A Non-Metaphysical Theory

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Arjuna
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 08:52 pm
@Extrain,
kennethamy;151606 wrote:
In Plato's Phaedo, Socrates talks of "misologists" who are haters of reason and argument, and he advises no one to discuss anything with them. He tells us that they became that way because, like misanthropes (haters of people) they encountered some bad arguments, and they concluded that are argument is bad in the way that misanthropes encounter bad people, and conclude that all people are bad. Both groups are, of course, the victims of bad argument themselves. The fallacy of hasty generalization. Rorty and his epigone are, misologists.
By coincidence, I happen to be reading Phaedo. There's some pretty wild and crazy argumentation there.

Extrain;151612 wrote:
Nice.

...and just notice the same kind of "misologist" demise of critical thinking witnessed here, too.

Frege, Russell=shallow persons.
So, all analytic philosophy=shallow
So, all Logic=shallow.
Therefore, all critical thinking=shallow.

Philosophical thesis of Materialism=bad.
Therefore, Idealism=good

Conclusion:

All philosophy should be metaphorical, relativistic, pragmatic, and dogmatically Eastern.

The dogmatism swings both ways.
It's always wise to use the right tool for the job at hand. What is dogmatism a tool for?
 
Extrain
 
Reply Tue 13 Apr, 2010 09:08 pm
@Arjuna,
Arjuna;151618 wrote:
It's always wise to use the right tool for the job at hand. What is dogmatism a tool for?


Sorry, I can't discern what you're driving at.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Wed 14 Apr, 2010 12:33 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;151588 wrote:
If A, B, and C are non-existent things which are a subset of the real, then clearly A, B, and C don't exist. But you insist on telling everyone that though A, B, and C don't exist, they are still nevertheless "real"--whatever that means.

So I don't understand your distinction whatsoever. And anyone who claimed he did, doesn't know what he is talking about.

Can you show us how non-existence can be "real"?

After all, nothing is just nothing. If nothing were something, then nothing would be something, and hence no longer nothing. So nothing would be not nothing. Negation applied to a negation makes something something. So "nothing is something" is a contradiction. So if A does not exist, then clearly A is not "real," either. A is nothing.

No one can make sense of nothing. Neither can you. Nothing is just nothing.

As you can see, this is just gibberish talk...good look in trying to make any sense of it--I sure as hell can't even make sense of what I just said!

Anyone who chooses to go down this linguistic route of talking just gets lost in the syntax of grammar, that's all.

So I strongly recommend paying attention to the meanings of your own words.


So, paying strict attention to the meanings of these words, which are not my own, as I did not write this piece, this particular passage conveys the essential distinction that is being made:

Existence is of objects, while reality also covers ideas beyond objects. A number is only real, while a baseball exists. The gross national product is only real, while Antarctica exists. The probability of the sun not rising tomorrow is real, while the sun itself exists.

Question: what is the matter with this passage?
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Wed 14 Apr, 2010 12:47 am
@Arjuna,
Arjuna;151586 wrote:


The wind exists. Wind is a real thing. Wind is caused and in turn is a cause. It isn't a particular object, though, even though it can be sensed. It's air in motion. We don't know exactly what air is and we don't know in an ultimate way what motion is. Our physicists are still working on the details. We know that wind is air in motion, though.


Wind is a great thing to bring in. It seems to me that wind exists, yes, but in what way? Is wind anything other than a concept and the qualia thereby organized? I agree on the air and motion point as well. How much of our experience is experienced outside of these imperfect conceptions-in-progress? Not much at all, if any of it. Even the word basketball already integrates the perceived inflated sphere into its context, as an object we use to play a particular game.

I see a lamp in front of me. It's only cut out as a separate object by my automatic process of thinking of it in terms of its use for me. It's base is on a shelf. The "matter" (another complex abstraction) of this lamp's base is in direct contact with the shelf. But I know/assume-from-experience that the lamp isn't stuck to or a part of the shelf. For me, objects are inconceivable apart from the concepts that delineate them.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Wed 14 Apr, 2010 03:07 am
@jeeprs,
And another thing. Different people see different things in a situation. They are all looking at 'the same thing' and yet one will see something that the others don't. And it might be something that is not really there; it might be a potential opportunity, or something about the way two things interact - anything, really. So an artistic visionary will create a piece of art that captures something hitherto completely unperceived about the scene in front of us - a Matisse, a Van Gogh. All you and I see is a church, a flower.

