A Non-Metaphysical Theory

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jeeprs
 
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2010 07:54 pm
There is an idea that I am trying to spell out which I think is important. But before I go down the track of trying to fully elaborate it, I would like to present a brief summary of it, to see if it stands up to criticism.

Reality and Existence

This has got to do with the difference between between reality and existence. I am working on the idea that what is real, and what exists, are not the same. I already know this is controversial and unconventional but I will try and provide a bit more detail at this point to see if it has any future.

What I propose exists, consists mainly of objects. Objects are the kinds of things we see, from the subatomic, to the galactic, in size. (I won't list them:bigsmile:)

Now I would like to say that this category of items called 'objects' comprises 'everything that exists', or every material thing. (I suppose this leaves out a very important particular, which is energy. I will put that aside for now.)

In this definition, all existing things are compounded, or made of parts (leaving aside the constituents of atoms e.g. quarks, leptons etc). Objects are also temporal - they begin and end in time.

Now I want to consider the idea of number. I regard numbers as being a type of universal. In other words, here I am proposing some kind of mathematical realism. I believe numbers are real, although they are not real in the same way as objects are. Some refer to them as abstract objects, but I don't think there is any such thing, for reasons that will become clear. Universals also include the various attributes of an object such as roundness, red-ness and so on, as per the traditional description.

Now I don't regard numbers as existing things. They are real, but they don't exist. Instead, mathematical relations, universals, and the like, are inherent, or implicit, in the way things exist. The universe exhibits tendencies to behave a certain way - in other words, it is lawful. Lawfulness consists of predictable regularities, the tendency for certain things to happen. The Pythagorean insight that 'all is number' is profoundly true, because number describes the ratio of all things to each other.

What I am considering is that the relationship between existing things - the lawful manner in which things exists - is of a different order of reality to the things themselves. In this depiction, the material objects are given form by the lawful operations of the Universe which are of course implicit everywhere.

But putting it like this, you can see that 'the lawfulness of the universe' cannot be objectified. It is not anything in particular - it is simply the way that everything is related or comes to exist. In other words, in itself it does not exist. It is not any particular thing. Nevertheless, without it, nothing would exist. Furthermore, it underlies not only all material particulars, but also the way that the mind itself works. So again, it cannot be objectified or considered.

Universal Mind

Now in some respects, this could be understood as a theistic idea, but really it is much more like Neo-platonism. In this understanding, 'the universal mind' can be understood as the origin of this order, but this too is not something that exists. There really is no universal mind. But wherever mind exists, there is a certain way that it operates. It will always develop along certain lines and operate in certain ways, in the same way that planets go around in elliptical orbits, and so on. In other words, it is lawful. So in this way there is a universal mind - not because this or that mind is universal, but because wherever mind appears, it always operates this way. The tendecy is real, but it does not exist until it is 'instantiated' in the specific instance of this or that mind.

It seems to me that a lot of the philosophical difficulties we have in relation to the idea of 'the lawfulness of the universe' come from trying to imagine 'where' these laws exist. We can't imagine what such a 'place' would be like, of course. A lot of the problem with Platonism is wondering 'where' the forms exist. Now in this understanding, that problem is solved by the answer that 'they don't exist anywhere. They are simply the way in which things tend to exist. So they are kind of implicit within the fabric of the cosmos, but can never (of course) be apprehended'.

Now I realise this is very sketchy. It is an idea I have been working on since I joined the Forum. And it is not actually a metaphysical idea because it does not propose the idea of 'substance'. Material things all exist, but they only exist by virtue of being expressions of the law. So I will throw it out there and watch what comes back.

thanks.
 
north
 
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2010 08:03 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;146422 wrote:
There is an idea that I am trying to spell out which I think is important. But before I go down the track of trying to fully elaborate it, I would like to present a brief summary of it, to see if it stands up to criticism.

Reality and Existence

This has got to do with the difference between between reality and existence. I am working on the idea that what is real, and what exists, are not the same. I already know this is controversial and unconventional but I will try and provide a bit more detail at this point to see if it has any future.

What I propose exists, consists mainly of objects. Objects are the kinds of things we see, from the subatomic, to the galactic, in size. (I won't list them:bigsmile:)

Now I would like to say that this category of items called 'objects' comprises 'everything that exists', or every material thing. (I suppose this leaves out a very important particular, which is energy. I will put that aside for now.)

