Is omniscience compatible with human freedom?

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fast
 
Reply Mon 30 Nov, 2009 09:15 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;107170 wrote:
I didn't say he was making the argument. I asked for an argument.
I noticed. I just wanted to make sure we were on the same page.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Mon 30 Nov, 2009 09:29 pm
@fast,
fast;107171 wrote:
I noticed. I just wanted to make sure we were on the same page.


Do you happen to know the argument he was referring to when he said "some have argued"?
 
fast
 
Reply Mon 30 Nov, 2009 09:34 pm
@Zetherin,
[QUOTE=Zetherin;107167]If you willed it, then you've exercised control over your choice, and you therefore have free will (as far as I understand "free will").[/QUOTE][QUOTE=Zetherin;107167]

The cause of your will matters not. Someone licking an icecream cone could cause me to will the choice to go buy an icecream cone, but this doesn't mean I didn't have the choice not to buy an icecream cone.

I use "will" here as a synonym for desire, choose, and have deliberate intention.[/QUOTE]I think it's helpful to 1) view the term, "free will" as a term in its own right and 2) not limit the analysis of the term by analyzing the words that compose the term. I say this because I think it's a mistake to think of free will as if it's a kind of will.

We do have free will, but we do not always have free will. When we speak of free will, it would not be unwise to speak about compulsion. To know whether an action is an action of our own free will, we look to see if the action is a compelled action. A compelled action is an action which the agent does not want to do, but is constrained to do, or restrained from doing.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Mon 30 Nov, 2009 09:44 pm
@kennethamy,
fast wrote:
I think it's helpful to 1) view the term, "free will" as a term in its own right and 2) not limit the analysis of the term by analyzing the words that compose the term. I say this because I think it's a mistake to think of free will as if it's a kind of will.


Then please describe how you would like to use "free will".

Quote:
We do have free will, but we do not always have free will.


I need to know what you mean by "free will" in each part of this sentence.

Quote:
To know whether an action is an action of our own free will, we look to see if the action is a compelled action. A compelled action is an action which the agent does not want to do, but is constrained to do, or restrained from doing.


I would agree with this. I would also add that involuntary actions (such as hearts beating) also have nothing to do with free will, but I'm not sure I would label them as "compelled". Would you?
 
fast
 
Reply Mon 30 Nov, 2009 09:59 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;107178 wrote:
I would agree with this. I would also add that involuntary actions (such as hearts beating) also have nothing to do with free will, but I'm not sure I would label them as "compelled". Would you?
I would not. Beating hearts are caused, not compelled.

One of the main conflicts in discussions about determinism and free will stem from the confusion between causation and compulsion, but I don't want to steer the conversation in that direction. I only touched on free will since I think it's important (and relevant) to the conversation about the compatibility of human freedom and omniscience.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Mon 30 Nov, 2009 10:49 pm
@fast,
fast;107180 wrote:
I would not. Beating hearts are caused, not compelled.

One of the main conflicts in discussions about determinism and free will stem from the confusion between causation and compulsion, but I don't want to steer the conversation in that direction. I only touched on free will since I think it's important (and relevant) to the conversation about the compatibility of human freedom and omniscience.


Not only is it relevant, I think kennethamy meant "free will" in using "human freedom".

I think what we're discussing here is central to the conversation, actually. It was what kennethamy and I were touching on right before you came, so I don't think he'd have any qualms about us proceeding.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Mon 30 Nov, 2009 11:38 pm
@kennethamy,
Man, this sort of question used to chew me up when I was a believer. Been a long time since then. Free will is a strange strange concept, really.

Unless a human could choose his motives to begin with, he's not really free, except to act on these un-chosen motives.

And if he could choose his own motives, what motives would he have to choose them in relation to?

Smile
 
Emil
 
Reply Tue 1 Dec, 2009 01:39 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;107146 wrote:
Yes. I agree. But you are right to distinguish between knowledge and certainty here. Some have argued that free will is compatible with knowledge, but not with certainty (which, presumably God has).


