking in Beauty makes Helen beautiful because Beauty Itself is beautiful. Call this way in which a Form is related to the property it is 'Being'. Understanding Being, the way in which Beauty is beautiful, that is, determining what it is for a Form to self-predicate, is central to understanding Plato's Theory of Forms and his middle period metaphysics.
Actually I wonder if there is a connection here with Rupert Sheldrake's morphic fields?
I doubt it. Aren't Jungian Archetypes mental entities?
Plato and Aristotle thought no such thing. Both of them are very explicit that Forms (i.e., essences) of things are substantively changless things existing independently of any mind. The mind, of course, has access to understanding these Forms by which it understands the changing physical world. But the world really does consist of these existing Changeless Forms independent of the mind's own private conceptions of these Forms. Hence, neither Plato nor Aristotle were Idealists, but instead, full-fledged Metaphysical Realists.
Aristotle thought physical things *gave* these forms existence--in other words, Forms had to be instantiated in physical things in order to exist. But Plato thought these Forms did not have to be instantiated in physical things in order to exist, but existed independently of any physical things.
Yes, Plato thought that there were walking properties without anything to instantiate them. He thought that only Red was red. Nothing else (really). He confused the "is" of identity, with the "is" of predication. (Here you can see where analytic philosophy improves on former philosophy).