In this definition, all existing things are compounded, or made of parts (leaving aside the constituents of atoms e.g. quarks, leptons etc). Objects are also temporal - they begin and end in time.

Now I want to consider the idea of number. I regard numbers as being a type of universal. In other words, here I am proposing some kind of mathematical realism. I believe numbers are real, although they are not real in the same way as objects are. Some refer to them as abstract objects, but I don't think there is any such thing, for reasons that will become clear. Universals also include the various attributes of an object such as roundness, red-ness and so on, as per the traditional description.

Now I don't regard numbers as existing things. They are real, but they don't exist. Instead, mathematical relations, universals, and the like, are inherent, or implicit, in the way things exist. The universe exhibits tendencies to behave a certain way - in other words, it is lawful. Lawfulness consists of predictable regularities, the tendency for certain things to happen. The Pythagorean insight that 'all is number' is profoundly true, because number describes the ratio of all things to each other.

What I am considering is that the relationship between existing things - the lawful manner in which things exists - is of a different order of reality to the things themselves. In this depiction, the material objects are given form by the lawful operations of the Universe which are of course implicit everywhere.

But putting it like this, you can see that 'the lawfulness of the universe' cannot be objectified. It is not anything in particular - it is simply the way that everything is related or comes to exist. In other words, in itself it does not exist. It is not any particular thing. Nevertheless, without it, nothing would exist. Furthermore, it underlies not only all material particulars, but also the way that the mind itself works. So again, it cannot be objectified or considered.

Universal Mind

Now in some respects, this could be understood as a theistic idea, but really it is much more like Neo-platonism. In this understanding, 'the universal mind' can be understood as the origin of this order, but this too is not something that exists. There really is no universal mind. But wherever mind exists, there is a certain way that it operates. It will always develop along certain lines and operate in certain ways, in the same way that planets go around in elliptical orbits, and so on. In other words, it is lawful. So in this way there is a universal mind - not because this or that mind is universal, but because wherever mind appears, it always operates this way. The tendecy is real, but it does not exist until it is 'instantiated' in the specific instance of this or that mind.

It seems to me that a lot of the philosophical difficulties we have in relation to the idea of 'the lawfulness of the universe' come from trying to imagine 'where' these laws exist. We can't imagine what such a 'place' would be like, of course. A lot of the problem with Platonism is wondering 'where' the forms exist. Now in this understanding, that problem is solved by the answer that 'they don't exist anywhere. They are simply the way in which things tend to exist. So they are kind of implicit within the fabric of the cosmos, but can never (of course) be apprehended'.


Quote:

Now I realise this is very sketchy. It is an idea I have been working on since I joined the Forum. And it is not actually a metaphysical idea because it does not propose the idea of 'substance'. Material things all exist, but they only exist by virtue of being expressions of the law. So I will throw it out there and watch what comes back.

thanks.


so your saying that a law comes first , BEFORE material things ?

if the law becomes first , how does the " law" bring into the existence of something ?
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2010 08:06 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;146422 wrote:
The universe exhibits tendencies to behave a certain way - in other words, it is lawful. Lawfulness consists of predictable regularities, the tendency for certain things to happen. The Pythagorean insight that 'all is number' is profoundly true, because number describes the ratio of all things to each other.
There are some problems with justifying this view:
1) Solomonoff has proved that ideal predictions are uncomputable
2) if the world were determined by laws, we would be unable to test for this, or correctly interpret the result, unless, as a matter of coincidence, the laws determined that we would perform the relevant experiment and draw the correct conclusion
3) Pythagoreanism, and discrete ontologies, conflict with pretty much all physical science since, and including, Newton
4) there are chemotactic processes which can not, even in principle, be algorithmically predicted.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2010 08:22 pm
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;146426 wrote:
2) if the world were determined by laws, we would be unable to test for this, or correctly interpret the result, unless, as a matter of coincidence, the laws determined that we would perform the relevant experiment and draw the correct conclusion