I mentioned the idea of realisation before. It has two meanings, one to realize something hitherto overlooked, but the other meaning to 'make real'. When a business visionary or political leader looks at the situation, she will see many things which you and I don't see. Many of these things don't strictly speaking exist, or they might only exist as potentials, or ideas. A great leader or great business visionary will then proceed to 'create something out of nothing' - a new standard of government, a whole new type of computer technology.....

Science itself tells us that the universe must contain an enormous mass of matter/energy, the nature of which is completely unknown to us. The vacuum of empty space contains all kinds of potential energy and virtual particles that pop in and out of existence.

I am sure that the what we understand as 'everything that exists' is only an infinitesimal sliver of 'what is real'.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 07:08 PM ----------

and none of this is metaphysical. It is actual.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 08:40 PM ----------

and there is something else I want to say about what exists and what is real.

Our lives are full of details. Sitting here typing, in immediate proximity, there is an unpaid phonebill, a pair of cheap computer speakers, an old christmas card with a coffee-cup stain on it, and a couple of books. These, and innumerable other, things, bits of stuff, items, are all around me and will doubtless be all around you, and if you look out into the starry skies, there are uncountable stars, planets, galaxies, and so on, and so forth.

But as I understand it, when it all comes to an end for us, there is this very brief moment when 'your life flashes before your eyes'. Those who have almost drowned say this all the time. 'This was your life'. And at that exact moment, and maybe not before, you will know what has been real to you, the real things that have been understood, and the real things that you failed to understand. Gone are all the phone bills, the books, the coffee stains, and all of the other trivia and paraphernalia that seems to fill our life. What remains is: .....

"Hell", I read somewhere recently, "is truth realized too late".
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Wed 14 Apr, 2010 05:43 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;151256 wrote:
This is Jeeprs way of trashing the entire Western tradition altogether with faulty generalizations, bad arguments, and mischaracterizations of every philosopher within it.


Hi Extrain - taken you off ignore again - please reference this statement: demonstrate exactly where, and how, I have trashed the entire Western tradition altogether with faulty....etc. Because it seems to me, in order for me to have done that, I must have entered several hundred thousand words. Not having done so, I think you can be fairly accused of one of the cardinal sins: hyperbole.

So herewith a challenge to Extrain, boy wonder, and highly trained philosophical sage: show me, jeeprs, destroyer of western philosophy, pillager and vandal of all you hold dear, where I have done what you accuse me of, above. Quote the words, show the posts. For the benefit of the many, for the common good of all, give the references.

Go ahead. Make my day.

(note to self - I have so many more important things to be doing right now....)

(second note to self: I now realise why extrain has taken such a visceral hatred of my position, which developed as soon as I entered a post on Eastern spirituality as an alternative to Western intellectuality. Basically it is because it marks me a heretic. Mine is exactly the kind of view that was targetted by the Spanish Inquisition, and most of the books I read are on the Index of Books Prohibited to the Faithful. It has nothing whatever to do with philosophy.)
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 14 Apr, 2010 06:22 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;151691 wrote:
Wind is a great thing to bring in. It seems to me that wind exists, yes, but in what way? Is wind anything other than a concept and the qualia thereby organized? I agree on the air and motion point as well. How much of our experience is experienced outside of these imperfect conceptions-in-progress? Not much at all, if any of it. Even the word basketball already integrates the perceived inflated sphere into its context, as an object we use to play a particular game.

I see a lamp in front of me. It's only cut out as a separate object by my automatic process of thinking of it in terms of its use for me. It's base is on a shelf. The "matter" (another complex abstraction) of this lamp's base is in direct contact with the shelf. But I know/assume-from-experience that the lamp isn't stuck to or a part of the shelf. For me, objects are inconceivable apart from the concepts that delineate them.


