But God's lying is really not the point, is it. The point is whether if God knows what you will do, must you do it. The answer is no. But if the question is whether if God knows what you will do, will you do it, the answer is unquestionably, yes. The puzzling question is whether if God is certain about what you will do, must you do it.

If God is certain, then not only does He know what He does, but in addition to that, He cannot be mistaken about what He knows, but I don't see how that would imply that I must do what I will do, so to answer the puzzling question, I'd say no, it's not the case that I must do what I will do just because God is certain about what I will do.

Yes. It now seems to me that if God is certain about what I will do, then it is impossible that He should be mistaken about what I will do. But that does not imply that it is impossible that I should do differently.

If God is certain about what I will do, how is it possible that I should do differently without creating a contradiction?

This is not to say that a creative person cannot argue for the conjunction of human free-will and divine omniscience.

Exactly. I don't understand this either.

If God is certain about what I will do, I cannot choose differently than what he knows. If I choose differently than what he knows, he was not certain. And not only would he not be certain, but what he knew would have been wrong. And we're assuming God is infallible, as far as I understood this conversation.

Fast and kennethamy, please clue us in.

If I cannot, then I will not, but that I will not doesn't mean I cannot.

I can do differently, but I will not do differently, and He knows that.

To add further:



He knew what I going to do before I knew what I was going to do. One thing I did was something I had to do, and another thing I did was something that I didn't have to do but did anyway.

In the first case, He knew I was going to do it before I knew I was going to do it, and He knew that I had to do it.


In the second case, He knew I was going to do it before I knew I was going to do it, and He knew that I was going to make the choice and do it anyway.

I think I've found the root of the miscommunication between ACB and I, and you and fast:

When we say "could have done otherwise", we are meaning could have otherwise from what God knows. When you guys say "could have done otherwise", you are meaning could have done otherwise from other possibilities that you could have done, not that it is otherwise from what God knows.

I think we all agree that we don't do things because God knows, but we can only do things that God knows.

Yes. Had I done differently (which I did not) then He would have known that. But since I did what I did, He knew that was what I was going to do. God knew what I would do because that was what I was going to do. But, I did not do what I did because God knew it.

Well, yes. But that is not peculiar to God. You can do also only things that I know you will do. It is just that God knows everything you will do, and I do not. But you cannot, if I know you will do A, do other than A. If you did, I would not know that you would do A in the first place. That is how the word, "know" works. Nothing special about how it works when God knows. It is (1) impossible if A knows you will do p, for you to do other than p. But not, (2) if A knows you will do p, it is impossible that you do other than p. To infer the (2) from (1) is to commit the modal fallacy. And that is an important source of the belief that omniscience is incompatible with free will.

I don't understand what logical necessity means, I think. I do not see how if Paul has two sons, that he doesn't have to have at least one son. Wouldn't his having two sons entail that he has at least one son? Why not?

I think part of the problem is due to carelessness with tenses. I would argue that if Paul has two sons, it is true that he didn't have to have at least one son, but false that he doesn't have to have at least one son.

Either the future is predetermined (in which case I have no free will) or it is not (in which case the underlined phrase above makes no sense to me). If I am free to choose, how can there possibly exist a fact about my choice before I choose? How can facts about the future exist already if the future is still open?

To answer "Because God is omniscient about the future" would beg the question. It may be the case that future facts do not already exist, in which case God cannot be omniscient about the future. Do you see my point?

I think part of the problem is due to carelessness with tenses. I would argue that if Paul has two sons, it is true that he didn't have to have at least one son, but false that he doesn't have to have at least one son.

Oh, I see. Didn't because he didn't have to knock up his wife in the first place. But because he did in fact knock up his wife, he does have to have at least one son now (because he now has two sons). Is that what you're getting at?

That's not what they're getting at, though, I don't think. The professor here is making a point regarding 1.) Logical necessity and 2.) Contingent truths. Neither of which I really understand.

Why cannot it be a fact that the Sun will rise tomorrow (if it rises)? Of course future futures do not exist. But (as Russell points out) past futures do exist. God was (and is) omniscient about them, and is omniscient about future futures too. The future is still open, but that does not mean that what happens in the future does not happen. And God is omniscient about what happens in the future. Indeed, it may be that for Him, it is no different from being omniscient about the past.

If future futures do not exist, then logically God cannot be omniscient about them. If they form part of the totality of possible knowledge, they must exist. Even God cannot do what is logically impossible.

If it is possible to know them, then isn't it possible not to know them?