Interesting. I would have thought that scientific laws are understood to be real, like Newton's laws. What am I not understanding here?
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2010 08:33 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;146433 wrote:
Interesting. I would have thought that scientific laws are understood to be real, like Newton's laws. What am I not understanding here?
If determinism is true, then it's true of everything, including all human thoughts and actions. As determinism is a global thesis, in a determined world our experiences would be mathematical consequences of the worlds global state, it would be infinitely improbable that such experiences would match an external world. What's required for interaction with the world is "cause", and cause is incompatible with determinism, because cause is irreducibly local while determinism is irreducibly global. Historically, determinism has required ad hoc hypotheses in order to be reconciled with observation, Epicurus introduced the clinamen, Newton and Leibniz appealed to god, quantum mechanics has the collapse of the wave, Zuse's thesis needs the great programmer.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2010 08:42 pm
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;146437 wrote:
If determinism is true, then it's true of everything, including all human thoughts and actions.


Is it not possible that some things are determined, and others not? I thought that chaos theory (among other things) showed that in complex systems, outcomes are unpredictable. Yet certain things are always bound to happen. You can't predict what the weather will be next Wednesday, but you can predict there will be weather.

---------- Post added 03-31-2010 at 01:43 PM ----------

north;146424 wrote:
if the law becomes first , how does the " law" bring into the existence of something ?


Yes indeed, that is the question.
 
north
 
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2010 08:47 pm
@jeeprs,
Quote:
Quote:
Originally Posted by north http://www.philosophyforum.com/images/PHBlue/buttons/viewpost.gif
if the law becomes first , how does the " law" bring into the existence of something ?

Yes indeed, that is the question.

how so ?
what law is based on nothing to begin with ?
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2010 08:54 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;146442 wrote:
Is it not possible that some things are determined, and others not?
No, determinism as understood by philosophers is a global ontological thesis, all or nothing.
jeeprs;146442 wrote:
I thought that chaos theory (among other things) showed that in complex systems, outcomes are unpredictable. Yet certain things are always bound to happen.
Amongst other things, chaos theory has been used to support the claim that determinism doesn't imply predictability, however, there is no implication from this that unpredictability implies determinism. Determinists, generally, agree that in principle a determined world is computable and as far as this is concerned, I think that appeal to chaos is hand waving. Almost all real numbers are uncomputable, so, any continuous ontology will be almost completely uncomputable. Be aware that this is a technical sense of "almost all", it means that there is at most a countable infinity of exceptions, but an uncountable infinity of conformities.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2010 08:56 pm
@jeeprs,
Thanks, ughaibu, I do appreciate the time that you have taken to comment, but I must say, I find you very hard to understand.

Also - what is so special about things being 'computable'? Is that a criteria for something?
 
north
 
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2010 09:06 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;146453 wrote:
Thanks, ughaibu, I do appreciate the time that you have taken to comment, but I must say, I find you very hard to understand.

Also - what is so special about things being 'computable'? Is that a criteria for something?


jeeprs

I also find him hard to understand

contradictions at times
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Tue 30 Mar, 2010 09:07 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;146453 wrote:
what is so special about things being 'computable'? Is that a criteria for something?
A determined world has three features:
1) at all times the world has a definite and describable state
2) there are laws of nature which are true in all times and places
3) given the state of the world at any time, the state of the world at all other times is exactly specified by the given state in conjunction with the laws of nature.
These conditions are such that, in principle, the evolution of the world can be exactly described mathematically, of course this cant actually be done, but for determinism to be true it must be the case that the world is computable in principle.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2010 03:34 am
@jeeprs,
Well Heisenberg's uncertainty principle has made short work of that idea. I am sure the idea of 'the determinate world' is a scientific myth, anyway. And even though things might be governed by a law, can't some laws be merely statistical probabilities? I mean, there is also the element of Hazard which by nature is unpredictable.

Quote:

We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.
-Pierre Simon Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities


I would have thought that quantum indeterminacy would have put an end to this idea once and for all.
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2010 06:40 am
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;146572 wrote:
though things might be governed by a law, can't some laws be merely statistical probabilities?
Some philosophers support the idea of probabilistic laws, but in any case, I dont see how such laws could be compatible with a determined world.
jeeprs;146572 wrote:
I would have thought that quantum indeterminacy would have put an end to this idea once and for all.
Determinists seem to think that they have a lot to lose, so they propose theories of determinism that are compatible with quantum mechanics.
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2010 02:45 pm
@jeeprs,
I don't get the constant appeal to determinism. Why are people so keen to give away their freedom?