The wind is not the concept of the wind, for there was wind before there was the concept of wind. The wind is not the qualia or the sensations of the wind, for the qualia or the sensations of the wind are only evidence for the wind,but not the wind.

For me, objects are inconceivable apart from the concepts that delineate them.

In that case, you ought to change your mind, since you are mistaken.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Thu 15 Apr, 2010 08:49 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;151688 wrote:
So, paying strict attention to the meanings of these words, which are not my own, as I did not write this piece, this particular passage conveys the essential distinction that is being made:

Existence is of objects, while reality also covers ideas beyond objects. A number is only real, while a baseball exists. The gross national product is only real, while Antarctica exists. The probability of the sun not rising tomorrow is real, while the sun itself exists.

Question: what is the matter with this passage?


lol! These are just word salads. You can talk nonsense all you like, but I don't understand this distinction at all, neither do you, and nor does anybody else.

If the gross national product and number do not exist, then necessarily, they are not real. Whatever distinction you are trying to make between physical objects and abstract (linguistic meanings?), this distinction cannot be found with respect to the one kind of thing existing and the other kind of thing not-existing. You need another way of forumulating whatever it is you are trying to say because, so far, it's nonsense.

You still haven't told me the difference between

existing things
non-existing/real things

You've only given me your own examples of things you think fall into these allegedly distinct categories. I am asking you to make sense of the intelligibility of this categorical distinction altogether. I cannot make sense of it. Period.

jeeprs;151750 wrote:
Hi Extrain - taken you off ignore again - please reference this statement: demonstrate exactly where, and how, I have trashed the entire Western tradition altogether with faulty....etc.


Hello? Anybody home? You've been openly admitting it everywhere.

We started this conversation in the Berkeley thread weeks ago. I am aware of at least 4 other people having noticed this same defect in your mishandling and abuse of Western Philosophy. It's not just me.
 
Arjuna
 
Reply Thu 15 Apr, 2010 09:21 pm
@Extrain,
I've been reading Plato. Some things are visible, some are invisible.

We say two blocks of wood are of equal size.

The blocks of wood are visible. Equality is not.

To Plato, equality is real. Not only that... it's unchanging. An unchanging reality? Whoa.

The way I understood you jeeprs, is that you're exploring how the unchanging reality is bound to the transient? Are you saying that separating the changeless from the transient is dissecting being, and that this dissection results in a kind of error of thought... ?
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Thu 15 Apr, 2010 09:55 pm
@jeeprs,
very good. that is close to what I am thinking. I think there is a very elusive element in Plato's thought which got muddled by the Aristotlean concepts of 'substance' and 'essence'. It is this intuition of the nature of 'ratio' 'form' and 'idea', which started with Pythagoras, and by which everything is related and made comprehensible. It is as if all of the logic by which everything is related is imprinted in the fabric of the cosmos, and individual beings only exist because they manifest these underlying 'ideas' and 'archetypes' (to paraphrase pythagorism). I think this is the authentic view of the ancient philosophers. It is very hard for us to penetrate, because in our world, the individual is the sole reality.

