Introduces the notion of a conceptual scheme, such that ones ontology is assumed as a part of one's conceptual scheme
One's ontology is basic to the conceptual scheme by which he interprets all experiences, even the most commonplace ones. Judged within some particular conceptual scheme - and how else is judgment possible? -an ontological statement goes without saying, standing in need of no separate justification at all.

Can you please explain to me why this is not a statement of the obvious? If a conceptual scheme involves object X, surely it automatically implies X's existence? Likewise, if a theory T is proved beyond reasonable doubt, and T involves X, then surely the existence of X is thereby proved beyond reasonable doubt also? How could this not be so?

I suppose you have not heard of scientific instrumentalism.

I suppose you have not heard of scientific instrumentalism.

Thanks! I didn't know there was a name for it. That's basically how engineers routinely operate. If the thing works, it doesn't really matter whether the theory being used corresponds to reality or not.

It points to the way that engineering feeds science.

Thanks for the link, which I have now read. I suppose the question of ontological relativity depends on how broadly or narrowly one defines 'existence'.

Would you explain what you mean? Maybe by giving an example?

Yes. In the broad sense of 'existence', any entity that features in a theory must ipso facto exist according to that theory. (And if the theory is correct, such an entity must actually exist.) For example:

Theory T explains certain observations by invoking gravity.
The word 'gravity' must have a reference.
Therefore, there is such a thing as gravity; it is the thing to which the word 'gravity' refers.
Therefore, gravity 'exists' in the broad sense.

In the narrow sense, only observable or potentially observable objects 'exist'. (But I would argue that any theoretical terms in a successful theory are ultimately reducible to 'real' (i.e. observation) terms, otherwise the theory would not work.)

Incidentally, I note in the OP that, according to Quine's view of his own conceptual scheme, redness does not exist. But according to the link on scientific instrumentalism, 'red' (on its own) is an observation term.

But, why would a theory "work" unless it corresponded to reality? Unless it was true? What else would explain why it "worked"? Suppose that by using a map you were able to go some place you wanted to get to. Why would the map be so useful unless it was correct?

Astrology works to allow a farmer to predict the spring equinox. Astrology is a kind of map: it's a solar calendar. I don't think I have to explain how the definitions of the particulars have changed. Mesopotamians of 2000 years ago were no doubt as certain of their understanding as we are. The only difference is we have perspective on them.

Today, we use models that we know aren't correct. Electronic engineering strictly relies on the particle model of the electron. We now know that the electron is both a particle and a wave. Electronic engineers know that. They don't care. The motto of the IEEE is: "Engineering: turning ideas into reality." Sit in an IEEE meeting staring at that banner for several hours... it's all philosophy.

We now have three models for understanding gravity. One that we commonly use, Newton's: gravity is a force, one that's a little more accurate at predicting gravity: Einstein's: gravity is the effect of mass on space, and a third that's still just a bun in the oven: Quantum Mechanics, which may or may not picture gravity as some sort of communication between objects.

But that is like replying to someone who says that when you observe a table, you are observing something that exists independently of your mind, by saying, "I suppose you have not heard of Idealism".

Astrology works to help farmers predict the equinox? Are you sure you don't mean astronomy? How does astrology do that?

Engineers don't use electron theory for their work, so far as I know.

But, anyway, my point is that the best explanation for a theory working is that it is true. Otherwise, why would a theory work? I am not saying that if a theory works that it is certain that it is true. There might still be a better theory. But, I am saying that truth is the best explanation of working.

Yes, and so?


iuhigujvuj

---------- Post added 10-23-2009 at 04:29 PM ----------



What about approximation of truth?

Astrology works to help farmers predict the equinox? Are you sure you don't mean astronomy? How does astrology do that?

Engineers don't use electron theory for their work, so far as I know.

But, anyway, my point is that the best explanation for a theory working is that it is true. Otherwise, why would a theory work? I am not saying that if a theory works that it is certain that it is true. There might still be a better theory. But, I am saying that truth is the best explanation of working.

Astrology and astonomy were originally the same thing. Astrology was created to allow farmers to predict the spring equinox. There was no astronomy or solar calendar before that.

Yes, electronic engineers use "electron theory" which is indistinguishable from electromagnetism. They always have. But it's true especially now that so much of electronic hardware is created at the chemical level.

They were never the same thing. Astronomy historically grew out of astrology. Astrologers happened to know some astronomical truths too. The fact that astrologers could predict that the Sun would come up in the morning, or that there would be a full moon, did not make them astronomers. Electronic engineers need not even know electron theory, anymore than civil engineers need know relativity theory. So how can they use it?

But are you defining different senses of existence, or are you giving different criteria for whether something exists? I think it is the latter. As a comparison think of the term, "round". I can determine whether something is round by sight or by feel. But that doesn't mean there are two different senses of the term "round", does it?

I don't think this comparison is quite right. Sight and feel are not different criteria of roundness; they are different methods of experiencing roundness. The criterion of roundness is the same in both cases - i.e. a stipulated degree of approximation to a particular kind of shape.

In my post, I was referring to different senses and different criteria of 'existence'. I think that 'different criteria' implies 'different senses'. Because, unlike in your roundness example, a thing may exist according to one criterion, but not exist according to another. (E.g. it may be an abstract entity.) This could not be the case if there were only one sense of existence; a properly defined sense is precise and unequivocal. Hence there must be different senses.

According to which different criteria do numbers exist or not exist. And why would you think that a criterion according to which numbers do not exist is a criterion of existence? Suppose I were to say that there are two criteria of existence; one according to which my house exists, and one according to which my house does not exist. Why would a criterion according to which my house does not exist be a criterion of existence?

Your house, being observable and tangible, exists according to any criterion of existence I can think of. But what about the following entities? (For each one I give in brackets two criteria of existence; according to the first, the entity exists, but according to the second, it does not. In each case the second criterion is a subset of the first.)

Unicorn (logical possibility; physical possibility).
Gravity (phenomenon required by a theory; directly observable phenomenon).
Number (conceivable [i.e. concrete or abstract] entity; concrete entity).

If one person says "Redness exists" and another says "Redness does not exist, but red objects do" (see the OP), they are using different criteria of existence. Likewise if one says "Numbers exist" and another says "Numbers do not exist, but countable or measurable objects do". Such different criteria are possible because the word 'existence' does not have a single, exact, agreed sense. Even if you yourself use it in only one sense, other people may differ, and there is no authority to arbitrate on the matter.