Quote:
There is, monks, an unborn - unbecome - unmade - unfabricated. If there were not that unborn - unbecome - unmade - unfabricated, there would not be the case that emancipation from the born - become - made - fabricated would be discerned. But precisely because there is an unborn - unbecome - unmade - unfabricated, emancipation from the born - become - made - fabricated is discerned.


The Buddha, Nibbana Sutta ('Total Unbinding')
 
prothero
 
Reply Wed 31 Mar, 2010 10:25 pm
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;146823 wrote:
I don't get the constant appeal to determinism. Why are people so keen to give away their freedom? The Buddha, Nibbana Sutta ('Total Unbinding')
I do not think one is being irrational, or denying scientific fact or human experience in asserting that determinism is false. Determinism was a result of classical Newtonian mechanics and has been on the defensive since quantum mechanics. There are many reasons to think natural laws are stochastic probabilties not fixed and deterministic. The difference between a little freedom and no freedom is all the difference in the world.

Although materialism and mechanistic determnism are common views they are not confirmed by modern science and certainly not confirmed by human experience. The fact that the "real" world is ordered and rationally intelligible as well as mathematically expressible implies there is a higher order of "existence" than the "material" on which the "material" depends. Logos. Einstein's wise old man.

I think of Plato's forms more in the manner of certain tendencies of the world toward higher levels of order, complexity,life, mind and higher levels of experience, value and aesthetic appeal. It is not so much the world is headed towards some specific form as that the world tends toward creative advance, toward novelty and towards the actualitzation of inherent potential. Life has been nearly wiped out numerous times and come back dramatically. The same features limbs, eyes, sense perception organs, arise again and again. The world just does not look or behave like (chance and necessity) or like (blind indifference). I really suggest you look at Whiteheads notion of creativity as ultimate principle and process as ultimate reality. He was a modern interpreter of Plato.
 
Jackofalltrades phil
 
Reply Thu 8 Apr, 2010 01:38 am
@jeeprs,
Your proposition/ideas are very thought provoking.

jeeprs;146422 wrote:


Now I want to consider the idea of number. I regard numbers as being a type of universal. In other words, here I am proposing some kind of mathematical realism. I believe numbers are real, although they are not real in the same way as objects are. Some refer to them as abstract objects, but I don't think there is any such thing, for reasons that will become clear. Universals also include the various attributes of an object such as roundness, red-ness and so on, as per the traditional description.

Now I don't regard numbers as existing things. They are real, but they don't exist. Instead, mathematical relations, universals, and the like, are inherent, or implicit, in the way things exist. The universe exhibits tendencies to behave a certain way - in other words, it is lawful. Lawfulness consists of predictable regularities, the tendency for certain things to happen. The Pythagorean insight that 'all is number' is profoundly true, because number describes the ratio of all things to each other.



What you are essentially saying is when the objects exists, so also the causes exists, and since the object has 'become' somethiing perceptible, so also are the causes and conditions. This is a profound Buddhist view of the external world.

Now, the operational methods on the basis on which the causes and conditions 'play' or 'operate' is what is being described as 'laws' or principles.

If it is so, than i should say, that you have touched upon a very subtle piece of scientific, epismediological and ontological discussion, on whether 'factors' are real or not. Some argue factors are indeed real, while some say otherwise. But i think it is indisputable, that known or perceptible factors like physical things like heat, colour, mass are real as much as force such as gravity exists as real and verifiable measures.

However, out there in the physical world, there aslo exists lot of unknown factors from the anthropic angle, which makes us believe that unknown laws also exists which makes things happen. But from such a surmise, to extra polate that the unknown is real, (not the objective real, as you have well explained below, but the lawfullness you suggests) would be embarking on a speculative line of thought.

Of course, philosophically your proposition is valid. And a strong argument, i suppose.


jeeprs;146422 wrote:
What I am considering is that the relationship between existing things - the lawful manner in which things exists - is of a different order of reality to the things themselves. In this depiction, the material objects are given form by the lawful operations of the Universe which are of course implicit everywhere.