Once you project it as 'spiritual substance' however, or try and envisage a separate realm in which these archetypes inhere - which is what I think Aristotle tried to do - then it all breaks down. These forms are transcendent, and the meaning of 'transcendent' is literally 'beyond existence'. Now I think this is why Plato spoke of noesis. I think noesis corresponds with the Indian 'Samadhi' or 'Dhyana'. It is only on that level that the forms can be apprehended because in this mode of being, the mind transcends itself. There was a remark earlier on that Plato was not a mystic. In fact he was an initiate of Orphism, while Aristotle was not. A theosophical comment on the relationship between the two:
Quote:
It seems a great historic tragedy that Aristotle, who remained under the influence of Plato for nearly twenty years, failed to continue the line of teaching begun by Pythagoras and clarified by Plato. But Aristotle was not content to be a "transmitter." Plato claimed no originality for his ideas, giving the credit to Socrates and Pythagoras. Aristotle's failure in this direction may be due to the fact that, while both Pythagoras and Plato were Initiates of the Mysteries, Aristotle was never initiated and depended on logical speculation for the development of his theories. This accounts for his many divergences from the teachings of Plato, whose philosophy was based upon the wisdom of the ancient East. According to Diogenes Laertius, Aristotle fell away from his teacher while Plato was still alive, whereat Plato remarked, "Aristotle has kicked me, as foals do their mothers when they are born." While there is evidence that Aristotle never lost his high personal regard for Plato, the fact remains that in his later writings he never mentions Plato except to refute his doctrines, maintaining that the Platonic method is fatal to science.
The reason I have called this 'non-metaphysical' is that metaphysics started with Aristotle. Plato and the pythagoreans were prior to that. I suppose it is 'mystical' but the feeling I have is that they see and know something actual about reality, which we don't know. I suppose I am saying, they were spiritually enlightened, and I think they were. I am still just thinking about all this. It is an interesting idea and worth contemplating.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Thu 15 Apr, 2010 10:04 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;146422 wrote:
There is an idea that I am trying to spell out which I think is important. But before I go down the track of trying to fully elaborate it, I would like to present a brief summary of it, to see if it stands up to criticism.

Reality and Existence


I'm not going to read all 13 pages of comments before I post this but I did search through the replies for the word "nominalism" and found it to be missing. The OP Seems to be related to the nominalism vs. realism question.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Thu 15 Apr, 2010 10:16 pm
@jeeprs,
I didn't pose it in terms of realism and nominalism, although I guess it has bearing. Incidentally as a reference to my earlier post, particularly the relationships between ancient Greek and Indian philosophy, see The Shape of Ancient Thought, by Thomas McEvilly.
 
longknowledge
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 12:05 am
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;152624 wrote:
The reason I have called this 'non-metaphysical' is that metaphysics started with Aristotle.

As I've pointed out many times before, here you are confusing the label "ta meta ta fysika" (Those [writings or "Books"] after the [writings or "Books" labeled] Physics"), with the subject matter of Aristotle's "Books" labeled as such. Among the subjects dealt with by Aristotle in those "Books" (most particularly in "Book Zeta") is the concept of "Being," which is central to the branch of Philosophy currently called "Metaphysics." The concept of "Being" goes back at least to Parmenides, who engaged in what we might call "pre-Aristotelian Metaphysics."

:flowers:
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 12:36 am
@jeeprs,
well I guess you're right about that. OK it is not a non-metaphysical idea, it is a metaphysical idea. But I can't change the thread title now.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 01:20 am
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;152624 wrote:
very good. that is close to what I am thinking. I think there is a very elusive element in Plato's thought which got muddled by the Aristotlean concepts of 'substance' and 'essence'. It is this intuition of the nature of 'ratio' 'form' and 'idea', which started with Pythagoras, and by which everything is related and made comprehensible. It is as if all of the logic by which everything is related is imprinted in the fabric of the cosmos, and individual beings only exist because they manifest these underlying 'ideas' and 'archetypes' (to paraphrase pythagorism). I think this is the authentic view of the ancient philosophers. It is very hard for us to penetrate, because in our world, the individual is the sole reality.

Once you project it as 'spiritual substance' however, or try and envisage a separate realm in which these archetypes inhere - which is what I think Aristotle tried to do - then it all breaks down. These forms are transcendent, and the meaning of 'transcendent' is literally 'beyond existence'. Now I think this is why Plato spoke of noesis. I think noesis corresponds with the Indian 'Samadhi' or 'Dhyana'. It is only on that level that the forms can be apprehended because in this mode of being, the mind transcends itself. There was a remark earlier on that Plato was not a mystic. In fact he was an initiate of Orphism, while Aristotle was not. A theosophical comment on the relationship between the two: The reason I have called this 'non-metaphysical' is that metaphysics started with Aristotle. Plato and the pythagoreans were prior to that. I suppose it is 'mystical' but the feeling I have is that they see and know something actual about reality, which we don't know. I suppose I am saying, they were spiritually enlightened, and I think they were. I am still just thinking about all this. It is an interesting idea and worth contemplating.


