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No matter what kind of formal system you use, the same rules appear in all of the systems.
I say numbers are real regardless of whether they are perceived or not. The relationships that are expressed by numerical symbols have obtained since the moment of creation.
They are not, however, evident, until the intelligence develops to perceive them. So they don't exist in the same way that material objects exist.
---------- Post added 08-18-2009 at 10:15 PM ----------
this is why they are a problem for empirical philosophy - because they don't exist in the same way as an object, and yet they are also not simply a product of mental operations.
Some logics admit of modality, some don't.
Can we at least agree that some features (e.g. the law of non-contradiction) are common to all systems of logic, while others (e.g. modality) are not?
If this book is standard, it should be peanuts for you to explain why there is no circular reasoning.
I am still waiting for this explanation.
If the above is correct, it seems to imply that the quantity of actually existing numbers is infinite. This leads to the controversial question of whether it makes sense to talk of actual infinities.
Just like every word has its equivalent in reality, every number has its equivalent in reality
...the Idealism of the present day acquired the name of Transcendental, from the use of that term by...Kant..., who replied to the skeptical philosophy of Locke, which insisted that there was nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the experience of the senses, by showing that there was a very important class of ideas, or imperative forms, which did not come by experience, but through which experience was acquired; that these were intuitions of the mind itself; and he denominated them Transcendental forms.
Response from Peter Smith on August 13, 2009 in askphilosopher.org:
Here's a simple argument. (1) There are four prime numbers between 10 and 20. (2) But if there are four prime numbers between 10 and 20, there must be such things as prime numbers. (3) And if there are such things as prime numbers, then there must be such things as numbers. Hence, from (1) to (3) we can conclude that (4) there are such things as numbers. Hence (5) numbers exist.
Where could that simple argument be challenged? (2) and (3) look compelling, and the inference from (1), (2) and (3) to (4) is evidently valid.
So that leaves two possibilities. We can challenge the argument at the very end, and try to resist the move from (4) to (5), saying that while it is true that there are such things as numbers, it doesn't follow that numbers actually exist. This response, however, supposes that there is a distinction between there being Xs and Xs existing. But what distinction could this be?
Well, someone could use mis-use "exists" to mean something like e.g. "physically exists": and of course it doesn't follow from there being Xs that Xs physically exist. But it isn't physical existence that is in question when we ask whether numbers exist -- trivially, they aren't the kind of thing you can weigh or stub your toe on! It's granted on all sides that numbers are not physical things.
But once it is clarified that "exists" is not being used in a restrictive way to mean, e.g., physically exists it is very difficult to see what the supposed distinction is supposed to be between there being Xs and Xs existing. Certainly, few modern philosophers believe that there is such a distinction to be drawn. (In a slogan, they think that existence is indeed what is expressed by the so called existential quantifiers, 'there is', 'there are'.) So we'll set aside this challenge.
The other option is to challenge the initial assumption (1). But how can that be done? 11, 13, 17, 19 are the only prime numbers between 10 and 20, and so there are four prime numbers between 10 and 20. That's a simple truth of arithmetic, surely.
But ah, you might say, we need to distinguish: it's certainly true-according-to-arithmetic that there are four prime numbers between 10 and 20, just as it is true-according-to-the-Sherlock-Holmes-stories that Holmes lived in Baker Street. But it isn't really, unqualifiedly, true that there was a man called Holmes living there, and it isn't plain true either that there are four prime numbers between 10 and 20. And from the granted assumption that it's true-according-to-arithmetic that there are four prime numbers between 10 and 20 the most we can reasonably infer is that it should (given arithmetic is a consistent story) be true according to arithmetic that numbers exist. And that doesn't show that numbers really do exist.
This sort of "fictionalist" line that treats arithmetic claims as if claims within a story (the story of arithmetic) has its warm supporters. They will deny that numbers really exist, but at the high price of denying that arithmetical truths are plain true (a reversal, then, of the traditional philosophical ranking of mathematical truths as the most secure truths of all!). If you are not willing to pay that price, and are also not willing to play fast and loose with a supposed distinction between there being numbers and numbers existing, then the simple argument above for the conclusion that numbers exists will look rather compelling.
The whole argument is about whether what you are saying is true or not. And I don't believe it is true. I think that numbers signify a reality which is not dependent on our belief or acceptance. It is not just 'made up' nor yet a convention. Yet numbers also do not exist without being counted. That is what is special about them. It is kind of magical, really.
Well this is a version of 'correspondence theory', is it not?
There are a couple of problems with this idea though. The first is that there are absurd numbers, which obviously can't correspond with anything in reality, but which might nonetheless be correct in their own terms. IN fact there are entire realms of imaginary numbers which might be logically correct but not correspond to anything.
The second thing is that I sense a certain circularity in this argument. We use a number of objects to justify the reality of the concept of number. But then, how do we know the concept of number is accurate? Why, with reference to the number objects! It is tautological. There was a contribution hereabout the weaknesses of correspondence theory which quotes a number of sources in support of this criticism. Really it is a kind of naive realism isn't it?
The passage in red does not sit easily with the one in green (though I would not go so far as to say there is a contradiction). What exactly is the status of very large numbers that have not yet been counted? Do they have a kind of shadowy, potential existence? For the sake of clarity, I would prefer to say that at any given time there only exist (a) already counted numbers, and (b) rules for counting further numbers. Only when a number has actually been counted does it come into existence. So I basically agree with the passage in green, while being somewhat doubtful about the passage in red.
So, unlike Exebeche, whose approach I nevertheless very much appreciate, I think I am heading for 'critical idealism'.
Jeeprs hit it pretty well i think.
The quantities we describe with numbers (those objects involved) exist independently of any counting/calculating we do. But that's not to say that 'numbers' have any similiar objective existence. Numbers is a concept we made up to represent varying quantities - that's all - they're representations. Does "fast" really exist? Does "green"? Does "fat"? It's a correlation to a particular aspect of the general; in this case, the quantities involved.
These concepts, terminologies and systems we construct help to solidify ideas in our minds. To me - and I'm no expert mind you - asking "do they really exist" is a question that doesn't fit it's subject/object.
My View... thanks
Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty - a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture.
Well Bertrand Russell would agree with you there.
I think this was a major factor behind the rise of analytical philosophy, Russell, Frege, and those kinds of thinkers. But the problem is, for me, they lost the mystical element which was a crucial element in Platonism. They had no spirituality about them. I like the way that Whitehead ended up developing the ideas but have yet to read him. But from what I understand I think he is probably the best representative of philosophical idealism in the Western tradition in the 20th Century.