Epistemic certainty (and the usual interpretation) and omniscience implies modal collapse. And modal collapse implies that the usual accounts of free will are false.
 
xris
 
Reply Tue 1 Dec, 2009 06:02 am
@Emil,
Having an experience that foretold the future, i had to reevaluate my position on free will and destiny. It was uncomfortable journey, that i had to make. Its not important that you believe me but my conclusions need to be considered.

Previous to this experience I believed we had the ability to make certain choices that where influenced by our life's journey. We wrote our own destiny and the future was not written.

I think we do write our own story and although life influences our decisions we have a degree of free will. The point of life is to learn and various experiences make us understand the complexities of life. My life is near written and it is recorded. If it is possible to observe that life before it was lived, without influence, then i cant see a problem with the logic of predetermined destiny and free will being compatible.


Do you influence the ending of film by observing the film, you cant rewrite the script.The point is, if there is a god like figure he has to observe the tragedies before they happen and is powerless to intervene. I dont see god but i see spirit world that can comprehend our destiny.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 1 Dec, 2009 07:18 am
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;107150 wrote:
But whether God has absolute certainty of everything, has nothing to do with my choices leading to the determination that only he knows.

What is the argument that my having a choice is incompatible with someone being certain about my choice?


That just choosing is not enough for free will if you could not have chosen differently. If someone is under posthypnotic suggestion, he may make choices, but those choices are not up to him.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Tue 1 Dec, 2009 08:22 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;107258 wrote:
That just choosing is not enough for free will if you could not have chosen differently. If someone is under posthypnotic suggestion, he may make choices, but those choices are not up to him.


If we are to confine free will to only the times we know that we had the option to choose differently, I sense this conversation getting very difficult to continue. Do we have to be certain that we know that we had the option to choose differently, or do we simply have to know that we had the option to choose differently? The former seems impossible to ascertain, while the latter seems to be not enough, as one could indeed be mistaken about whether or not they were under the influence (they could easily be unaware).

This concept of having the choice not to is very, very strange. At first glance it appears like something I could easily understand, but after analyzing, it becomes something I don't think I can touch intellectually. It seems as though someone could argue that noone ever has free will - that one is always compelled by something, and noone ever has the choice to not choose what one chooses. We're just under the illusion that we could have chosen differently.

But I don't think that's true.

What do you think?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 1 Dec, 2009 08:33 am
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;107269 wrote:
If we are to confine free will to only the times we know that we had the option to choose differently, I sense this conversation getting very difficult to continue. Do we have to be certain that we know that we had the option to choose differently, or do we simply have to know that we had the option to choose differently? The former seems impossible to ascertain, while the latter seems to be not enough, as one could indeed be mistaken about whether or not they were under the influence (they could easily be unaware).

This concept of having the choice not to is very, very strange. At first glance it appears like something I could easily understand, but after analyzing, it becomes something I don't think I can touch intellectually. It seems as though someone could argue that noone ever has free will - that one is always compelled by something, and noone ever has the choice to not choose what one chooses. We're just under the illusion that we could have chosen differently.

But I don't think that's true.

What do you think?


But I don't confine free will only to times we know we have the option to choose different. But to when we do have such an option whether or not we know we do. Knowing we have the option is irrelevant. To argue that one is always compelled by something, one would have to use the term "compel" in a peculiar way. Suppose that someone suggests that I try a new restaurant because he liked it, and thought I would too. If I go because of that suggestion, have I been compelled to go?
 
fast
 
Reply Tue 1 Dec, 2009 08:39 am
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;107269 wrote:
It seems as though someone could argue that noone ever has free will - that one is always compelled by something, and noone ever has the choice to not choose what one chooses.

Every action has a cause, but not every action is compelled.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Tue 1 Dec, 2009 08:41 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
If I go because of that suggestion, have I been compelled to go?


I think not.

Quote:
But to when we do have such an option whether or not we know we do


I understand. But I don't see how this helps. How are we to proceed from here? How do we evaluate whether or not we had such an option? And even if we evaluated, as you note, us knowing or not doesn't matter. So, what now?

fast wrote:

Every action has a cause, but every action is compelled.