But putting it like this, you can see that 'the lawfulness of the universe' cannot be objectified. It is not anything in particular - it is simply the way that everything is related or comes to exist. In other words, in itself it does not exist. It is not any particular thing. Nevertheless, without it, nothing would exist. Furthermore, it underlies not only all material particulars, but also the way that the mind itself works. So again, it cannot be objectified or considered.

Universal Mind

Now in some respects, this could be understood as a theistic idea, but really it is much more like Neo-platonism. In this understanding, 'the universal mind' can be understood as the origin of this order, but this too is not something that exists. There really is no universal mind. But wherever mind exists, there is a certain way that it operates. It will always develop along certain lines and operate in certain ways, in the same way that planets go around in elliptical orbits, and so on. In other words, it is lawful. So in this way there is a universal mind - not because this or that mind is universal, but because wherever mind appears, it always operates this way. The tendecy is real, but it does not exist until it is 'instantiated' in the specific instance of this or that mind.

It seems to me that a lot of the philosophical difficulties we have in relation to the idea of 'the lawfulness of the universe' come from trying to imagine 'where' these laws exist. We can't imagine what such a 'place' would be like, of course. A lot of the problem with Platonism is wondering 'where' the forms exist. Now in this understanding, that problem is solved by the answer that 'they don't exist anywhere. They are simply the way in which things tend to exist. So they are kind of implicit within the fabric of the cosmos, but can never (of course) be apprehended'.

Now I realise this is very sketchy. It is an idea I have been working on since I joined the Forum. And it is not actually a metaphysical idea because it does not propose the idea of 'substance'. Material things all exist, but they only exist by virtue of being expressions of the law. So I will throw it out there and watch what comes back.

thanks.



It is meta-physical. Any speculation beyond the ambit of the physical nature of things is meta-physics. Your deductions of the (universal) laws, although vague, except the number premise, is an attempt to comprehend the unknown. This is a bold attempt. And one should appreciate your thoughts.

In a discussion of a similar nature with a dear friend of mine who is or seemed to me more scientifically inclined than me, and who have studied philosophy and theology, we could not go ahead when he proposed that ' 'zero' is a real thing. And that 'zero' exists.

He argues, in a simple manner, that if there are 5 apples, and the farmer ate all the 5 apples that what is left in the basket is 'zero' apples. He ofcourse is a simple person, and does a lot of thinking.

Now, how tenable is this mathematical argument.?
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Thu 8 Apr, 2010 02:46 am
@jeeprs,
actually, the reason I am saying it is not a metaphysical argument, is because it doesn't rely upon the idea of substance. It is based more, as you have noticed, on the emptiness view of Buddhism, and the way that things exist 'dependent on causes and conditions'. But I don't think it is strictly Buddhist, either. It is definitely partially from Western philosophy also. I think the Pythagorean tradition has an understanding of the mathematical nature of reality which is not native to the Buddhist, or for that matter Indian, outlook.

What interests me is the way in which modern people, or scientific people (which is almost the same!), conceive of the idea of spiritual realities or forms. The idea is they must exist somewhere, in some ideal place. Then, to put it crudely, it is a short step to being able to say 'there is obviously no such place, and so there can be no such thing'. They basically reject them because they cannot conceive of such a thing. I guess, being wedded to what they understand as Naturalism, the first rule of anything is that 'we can conceive of it'. Otherwise they reject it.

Dawkins faces this problem with his conception, or misconception, of Deity. His attitude is that deity must be something more complex than that which it creates, and as the universe is obviously extremely complex, then this deity must be immensely complex indeed. What I see, with thinking of this type, is this demand that whatever deity is, first and foremost it must be something we can conceive of, or imagine. So the way he imagines it, it is hugely improbable that such a being should exist.

I can agree that no such being exists, but also observe that this is from the outset a misunderstanding of the nature of Deity. So Dawkins is spending an immense amount of effort, in effect, of proving the non-existence of something that doesn't exist. Of course Terry Eagleton made the exact same point in his review of God Delusion some years back, so I won't repeat it here.