This is factually incorrect. Metaphysics didn't "begin with Aristotle." It began with Anaximander, Anaximenes, Parmenides (who thought the universe was one Being), and the Pythagoreans--all of whom lived before Plato. The only one who might not be considered a Metaphysician would possibly be Heraclitus. But Plato united Parmenides' and Heraclitus' philosophy together into one coherent and systematic metaphysical whole.

So, on the contrary, Plato had a very substantive Metaphysics. Plato had thought the Forms had substantive changless Being, existing independently from material particulars. Aristotle thought the Forms had only inherent existence, dependent on material changing particulars. That's the distinction, but neither Plato nor Aristotle ever abandoned unchanging "ousia" (essence) possessed by all changing material particulars. Plato and Aristotle had very similar metaphysical systems, but nonetheless had partially distinct characterizations of the relationship between the unchanging perfect realm of the Forms, and the changing less-perfect being of particular objects.

In Plato's own words from the Phaedo:
Quote:

[INDENT]What about these things? Do we say that justice itself is something? Of course. And the fair and the good? Surely. Then have you ever seen any of these sorts of things with your eyes? In no way. But then have you grasped them with any other sense through the body. I am talking about all (of them), for instance about size, health, strength, in a word about the essence (ousia)
"This is the first passage in the dialogues widely agreed to introduce Forms. First, Forms are marked as auto kath auto beings, beings that are what they are in virtue of themselvesperfect and what particulars strive to be like but fall short of. Then in the Affinity Argument we discover that Forms are simple or incomposite, of one form (monoeidetic), whereas particulars are complex, divisible and of many forms. In the crucial Final Argument, Plato finally presents the hypothesis of Forms to explain coming into being and destruction, in general, i.e., change. Once Cebes accepts the hypothesis, a novel implication is announced (100c3-7)"Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy): Here is another Quote from Plato himself:
[INDENT]
Quote:
Well then, consider what then follows if you also accept my hypothesis. For it seems to me that if anything else [material particulars] is beautiful besides Beauty Itself, it is beautiful on account of nothing else than because it partakes of Beauty Itself. And I speak in the same way about everything else. Do you accept this sort of cause or explanation?[2]

[/INDENT]You seriously need to read the right sources on Plato's Metaphysics and Epistemology. For instance, Stanford again says here:

Quote:
In this passage, Plato introduces two predication relations, Being and Partaking. Understanding how Being and Partaking function to 'tie' together the various subjects and properties mentioned in his metaphysical discussions is crucial to reconstructing his metaphysics and epistemology. At first blush, it seems that there are two kinds of subjects of which properties are predicated, namely Forms and material particulars. (I exempt souls from this list). Similarly, at first blush it seems that there are Forms for every property involved in the changes afflicting material particulars.[3] For instance, since particulars, e.g. Helen of Troy, change from being not-beautiful to being beautiful, there is the Form Beauty Itself. In this passage, Plato asserts that particulars like Helen, because she is not the Form but rather is a material particular, is related to, or 'tied to' Beauty in virtue of what he calls 'partaking.' Beauty Itself, on the other hand, not being something 'other than Beauty', does not partake of Beauty-it simply is beautiful. Generalizing from what is said here about Beauty Itself, it seems that Forms inherit from the Socratic Properties their self-predicational status: Beauty is beautiful; Justice is just; Equality is equal. Partaking in Beauty makes Helen beautiful because Beauty Itself is beautiful. Call this way in which a Form is related to the property it is 'Being'. Understanding Being, the way in which Beauty is beautiful, that is, determining what it is for a Form to self-predicate, is central to understanding Plato's Theory of Forms and his middle period metaphysics.


Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 04:50 am
@jeeprs,
Actually I wonder if there is a connection here with Rupert Sheldrake's morphic fields?

 
Extrain
 
Reply Fri 16 Apr, 2010 11:51 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;152699 wrote:
Actually I wonder if there is a connection here with Rupert Sheldrake's morphic fields?



I doubt it. Aren't Jungian Archetypes mental entities?

