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it's nice to know I'm not just delusional, or at least not alone in my delusion.
I don't get the constant appeal to determinism. Why are people so keen to give away their freedom?
The Buddha, Nibbana Sutta ('Total Unbinding')
.Determinists seem to think that they have a lot to lose, so they propose theories of determinism that are compatible with quantum mechanics.
I doubt anyone does that now.
What about t'Hooft? or Bohm? and amongst philosophers, presumably all of them who are determinists espouse theories of determinism that are compatible with quantum mechanics.
I suppose they would hold that there is no good reason to hold that what occurs on a micro-level significantly occurs on the macro-level.
Of course they dont. They hold the view that all micro-events are exactly specified by laws of nature in conjunction with non-local states of the world, because if micro-level events are not determined, then determinism is false.
what I wrote is that determinists believe that whatever happens on a micro-level does not matter on the macro-level so far as determinism is concerned
Determinists obviously do not believe that, because it would amount to believing that whether or not determinism is false, determinism is true.
It would amount to saying that determinism is true on the macro-level.
Which would entail that determinism is also true on the micro-scale, because determinism is all or nothing.
Why cannot it be true on a macro-scale, and not on the micro-scale if the micro does not significantly affect the macro?
Because that is not what determinism is.
Why didn't you say so in the first place?
actually, the reason I am saying it is not a metaphysical argument, is because it doesn't rely upon the idea of substance. It is based more, as you have noticed, on the emptiness view of Buddhism, and the way that things exist 'dependent on causes and conditions'.
What interests me is the way in which modern people, or scientific people (which is almost the same!), conceive of the idea of spiritual realities or forms. The idea is they must exist somewhere, in some ideal place. Then, to put it crudely, it is a short step to being able to say 'there is obviously no such place, and so there can be no such thing'. They basically reject them because they cannot conceive of such a thing. I guess, being wedded to what they understand as Naturalism, the first rule of anything is that 'we can conceive of it'. Otherwise they reject it.
Dawkins faces this problem with his conception, or misconception, of Deity. His attitude is that deity must be something more complex than that which it creates, and as the universe is obviously extremely complex, then this deity must be immensely complex indeed. What I see, with thinking of this type, is this demand that whatever deity is, first and foremost it must be something we can conceive of, or imagine. So the way he imagines it, it is hugely improbable that such a being should exist.
I can agree that no such being exists, but also observe that this is from the outset a misunderstanding of the nature of Deity. So Dawkins is spending an immense amount of effort, in effect, of proving the non-existence of something that doesn't exist.
What I am reflecting on is that I don't think there is a 'where' or 'what' when it comes to these higher levels of being. They are beyond our imagination or conception. Now of course a Christian would say, 'but Deity has revealed something of himself in the life of Jesus and the Scripture. That is how we know'. But even though that may be the case, I am still curious to know something of 'spiritual' or 'formal' realities. So what does 'knowing' comprise in this context?
The esoteric understanding is that the Platonic forms actually represent 'the formal realm' and Deity the 'causal realm' - this is part of the hierarchical ontology. But these are not actually 'realms' in the way the ordinary imagination can depict them. They are subtle realms. The way in which beings on this level both do, and do not, exist, is the subject of the Diamond Sutra.
Now these ideas are known in the various schools of what are now called the perennial philosophy, but it requires considerable subtlety of thought, or should I say cognition, to know what they mean. So the Platonic realm is, in a sense, the way cognition itself works; these forms, represented in one sense as the Archetypes, actually in-form the very way in which we interact with the world. So of course they can never be disclosed by direct inspection, as it were. Because again, they don't exist, but they cause things - in the case of the archetypes - to exist the way they do. They are like the ground of existence, not another existing thing. Any knowledge of them, and I use the term in a very qualified sense, can only arise out of 'meditative realization' as distinct from discursive thought. This is how the understanding is always taught in the traditional setting, whether Christian, Hindu, Sufi or Buddhist.
So this is a very basic misunderstanding in the modern world generally, the idea that 'spirit' is simply something that can be thought of. I suspect most people would instinctively hold a view like that. But it is a mistaken view.
We were talking about physicists and philosophers, I felt no responsibility to make the astoundingly obvious observation that "determinism" is being used as those people use it, during a dialogue about those people's attitudes to it. On the other hand, if you intended the introduction of some peculiar notion of determinism, why didn't you announce the fact?
I don't know that physicists or philosopher hold that it is not possible for determinism to be true on the macro-level, but false on the micro-level.
How do you know it?
What I am considering is that the relationship between existing things - the lawful manner in which things exists - is of a different order of reality to the things themselves. In this depiction, the material objects are given form by the lawful operations of the Universe which are of course implicit everywhere.
But putting it like this, you can see that 'the lawfulness of the universe' cannot be objectified. It is not anything in particular - it is simply the way that everything is related or comes to exist. In other words, in itself it does not exist. It is not any particular thing. Nevertheless, without it, nothing would exist. Furthermore, it underlies not only all material particulars, but also the way that the mind itself works. So again, it cannot be objectified or considered.
You may be right, it is very difficult to place your theory strictly into a field of thought which essentially deals with things or substances which are unmeasurable or undetectable. The idea of spirits is a strong idea. I would tend to believe that the platonic forms can be both in the realm of ideas and/or spirits.
I agree that there is utter confusion out there. The definition of ideas is well settled by the modern or scientific man, though. It is the definition of spirits which is in the mists. One problem being, the inability of men to encounter such entities in everyday life. I think more than naturalism, it is materialism that should get the blame, if at all it is right to do so.
I remember, from my school days, there was a poem in my local language which translated would tend to mean 'In this my hut/house'. ....Tired he comes back home. He then says and concludes that God is no where, but is everywhere, and therefore God is in his very home, from where he begun his quest at first. It could be the home or the heart even.
Yes, i think, you are right to the extent, that meditation has the proven ability to make one believe how the spiritual realm exists.
Yes the spirit cannot be conceived or thought off unless it is equated with energy, which you thought it fit to keep aside from the present discourse.
Your wilful ignorance about this, is remarkable. When something interests me, I read about it. In this case, determinism is such a simple claim, that it's no real challenge to figure out for oneself.
I can't figure out why determinism cannot be true in one area, but not in another. So I congratulate you.
Perhaps, someday, you will let me know what your argument is for that.