What I am reflecting on is that I don't think there is a 'where' or 'what' when it comes to these higher levels of being. They are beyond our imagination or conception. Now of course a Christian would say, 'but Deity has revealed something of himself in the life of Jesus and the Scripture. That is how we know'. But even though that may be the case, I am still curious to know something of 'spiritual' or 'formal' realities. So what does 'knowing' comprise in this context?

The esoteric understanding is that the Platonic forms actually represent 'the formal realm' and Deity the 'causal realm' - this is part of the hierarchical ontology. But these are not actually 'realms' in the way the ordinary imagination can depict them. They are subtle realms. The way in which beings on this level both do, and do not, exist, is the subject of the Diamond Sutra.

Now these ideas are known in the various schools of what are now called the perennial philosophy, but it requires considerable subtlety of thought, or should I say cognition, to know what they mean. So the Platonic realm is, in a sense, the way cognition itself works; these forms, represented in one sense as the Archetypes, actually in-form the very way in which we interact with the world. So of course they can never be disclosed by direct inspection, as it were. Because again, they don't exist, but they cause things - in the case of the archetypes - to exist the way they do. They are like the ground of existence, not another existing thing. Any knowledge of them, and I use the term in a very qualified sense, can only arise out of 'meditative realization' as distinct from discursive thought. This is how the understanding is always taught in the traditional setting, whether Christian, Hindu, Sufi or Buddhist.

So this is a very basic misunderstanding in the modern world generally, the idea that 'spirit' is simply something that can be thought of. I suspect most people would instinctively hold a view like that. But it is a mistaken view.
 
wayne
 
Reply Thu 8 Apr, 2010 03:17 am
@jeeprs,
Jeeprs,
My academic skills are very weak, but I think I'm following you here. I have ,for some time now, been thinking in terms of Deity not being able to fit it the box of human understanding. It makes sense to me that a true deity must defy knowing. Even the bible, as adulterated as I think it must be, claims that we may know god by his work. Another reference to this is that when he shows himself to whatsisname he can only look at the reflection of his light, not god himself. Solomon also makes some referenses toward this kind of understanding of god.
Am I reading you right?
 
jeeprs
 
Reply Thu 8 Apr, 2010 03:36 am
@jeeprs,
Very much so. And though I am not a practicing Christian, I don't regard the Bible as adulterated, but I think there is much misinterpretation of it, and also it is overly idolized.

The 'mystical path' aspect of Christianity is beautiful, but hardly known in the current versions of Christianity. I have only got to know it because I have sought it out. Once you start to understand 'the way unknowing' things fall into place - but it takes a lot of application to really get it. It may be simple but it is very hard to grasp too.

Have a look for a Christian classic called The Cloud of Unknowing. Beautiful and perennial piece of work.

---------- Post added 04-08-2010 at 07:37 PM ----------

Also The Teachings of Meister Eckhardt.
 
wayne
 
Reply Thu 8 Apr, 2010 04:17 am
@jeeprs,
jeeprs;149521 wrote:
Very much so. And though I am not a practicing Christian, I don't regard the Bible as adulterated, but I think there is much misinterpretation of it, and also it is overly idolized. .


I too think there is much misinterpretation of the Bible. By adulterated, I mean that sometimes the translation seems to lend toward a misinterpretation of messages. For instance, in ecclesiastes Solomon poses the question, " why should god become angry and destroy the work of your hands on account of your words" I read that as a question and ask myself, yeah why would he do that. The present context doesn't lend itself to that interpretation, although the question makes more sense in that context.

jeeprs;149521 wrote:
The 'mystical path' aspect of Christianity is beautiful, but hardly known in the current versions of Christianity. I have only got to know it because I have sought it out. Once you start to understand 'the way unknowing' things fall into place - but it takes a lot of application to really get it. It may be simple but it is very hard to grasp too..


I am very interested to know this. I also really like your idea that creativity seems like a universal law, of sorts. I have thought for a long time that creativity is the very image of god. The hard part is that no words can give description to much of it.

jeeprs;149521 wrote:
Have a look for a Christian classic called The Cloud of Unknowing. Beautiful and perennial piece of work.

---------- Post added 04-08-2010 at 07:37 PM ----------

Also The Teachings of Meister Eckhardt.


I will look into these, it's nice to know I'm not just delusional, or at least not alone in my delusion.
 
 

 
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