Plato and Aristotle thought no such thing. Both of them are very explicit that Forms (i.e., essences) of things are substantively changless things existing independently of any mind. The mind, of course, has access to understanding these Forms by which it understands the changing physical world. But the world really does consist of these existing Changeless Forms independent of the mind's own private conceptions of these Forms. Hence, neither Plato nor Aristotle were Idealists, but instead, full-fledged Metaphysical Realists.

Aristotle thought physical things *gave* these forms existence--in other words, Forms had to be instantiated in physical things in order to exist. But Plato thought these Forms did not have to be instantiated in physical things in order to exist, but existed independently of any physical things.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 17 Apr, 2010 12:00 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;153101 wrote:
I doubt it. Aren't Jungian Archetypes mental entities?

Plato and Aristotle thought no such thing. Both of them are very explicit that Forms (i.e., essences) of things are substantively changless things existing independently of any mind. The mind, of course, has access to understanding these Forms by which it understands the changing physical world. But the world really does consist of these existing Changeless Forms independent of the mind's own private conceptions of these Forms. Hence, neither Plato nor Aristotle were Idealists, but instead, full-fledged Metaphysical Realists.

Aristotle thought physical things *gave* these forms existence--in other words, Forms had to be instantiated in physical things in order to exist. But Plato thought these Forms did not have to be instantiated in physical things in order to exist, but existed independently of any physical things.


Yes, Plato thought that there were walking properties without anything to instantiate them. He thought that only Red was red. Nothing else (really). He confused the "is" of identity, with the "is" of predication. (Here you can see where analytic philosophy improves on former philosophy).
 
Extrain
 
Reply Sat 17 Apr, 2010 12:32 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;153104 wrote:
Yes, Plato thought that there were walking properties without anything to instantiate them. He thought that only Red was red. Nothing else (really). He confused the "is" of identity, with the "is" of predication. (Here you can see where analytic philosophy improves on former philosophy).


Yes, I see what you're saying. But do you really think that is a fair representation of Plato? I wouldn't exactly say he confused the two logical notions of "is." He just thought there were more than two notions of "is." For instance, he thought (1) "Red is red" is an instance of self-predication not identity (and, of course, this gives rise to the dubious "Third Man" regress Aristotle pointed out). And (2) he thought that Forms had "more Being" than the world of changing objects. Perfect Being=Changless Being, for Plato. Perfect Being is not necessarily an instance of self-identity (although, of course, it is fair to think Plato also held that (3) all Forms are necessarilly self-identical, too).

I've wondered about Aristotle on this score, though. In spite of all his developments in syllogistic logic, and his metaphysical theory of instantiation being a necessary condition for the existence of properties, does his logic have anything to say about the difference between the "is" of identity and the "is" of predication? I don't think it does, but it might nevertheless be a precursor to this later development.

Actually, it seems that Aristotle's take on the "Law of Identity" resembles much of Leibniz' Law of the Indiscernability of Identicals, not strictly logical (or formal) identity.

---------- Post added 04-17-2010 at 12:34 AM ----------

Since we're on this topic, I have a question:

I know you think having properties is a necessary condition for something X to exist.

But do you think having properties is a sufficient condition? I am just thinking that we can logically quantifiy (along with a predicate) any statement concerning non-existent entites, but not necessarily be committed to their existence...The existential quantifier takes two possible roles, one would think:

(1) as revealing a necessary ontological condition for which statements we take to be true, namely, that something x exists, and that x is an F (Quine).

(2) as providing an inferential function that allows us to talk about things for which we know nothing about, or to whose alleged existence we are not necessarily committed. For instance, "Bob admires some really famous detective....Who was that again?....Oh! I remember! It was Sherlock Holmes! So, there is some thing Bob admires, namely, Sherlock Holmes."

So is quantification ever a guide in revealing to us any answers concerning deep ontological questions about what exists? Quine sure didn't think so. He only thought which statements we were willing to existentially quantify in order to be true revealed merely which entities we thought existed. But consequently, there is an existing tension between (1) and (2) I think Quine failed to appreciate.

(P.S. I understand Boolean Logic takes the (Ex) quantifier to be neutral about existential commitments, while Aristotelian logic does not. But I am asking a metaphysical question, not a logical one.)
 
 

 
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