You mean, but every action is not compelled. I agree.
 
fast
 
Reply Tue 1 Dec, 2009 09:12 am
@Emil,
Emil;107219 wrote:
Epistemic certainty (and the usual interpretation) and omniscience implies modal collapse.

What is modal collapse?
 
Emil
 
Reply Tue 1 Dec, 2009 09:19 am
@fast,
fast;107279 wrote:
What is modal collapse?


This:[INDENT]Modal collapse. For all propositions, that P logically implies that P is necessary.
(∀P)(P⇒□P)
[/INDENT]Modal collapse and some other things imply the (also) counter-intuitive:[INDENT](∀P)(◊P⇒P)
[/INDENT]See my essay "Infallible knowledge, the modal fallacy and modal collapse".
 
Khethil
 
Reply Tue 1 Dec, 2009 09:42 am
@Emil,
I don't see them as incompatible at all.[INDENT]
  • Assume that theologically it's known, somewhere by some entity, all decisions I will make throughout my life based on factors that will change.


  • Also enter the assumption that such knowledge base also is aware of every decision everyone else and every other entity will make throughout their lifetimes as well.


  • Along with this entity's abilities, add ultimate knowledge of the workings of the universe; mechanically, physically, etc., in all ways - throughout all effects proportionately.

[/INDENT]Then pose the question: Did I still have the freedom to choose on my own? Sure!

In a mechanical sense as the question's been posed: I don't see them incompatible at all, as long as one's able to enter the assumptions presented above. I've always believed that we act and and react to our world in ways that - were everything known - would be predictable. This hasn't anything to do with Free Will; the choice was still made. That it was made on 'knowable'/'predictable' factors that presented a result borne of causes, doesn't really diminish that - not on its own.

Really Basic Example:[INDENT]I know my son loves Snickers, I also know that he loves Mars' Bars and Milkyway Bars. I tell him, "Son, pick out the candy you want". Is it conceivable that his father knows which he's going to select? If so, on any level, does that diminish the fact that he made the decision on his own?
[/INDENT]In any case, I don't believe there exists any omniscient presence whatsoever, although such a thing isn't beyond all possibility

Just my take, thanks
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 1 Dec, 2009 09:56 am
@fast,
fast;107279 wrote:
What is modal collapse?


Every truth is a necessary truth. (I think). Spinoza's philosophy illustrates modal collapse.
 
fast
 
Reply Tue 1 Dec, 2009 10:24 am
@Khethil,
[QUOTE=Khethil;107284]I know my son loves Snickers, I also know that he loves Mars' Bars and Milkyway Bars. I tell him, "Son, pick out the candy you want". Is it conceivable that his father knows which he's going to select? If so, on any level, does that diminish the fact that he made the decision on his own?[/quote]

You may know what decision your son will make, and supposing God exists and that he's all knowing, then He knows what decision your son will make as well, but the difference between using you as example of knowing and using God as an example of One that knows is that we are supposing that He is omniscient and that you are not. Even though you both know, with you, there is the possibility that you could be mistaken, and with God, we suppose no such possibility, so you have fallible knowledge whereas God has infallible knowledge. I cautiously presume that being all-knowing implies the impossibility of mistake making it so that He has epistemic certainty.

If God knows (and cannot be mistaken) that your son will choose Snickers, and since knowledge implies truth, then it's true that he will choose snickers. Suppose God tells you that next year on February 11th, your son will eat a snickers bar (and suppose you are forced to keep it a secret--not that that, interestingly enough, should matter). Well, we can be mighty confident that your son will do exactly as God says he will do.

Some people upon hearing that will think that because it's true will also make an error in reasoning and think that it must be true, but it's not the case that it must be true--only that it is true. That your son will choose snickers isn't to say that no other contingent possibility exists. It's just that no other possibility will be chosen.
 
Khethil
 
Reply Tue 1 Dec, 2009 11:17 am
@fast,
fast;107293 wrote:
You may know what decision your son will make, and supposing God exists and that he's all knowing, then He knows what decision your son will make as well, but the difference...


Aye, though you take my rather rough example a bit too literally, it's used to illustrate the possibility. But you're quite right, and I believe we're on the same page.

Thanks
 
 

 
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